As governments crack down on ransomware, cybercriminals may soon shift to business email compromise—already the world's most profitable type of scam.

Ransomware attacks, including those of the massively disruptive and dangerous variety, have proved difficult to combat comprehensively. Hospitals, government agencies, schools, and even critical infrastructure companies continue to face debilitating attacks and large ransom demands from hackers. But as governments around the world and law enforcement in the United States have grown serious about cracking down on ransomware and have started to make some progress, researchers are trying to stay a step ahead of attackers and anticipate where ransomware gangs may turn next if their main hustle becomes impractical.

At the RSA security conference in San Francisco on Monday, longtime digital scams researcher Crane Hassold will present findings that warn it would be logical for ransomware actors to eventually convert their operations to business email compromise (BEC) attacks as ransomware becomes less profitable or carries a higher risk for attackers. In the US, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has repeatedly found that total money stolen in BEC scams far exceeds that pilfered in ransomware attacks—though ransomware attacks can be more visible and cause more disruption and associated losses. 

In business email compromise, attackers infiltrate a legitimate corporate email account and use the access to send phony invoices or initiate contract payments that trick businesses into wiring money to criminals when they think they’re just paying their bills.

“So much attention is being paid to ransomware, and governments all over the world are taking action to disrupt it, so eventually the return on investment is going to be impacted,” says Hassold, who is director of threat intelligence at Abnormal Security and a former digital behavior analyst for the FBI. “And ransomware actors are not going to say, ‘Oh, hey, you got me’ and go away. So it’s possible that you would have this new threat where you have the more sophisticated actors behind ransomware campaigns moving over to the BEC space where all the money is being made.”

BEC attacks, many of which originate in West Africa and specifically Nigeria, are historically less technical and rely more on social engineering, the art of creating a compelling narrative that tricks victims into taking actions against their own interests. But Hassold points out that a lot of the malware used in ransomware attacks is built to be flexible, with a modular quality so different types of scammers can assemble the combination of software tools they need for their specific hustle. And the technical ability to establish “initial access,” or a digital foothold, to then deploy other malware would be extremely useful for BEC, where gaining access to strategic email accounts is the first step in most campaigns. Ransomware actors would bring a much higher level of technical sophistication to this aspect of the scams.

Hassold also points out that while the most notorious and aggressive ransomware gangs are typically small teams, BEC actors are usually organized into much looser and more decentralized collectives, making it more difficult for law enforcement to target a central organization or kingpin. Similar to Russia’s unwillingness to cooperate on ransomware investigations, it has taken time for global law enforcement to develop working relationships with the Nigerian government to counter BEC. But even as Nigeria has put more emphasis on BEC enforcement, countering the sheer scale of the scam operations is still a challenge.

“You can’t just cut off the head of the snake,” Hassold says. “If you arrest a dozen or even a few hundred of these actors, you’re still not making much of a dent.”

For ransomware actors, the most difficult aspect of transitioning to BEC scams would likely be the dramatic difference in collecting stolen money. Ransomware gangs almost exclusively collect victim payments in cryptocurrency, while BEC actors primarily use local networks of money mules in the markets where they launch their scams to launder fiat currency. Ransomware actors would need to plug into existing networks or invest in establishing their own in order to monetize BEC scams and have somewhere for the errant payments to go. Hassold points out, though, that as law enforcement becomes increasingly adept at tracing and freezing cryptocurrency payments—and as the value of cryptocurrencies continues to fluctuate wildly—ransomware actors may be motivated to learn new techniques and switch gears.

Crucially, Hassold notes that while he and his colleagues have not seen evidence of active collaboration between Eastern European ransomware gangs and West African BEC actors, he does see evidence on criminal forums and in active engagement with attackers that ransomware actors are interested in BEC and have been learning about it. Whether this exploration is simply for, ahem, professional enrichment, remains to be seen.

“All of these types of attacks are very serious and the stakes are very high, so it got me thinking about what things will look like in the future when ransomware eventually gets disrupted,” Hassold says. “It’s possible that these two threats on opposite sides of the cybercrime spectrum will converge in the future—and we need to be ready for that.”

