Security
Headlines
HeadlinesLatestCVEs

Tag

#google

Scattered Spider Hacker Arrests Halt Attacks, But Copycat Threats Sustain Security Pressure

Google Cloud's Mandiant Consulting has revealed that it has witnessed a drop in activity from the notorious Scattered Spider group, but emphasized the need for organizations to take advantage of the lull to shore up their defenses. "Since the recent arrests tied to the alleged Scattered Spider (UNC3944) members in the U.K., Mandiant Consulting hasn't observed any new intrusions directly

The Hacker News
#google#The Hacker News
GHSA-jgmv-j7ww-jx2x: Koa Open Redirect via Referrer Header (User-Controlled)

## Summary In the latest version of Koa, the back method used for redirect operations adopts an insecure implementation, which uses the user-controllable referrer header as the redirect target. ## Details on the API document https://www.koajs.net/api/response#responseredirecturl-alt, we can see: **response.redirect(url, [alt])** ``` Performs a [302] redirect to url. The string "back" is specially provided for Referrer support, using alt or "/" when Referrer does not exist. ctx.redirect('back'); ctx.redirect('back', '/index.html'); ctx.redirect('/login'); ctx.redirect('http://google.com'); ``` however, the "back" method is insecure: - https://github.com/koajs/koa/blob/master/lib/response.js#L322 ``` back (alt) { const url = this.ctx.get('Referrer') || alt || '/' this.redirect(url) }, ``` Referrer Header is User-Controlled. ## PoC **there is a demo for POC:** ``` const Koa = require('koa') const serve = require('koa-static') const Router = require('@koa/router') const...

Allianz Life says majority of 1.4 million US customers’ info breached

Allianz notified authorities about a data breach that exposed the information about almost all its US customers

Scattered Spider Launching Ransomware on Hijacked VMware Systems, Google

A new report from Google's GTIG reveals how UNC3944 (0ktapus) uses social engineering to compromise Active Directory, then exploits VMware vSphere for data theft and direct ransomware deployment. Understand their tactics and learn vital mitigation steps.

Tea App Breach: Women Only Dating Platform Leaks 72K User Images

The “Tea” app, a new and popular social platform for women, confirmed a major data breach affecting users…

Scattered Spider Hijacks VMware ESXi to Deploy Ransomware on Critical U.S. Infrastructure

The notorious cybercrime group known as Scattered Spider is targeting VMware ESXi hypervisors in attacks targeting retail, airline, and transportation sectors in North America. "The group's core tactics have remained consistent and do not rely on software exploits. Instead, they use a proven playbook centered on phone calls to an IT help desk," Google's Mandiant team said in an extensive

GHSA-4v6w-xpmh-gfgp: Skops may allow MethodNode to access unexpected object fields through dot notation, leading to arbitrary code execution at load time

## Summary An inconsistency in `MethodNode` can be exploited to access unexpected object fields through dot notation. This can be used to achieve **arbitrary code execution at load time**. While this issue may seem similar to https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/security/advisories/GHSA-m7f4-hrc6-fwg3, it is actually more severe, as it relies on fewer assumptions about trusted types. ## Details The `MethodNode` allows access to attributes of existing objects via dot notation. However, there are several critical shortcomings: * Although the `__class__` and `__module__` fields are checked via `get_untrusted_types` and during the `load` phase (as a concatenated string), **they are not actually used by `MethodNode`**. Instead, the `func` and `obj` entries in the `schema.json` are used to determine behavior. This means that even an apparently harmless `__module__.__class__` pair can lead to access of arbitrary attributes or methods of loaded objects, without any additional checks. * **...

GHSA-m7f4-hrc6-fwg3: Skops has Inconsistent Trusted Type Validation that Enables Hidden `operator` Methods Execution

## Summary An inconsistency in `OperatorFuncNode` can be exploited to hide the execution of untrusted `operator.xxx` methods. This can then be used in a code reuse attack to invoke seemingly safe functions and escalate to arbitrary code execution with minimal and misleading trusted types. **Note:** This report focuses on `operator.call` as it appears to be the most interesting target, but the same technique applies to other `operator` methods. Moreover, please do not focus too much on the specific example used to hide the `operator.call` invocation—it was a zero-effort choice meant solely to demonstrate the issue. The key point is the **inconsistency** that allows a user to approve a type as trusted, while in reality enabling the execution of `operator.xxx`. ## Details The `OperatorFuncNode` allows calling methods belonging to the `operator` module and included in a trusted list of methods. However, what is returned by `get_untrusted_types` and checked during the `load` call is no...

On-Premise vs SaaS Data Annotation Platforms Compared

Choosing a data annotation platform? Learn when to use SaaS or on premise based on speed, cost, data privacy, and project scope.