#git

No, Gmail wasn’t hacked. But a flood of old stolen credentials on the dark web sparked headlines suggesting otherwise. Here’s what really happened.

BeyondTrust’s annual cybersecurity predictions point to a year where old defenses will fail quietly, and new attack vectors will surge. Introduction The next major breach won’t be a phished password. It will be the result of a massive, unmanaged identity debt. This debt takes many forms: it’s the “ghost” identity from a 2015 breach lurking in your IAM, the privilege sprawl from thousands of new

Organizations in Ukraine have been targeted by threat actors of Russian origin with an aim to siphon sensitive data and maintain persistent access to compromised networks. The activity, according to a new report from the Symantec and Carbon Black Threat Hunter Team, targeted a large business services organization for two months and a local government entity in the country for a week. The attacks

### Summary NextAuth.js's email sign-in can be forced to deliver authentication emails to an attacker-controlled mailbox due to a bug in `nodemailer`'s address parser used by the project (fixed in `nodemailer` **v7.0.7**). A crafted input such as: ``` "e@attacker.com"@victim.com ``` is parsed incorrectly and results in the message being delivered to `e@attacker.com` (attacker) instead of `"<e@attacker.com>@victim.com"` (the intended recipient at `victim.com`) in violation of RFC 5321/5322 semantics. This allows an attacker to receive login/verification links or other sensitive emails intended for the victim. <h2>Affected NextAuthjs Version</h2> ≤ Version | Afftected -- | -- 4.24.11 | Yes 5.0.0-beta.29 | Yes ## POC Example Setup showing misdelivery of email ```jsx import NextAuth from "next-auth" import Nodemailer from "next-auth/providers/nodemailer" import { PrismaAdapter } from "@auth/prisma-adapter" import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma" export const { handlers, auth, sign...

The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path. * Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer's configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system. * Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem h...

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a set of 10 malicious npm packages that are designed to deliver an information stealer targeting Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. "The malware uses four layers of obfuscation to hide its payload, displays a fake CAPTCHA to appear legitimate, fingerprints victims by IP address, and downloads a 24MB PyInstaller-packaged information stealer that harvests

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted HTTP Range header that triggers quadratic-time processing in Starlette's `FileResponse` Range parsing/merging logic. This enables CPU exhaustion per request, causing denial‑of‑service for endpoints serving files (e.g., `StaticFiles` or any use of `FileResponse`). ### Details Starlette parses multi-range requests in ``FileResponse._parse_range_header()``, then merges ranges using an O(n^2) algorithm. ```python # starlette/responses.py _RANGE_PATTERN = re.compile(r"(\d*)-(\d*)") # vulnerable to O(n^2) complexity ReDoS class FileResponse(Response): @staticmethod def _parse_range_header(http_range: str, file_size: int) -> list[tuple[int, int]]: ranges: list[tuple[int, int]] = [] try: units, range_ = http_range.split("=", 1) except ValueError: raise MalformedRangeHeader() # [...] ranges = [ ( int(_[0]) if _[0] else file_size - in...

We’ve identified an HTML injection/XSS vulnerability in PrivateBin service that allows the injection of arbitrary HTML markup via the attached filename. Below are the technical details, PoC, reproduction steps, impact, and mitigation recommendations. **Recommend action:** As the vulnerability has been fixed in the latest version, users are **strongly encouraged** to upgrade PrivateBin to the latest version _and_ [check](https://privatebin.info/directory/check) that a strong CSP header, just as the default suggested one, is delivered. **Summary of the vulnerability:** The `attachment_name` field containing the attached file name is included in the object that the client encrypts and is eventually rendered in the DOM without proper escaping. ## Impact The vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary HTML into the filename displayed near the file size hint, when attachments are enabled. This is by definition [a XSS vulnerability (CWE-80)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/80...

### Summary A malicious host may provide a crafted LUKS2 volume to a Contrast pod VM that uses the [secure persistent volume](https://docs.edgeless.systems/contrast/howto/encrypted-storage) feature. The guest will open the volume and write secret data using a volume key known to the attacker. LUKS2 volume metadata is (a) not authenticated and (b) supports null key-encryption algorithms, allowing an attacker to create a volume such that the volume: - Opens (cryptsetup open) without error using any passphrase or token - Records all writes in plaintext (or ciphertext with an attacker-known key) ### Details Contrast uses cryptsetup to setup secure persistent volumes, using the secret seed as key for the cryptsetup encryption. To do so the Contrast Initializer will invoke the `cryptsetup` CLI. If the device provided by Kubernetes is a identified as cryptsetup device, the Initializer assumes a pod restart happened and the device was previously encrypted with the secret seed. The Initia...

### Summary This is a patch bypass of CVE-2025-58179 in commit [9ecf359](https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/9ecf3598e2b29dd74614328fde3047ea90e67252). The fix blocks `http://`, `https://` and `//`, but can be bypassed using backslashes (`\`) - the endpoint still issues a server-side fetch. ### PoC [https://astro.build/_image?href=\\raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg&f=svg](https://astro.build/_image?href=%5C%5Craw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg&f=svg)