Missing permission checks in Jenkins Orka by MacStadium Plugin 1.31 and earlier allow attackers with Overall/Read permission to connect to an attacker-specified HTTP server using attacker-specified credentials IDs obtained through another method, capturing credentials stored in Jenkins.

CVE-2023-24433: Jenkins Security Advisory 2023-01-24

Jenkins Keycloak Authentication Plugin 2.3.0 and earlier does not invalidate the previous session on login.

CVE-2023-24456: Jenkins Security Advisory 2023-01-24

Hackers don't need a key to get past your defenses, if they can essentially teleport using RMMs, warns CISA and the NSA.

It has come to light that hackers cleverly utilized two off-the-shelf remote monitoring and management systems (RMMs) to breach multiple Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agency networks in the US last summer.

On Jan. 25, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) released a joint advisory detailing the attacks, warning the cybersecurity community about the malicious use of commercial RMM software, and offering mitigations and indicators of compromise to watch out for.

IT service providers use RMMs to remotely monitor and manage clients' networks and endpoints. But hackers can use the same software to bypass typical software control policies and authorization requirements on victim computers — as the US government found out.

**How Hackers Breached the Government With RMMs**

Last October, CISA conducted a retrospective analysis of Einstein — its intrusion detection system, deployed across FCEB agencies. The researchers found, perhaps, more than they'd bargained for.

In mid-June last year, hackers sent a phishing email to an FCEB employee's government address. The email prompted the employee to call a phone number. Calling the number prompted them to visit a malicious Web address: "myhelpcare.online."

Visiting the domain triggered the download of an executable, which then connected to a second domain, which is where two RMMs — AnyDesk and ScreenConnect (now ConnectWise Control) — came into play. The second domain didn't actually install AnyDesk and ScreenConnect clients onto the target's machine. Instead, it went backward: downloading the programs as self-contained, portable executables, configured to connect back to the threat actor's server.

Why does this matter? "Because," the authoring organizations explained, "portable executables do not require administrator privileges, they can allow execution of unapproved software even if a risk management control may be in place to audit or block the same software's installation on the network."

Having made a mockery of admin privileges and software controls, the threat actors could then use the executable "to attack other vulnerable machines within the local intranet or establish long term persistent access as a local user service."

It turns out, though, that the June compromise was merely the tip of an iceberg. Three months later, traffic was observed between a different FCEB network and a similar domain — "myhelpcare.cc" — and further analysis, the authors recalled, "identified related activity on many other FCEB networks."

Despite targeting government employees, the attackers appear to have been financially motivated. After connecting to target machines, they enticed victims to log in to their bank accounts, then "used their access through the RMM software to modify the recipient’s bank account summary," the authors wrote. "The falsely modified bank account summary showed the recipient was mistakenly refunded an excess amount of money. The actors then instructed the recipient to 'refund' this excess amount to the scam operator."

**Why Hackers Like RMMs**

Hackers have a long history of utilizing legitimate software for illegitimate ends. Most popular are red-team tools — like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit — which cyber defenders use to test their own systems but can be seamlessly applied in the same way in an adversarial context.

Even software with no obvious relationship with cybersecurity can be repurposed for evil. As just one example, North Korean hacking clusters have been observed hijacking email marketing services to send phishing lures past spam filters.

In this case, RMMs have become ubiquitous in recent years, allowing attackers who use them an easy way to hide in plain sight. More than anything, though, it's the degree of autonomy that RMMs require in order to perform their normal functions that hackers turn to their advantage.

"Many RMM systems use tools that are built into the operating system," Erich Kron, security awareness advocate at KnowBe4, explains to Dark Reading. "These, as well as purpose-built RMM tools, typically have very high levels of system access, making them very valuable to attackers."

"To add to the issue," Kron notes, "RMM tools are often excluded from security monitoring as they can trigger false positives and appear malicious and unusual when doing their legitimate work."

Added together, "it makes the activities much harder to spot as they blend in with normal computing operations," he adds. Organizations that manage to spot the difference will find further headaches in preventing malicious use of RMMs, while maintaining legitimate use of RMMs over the same systems.

It's no wonder, then, that more hackers are adopting these programs into their attack flows. In a Jan. 26 report covering their incident response findings from the fourth quarter of 2022, Cisco Talos made special note of Syncro, an RMM they encountered in nearly 30% of all engagements.

It was "a significant increase compared to previous quarters," Talos researchers explained. "Syncro was among many other remote access and management tools, including AnyDesk and SplashTop, that adversaries leveraged to establish and maintain remote access to compromised hosts."

