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Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a malicious Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension with basic ransomware capabilities that appears to be created with the help of artificial intelligence – in other words, vibe-coded. Secure Annex researcher John Tuckner, who flagged the extension "susvsex," said it does not attempt to hide its malicious functionality. The extension was uploaded on

### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. The permissions granted to the `virt-handler` service account, such as the ability to update VMI and patch nodes, could be abused to force a VMI migration to an attacker-controlled node. ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ Following the [GitHub security advisory published on March 23 2023](https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2), a `ValidatingAdmissionPolicy` was introduced to impose restrictions on which sections of node resources the `virt-handler` service account can modify. For instance, the `spec` section of nodes has been made immutable, and modifications to the `labels` section are now limited to `kubevirt.io`-prefixed labels only. This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration o...

### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. A logic flaw in the `virt-controller` allows an attacker to disrupt the control over a running VMI by creating a pod with the same labels as the legitimate `virt-launcher` pod associated with the VMI. This can mislead the `virt-controller` into associating the fake pod with the VMI, resulting in incorrect status updates and potentially causing a DoS (Denial-of-Service). ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ A vulnerability has been identified in the logic responsible for reconciling the state of VMI. Specifically, it is possible to associate a malicious attacker-controlled pod with an existing VMI running within the same namespace as the pod, thereby replacing the legitimate `virt-launcher` pod associated with the VMI. The `virt-launcher` pod is critical for enforcing the isolation mechanisms appli...

### Summary Due to improper TLS certificate management, a compromised `virt-handler` could impersonate `virt-api` by using its own TLS credentials, allowing it to initiate privileged operations against another `virt-handler`. ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ Because of improper TLS certificate management, a compromised `virt-handler` instance can reuse its TLS bundle to impersonate `virt-api`, enabling unauthorized access to VM lifecycle operations on other `virt-handler` nodes. The `virt-api` component acts as a sub-resource server, and it proxies API VM lifecycle requests to `virt-handler` instances. The communication between `virt-api` and `virt-handler` instances is secured using mTLS. The former acts as a client while the latter as the server. The client certificate used by `virt-api` is defined in the source code as follows and have the following properties: ```go //pkg/virt-api/...

### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. A flawed implementation of the Kubernetes aggregation layer's authentication flow could enable bypassing RBAC controls. ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ It was discovered that the `virt-api` component fails to correctly authenticate the client when receiving API requests over mTLS. In particular, it fails to validate the CN (Common Name) field in the received client TLS certificates against the set of allowed values defined in the `extension-apiserver-authentication` configmap. The Kubernetes API server proxies received client requests through a component called aggregator (part of K8S's API server), and authenticates to the `virt-api` server using a certificate signed by the CA specified via the `--requestheader-client-ca-file` CLI flag. This CA bundle is primarily used in the context of aggr...

# Summary Prior to `langgraph-checkpoint` version `3.0` , LangGraph’s `JsonPlusSerializer` (used as the default serialization protocol for all checkpointing) contains a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when deserializing payloads saved in the `"json"` serialization mode. If an attacker can cause your application to persist a payload serialized in this mode, they may be able to also send malicious content that executes arbitrary Python code during deserialization. Upgrading to version langgraph-checkpoint `3.0` patches this vulnerability by preventing deserialization of custom objects saved in this mode. If you are deploying in `langgraph-api`, any version `0.5` or later is also free of this vulnerability. # Details **Affected file / component** [jsonplus.py](https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/blob/c5744f583b11745cd406f3059903e17bbcdcc8ac/libs/checkpoint/langgraph/checkpoint/serde/jsonplus.py) By default, the serializer attempts to use `"msgpack"` for serializat...

### Impact ### The OCI runtime specification has a `maskedPaths` feature that allows for files or directories to be "masked" by placing a mount on top of them to conceal their contents. This is primarily intended to protect against privileged users in non-user-namespaced from being able to write to files or access directories that would either provide sensitive information about the host to containers or allow containers to perform destructive or other privileged operations on the host (examples include `/proc/kcore`, `/proc/timer_list`, `/proc/acpi`, and `/proc/keys`). `maskedPaths` can be used to either mask a directory or a file -- directories are masked using a new read-only `tmpfs` instance that is mounted on top of the masked path, while files are masked by bind-mounting the container's `/dev/null` on top of the masked path. In all known versions of runc, when using the container's `/dev/null` to mask files, runc would not perform sufficient verification that the source o...

## Summary A command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges). ## Details ### Root Cause: MotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as **image_file_name** and **movie_filename** in the Web UI. These are written directly into **/etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf**. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands. ### Vulnerability flow: Dashboa...

### Summary Using `.t` (aka `.list`) with `{ sync: true }` to read tar entry contents returns uninitialized memory contents if tar file was changed on disk to a smaller size while being read. ### Details See: * https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/issues/445 * https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/pull/446 * Regression happened in https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/5330eb04bc43014f216e5c271b40d5c00d45224d ### PoC A: ```js import * as tar from 'tar' import fs from 'node:fs' fs.writeFileSync('tar.test.tmp', Buffer.alloc(1*1024)) // from readme const filesAdded = [] tar.c( { sync: true, file: 'tar.test.tmp.tar', onWriteEntry(entry) { // initially, it's uppercase and 0o644 console.log('adding', entry.path, entry.stat.mode.toString(8)) // make all the paths lowercase entry.path = entry.path.toLowerCase() // make the entry executable entry.stat.mode = 0o755 // in the archive, it's lowercase and 0o755 filesAdded.push([entr...

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered yet another active software supply chain attack campaign targeting the npm registry with over 100 malicious packages that can steal authentication tokens, CI/CD secrets, and GitHub credentials from developers' machines. The campaign has been codenamed PhantomRaven by Koi Security. The activity is assessed to have begun in August 2025, when the first