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By Deeba Ahmed 100,000+ Reasons to Rethink Vulnerability Management. This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Flashpoint Uncovers 100,000+ Hidden Vulnerabilities, Including Zero-Days
Unspecified governments have demanded mobile push notification records from Apple and Google users to pursue people of interest, according to U.S. Senator Ron Wyden. "Push notifications are alerts sent by phone apps to users' smartphones," Wyden said. "These alerts pass through a digital post office run by the phone operating system provider -- overwhelmingly Apple or Google. Because of
Cisco Talos has disclosed 10 vulnerabilities over the past two weeks, including nine that exist in a popular online PDF reader that offers a browser plugin.
Governments can access records related to push notifications from mobile apps by requesting that data from Apple and Google, according to details in court records and a US senator.
A quick IT guide for conducting a vulnerability assessment.
Chipmaker Qualcomm has released more information about three high-severity security flaws that it said came under "limited, targeted exploitation" back in October 2023. The vulnerabilities are as follows - CVE-2023-33063 (CVSS score: 7.8) - Memory corruption in DSP Services during a remote call from HLOS to DSP. CVE-2023-33106 (CVSS score: 8.4) - Memory corruption in
Inappropriate implementation in Web Browser UI in Google Chrome prior to 120.0.6099.62 allowed a remote attacker to potentially spoof the contents of an iframe dialog context menu via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
### Summary Unsafe YAML deserilization will result in arbitrary code execution. A maliciously crafted YAML file can cause arbitrary code execution if PyDrive2 is run in the same directory as it, or if it is loaded in via `LoadSettingsFile`. ### Details The loader being imported from the `yaml` library is `CLoader`: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L5 This loader is then used to load a user supplied file: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L108-L121 CLoader is considered unsafe. It will allow any Python code inside of it to be executed. This loading behaviour also happens automatically, the file only needs to be present for this vulnerability to occur. https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L9 Reference: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-...
PyDrive2 is a wrapper library of google-api-python-client that simplifies many common Google Drive API V2 tasks. Unsafe YAML deserilization will result in arbitrary code execution. A maliciously crafted YAML file can cause arbitrary code execution if PyDrive2 is run in the same directory as it, or if it is loaded in via `LoadSettingsFile`. This is a deserilization attack that will affect any user who initializes GoogleAuth from this package while a malicious yaml file is present in the same directory. This vulnerability does not require the file to be directly loaded through the code, only present. This issue has been addressed in commit `c57355dc` which is included in release version `1.16.2`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
### Summary When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query. When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions. ### Details For example, we have this Nginx configuration: ``` location /admin { deny all; return 403; } ``` This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin This won’t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment. However, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become /%23/../admin And allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy. Here is a diagram to summarize the attack: ![i...