To conclude their notice, the NSA, CISA, and MS-ISAC suggested steps that network defenders can take to combat RMM-enabled attacks, including:

*   Good hygiene and awareness around phishing,
*   Identifying remote access software on your network and whether it's only being loaded into memory,
*   Implementing controls against, and auditing for, unauthorized RMMs running as a portable executable,
*   Requiring that RMMs only ever be used over approved virtual private networks and virtual desktop interfaces, and
*   Blocking connections on common RMM ports and protocols at the network perimeter.

Federal Agencies Infested by Cyberattackers via Legit Remote Management Systems

Syncro, a remote management and monitoring tool, emerges as an increasingly common tool for adversaries.
By Caitlin Huey.
Ransomware continued to be a top threat Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) responded to this quarter, with appearances from both previously seen and newly observed ransomware families. However, IR also observed

Thursday, January 26, 2023 04:01

Syncro, a remote management and monitoring tool, emerges as an increasingly common tool for adversaries.

_By_ _Caitlin Huey__._

Ransomware continued to be a top threat Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) responded to this quarter, with appearances from both previously seen and newly observed ransomware families. However, IR also observed a significant number of cases in which post-exploitation activities occurred where the actor’s motivation could not be determined. For example, phishing campaigns, our top initial-access vector this quarter, were equally as common and featured a variety of post-exploitation activities, including command execution to perform credential harvesting, red-teaming framework deployment and remote access tooling installation.

This quarter also featured several engagements where adversaries leveraged Syncro, a legitimate and full-featured remote access platform. Syncro was among many other remote access and management tools, including AnyDesk and SplashTop, that adversaries leveraged to establish and maintain remote access to compromised hosts. The use of Syncro to support a number of operations is consistent with a key finding from the Talos’ 2022 Year in Review, which reported that adversaries are increasingly relying on dual-use tools to stay undetected in victim environments.

**Targeting**

The telecommunications sector was the most targeted this quarter, closely followed by the education and manufacturing sectors, respectively. Telecommunications was a consistently top-targeted vertical in Talos IR engagements in 2022, apart from Q3, in which organizations in the education sector were most targeted.

**Ransomware**

Talos IR observed the BlackCat (ALPHV) ransomware, a ransomware family consistently seen in incidents throughout 2022, in a few engagements this quarter. This quarter also featured Royal ransomware, which had not previously been observed in Talos IR engagements. First emerging in early 2022 as a suspected Conti rebrand, Royal has been increasingly observed in attacks since September, according to public reporting.

This quarter Talos IR responded to an incident involving Royal ransomware. The group did not start posting victim data, which has been used as a means of extortion for over 50 companies globally spanning multiple business verticals, to their Tor leaks site until September 2022. In one Royal ransomware incident, Talos IR identified the affiliate(s) using red team frameworks such as Cobalt Strike and Mimikatz, and by performing mass uninstallation of security software across the environment. Talos IR also observed both the legitimate utility PsExec executing a shell on a remote share on one host, as well as AnyDesk service’s creation for persistence. The actor also used batch script files for persistence to perform various actions such as adding admin accounts using the “net user /add” command, executing commands to boot in Safe Mode and modifying the registry.

The emergence of Royal ransomware, as a suspected rebrand of Conti, which shut down its operations in June 2022, highlights the resilience of ransomware actors following the shut down and/or rebrand of high-profile groups. Royal’s appearance in an engagement this quarter coincided with increased public reporting on a malware downloader, dubbed BatLoader, which has delivered Cobalt Strike Beacon implants that distributed Royal ransomware. Researchers identified several attributes within the BatLoader attack chain that are similar to activity linked to Conti. The overlaps between the two include shared indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) such as the use of the Atera agent for remote access, as well as an IP address used by Conti affiliates in a campaign leveraging Log4j. While the exact relationship between Conti and BatLoader is still unknown, this nexus may suggest BatLoader’s potential for adoption by multiple ransomware operators/affiliates. Additionally, BatLoader’s incorporation of Royal as a primary ransomware payload likely indicates Royal rising in prominence as operators look to incorporate new threats and techniques to carry out financially motivated operations that will help them remain effective.

**Adversaries increasingly relying on Syncro**

Talos IR observed the Syncro remote management and monitoring (RMM) tool used in nearly 30 percent of engagements, a significant increase compared to previous quarters. Syncro is a commercially available RMM solution that advertises remote desktop access, remote registry editor, remote event viewer and more. Talos IR observed Syncro used as part of attack chains supporting multiple threats this quarter, including BatLoader. Syncro was also distributed in phishing campaigns to gain access to newly-compromised accounts. While the reason for Syncro’s increased usage is unknown, its use as a full-featured remote access platform for managed service providers (MSPs) and its ubiquity across enterprise environments likely makes it an attractive option.

