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A vulnerability affects certain React packages¹ for versions 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, and 19.2.0 and frameworks that use the affected packages, including Next.js 15.x and 16.x using the App Router. The issue is tracked upstream as [CVE-2025-55182](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-55182). Fixed in: React: 19.0.1, 19.1.2, 19.2.1 Next.js: 15.0.5, 15.1.9, 15.2.6, 15.3.6, 15.4.8, 15.5.7, 16.0.7 The vulnerability also affects experimental canary releases starting with 14.3.0-canary.77. Users on any of the 14.3 canary builds should either downgrade to a 14.x stable release or 14.3.0-canary.76. All users of stable 15.x or 16.x Next.js versions should upgrade to a patched, stable version immediately. ¹ The affected React packages are: - react-server-dom-parcel - react-server-dom-turbopack - react-server-dom-webpack

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a critical ChatGPT Atlas browser attack, confirming the danger of the ongoing surge in the ClickFix threat.

When an application passed an attacker controlled float poing number into the `toFixed()` function, it might lead to high CPU consumption and a potential Denial of Service. Small numbers go through this call stack: `NativeNumber.numTo > DToA.JS_dtostr > DToA.JS_dtoa > DToA.pow5mult` where `pow5mult` attempts to raise `5` to a ridiculous power. Example code: `(4.47118444E-314).toFixed(2)`

## Summary Workspace Agent manifests containing sensitive values were logged in plaintext unsanitized ## Details By default Workspace Agent logs are redirected to [stderr](https://linux.die.net/man/3/stderr) https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/a8862be546f347c59201e2219d917e28121c0edb/cli/agent.go#L432-L439 [Workspace Agent Manifests](https://coder.com/docs/reference/agent-api/schemas#agentsdkmanifest) containing sensitive environment variables were logged insecurely https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/7beb95fd56d2f790502e236b64906f8eefb969bd/agent/agent.go#L1090 An attacker with limited local access to the Coder Workspace (VM, K8s Pod etc.) or a third-party system ([SIEM](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/security_information_and_event_management_tool), logging stack) could access those logs This behavior opened room for unauthorized access and privilege escalation ## Impact Impact varies depending on the environment variables set in a given workspace ## Patches [Fix](https://g...

Due to errors in parsing shell commands related to $IFS and short CLI flags, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code read-only validation and trigger arbitrary code execution. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to [RyotaK](hxxps://ryotak.net) from [GMO Flatt Security Inc.](hxxps://flatt.tech/en/) for reporting this issue!

We believe that we have discovered a potential security vulnerability in ImageMagick’s Magick++ layer that manifests when `Options::fontFamily` is invoked with an empty string. **Vulnerability Details** - Clearing a font family calls `RelinquishMagickMemory` on `_drawInfo->font`, freeing the font string but leaving `_drawInfo->font` pointing to freed memory while `_drawInfo->family` is set to that (now-invalid) pointer. Any later cleanup or reuse of `_drawInfo->font` re-frees or dereferences dangling memory. - `DestroyDrawInfo` and other setters (`Options::font`, `Image::font`) assume `_drawInfo->font` remains valid, so destruction or subsequent updates trigger crashes or heap corruption. ```cpp if (family_.length() == 0) { _drawInfo->family=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(_drawInfo->font); DestroyString(RemoveImageOption(imageInfo(),"family")); } ``` - **CWE-416 (Use After Free):** `_drawInfo->font` is left dangling yet still reachable through the Options object. - **CW...

Attackers are using a tool called Evilginx to steal session cookies, letting them bypass the need for a multi-factor authentication (MFA) token.

The threat actor known as Water Saci is actively evolving its tactics, switching to a sophisticated, highly layered infection chain that uses HTML Application (HTA) files and PDFs to propagate a worm that deploys a banking trojan via WhatsApp in attacks targeting users in Brazil. The latest wave is characterized by the attackers shifting from PowerShell to a Python-based variant that spreads the

Guide to scale ready code security with event driven scans unified data and API first design for large teams seeking strong growth aligned control.

We’ve seen a new wave of attacks exploiting legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools to remotely control victims’ systems.