The Hacker Gold Rush That's Poised to Eclipse Ransomware

Today, Talos is publishing a glimpse into the most prevalent threats we've observed between May 27 and June 3. As with previous roundups, this post isn't meant to be an in-depth analysis. Instead, this post will summarize the threats we've observed by highlighting key behavioral characteristics,...


[[ This is only the beginning! Please visit the blog for the complete entry ]]

Threat Roundup for May 27 to June 3

DataLenz delivers real-time, machine learning-based breach detection with user behavior modeling for IBM zSystems.

NORMAN, Okla., June 3, 2022 /PRNewswire-PRWeb/ -- Iconium Software, the leading provider of geospatial security monitoring for IBM mainframe data, has announced the release of DataLenz 1.3 providing immediate access to indicators of compromise (IOCs) potentially saving IBM zSystems customers millions of dollars per year caused by security breaches. By presenting multiple complex data access points through a simple to use graphical interface, DataLenz quickly brings clarity to potential data threats permitting security personnel to act swiftly. Gone are the days of having to laboriously wade through reports trying to determine if a security breach occurred or not, let alone quickly take action.

Organization's mission-critical IBM mainframe data is constantly at risk from bad actors, often masquerading as insiders from remote geographies. DataLenz provides the CISO, DPO and SOC security professional with real-time awareness of and automatic response to anomalous and out-of-bounds threats against critical mainframe data assets.

"Many large enterprises are under attack from bad actors often from remote locations, as evidenced by increased frequency and severity of breaches," said Rick Jones co-founder and CEO, of Iconium Software. "Our customers are forward-thinking organizations that are looking to provide the most robust security for their IBM mainframe data. Our DataLenz solution, addresses these challenges by giving IBM mainframe professionals, security teams, and compliance-focused professionals the best set of tools available to deal with these new threats."

"As the geopolitical and overall security landscape becomes more fractured, enterprises are reevaluating their security posture. The DataLenz solution is perfectly placed to address the emerging threat vectors facing those enterprises looking to secure vital mainframe-based data. The latest enhancements in V1.3 further strengthen the DataLenz solution and more closely aligns with the most stringent requirements of highly regulated mainframe customers" – Steven Dickens, Senior Analyst, Futurum Research

With DataLenz 1.3, new innovation provides the following:

\-- Real-time alerts, intelligent analytics with customizable thresholds, and management for anomalous threats and out-of-bounds data and resource access, alteration, replication, and movement to, from, and on the IBM Z mainframe platform.

\-- An intuitive advanced dashboard with real-time and historical views, allows users to filter specific types and sources (including graphical paradigms such as geopolitical and satellite maps), and then expand into every relevant form of drill-down and analytical detail needed to recognize, understand, and respond to threats arising from inappropriate data and resource access anywhere in the world.

\-- Advanced methods of notification of any potential breach of access with a wide range of user responses including issuing administrative commands such as terminating and blocking apparent threat actors and issuing RACF® administrative commands (as authorized).

\-- Detailed historical tracking, analysis, and response to anomalous and threatening events, plus exporting and forwarding of custom-specifiable data for processing by the full range of tools from spreadsheets to real-time event management systems (SIEMs).

\-- Advanced and intuitive filters, heat maps, geographical zoom-in, score cards, and highly configurable widgets create a fully immersive environment for maximum awareness and control.

\-- Datalenz strengthens your data protection and in conjunction with RACF,  
ACF2, Top Secret. Today's CISOs and DPOs demand truly comprehensive, reliable, real-time and compelling awareness of and resolution of all potential threats to their mission-critical mainframe data and legal and regulatory compliance.

More than just ensuring compliance with ever-more-exacting audits, immediate responsiveness to potential breaches of critical data must be dealt with using automation and advanced analytical tools for the briefest possible Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). Remote accesses must be properly managed to prevent, alert, terminate and block out-of-bounds interaction with sensitive data and related resources, employing real-time and historical graphical searching, filtering, reporting, drill-down and response to anomalous events.

The advanced monitoring, historical intelligence, proactive alerting and actions and versatile dashboard functionality of DataLenz 1.3 make it the definitive solution for extending the security of your critical mainframe data against threats anywhere in the world. See DataLenz v1.3 in action and discover how quickly DataLenz can bring your mainframe data access into sharp focus. See DataLenz v1.3 in action and discover how quickly DataLenz can bring your mainframe data access into sharp focus.

