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While application development has evolved rapidly, the API management suites used to access these services remain a spooky reminder of a different era. Introducing new API management infrastructure with these legacy models still poses challenges for organizations as they modernize. Transitioning from monolithic architectures to agile microservices empowers developers to make quick changes. Using

### Impact The Fides web application allows users to edit consent and privacy notices such as cookie banners. These privacy notices can then be served by other integrated websites, for example in cookie consent banners. One of the editable fields is a privacy policy URL and this input was found to not be validated. The vulnerability makes it possible to craft a payload in the privacy policy URL which triggers JavaScript execution when the privacy notice is served by an integrated website. The domain scope of the executed JavaScript is that of the integrated website. Exploitation is limited to Admin UI users with the contributor role or higher. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version `2.22.1`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds.

### Impact The Fides webserver API allows users to retrieve its configuration using the `GET api/v1/config` endpoint. The configuration data is filtered to suppress most sensitive configuration information before it is returned to the user, but even the filtered data contains information about the internals and the backend infrastructure, such as various settings, servers’ addresses and ports and database username. This information is useful for administrative users as well as attackers, thus it should not be revealed to low-privileged users. This vulnerability allows Admin UI users with roles lower than the owner role e.g. the viewer role to retrieve the config information using the API. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version `2.22.1`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds.

### Impact The Fides web application allows a custom integration to be uploaded as a ZIP file containing configuration and dataset definitions in YAML format. It was discovered that specially crafted YAML dataset and config files allow a malicious user to perform arbitrary requests to internal systems and exfiltrate data outside the environment (also known as a Server-Side Request Forgery). The application does not perform proper validation to block attempts to connect to internal (including localhost) resources. Exploitation is limited to API clients with the `CONNECTOR_TEMPLATE_REGISTER` authorization scope. In the Fides Admin UI this scope is restricted to highly privileged users, specifically root users and users with the owner role. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version `2.22.1`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds.

### Impact The length of URIs and the various parts (eg path segments, query parameters) is usually limited by the webserver processing the incoming request. In the case of Puma the defaults are : - path segment length: 8192 - Max URI length: 1024 * 12 - Max query length: 1024 * 10 See https://github.com/puma/puma/blob/master/docs/compile_options.md If too long Puma raises: > Puma caught this error: HTTP element REQUEST_PATH is longer than the (8192) allowed length (was 12503) (Puma::HttpParserError) However due to the performance of `hashids` extremely long encoded IDs will consume a large amount of CPU and allocate a huge number of intermediate objects. For example: ``` curl -vvv https://localhost.ssl:3000//dos?id=abcd-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa...

### Impact Given specially crafted zip or JAR file, `IO.unzip` allows writing of arbitrary file. The follow is an example of a malicious entry: ``` +2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys ``` This would have a potential to overwrite `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`. Within sbt's main code, `IO.unzip` is used in `pullRemoteCache` task and `Resolvers.remote`; however many projects use `IO.unzip(...)` directly to implement custom tasks - https://github.com/search?q=IO.unzip+language%3AScala&type=code&l=Scala&p=1 ### Patches The problem has been patched in https://github.com/sbt/io/pull/360 sbt 1.9.7 is available with the fix. ### Workarounds A workaround might be use some other library to unzip. ### References - https://github.com/snyk/zip-slip-vulnerability - https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGCODEHAUSPLEXUS-31680 - https://github.com/sbt/io/issues/358

### Summary `maxBodyLebgth` was not used when receiving Message objects. Attackers could just send a very large Message causing a memory overflow and triggering an OOM Error. ### PoC #### RbbitMQ * Use RabbitMQ 3.11.16 as MQ and specify Message Body size 512M (here it only needs to be larger than the Consumer memory) * Start RabbitMQ #### Producer * Build a String of length 256M and send it to Consumer ``` package org.springframework.amqp.helloworld; import org.springframework.amqp.core.AmqpTemplate; import org.springframework.context.ApplicationContext; import org.springframework.context.annotation.AnnotationConfigApplicationContext; public class Producer { public static void main(String[] args) { ApplicationContext context = new AnnotationConfigApplicationContext(HelloWorldConfiguration.class); AmqpTemplate amqpTemplate = context.getBean(AmqpTemplate.class); String s = "A"; for(int i=0;i<28;++i){ s = s + s; System.o...

### Impact Parse Server crashes when uploading a file without extension. ### Patches A permanent fix has been implemented to prevent the server from crashing. ### Workarounds There are no known workarounds. ### References - GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-792q-q67h-w579 - Patched in Parse Server 6: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/6.3.1 - Patched in Parse Server 5 (LTS): https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/5.5.6

Multiple Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in Concrete CMS v.9.2.1 allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted script to the Header and Footer Tracking Codes of the SEO & Statistics.

Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Geeklog-Core geeklog v.2.2.2 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the Service, and website URL to Ping parameters of the admin/trackback.php component.