First discovered in February 2022, BatLoader uses legitimate tools, like Syncro and the Atera remote access software, to maintain access to infected systems. Since October 2022, Talos has observed a general uptick in our endpoint telemetry and Talos IR investigations associated with BatLoader, which deploys a variety of secondary malware payloads including the Vidar information stealer and the commodity loader Ursnif/Gozi. In one BatLoader engagement, the initial access vector relied on phishing and/or search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning to lure users to download the malware from attacker-created websites. This is consistent with public reporting on typical BatLoader infections. After initial access was established, the BatLoader infection chain leveraged multiple PowerShell and batch scripts to download tools and components needed for subsequent stages of the attack.

In another incident, Talos IR identified legitimate accounts sending phishing emails with email subjects that translated from Arabic to “Staff Promotion.” The emails contained OneDrive and OneHub phishing links with a compressed Microsoft Windows Installer (MSI) file that would install Syncro. The adversary attempted to use Syncro to stay connected to the targeted user’s workstation. During analysis of the MSI file, multiple Syncro services were installed, including SyncroRecovery (SyncroLive) and SyncroOvermind. The adversary’s tactics appeared to focus on maintaining initial access through installation of Syncro. The lack of two-factor authentication (2FA) for email access allowed the adversary to perform phishing attacks, highlighting the need to ensure multi-factor authentication (MFA) across all critical assets.

Talos IR also observed Syncro installed as part of post-compromise behavior after successful phishing attacks established initial access. In a Qakbot engagement, a phishing email contained a malicious password-protected ZIP file that, when opened, contained an ISO file detected as Qakbot. The adversary was able to crack a weak password for a service account, then used the compromised account to deploy installers for remote access tools Syncro and SplashTop. Active Directory (AD) mapping tools such as ADFind and SharpHound were also identified when a compromised host attempted to access “SharpHound.exe” in the Downloads folder. Shortly after, the adversary created a new folder for the purpose of placing and staging additional tooling.

**Initial vectors**

This quarter, nearly 40 percent of engagements featured phishing emails used as a means to establish initial access, followed by user execution of a malicious document or link. In many engagements, valid accounts and/or accounts with weak passwords also helped facilitate initial access whereby the adversary leveraged compromised credentials. It is important to note that for the majority of incidents, Talos IR could not reasonably determine the initial vector because of logging deficiencies or a lack of visibility into the affected environment.

Talos IR continues to observe threats consistently seen across quarters, including attempts to take advantage of weaknesses or vulnerabilities in public-facing applications. In one engagement, the adversary entered the environment through an exposed Microsoft Remote Desktop Services (RDS) web application. After gaining access, the adversary took over service accounts via a successful Kerberoasting attack. Talos IR identified several script files that contained credentials for various user accounts, many of which had been hard-coded into the scripts themselves. ZIP files were also created shortly after the scripts, suggesting possible data staging activity. Talos IR believes the adversary was able to enter the environment using stolen credentials obtained through a previous phishing campaign against a user account, highlighting the need for user training and password reset policies, especially following suspected phishing attacks.

**Security weaknesses**

Lack of MFA remains one of the biggest impediments for enterprise security. Nearly 30 percent of engagements either had no MFA or only had it enabled on a handful of accounts and critical services. Talos IR frequently observes ransomware and phishing incidents that could have been prevented if MFA had been properly enabled on critical services, such as endpoint detection response (EDR) solutions or VPNs. To help minimize initial access vectors, Talos IR recommends disabling VPN access for all accounts that are not using two-factor authentication.

In all of the ransomware engagements that closed out this quarter, PsExec was used to facilitate lateral movement or execute the final ransomware executable. Talos IR recommends that organizations disable PsExec, as well as access to administrative shares, to limit lateral movement. Additionally, organizations should consider use of Microsoft AppLocker to block tools and files that have been consistently leveraged by adversaries. This helps to create another layer of enforcement for any known malicious or often-misused files.

**Top-observed MITRE ATT&CK techniques**

The table below represents the MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed in this quarter’s Talos IR engagement. Given that some techniques can fall under multiple tactics, we grouped them under the most relevant tactic in which they were leveraged. Please note, this is not an exhaustive list.

Key findings from the MITRE ATT&CK appendix include:

*   Legitimate remote access and management software, such as AnyDesk and TeamViewer, were leveraged in over 35 percent of engagements this quarter.
*   In every ransomware engagement this quarter, PsExec was used to facilitate lateral movement or execute the ransomware executable.
*   Phishing emails with malicious links and/or attachments were the top initial access vector this quarter, seen in nearly 40 percent of engagements. User execution of a malicious file or link would subsequently lead to a variety of malicious threats, including execution of commodity malware such as Qakbot.