To learn more about Iconium and today's news, visit the website: https://www.iconiumsoftware.com

**About Iconium Software**

Iconium Software was formed in 2017 to serve customers and offer high-performance quality software products that are customer-driven by design. The Founders, Executive Team, and employees at Iconium Software are committed to providing the highest quality software to achieve the greatest advantage for each of our customers. For more information \[email protected\].

Iconium Software Releases DataLenz v1.3 for IBM zSystems

May 2022 saw the continued dominance of LockBit, and a possible disbursement of the Conti gang into other ransomware groups.
The post Ransomware: May 2022 review appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team monitors the threat landscape continuously and produces monthly ransomware reports based on a mixture of proprietary and open-source intelligence.

**Conti sleight of hand?**

Although LockBit remained the most widely-deployed ransomware in May 2022, it was, typically, Conti that sucked all of the air out of the room.

Conti ransomware and the group that distributes it has been a dangerous, noisy presence in the ransomware ecosystem since 2020. It has been involved in hundreds of attacks, including the horrific disabling of Ireland’s Health Service Executive, and according to the FBI, it is “the costliest strain of ransomware ever documented”, having raked in over $150 million in ransom payments.

Recently, the group has had its troubles. On February 27, an individual with access to the group’s inner-workings started leaking a treasure trove of data that included source code, files, and tens of thousands of internal chat messages. Not long after, a hacking group began using the leaked source code to attack targets inside Russia, violating one of ransomware’s unspoken rules. And at the start of this month, the FBI put a $10 million bounty on the group’s head.

On May 8 the newly-inaugurated president of Costa Rica declared a national emergency across the country’s public sector, in response to the continuing effects of a devastating Conti ransomware attack carried out in April. On the same day, an inflammatory message appeared on the group’s leak site, alongside a leak of 672 GB of stolen data.

The message itself is the usual grandiose puffery: It took a swing at US President Joe Biden—”this old fool will soon die”, claimed the attack had been carried out by just two people, and threatened that Costa Rica was just a “Demo version” of what was to come.

You would be forgiven for thinking that despite recent travails, Conti is going strong.

But according to an in-depth analysis by Advintel though, that’s what it wants you to think. It says that far from being in rude health, the Conti brand is in the process of disbanding and that the attacks on Costa Rica were a deliberately showy act from an operation being run by a skeleton crew.

It seems that the decision to offer its “full support of Russian government” in February, following the invasion of Ukraine, may have been a fatal error. By aligning itself to the Russian state it had made ransom payments a potential sanctions violation, killing the group’s income.

Advintel asserts that as a result the Conti group has been “silently creating subdivisions that began operations before the start of the shutdown process.” These subdivisions—said to include KaraKurt, BlackByte, BlackBasta—are supposed to establish themselves before Conti disappears to avoid the kind of shallow and transparent rebrand some other groups have pursued.

Malwarebytes Threat Intel has been able to confirm that there was an internal announcement about the shutdown for affiliates, and that the group’s internal chat servers are down, although the leak site is still operational, and updated almost daily with additional data.

**Ransomware attacks in May 2022**

Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence builds a monthly picture of ransomware activity by monitoring the information published by ransomware gangs on their Dark Web leak sites. This information represents victims who were successfully attacked but opted not to pay a ransom.

In May, LockBit remained by far the most widely-used ransomware. Conti remained active, but its activity was significantly reduced compared to recent months. Notably, three of the four groups that have overtaken it—Black Basta, Hive, and ALPHV—are linked to the alleged Conti disbandment. Intriguingly, Hive was named as the ransomware used in an attack on Costa Rica’s national health service on May 31.

The USA remained far and away the country most badly affected by ransomware attacks in May, and services the industry sector more likely to be attacked.

