#js

# Command Injection in MCP Server The MCP Server at https://github.com/akoskm/create-mcp-server-stdio is written in a way that is vulnerable to command injection vulnerability attacks as part of some of its MCP Server tool definition and implementation. ## Vulnerable tool The MCP Server exposes the tool `which-app-on-port` which relies on Node.js child process API `exec` which is an unsafe and vulnerable API if concatenated with untrusted user input. Vulnerable line of code: https://github.com/akoskm/create-mcp-server-stdio/blob/main/src/index.ts#L24-L40 ```js server.tool("which-app-on-port", { port: z.number() }, async ({ port }) => { const result = await new Promise<ProcessInfo>((resolve, reject) => { exec(`lsof -t -i tcp:${port}`, (error, pidStdout) => { if (error) { reject(error); return; } const pid = pidStdout.trim(); exec(`ps -p ${pid} -o comm=`, (error, stdout) => { if (error) { reject(error); return...

CodeceptJS 3.7.3 contains a command injection vulnerability in the emptyFolder function (lib/utils.js). The execSync command directly concatenates the user-controlled directoryPath parameter without sanitization or escaping, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands.

Cybersecurity never slows down. Every week brings new threats, new vulnerabilities, and new lessons for defenders. For security and IT teams, the challenge is not just keeping up with the news—it’s knowing which risks matter most right now. That’s what this digest is here for: a clear, simple briefing to help you focus where it counts. This week, one story stands out above the rest: the

A threat actor possibly of Russian origin has been attributed to a new set of attacks targeting the energy sector in Kazakhstan. The activity, codenamed Operation BarrelFire, is tied to a new threat group tracked by Seqrite Labs as Noisy Bear. The threat actor has been active since at least April 2025. "The campaign is targeted towards employees of KazMunaiGas or KMG where the threat entity

### Summary Provided grammar, would fit in a context window of most of the models, but takes minutes to process in 0.1.23. In testing with 0.1.16 the parser worked fine so this seems to be a regression caused by Earley parser. ### Details Full reproducer provider in the POC section. The resulting grammar is around 70k tokens, and the grammar parsing itself (with the models I checked) was significantly longer than LLM processing itself, meaning this can be used to DOS model providers. ### Patch This problem is caused by the grammar optimizer introduced in v0.1.23 being too slow. It only happens for very large grammars (>100k characters), like the below one. v0.1.24 solved this problem by optimizing the speed of the grammar optimizer and disable some slow optimization for large grammars. Thanks to @Seven-Streams ### PoC ``` import string import random def enum_schema(size=10000,str_len=10): enum = {"enum": ["".join(random.choices(string.ascii_uppercase, k=str_len)) for _ in...

### Summary When using Astro's Cloudflare adapter (`@astrojs/cloudflare`) configured with `output: 'server'` while using the default `imageService: 'compile'`, the generated image optimization endpoint doesn't check the URLs it receives, allowing content from unauthorized third-party domains to be served. ### Details On-demand rendered sites built with Astro include an `/_image` endpoint, which returns optimized versions of images. The `/_image` endpoint is restricted to processing local images bundled with the site and also supports remote images from domains the site developer has manually authorized (using the [`image.domains`](https://docs.astro.build/en/reference/configuration-reference/#imagedomains) or [`image.remotePatterns`](https://docs.astro.build/en/reference/configuration-reference/#imageremotepatterns) options). However, a bug in impacted versions of the `@astrojs/cloudflare` adapter for deployment on Cloudflare’s infrastructure, allows an attacker to bypass the thir...

Bill takes thoughtful look at the transition from summer camp to grind season, explores the importance of mental health and reflects on AI psychiatry.

### Summary [Python class pollution](https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/) is a novel vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The `Delta` class is vulnerable to class pollution via its constructor, and when combined with a gadget available in DeltaDiff itself, it can lead to Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution (via insecure [Pickle](https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html) deserialization). The gadget available in DeepDiff allows `deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to be modified to allow dangerous classes such as `posix.system`, and then perform insecure Pickle deserialization via the Delta class. This potentially allows any Python code to be executed, given that the input to `Delta` is user-controlled. Depending on the application where DeepDiff is used, this can also lead to other vulnerabilities. For example, in a web application, it might be possible to bypass authentication via class po...

### Summary A flaw in the `getPath` utility function could allow path confusion and potential bypass of proxy-level ACLs (e.g. Nginx location blocks). ### Details The original implementation relied on fixed character offsets when parsing request URLs. Under certain malformed absolute-form Request-URIs, this could lead to incorrect path extraction. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies reject such malformed requests with a 400 Bad Request, so the impact depends on the application and environment. ### Impact If proxy ACLs are used to protect sensitive endpoints such as `/admin`, this flaw could have allowed unauthorized access. The confidentiality impact depends on what data is exposed: if sensitive administrative data is exposed, the impact may be High (CVSS 7.5); otherwise it may be Medium (CVSS 5.3). ### Resolution The implementation has been updated to correctly locate the first slash after "://", preventing such path confusion.

### Impact This only impacts apps that have the `embeddedAsarIntegrityValidation` and `onlyLoadAppFromAsar` [fuses](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/fuses) enabled. Apps without these fuses enabled are not impacted. Specifically this issue can only be exploited if your app is launched from a filesystem the attacker has write access too. i.e. the ability to edit files inside the `resources` folder in your app installation on Windows which these fuses are supposed to protect against. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `38.0.0-beta.6` * `37.3.1` * `36.8.1` * `35.7.5` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)