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### Summary Using profile.Profile.runctx, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to profile.Profile.runctx function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` class EvilProfileRunctx: def __reduce__(self): from profile import Profile payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" return Profile.runctx, (Profile(), payload, {}, {}) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when th...

### Summary Using profile.Profile.run, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to profile.Profile.run function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` class EvilProfileRun: def __reduce__(self): from profile import Profile payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" return Profile.run, (Profile(), payload) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loa...

### Summary Using trace.Trace.runctx, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to trace.Trace.runctx function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` class EvilTraceRunctx: def __reduce__(self): from trace import Trace payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" return Trace.runctx, (Trace(), payload, {}, {}) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is l...

### Summary Using trace.Trace.run, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to trace.Trace.run function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` class EvilTraceRun: def __reduce__(self): from trace import Trace payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" return Trace.run, (Trace(), payload) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain ...

New features to take over smartphones and monitor user activity demonstrate the continued evolution of the malware, which is now being spread on GitHub.

Zscaler reports 77 Android apps on Google Play with 19 million installs spread malware, hitting 831 banks and…

### Impact A vulnerability exists where sensitive information, such as OAuth tokens, is recorded in log files when an error occurs during the execution of an SQL query. An attacker could intentionally trigger an SQL error by methods such as placing a high load on the database. This could allow an attacker who has the authority to view the log files to illicitly acquire the recorded sensitive information. ### Patch This vulnerability has been fixed in the following pull request: https://github.com/traPtitech/traQ/pull/2787 It is possible that OAuth tokens issued before the patch was applied have already been recorded in the logs. To completely eliminate the security risk, server administrators are strongly recommended to revoke all existing OAuth tokens. ### Workaround If you cannot apply the update immediately, as a temporary workaround, please review access permissions for SQL error logs and strictly limit access to prevent unauthorized users from viewing them.

## Summary A 32-bit integer overflow in the BMP encoder’s scanline-stride computation collapses `bytes_per_line` (stride) to a tiny value while the per-row writer still emits `3 × width` bytes for 24-bpp images. The row base pointer advances using the (overflowed) stride, so the first row immediately writes past its slot and into adjacent heap memory with attacker-controlled bytes. This is a classic, powerful primitive for heap corruption in common auto-convert pipelines. - **Impact:** Attacker-controlled heap out-of-bounds (OOB) write during conversion **to BMP**. - **Surface:** Typical upload → normalize/thumbnail → `magick ... out.bmp` workers. - **32-bit:** **Vulnerable** (reproduced with ASan). - **64-bit:** Safe from this specific integer overflow (IOF) by arithmetic, but still add product/size guards. - **Proposed severity:** **Critical 9.8** (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). --- ## Scope & Affected Builds - **Project:** ImageMagick (B...

## Summary A format string bug vulnerability exists in `InterpretImageFilename` function where user input is directly passed to `FormatLocaleString` without proper sanitization. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary memory regions, enabling a wide range of attacks from heap overflow to remote code execution. <br> ## Details ### root cause ``` MagickExport size_t InterpretImageFilename(const ImageInfo *image_info, Image *image,const char *format,int value,char *filename, ExceptionInfo *exception) { ... while ((cursor=strchr(cursor,'%')) != (const char *) NULL) { const char *q = cursor; ssize_t offset = (ssize_t) (cursor-format); cursor++; /* move past '%' */ if (*cursor == '%') { /* Escaped %%. */ cursor++; continue; } /* Skip padding digits like %03d. */ if (isdigit((int) ((unsigned char) *cursor)) != 0) (void) strtol(cursor,(char **) &cursor,10); switch (*cursor) ...

## Summary Passing a geometry string containing only a colon (":") to montage -geometry leads GetGeometry() to set width/height to 0. Later, ThumbnailImage() divides by these zero dimensions, triggering a crash (SIGFPE/abort), resulting in a denial of service. ## Details **Root Cause** 1. `montage -geometry ":" ...` reaches `MagickCore/geometry.c:GetGeometry().` 2. `StringToDouble/InterpretLocaleValue` parses `":"` as `0.0;` then: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/0ba1b587be17543b664f7ad538e9e51e0da59d17/MagickCore/geometry.c#L355 `WidthValue` (and/or `HeightValue)` is set with a zero dimension. 3. In MagickCore/resize.c:ThumbnailImage(), the code computes: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/0ba1b587be17543b664f7ad538e9e51e0da59d17/MagickCore/resize.c#L4625-L4629 causing a division by zero and immediate crash. The issue is trivially triggerable without external input files (e.g., using `xc:white`). ### Reproduction Environment ``` Version: ImageMagick 7.1...