Known ransomware attacks by group, May 2022

Known ransomware attacks by country, May 2022

Known ransomware attacks by industry, May 2022

****Ransomware mitigations****

Source: IC3.gov

*   Implement regular backups of all data to be stored as air-gapped, password-protected copies offline. Ensure these copies are not accessible for modification or deletion from any system where the original data resides.
*   Implement network segmentation, such that all machines on your network are not accessible from every other machine.
*   Install and regularly update antivirus software on all hosts, and enable real-time detection.
*   Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches are released.
*   Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new or unrecognized user accounts.
*   Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configures access controls with the least privilege in mind. Do not give all users administrative privileges.
*   Disable unused remote access/Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports and monitor remote access/RDP logs for any unusual activity.
*   Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
*   Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
*   Use double authentication when logging into accounts or services.
*   Ensure routine auditing is conducted for all accounts.
*   Ensure all the identified IOCs are input into the network SIEM for continuous monitoring and alerts.

****How Malwarebytes protects against ransomware****

Malwarebytes can protect systems against all ransomware variants in several ways.

The Malwarebytes Anti-Malware technology detects malicious files, browser modifications, and system modifications on Windows PCs using a combination of signature-based and signatureless technologies. This layer of protection detects the Ransomware binary itself. Detections can happen in real-time as the binary is run or the infection can be rooted out from an already-compromised machine by conducting a full system scan.

Anti-Ransomware is a signatureless technology in charge of monitoring system activity of processes against a certain subset of data in specific locations on the endpoint. Using patented technology, Anti-Ransomware assesses changes in those data files. If an internal scoring threshold is crossed by a monitored process, it triggers a detection from the Anti-Ransomware component.

For those already infected, Ransomware Rollback can help recover encrypted files within 72 hours of the attack. Rollback creates a local cache on the endpoint to store changes to files on the system. It can use this cache to help revert changes caused by a threat. The rollback feature is dependent on activity monitoring available in Malwarebytes Endpoint Detection and Response.

Ransomware: May 2022 review

The attack on Israeli organizations is the latest in a long line of attempts to compromise supply chains, as the APT looks to leverage that access to target a multitude of potential victims.

After detecting a Lebanese hacking group it calls Polonium abusing its OneDrive personal storage service, Microsoft says it was able to disable the group, which could have links to the Iranian government.

In its latest effort, the advanced persistent threat (APT) targeted more than 20 Israeli organizations and one intergovernmental organization. The Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) says it suspended more than 20 malicious OneDrive applications created by Polonium actors in the campaign.

Among the targeted organizations were those involved in critical manufacturing, transportation systems, financial services, IT, and Israel’s defense industry, the software giant says – all of which offer an avenue to carry out downstream supply chain attacks.

"In at least one case, Polonium’s compromise of an IT company was used to target a downstream aviation company and law firm in a supply-chain attack that relied on service provider credentials to gain access to the targeted networks," according to MSTIC. "Multiple manufacturing companies they targeted also serve Israel’s defense industry, indicating a Polonium tactic that follows an increasing trend by many actors, including among several Iranian groups, of targeting service provider access to gain downstream access."

**Polonium's Infection Routine**

In 80% of the observed cases, the group exploited a flaw in Fortinet VPN appliances (likely via CVE-2018-13379 vulnerability) to gain initial access. Then they installed a custom PowerShell implant called CreepySnail on the target networks, according to Microsoft. From there, the actors deployed a set of tools named CreepyDrive and CreepyBox to abuse legitimate cloud services for command-and-control (C2) across most of their victims. 

MSTIC says with “moderate confidence” that the attacks were likely carried out with help from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).

"The observed activity was coordinated with other actors affiliated with Iran's \[MOIS\], based primarily on victim overlap and commonality of tools and techniques," the MSTIC assessment states. “The tactic of leveraging IT products and service providers to gain access to downstream customers remains a favorite of Iranian actors and their proxies.”

**Cyber Operations in Support of State Objectives**

Sherrod DeGrippo, Proofpoint’s vice president of threat research and detection, explains that Iran, specifically MOIS, uses a variety of organizations and affiliates to conduct cyber operations in support of Iranian government interests.

“This activity, which spans the spectrum of state responsibility, mirrors Iran’s material support to various organizations,” she says.

From DeGrippo’s perspective, this report demonstrates another example of how Iran and Israel are engaged in cyber conflict and comes amid rising gray zone tensions between Iran and its adversaries.

In March 2021, for example, Proofpoint reported on how the Iran-aligned threat actor TA453 had targeted Israeli and American medical researchers in late 2020. TA453 has historically aligned with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) priorities, targeting dissidents, academics, diplomats, and journalists.

