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When Attackers Get Hired: Today’s New Identity Crisis What if the star engineer you just hired isn’t actually an employee, but an attacker in disguise? This isn’t phishing; it’s infiltration by onboarding. Meet “Jordan from Colorado,” who has a strong resume, convincing references, a clean background check, even a digital footprint that checks out. On day one, Jordan logs into email and attends

Salesloft Drift breach traced to GitHub compromise and stolen OAuth tokens, Mandiant confirms breach contained and Salesforce data targeted.

A threat actor possibly of Russian origin has been attributed to a new set of attacks targeting the energy sector in Kazakhstan. The activity, codenamed Operation BarrelFire, is tied to a new threat group tracked by Seqrite Labs as Noisy Bear. The threat actor has been active since at least April 2025. "The campaign is targeted towards employees of KazMunaiGas or KMG where the threat entity

GhostAction supply chain attack hit 817 GitHub repositories, stealing 3,325 secrets including npm, PyPI, and DockerHub tokens.

A new set of four malicious packages have been discovered in the npm package registry with capabilities to steal cryptocurrency wallet credentials from Ethereum developers. "The packages masquerade as legitimate cryptographic utilities and Flashbots MEV infrastructure while secretly exfiltrating private keys and mnemonic seeds to a Telegram bot controlled by the threat actor," Socket researcher

Hello Kubernetes Community, A security issue was discovered in secrets-store-sync-controller where an actor with access to the controller logs could observe service account tokens. These tokens could then potentially be exchanged with external cloud providers to access secrets stored in cloud vault solutions. Tokens are only logged when there is a specific error marshaling the `parameters` sent to the providers. ### Am I vulnerable? To check if tokens are being logged, examine the manager container log: ```bash kubectl logs -l 'app.kubernetes.io/part-of=secrets-store-sync-controller' -c manager -f | grep --line-buffered "csi.storage.k8s.io/serviceAccount.tokens" ``` ### Affected Versions - secrets-store-sync-controller < v0.0.2 ### How do I mitigate this vulnerability? Upgrade to secrets-store-sync-controller v0.0.2+ ### Fixed Versions - secrets-store-sync-controller >= v0.0.2 ### Detection Examine cloud provider logs for unexpected token exchanges, as well as unexpected...

### Impact **What kind of vulnerability is it?** This is a **Critical** severity directory traversal (path traversal) vulnerability in the `File.download()` method of the `internetarchive` library. **Who is impacted?** All users of the `internetarchive` library versions `< 5.5.1` are impacted. The vulnerability is particularly critical for users on **Windows systems**, but all operating systems are affected. **Description of the vulnerability:** The vulnerability existed because the `file.download()` method did not properly sanitize user-supplied filenames or validate the final download path. A maliciously crafted filename could contain path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../../../windows/system32/file.txt`) or illegal characters that, when processed, would cause the file to be written outside of the intended target directory. **Potential Impact:** An attacker could potentially overwrite critical system files or application configuration files, leading to a denial of service, privil...

### Impact When establishing a TLS session using `fs2-io` on the JVM using the `fs2.io.net.tls` package, if one side of the connection shuts down write while the peer side is awaiting more data to progress the TLS handshake, the peer side will spin loop on the socket read, fully utilizing a CPU. This CPU is consumed until the overall connection is closed. This could be used as a denial of service attack on an fs2-io powered server -- for example, by opening many connections and putting them in a half-shutdown state. Note: this issue impacts ember backed http4s servers with HTTPS as a result of ember using fs2's TLS support. ### Patches Fixed in fs2 3.12.2 and 3.13.0-M7. ### Workarounds No workarounds. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: [Open an issue.](https://github.com/typelevel/fs2/issues/new/choose) Contact the [Typelevel Security Team](https://github.com/typelevel/.github/blob/main/SECURITY.md).

## Summary Insecure session handling opened room for a privilege escalation scenario in which [prebuilt workspaces](https://coder.com/docs/admin/templates/extending-templates/prebuilt-workspaces) could be compromised by abusing a shared system identity. ## Details Coder automatically generates a session token for a user when a workspace is started. It is automatically exposed via [`coder_workspace_owner.session_token`](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/coder/coder/latest/docs/data-sources/workspace_owner#session_token-1). Prebuilt workspaces are initially owned by a built-in `prebuilds` system user. When a prebuilt workspace is claimed, a new session token is generated for the user that claimed the workspace, but the previous session token for the `prebuilds` user was not expired. Any Coder workspace templates that persist this automatically generated session token are potentially impacted. For example, the [coder-login module](https://github.com/coder/registry/blob/8677e7...

**Reporter:** Lumina Mescuwa **Product:** ImageMagick 7 (MagickCore) **Component:** `MagickCore/blob.c` (Blob I/O - BlobStream) **Tested:** 7.1.2-0 (source tag) and 7.1.2-1 (Homebrew), macOS arm64, clang-17, Q16-HDRI **Impact:** Heap out-of-bounds **WRITE** (attacker-controlled bytes at attacker-chosen offset) → memory corruption; potential code execution --- ## Executive Summary For memory-backed blobs (**BlobStream**), [`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) permits advancing the stream **offset** beyond the current end without increasing capacity. The subsequent [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) then expands by **`quantum + length`** (amortized) instead of **`offset + length`**, and copies to `data + offset`. When `offset ≫ extent`, the copy targets memory beyond the allocatio...