Tactic 

Technique 

Example 

Initial Access (TA0001) 

T1078 Valid Accounts  

Adversary leveraged stolen or compromised credentials  

Reconnaissance (TA0043) 

T1592 Gather Victim Host Information 

Text file contains details about host 

Persistence (TA0003) 

T1136 Create Account 

Created a user to add to the local administrator’s group 

Execution (TA0002) 

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell  

Executes PowerShell code to retrieve information about the client's Active Directory environment 

Discovery (TA0007) 

T1046 Network Service Scanning   

Use a network or port scanner utility  

Credential Access (TA0006) 

T1003 OS Credential Dumping 

Deploy Mimikatz and publicly available password lookup utilities 

Privilege Escalation (TA0004)  

T1484 Domain Policy Modification   

Modify GPOs to execute malicious files  

Lateral Movement (TA0008) 

T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol  

Adversary made attempts to move laterally using Windows Remote Desktop 

Defense Evasion (TA0005) 

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information 

Use base64-encoded PowerShell scripts 

Command and Control (TA0011) 

T1219 Remote Access Software   

Remote access tools found on the compromised system   

Impact (TA0040) 

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact  

Deploy Hive ransomware and encrypt critical systems 

Exfiltration (TA0010) 

T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol  

Use WinSCP for potential exfiltration of system information   

Collection (TA0009) 

T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility  

Adversary leveraged xcopy on Windows to copy files  

Software/Tool 

S0002 Mimikatz 

Use Mimikatz to obtain account logins and passwords

Quarterly Report: Incident Response Trends in Q4 2022

By Habiba Rashid
Although the company did not put out an official notice or announcement on its website, impacted customers were emailed with details regarding the security incident.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Sophisticated SMS Phishing scam Dupes Zendesk Staff

Zendesk states that, as a result of the hack, threat actors had access to unstructured data from a logging platform for a month between September 25th and October 26th, 2022.

On October 25, 2022, Zendesk, a customer service solutions provider, had its security compromised resulting from a sophisticated **SMS phishing** campaign targeted at its employees.

As a result of the employees’ account credentials being compromised, the threat actor had access to unstructured data from a logging platform for a month between September 25th and October 26th, 2022.

Although the company did not put out an official notice or announcement on its website, impacted customers were emailed with details regarding the security incident.

Coinigy, a virtual wallet services provider, was among those affected and, therefore, received an email from Zendesk support on January 13, 2023. **Coinigy’s post** regarding the compromise explained that they felt the need to disclose it to their customers and made the email sent by Zendesk public.

“Zendesk determined that Service Data belonging to your coiningy.zendesk.com account may have been in the (exposed) unstructured logging platform data,” the email from Zendesk explained. “There is no evidence suggesting the threat actor accessed the Zendesk instance of your coiningy.zendesk.com account at any time.”

Although Coinigy was informed of the incident in January 2023, it appears that Zendesk notified other victims much earlier. Kraken, a Bitcoin and cryptocurrency exchange, informed its customers **about the Zendesk breach** as far back as November. 

Kraken stated that the attackers viewed the content of support tickets, which included information such as names, email addresses, dates of birth, and phone numbers. The exchange further added that accounts and funds were not at risk. 

1.  How to Teach Your Employees About Cybersecurity
2.  4 Ways For Employees To Distinguish Phishing Attacks
3.  Twilio Breached After Employee Accounts compromise
4.  Cisco Breached After Employee’s Google Account Hack
5.  Shopify Suffered Data Breach due to “Rogue” Employees

I’m a student and cybersecurity writer. On a random Sunday, I am likely to be figuring out life and reading Kafka.

Sophisticated SMS Phishing scam Dupes Zendesk Staff

Respondents indicate organizations are unprepared to handle cyberwarfare, there's no one-size-fits-all response to ransomware, and cybersecurity spending is on the rise.

**SAN** **FRANCISCO** **,** **Jan.** **24**, **2023** **/PRNewswire/ --** Armis, the leading asset visibility and security company, today announced the Armis State of Cyberwarfare and Trends Report: 2022-2023, which highlights global IT and security professionals' sentiment on cyberwarfare. The study shares sentiment from more than 6,000 global respondents across multiple industries, including healthcare, critical infrastructure, retail, supply chain and logistics, and more.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has not only tragically upended the lives of countless people in a sovereign nation, but it is also causing geopolitical shockwaves of cyberwarfare that will reverberate for the foreseeable future. Today's targets extend well beyond the higher levels of the opposition governments; any organization is a potential victim, with critical infrastructure and high-value entities at the top of the list.