“While this campaign may have been a one-off requirement, TA453 targeting Israeli organizations and individuals is consistent with these ever-increasing geopolitical tensions between the two countries,” she noted.

**Defense Should Focus on Authentication Activity**

Mike Parkin, senior technical engineer at Vulcan Cyber, a provider of SaaS for enterprise cyber-risk remediation, says that while knowing Polonium’s exact motivation is impossible, given the known animosity between the states involved, it’s a “reasonably safe bet” they are trying to do as much damage to their targets as possible as part of a larger agenda.

“State and state-sponsored threat actors compound the problems presented by common cybercriminal groups,” he explains to Dark Reading. “Where criminals are typically after information for sale, data to hold for ransom, or resources to use for further attacks, state-level actors often have additional, much deeper motivations,” such as cyber-espionage or destructive attacks.

Because of the overlap in techniques and tools, it can be difficult to tell the two apart, which can complicate the matter for targeted organizations, he adds.

**Fending Off State-Sponsored Cyberattacks**

To thwart attacks like these, Microsoft advises that organizations should review all authentication activity throughout their remote access infrastructure and VPNs. A particular focus should be fixed on accounts configured with single-factor authentication, to confirm authenticity and investigate any anomalous activity.

Parkin points out that access and authentication logs can easily reveal suspicious activity and keep an attempted breach from turning into a newsworthy incident.

“There is an old saying from system administration about the uselessness of keeping logs that are never reviewed,” he says. “With access logs, regular reviews for suspicious activity should be happening regularly. If not, why keep them?”

In addition to patching known vulnerabilities, Proofpoint’s DeGrippo also notes that a basic best practice for defense is ensuring that all remote-access accounts are required to enable multifactor authentication (MFA).

“Those accounts that require only single-factor authentication do not have the protection MFA provides, allowing an attacker to successfully phish or social engineer a user’s password without encountering a secondary authentication,” she adds.

**VPNs: Taking a Page From Fancy Bear**

Phil Neray, vice president of cyber-defense strategy at CardinalOps, a threat coverage optimization company, tells Dark Reading that Russian threat actor Fancy Bear (aka APT28 and Strontium) also targeted VPNs on a large scale in 2018 with the VPNFilter campaign, which similarly targeted critical infrastructure.

MITRE ATT&CK categorizes this approach as T1133 External Remote Services, with recommended mitigations including creating security information and event management (SIEM) detection queries that examine authentication logs for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.

“Exploiting vulnerable VPNs as the initial access point, as in this campaign, is also attractive since VPNs are Internet-exposed on one side and provide direct access to the victim network on the other,” Neray says. “We recommend ensuring your SIEM has specific detections for it, such as monitoring for suspicious logins.”

Microsoft Disables Iran-Linked Lebanese Hacking Group Polonium

The company continues to downplay the severity of the Follina vulnerability, which remains present in all supported versions of Windows.

Researchers warned last weekend that a flaw in Microsoft's Support Diagnostic Tool could be exploited using malicious Word documents to remotely take control of target devices. Microsoft released guidance on Monday, including temporary defense measures. By Tuesday, the United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency had warned that “a remote, unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability,” known as Follina, “to take control of an affected system.” But Microsoft would not say when or whether a patch is coming for the vulnerability, even though the company acknowledged that the flaw was being actively exploited by attackers in the wild. And the company still had no comment about the possibility of a patch when asked by WIRED yesterday.

The Follina vulnerability in a Windows support tool can be easily exploited by a specially crafted Word document. The lure is outfitted with a remote template that can retrieve a malicious HTML file and ultimately allow an attacker to execute Powershell commands within Windows. Researchers note that they would describe the bug as a “zero-day,” or previously unknown vulnerability, but Microsoft has not classified it as such.

“After public knowledge of the exploit grew, we began seeing an immediate response from a variety of attackers beginning to use it,” says Tom Hegel, senior threat researcher at security firm SentinelOne. He adds that while attackers have primarily been observed exploiting the flaw through malicious documents thus far, researchers have discovered other methods as well, including the manipulation of HTML content in network traffic.

 “While the malicious document approach is highly concerning, the less documented methods by which the exploit can be triggered are troubling until patched,” Hegel says. “I would expect opportunistic and targeted threat actors to use this vulnerability in a variety of ways when the option is available—it’s just too easy.” 

