#dos

View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 4.1 ATTENTION: Low attack complexity Vendor: Mitsubishi Electric Iconics Digital Solutions, Mitsubishi Electric Equipment: ICONICS Product Suite and Mitsubishi Electric MC Works64 Vulnerability: Windows Shortcut Following (.LNK) 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in information tampering. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS The following versions of ICONICS Product Suite and Mitsubishi Electric MC Works64 are affected: GENESIS64: All versions GENESIS: Version 11.00 Mitsubishi Electric MC Works64: All versions 3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW 3.2.1 Windows Shortcut Following (.LNK) CWE-64 An information tampering vulnerability due to Windows Shortcut Following exists in multiple processes in GENESIS64, MC Works64, and GENESIS. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system to exploit this vulnerability. By creating a symbolic link, an attacker can cause the p...

A prototype pollution vulnerability in `js-toml` allows a remote attacker to add or modify properties of the global `Object.prototype` by parsing a maliciously crafted TOML input. ### Impact The `js-toml` library is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. When parsing a TOML string containing the specially crafted key `__proto__`, an attacker can add or modify properties on the global `Object.prototype`. While the `js-toml` library itself does not contain known vulnerable "gadgets", this can lead to severe security vulnerabilities in applications that use the library. For example, if the consuming application checks for the existence of a property for authorization purposes (e.g., `user.isAdmin`), this vulnerability could be escalated to an authentication bypass. Other potential impacts in the application include Denial of Service (DoS) or, in some cases, Remote Code Execution (RCE), depending on the application's logic and dependencies. Any application that uses an affected version of ...

### Summary The `filter` parameter for the "Recent uploads" page allows arbitrary Regexes. If this feature is enabled (which is the default), an attacker can craft a filter which deadlocks the server. ### PoC `https://127.0.0.1:3923/?ru&filter=(.+)+x` ### Impact The server becomes fully inaccessible for a long time.

### Summary A path traversal vulnerability was discovered in WASM Traefik’s plugin installation mechanism. By supplying a maliciously crafted ZIP archive containing file paths with `../` sequences, an attacker can overwrite arbitrary files on the system outside of the intended plugin directory. This can lead to remote code execution (RCE), privilege escalation, persistence, or denial of service. **✅ After investigation, it is confirmed that no plugins on the [Catalog](https://plugins.traefik.io/plugins) were affected. There is no known impact.** ### Details The vulnerability resides in the WASM plugin extraction logic, specifically in the `unzipFile` function (`/plugins/client.go`). The application constructs file paths during ZIP extraction using `filepath.Join(destDir, f.Name)` without validating or sanitizing `f.Name`. If the ZIP archive contains entries with `../`, the resulting path can escape the intended directory, allowing writes to arbitrary locations on the host filesystem....

### Summary Nested imports of MaterialX files can lead to a crash via stack memory exhaustion, due to the lack of a limit on the "import chain" depth. ### Details The MaterialX [specification](https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/MaterialX/blob/main/documents/Specification/MaterialX.Specification.md#mtlx-file-format-definition) supports importing other files by using `XInclude` tags. When parsing file imports, recursion is used to process nested files in the form of a tree with the root node being the first MaterialX files parsed. However, there is no limit imposed to the depth of files that can be parsed by the library, therefore, by building a sufficiently deep chain of MaterialX files one referencing the next, it is possible to crash the process using the MaterialX library via stack exhaustion. ### PoC This test is going to employ Windows UNC paths, in order to make the Proof Of Concept more realistic. In fact, by using windows network shares, an attacker would be able t...

### Summary The OpenEXR file format defines many information about the final image inside of the file header, such as the size of data/display window. The application trusts the value of `dataWindow` size provided in the header of the input file, and performs computations based on this value. This may result in unintended behaviors, such as excessively large number of iterations and/or huge memory allocations. ### Details A concrete example of this issue is present in the function `readScanline()` in `ImfCheckFile.cpp` at line 235, that performs a for-loop using the `dataWindow min.y` and `max.y` coordinates that can be arbitrarily large. ```cpp in.setFrameBuffer (i); int step = 1; // // try reading scanlines. Continue reading scanlines // even if an exception is encountered // for (int y = dw.min.y; y <= dw.max.y; y += step) // <-- THIS LOOP IS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE OF DW.MAX { try { in.readPixels (y); } catch (...) { threw = true; // ...

### Summary When reading a deep scanline image with a large sample count in `reduceMemory` mode, it is possible to crash a target application with a NULL pointer dereference in a write operation. ### Details In the `ScanLineProcess::run_fill` function, implemented in `src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfDeepScanLineInputFile.cpp`, the following code is used to write the `fillValue` in the sample buffer: ```cpp switch (fills.type) { case OPENEXR_IMF_INTERNAL_NAMESPACE::UINT: { unsigned int fillVal = (unsigned int) (fills.fillValue); unsigned int* fillptr = static_cast<unsigned int*> (dest); for ( int32_t s = 0; s < samps; ++s ) fillptr[s] = fillVal; // <--- POTENTIAL CRASH HERE break; } ``` However, when `reduceMemory` mode is enabled in the `readDeepScanLine` function in `src/lib/Open...

A prototype pollution vulnerability exists in @nyariv/sandboxjs versions <= 0.8.23, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary properties into Object.prototype via crafted JavaScript code. This can result in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition or, under certain conditions, escape the sandboxed environment intended to restrict code execution. The vulnerability stems from insufficient prototype access checks in the sandbox’s executor logic, particularly in the handling of JavaScript function objects returned.

We’re excited to announce significant updates to the Microsoft .NET Bounty Program. These changes expand the program’s scope, simplify the award structure, and offer great incentives for security researchers. The .NET Bounty Program now offers awards up to $40,000 USD for vulnerabilities impacting the .NET and ASP.NET Core (including Blazor and Aspire).

We’re excited to announce significant updates to the Microsoft .NET Bounty Program. These changes expand the program’s scope, simplify the award structure, and offer great incentives for security researchers. The .NET Bounty Program now offers awards up to $40,000 USD for vulnerabilities impacting the .NET and ASP.NET Core (including Blazor and Aspire).