"Cyberwarfare is the future of terrorism on steroids, providing a cost-effective and asymmetric method of attack, which requires constant vigilance and expenditure to defend against," said Nadir Izrael, CTO and Co-founder of Armis. "Clandestine cyberwarfare is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. We now see brazen cyberattacks by nation-states, often with the intent to gather intelligence, disrupt operations, or outright destroy data. Based on these trends, all organizations should consider themselves possible targets for cyberwarfare attacks and secure their assets accordingly."

Key global findings from the Armis State of Cyberwarfare and Trends Report: 2022-2023 include:

*   One-third (33%) of global organizations are not taking the threat of cyberwarfare seriously, identifying as indifferent or unconcerned about the impact of cyberwarfare on their organization as a whole, leaving room for security gaps.
*   Nearly a quarter of global organizations (24%) feel underprepared to handle cyberwarfare. Even still, the lowest-ranking security element in the eyes of IT professionals is preventing nation-state attacks (22%).
*   Over 3 in 5 (64%) IT and security professionals surveyed agree with the statement, 'The war in Ukraine has created a greater threat of cyberwarfare.'
*   Over half (54%) of professionals who are the sole decision maker for IT security said they experienced more threat activity on their network between May 2022 and October 2022 when compared to the six months prior.
*   Over half (55%) of IT professionals surveyed agree with the statement, 'My organization has stalled or stopped digital transformation projects due to the threat of cyberwarfare.' This percentage is even higher in specific countries, including Australia (79%), the U.S. (67%), Singapore (63%), the UK (57%), and Denmark (56%). 
*   When asked about their organization's policy on paying ransoms in the event of a ransomware attack, IT professionals globally were divided in their responses. Twenty-four percent of respondents indicated their organization always pays, 31% said their organization only pays when customer data is at risk, 26% said the organization never pays, and 19% indicated that it depends.
*   Just over three-quarters (76%) of IT professionals surveyed agree that the boards of directors are changing their organization's culture towards cybersecurity in response to the threat of cyberwarfare.
*   Almost 4 in 5 (78%) IT professionals surveyed said, when thinking about recent and ongoing sudden global events (such as the pandemic, Ukraine conflict, etc.), it's likely that their company invests more of its budget into cybersecurity, with nearly 2 in 5 (37%) who think it's very likely.

Proprietary data from the Armis Asset Intelligence and Security Platform collected from June 1, 2022 through November 30, 2022 confirmed the aforementioned trends haven't slowed, only worsened. Threat activity against the global Armis customer base increased by 15% from September to November when compared to the three months prior. Further, Armis identified the largest percentage of threat activity against critical infrastructure organizations, with healthcare organizations the second most targeted when compared to various industries.

In addition to the key global findings from the report and complimentary proprietary data from the Armis platform, Armis zoomed in on regional trends with unique country-by-country analysis within breakout reports for the U.S., UK, France, DACH (Austria, Germany, Switzerland), Iberia, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and APJ (Australia, Japan, Singapore).

For further information on the Armis State of Cyberwarfare and Trends Report: 2022-2023, please visit: https://www.armis.com/cyberwarfare/

**Methodology**

Armis surveyed 6,021 IT and security professionals in firms with more than one hundred employees across the U.S., UK, France, DACH (Austria, Germany, Switzerland), Iberia, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and APJ (Australia, Japan, Singapore). Those findings were gathered between September 22, 2022 and October 5, 2022 and depict the state of cyberwarfare globally across various regions and industries.

**About Armis**

Armis, the leading asset visibility and security company, provides the industry's first unified asset intelligence platform designed to address the new extended attack surface that connected assets create. Fortune 100 companies trust our real-time and continuous protection to see with full context all managed, unmanaged assets across IT, cloud, IoT devices, medical devices (IoMT), operational technology (OT), industrial control systems (ICS), and 5G. Armis provides passive cyber asset management, risk management, and automated enforcement. Armis is a privately held company and headquartered in California.

Armis State of Cyberwarfare and Trends Report: 2022-2023 Highlights Global IT and Security Professionals' Sentiment on Cyberwarfare

Apple Security Advisory 2023-01-23-6 - macOS Big Sur 11.7.3 addresses buffer overflow, bypass, and code execution vulnerabilities.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-01-23-6 macOS Big Sur 11.7.3

macOS Big Sur 11.7.3 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/HT213603.