The vulnerability is present in all supported versions of Windows and can be exploited through Microsoft Office 365, Office 2013 through 2019, Office 2021, and Office ProPlus. Microsoft's main proposed mitigation involves disabling a specific protocol within Support Diagnostic Tool and using Microsoft Defender Antivirus to monitor for and block exploitation. 

But incident responders say that more action is needed, given how easy it is to exploit the vulnerability and how much malicious activity is being detected. 

“We are seeing a variety of APT actors incorporate this technique into longer infection chains that utilize the Follina vulnerability," says Michael Raggi, a staff threat researcher at the security firm Proofpoint who focuses on Chinese government-backed hackers. "For instance, on May 30, 2022, we observed Chinese APT actor TA413 send a malicious URL in an email which impersonated the Central Tibetan Administration. Different actors are slotting in the Follina-related files at different stages of their infection chain, depending on their preexisting toolkit and deployed tactics.”

Researchers have also seen malicious documents exploiting Follina with targets in Russia, India, the Philippines, Belarus, and Nepal. An undergraduate researcher first noticed the flaw in August 2020, but it was first reported to Microsoft on April 21. Researchers also noted that Follina hacks are particularly useful to attackers because they can stem from malicious documents without relying on Macros, the much-abused Office document feature that Microsoft has worked to rein in.

“Proofpoint has identified a variety of actors incorporating the Follina vulnerability within phishing campaigns," says Sherrod DeGrippo, Proofpoint's vice president of threat research.

With all this real-world exploitation, the question is whether the guidance Microsoft has published so far is adequate and proportionate to the risk. 

“Security teams could view Microsoft’s nonchalant approach as a sign that this is ‘just another vulnerability,’ which it most certainly is not,” says Jake Williams, director of cyber threat intelligence at the security firm Scythe. “It’s not clear why Microsoft continues to downplay this vulnerability, especially while it’s being actively exploited in the wild.”

An Actively Exploited Microsoft Zero-Day Flaw Still Has No Patch

If you want your IT and security administrators to get buried in trivial workloads and productivity bottlenecks, having poor network object management is a great way to accomplish that.

With needs around data privacy and application management changing rapidly, many businesses have yet to master the implementation of new security standards. The challenge becomes more complex when managing objects within a multivendor security network. Each vendor has its own management platform, which often forces network security admins to define objects multiple times, resulting in a counter-effect.

First, this can be an inefficient use of valuable resources and cause workload bottlenecks. Second, it creates naming inconsistency and introduces myriad unexpected errors, leading to security flaws and connectivity problems. This raises the question: Are businesses doing enough to ensure their network objects are synchronized in legacy and greenfield environments?

**What Is Network Object Management, and Why Should We Talk About It?**

If you want your IT and security administrators to get buried in trivial workloads and productivity bottlenecks, having poor network object management is a great way to achieve it. Inconsistent or incorrect naming of network objects can introduce a seemingly limitless number of problems for your organization, from connectivity woes to gaps in network security that you can't see. In this regard, poor network object management could actually be one of the biggest "insider threats" to an organization's overall cybersecurity efforts; if object names are incorrectly paired with a particular security policy due to inconsistent naming, everything will look fine on paper until a breach occurs, and even then it might be difficult to find the vulnerability.

This is why intelligent and proactive network object management is so crucial to a multicloud strategy. On a basic level, organizations might only need to name things such as servers, IP addresses, and groups of similar objects to which fairly simple security rules might be applied. But as an organization grows, it tends to end up with more network objects than it can count, sometimes running into the tens of thousands. Even a team of dedicated IT and security professionals wouldn't be able to monitor and update such a large number of objects, and mistakes due to avoidable human error would go through the roof. It's easy to see how things could go wrong with a manual or legacy approach to naming network objects — and they do.

**Why Network Object Management Is More Important With a Multicloud Approach**

For network security policies to work effectively, so-called "objects" on the network, such as servers or groups of IP addresses, need to be named so they can be included in the policies applicable to them. One of the biggest challenges that emerges with multicloud solutions is that businesses typically end up using network traffic-filtering solutions from multiple cloud vendors. Each solution will usually have its own vendor-specific platform, forcing network and security administrators to define the objects on their network multiple times. Not only does this waste a lot of time that could be spent elsewhere in the business, but it can lead to costly errors and security gaps.