AppleMobileFileIntegrity  
Available for: macOS Big Sur  
Impact: An app may be able to access user-sensitive data  
Description: This issue was addressed by enabling hardened runtime.  
CVE-2023-23499: Wojciech Reguła (@_r3ggi) of SecuRing  
(wojciechregula.blog)

curl  
Available for: macOS Big Sur  
Impact: Multiple issues in curl  
Description: Multiple issues were addressed by updating to curl  
version 7.85.0.  
CVE-2022-35252

dcerpc  
Available for: macOS Big Sur  
Impact: Mounting a maliciously crafted Samba network share may lead  
to arbitrary code execution  
Description: A buffer overflow issue was addressed with improved  
memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23513: Dimitrios Tatsis and Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco  
Talos

PackageKit  
Available for: macOS Big Sur  
Impact: An app may be able to gain root privileges  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-23497: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

Screen Time  
Available for: macOS Big Sur  
Impact: An app may be able to access information about a user’s  
contacts  
Description: A privacy issue was addressed with improved private data  
redaction for log entries.  
CVE-2023-23505: Wojciech Reguła of SecuRing (wojciechregula.blog)

WebKit  
Available for: macOS Big Sur  
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
WebKit Bugzilla: 248268  
CVE-2023-23518: YeongHyeon Choi (@hyeon101010), Hyeon Park  
(@tree_segment), SeOk JEON (@_seokjeon), YoungSung Ahn (@_ZeroSung),  
JunSeo Bae (@snakebjs0107), Dohyun Lee (@l33d0hyun) of Team ApplePIE  
WebKit Bugzilla: 248268  
CVE-2023-23517: YeongHyeon Choi (@hyeon101010), Hyeon Park  
(@tree_segment), SeOk JEON (@_seokjeon), YoungSung Ahn (@_ZeroSung),  
JunSeo Bae (@snakebjs0107), Dohyun Lee (@l33d0hyun) of Team ApplePIE

Windows Installer  
Available for: macOS Big Sur  
Impact: An app may be able to bypass Privacy preferences  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23508: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

macOS Big Sur 11.7.3 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or  
Apple's Software Downloads web site:  
https://support.apple.com/downloads/  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates  
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 2023-01-23-6

Apple Security Advisory 2023-01-23-5 - macOS Monterey 12.6.3 addresses buffer overflow, bypass, code execution, and information leakage vulnerabilities.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-01-23-5 macOS Monterey 12.6.3

macOS Monterey 12.6.3 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/HT213604.

AppleMobileFileIntegrity  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to access user-sensitive data  
Description: This issue was addressed by enabling hardened runtime.  
CVE-2023-23499: Wojciech Reguła (@_r3ggi) of SecuRing  
(wojciechregula.blog)

curl  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: Multiple issues in curl  
Description: Multiple issues were addressed by updating to curl  
version 7.86.0.  
CVE-2022-42915  
CVE-2022-42916  
CVE-2022-32221  
CVE-2022-35260

curl  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: Multiple issues in curl  
Description: Multiple issues were addressed by updating to curl  
version 7.85.0.  
CVE-2022-35252

dcerpc  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: Mounting a maliciously crafted Samba network share may lead  
to arbitrary code execution  
Description: A buffer overflow issue was addressed with improved  
memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23513: Dimitrios Tatsis and Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco  
Talos

DiskArbitration  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An encrypted volume may be unmounted and remounted by a  
different user without prompting for the password  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-23493: Oliver Norpoth (@norpoth) of KLIXX GmbH (klixx.com)

DriverKit  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel  
privileges  
Description: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved  
checks.  
CVE-2022-32915: Tommy Muir (@Muirey03)

Intel Graphics Driver  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel  
privileges  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved bounds checks.  
CVE-2023-23507: an anonymous researcher

Kernel  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel  
privileges  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23504: Adam Doupé of ASU SEFCOM

Kernel  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to determine kernel memory layout  
Description: An information disclosure issue was addressed by  
removing the vulnerable code.  
CVE-2023-23502: Pan ZhenPeng (@Peterpan0927) of STAR Labs SG Pte.  
Ltd. (@starlabs_sg)

PackageKit  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to gain root privileges  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-23497: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

Screen Time  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to access information about a user’s  
contacts  
Description: A privacy issue was addressed with improved private data  
redaction for log entries.  
CVE-2023-23505: Wojciech Regula of SecuRing (wojciechregula.blog)

Weather  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to bypass Privacy preferences  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23511: Wojciech Regula of SecuRing (wojciechregula.blog), an  
anonymous researcher

WebKit  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
WebKit Bugzilla: 248268  
CVE-2023-23518: YeongHyeon Choi (@hyeon101010), Hyeon Park  
(@tree_segment), SeOk JEON (@_seokjeon), YoungSung Ahn (@_ZeroSung),  
JunSeo Bae (@snakebjs0107), Dohyun Lee (@l33d0hyun) of Team ApplePIE  
WebKit Bugzilla: 248268  
CVE-2023-23517: YeongHyeon Choi (@hyeon101010), Hyeon Park  
(@tree_segment), SeOk JEON (@_seokjeon), YoungSung Ahn (@_ZeroSung),  
JunSeo Bae (@snakebjs0107), Dohyun Lee (@l33d0hyun) of Team ApplePIE

Windows Installer  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to bypass Privacy preferences  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23508: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

Additional recognition

Kernel  
We would like to acknowledge Nick Stenning of Replicate for their  
assistance.

macOS Monterey 12.6.3 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or  
Apple's Software Downloads web site:  
https://support.apple.com/downloads/  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates  
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 2023-01-23-5

Apple Security Advisory 2023-01-23-4 - macOS Ventura 13.2 addresses buffer overflow, bypass, code execution, information leakage, and use-after-free vulnerabilities.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-01-23-4 macOS Ventura 13.2

macOS Ventura 13.2 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/HT213605.

AppleMobileFileIntegrity  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to access user-sensitive data  
Description: This issue was addressed by enabling hardened runtime.  
CVE-2023-23499: Wojciech Reguła (@_r3ggi) of SecuRing  
(wojciechregula.blog)

curl  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Multiple issues in curl  
Description: Multiple issues were addressed by updating to curl  
version 7.86.0.  
CVE-2022-42915  
CVE-2022-42916  
CVE-2022-32221  
CVE-2022-35260

dcerpc  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Mounting a maliciously crafted Samba network share may lead  
to arbitrary code execution  
Description: A buffer overflow issue was addressed with improved  
memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23513: Dimitrios Tatsis and Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco  
Talos

DiskArbitration  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An encrypted volume may be unmounted and remounted by a  
different user without prompting for the password  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-23493: Oliver Norpoth (@norpoth) of KLIXX GmbH (klixx.com)

ImageIO  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Processing an image may lead to a denial-of-service  
Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved  
state management.  
CVE-2023-23519: Yiğit Can YILMAZ (@yilmazcanyigit)

Intel Graphics Driver  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel  
privileges  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved bounds checks.  
CVE-2023-23507: an anonymous researcher

Kernel  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to leak sensitive kernel state  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23500: Pan ZhenPeng (@Peterpan0927) of STAR Labs SG Pte.  
Ltd. (@starlabs_sg)

Kernel  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to determine kernel memory layout  
Description: An information disclosure issue was addressed by  
removing the vulnerable code.  
CVE-2023-23502: Pan ZhenPeng (@Peterpan0927) of STAR Labs SG Pte.  
Ltd. (@starlabs_sg)

Kernel  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel  
privileges  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23504: Adam Doupé of ASU SEFCOM

libxpc  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to access user-sensitive data  
Description: A permissions issue was addressed with improved  
validation.  
CVE-2023-23506: Guilherme Rambo of Best Buddy Apps (rambo.codes)

Mail Drafts  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: The quoted original message may be selected from the wrong  
email when forwarding an email from an Exchange account  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-23498: an anonymous researcher

Maps  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to bypass Privacy preferences  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-23503: an anonymous researcher

PackageKit  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to gain root privileges  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-23497: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

Safari  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to access a user’s Safari history  
Description: A permissions issue was addressed with improved  
validation.  
CVE-2023-23510: Guilherme Rambo of Best Buddy Apps (rambo.codes)

Safari  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Visiting a website may lead to an app denial-of-service  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved handling of  
caches.  
CVE-2023-23512: Adriatik Raci

Screen Time  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to access information about a user’s  
contacts  
Description: A privacy issue was addressed with improved private data  
redaction for log entries.  
CVE-2023-23505: Wojciech Reguła of SecuRing (wojciechregula.blog)

Vim  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Multiple issues in Vim  
Description: A use after free issue was addressed with improved  
memory management.  
CVE-2022-3705

Weather  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to bypass Privacy preferences  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23511: Wojciech Regula of SecuRing (wojciechregula.blog), an  
anonymous researcher

WebKit  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.  
WebKit Bugzilla: 245464  
CVE-2023-23496: ChengGang Wu, Yan Kang, YuHao Hu, Yue Sun, Jiming  
Wang, JiKai Ren and Hang Shu of Institute of Computing Technology,  
Chinese Academy of Sciences

WebKit  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
WebKit Bugzilla: 248268  
CVE-2023-23518: YeongHyeon Choi (@hyeon101010), Hyeon Park  
(@tree_segment), SeOk JEON (@_seokjeon), YoungSung Ahn (@_ZeroSung),  
JunSeo Bae (@snakebjs0107), Dohyun Lee (@l33d0hyun) of Team ApplePIE  
WebKit Bugzilla: 248268  
CVE-2023-23517: YeongHyeon Choi (@hyeon101010), Hyeon Park  
(@tree_segment), SeOk JEON (@_seokjeon), YoungSung Ahn (@_ZeroSung),  
JunSeo Bae (@snakebjs0107), Dohyun Lee (@l33d0hyun) of Team ApplePIE

Wi-Fi  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to disclose kernel memory  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23501: Pan ZhenPeng (@Peterpan0927) of STAR Labs SG Pte.  
Ltd. (@starlabs_sg)

Windows Installer  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to bypass Privacy preferences  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-23508: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

Additional recognition

Bluetooth  
We would like to acknowledge an anonymous researcher for their  
assistance.