Furthermore, this opens the door to another problem — that is, name duplication. On a small scale, this is quite easily rectified by a team that knows what to look for. But for bigger organizations, name duplication can spiral into a much larger problem. It's not uncommon for two copies of the same name to end up with two distinctly separate definitions.

For instance, let's say we have a group of database servers containing three IP addresses that we name "DB1" and the relevant security policy is applied. Then somebody takes the "DB1" name and uses it to define data servers in another network environment, this time containing only two IP addresses. In this example, the security policy rule using the name "DB1" would look fine to even a well-trained eye because the names and definitions it contained would seem identical. But we're now in a situation where one of these groups would apply to two IP addresses rather than three, and that will cause more problems the more the definition is used.

**Best Practices**

It's always good to have a set of maintenance guidelines that can help you achieve a higher standard of cyber hygiene. To help you get there, below are some general best practices that can serve as your cleanup checklist for network object management.

*   Remove duplicate objects.
*   Delete expired and unused rules and objects.
*   Break up long rule sections into readable chunks.
*   Enforce object naming conventions.
*   Delete old and unused policies.
*   Document rules, objects and policy revisions.

**The Takeaway**

Network object management might not be big or exciting, but it's fundamental to the safe and secure running of multicloud network environments. If a business achieves 100% accuracy in its approach to network object management, perhaps by leveraging automation and monitoring tools, there's very little reason it can't go on to achieve 100% network performance and efficiency.

Why Network Object Management Is Critical for Managing Multicloud Network Security

The cybercriminal group is distancing itself from its previous branding by shifting  tactics and tools once again in an aim to continue to profit from its nefarious activity.

The cybercriminal group is distancing itself from its previous branding by shifting tactics and tools once again in an aim to continue to profit from its nefarious activity.

Evil Corp has shifted tactics once again, this time pivoting to LockBit ransomware after U.S. sanctions have made it difficult for the cybercriminal group to reap financial gain from its activity, researchers have found.

Researchers from Mandiant Intelligence have been tracking a “financially motivated threat cluster” they’re calling UNC2165 that has numerous overlaps with Evil Corp and is highly likely the latest incarnation of the group.

UNC2165 is using a combination of the FakeUpdates infection chain to gain access to target networks followed by the LockBit ransomware, researchers wrote in a report published Thursday. The activity appears to represent “another evolution in Evil Corp affiliated actors’ operations,” they wrote.

“Numerous reports have highlighted the progression of linked activity including development of new ransomware families and a reduced reliance on Dridex to enable intrusions,” researchers wrote. “Despite these apparent efforts to obscure attribution, UNC2165 has notable similarities to operations publicly attributed to Evil Corp.”

The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Evil Corp in December 2019 in a widespread crackdown on the dangerous and prolific cybercriminal group best known for spreading the aforementioned info-stealing Dridex malware and later its own WastedLocker ransomware.

The sanctions basically forbid any U.S. entity from doing business or being associated with Evil Corp, effectively preventing ransomware negotiation firms from facilitating ransom payments for the group–obviously limiting its ability to profit from criminal activity.

****Shapeshifting Cybercriminals****

Evil Corp took a brief hiatus after the sanctions and a subsequent indictment of its leaders, but since has cloaked itself through clever rebranding to continue its nefarious activity.

Indeed, its latest pivot is not the first time the group used a different identity to try to skirt sanctions against it. About a year ago, Evil Corp tried to mask itself by using previously unknown ransomware called PayloadBin, which researchers determined was likely a rebrand of its own ransomware, WastedLocker, according to reports.

Before that the group resurfaced briefly soon after the OFAC sanctions were levied with new tactics to try to hide its activity, leveraging the oft-used threat tool HTML redirectors–or code that uses meta refresh tags to redirect users to another website–to drop payloads through malicious Excel files.

****Most Recent Incarnation****

The latest activity from Evil Corp “almost exclusively” gains access to victims’ networks on the back of a group tracked as UNC1543, to which the use of FakeUpdates has been linked, according to Mandiant. In the months prior to the government’s indictments of Evil Corp, this method was used as the initial infection vector for Dridex and the BitPaymer and DoppelPaymer ransomware.

Evil Corp also is deploying other ransomware—specifically Hades–in its activity as UNC2165, researchers said. “Hades has code and functional similarities to other ransomware believed to be associated with Evil Corp-affiliated threat actors,” they said.

The use of other ransomware is indeed a “natural evolution” for this emerging criminal group to distance itself from Evil Corp, researchers said.

However, LockBit more than Hades especially is a natural fit because of its RaaS model and rise to prominence in recent years, they said. Indeed, LockBit has taken down some big-name targets in its own right, such as Accenture and Bangkok Air, in the last year.

“Using this RaaS would allow UNC2165 to blend in with other affiliates,” researchers wrote. “Additionally, the frequent code updates and rebranding of HADES required development resources and it is plausible that UNC2165 saw the use of LOCKBIT as a more cost-effective choice.”

****The Move Makes Sense****

Since ransomware operators see their operations as any other business leaders would, it makes sense that they also have to evolve with the times to stay ahead in the market and maintain profit just like anyone else, noted a security professional.

“For cybercriminals, it’s a similar concept,” observed James McQuiggan, security awareness advocate at security firm KnowBe4, said in an email to Threatpost. “They need to continually develop their applications and encryption to avoid detection and make money via extortion using various methods.”

Given this perspective, it’s not surprising that Evil Corp is leveraging other ransomware to continue to stay relevant and, more importantly, get paid, he said. And with Evil Corp cloaking itself in the  activity of other ransomware groups, targets likely will pay an extortion fee, as they would not be aware of the government sanctions against the true perpetrators of the crime, McQuiggan said.

Evil Corp Pivots LockBit to Dodge U.S. Sanctions

Microsoft on Thursday said it took steps to disable malicious activity stemming from abuse of OneDrive by a previously undocumented threat actor it tracks under the chemical element-themed moniker Polonium.
In addition to removing the offending accounts created by the Lebanon-based activity group, the tech giant's Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) said it suspended over 20 malicious OneDrive

Microsoft on Thursday said it took steps to disable malicious activity stemming from abuse of OneDrive by a previously undocumented threat actor it tracks under the chemical element-themed moniker Polonium.

In addition to removing the offending accounts created by the Lebanon-based activity group, the tech giant's Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) said it suspended over 20 malicious OneDrive applications created and that it notified affected organizations.

"The observed activity was coordinated with other actors affiliated with Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), based primarily on victim overlap and commonality of tools and techniques," MSTIC assessed with "moderate confidence."

The adversarial collective is believed to have breached more than 20 organizations based in Israel and one intergovernmental organization with operations in Lebanon since February 2022.

Targets of interest included entities in the manufacturing, IT, transportation, defense, government, agriculture, financial, and healthcare sectors, with one cloud service provider compromised to target a downstream aviation company and law firm in what's a case of a supply chain attack.

In a vast majority of the cases, initial access is believed to have been obtained by exploiting a path traversal flaw in Fortinet appliances (CVE-2018-13379), abusing it to drop custom PowerShell implants like CreepySnail that establish connections to a command-and-control (C2) server for follow-on actions.

Attack chains mounted by the actor have involved the use of custom tools that leverage legitimate cloud services such as OneDrive and Dropbox accounts for C2 using malicious tools dubbed CreepyDrive and CreepyBox with its victims.

"The implant provides basic functionality of allowing the threat actor to upload stolen files and download files to run," the researchers said.

This is not the first time Iranian threat actors have taken advantage of cloud services. In October 2021, Cybereason disclosed an attack campaign staged by a group called MalKamak that used Dropbox for C2 communications in an attempt to stay under the radar.

Additionally, MSTIC noted that multiple victims that were compromised by Polonium were previously targeted by another Iranian group called MuddyWater (aka Mercury), which has been characterized by the U.S. Cyber Command as a "subordinate element" within MOIS.

The victim overlaps lend credence to earlier reports that MuddyWater is a "conglomerate" of multiple teams along the lines of Winnti (China) and the Lazarus Group (North Korea).

To counter such threats, customers are advised to enable multi-factor authentication as well as review and audit partner relationships to minimize any unnecessary permissions.

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