Kernel  
We would like to acknowledge Nick Stenning of Replicate for their  
assistance.

Shortcuts  
We would like to acknowledge Baibhav Anand Jha from ReconWithMe and  
Cristian Dinca of Tudor Vianu National High School of Computer  
Science, Romania for their assistance.

WebKit  
We would like to acknowledge Eliya Stein of Confiant for their  
assistance.

macOS Ventura 13.2 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or Apple's  
Software Downloads web site: https://support.apple.com/downloads/  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates  
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 2023-01-23-4

The company will block the configuration files, which interact with Web applications — since threat actors increasingly use the capability to install malicious code.

Microsoft plans to add a feature to Office Excel that will make it harder for cyberattackers to exploit the spreadsheet application's "add-ins" function to run malicious code on a victim's computer.

And while it's a welcome development, Microsoft's countermeasure is just the latest go-around in the cat-and-mouse game going on between major software makers and cyberattackers, researchers say.

**Microsoft Takes Aim at XLLs **

In an update to its Microsoft 365 road map last week, the company stated that it is currently "implementing measures to block XLL \[add-in files\] coming from the internet," with a goal to have the feature in general availability sometime in March. 

Excel add-in files are designated with the XLL file extension. They provide a way to use third-party tools and functions in Microsoft Excel that aren't natively part of the software; they're similar to dynamic link libraries (DLLs) but with specific features for Excel spreadsheets. For cyberattackers, they offer a way to read and write data within spreadsheets, add custom functions, and interact with Excel objects across platforms, Vanja Svajcer, a researcher with Cisco's Talos group, said in a December analysis.

And indeed, attackers started experimenting with XLLs in 2017, with more widespread usage coming after the technique became part of common malware frameworks, such as Dridex. The add-in functionality has become increasingly popular with attackers since then; in fact, according to an Arctic Wolf report from early 2022, the use of XLL files increased nearly 600% in 2021.

One of the reasons for that is because Microsoft Office does not block the feature but raises a dialogue box instead, a common approach that Microsoft has taken in the past, Svajcer wrote: "Before an XLL file is loaded, Excel displays a warning about the possibility of malicious code being included. Unfortunately, this protection technique is often ineffective as a protection against the malicious code, as many users tend to disregard the warning."

That could be an issue even after blocking is in place, Mike Parkin, senior technical engineer at Vulcan Cyber, tells Dark Reading.

"Unfortunately, it's unclear at this point whether it's just going to be a warning that users can easily click through, a more proactive 'off by default' setting, or whether they are going to disable it entirely for XLL files downloaded from the Internet," he notes.

**Staying Ahead of the Cyberattackers?**

For more than two decades, cybersecurity firms have sought to strip out potential avenues for malicious scripts in common files types — such as Office formats or PDF files — but attackers have always adapted. 

For instance, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and Excel 4.0 macros both became so popular over the past five years for malware delivery that Microsoft blocked Office macros by default in the summer of 2022, disallowing macros from running when they have been assigned a Mark of the Web (MotW) tag, which indicates that the document came from the Internet.

Following that decision, threat actors began incorporating Shell Link (LNK) files as payloads for a number of malware families, with their use peaking in October with a spike in usage by the operators behind Qakbot, according to an analysis this week by researchers in Cisco's Talos intelligence group.

And LNK files aren't the only file type that's becoming a more popular way to hide malicious code in the wake of blocking macros. In the third quarter of 2022, for example, zip archives and HTML files became the most common file types for malware delivery, with 44% of malware files hidden in archives, according to the third quarter "HP Wolf Security Threat Insights Report." 

Even if these alternative approaches are not as efficient or powerful, attackers will have to adopt them to continue to successfully compromise victim's systems, because companies are hardening their products against more common attack techniques, Dave Storie, an adversarial collaboration engineer at cybersecurity-services firm Lares Consulting, said in a statement sent to Dark Reading.

"When organizations like Microsoft reduce the attack surface or otherwise increase the effort required to execute an attack on their product offerings, it forces threat actors to explore alternate avenues," he said. "This often leads to exploring previously known, perhaps less ideal, options for threat actors to achieve their objectives."

Tag

#cisco