#js

## Impact Using the `/locales/locale.json` with the `locale` and `namespace` query parameters, a malicious actor is able to execute arbitrary code, without being authenticated. With the ability to execute arbitrary code, this vulnerability can be exploited in an infinite number of ways. It could be used to gain access to the Panel's server, read credentials from the Panel's config (`.env` or otherwise), extract sensitive information from the database (such as user details [username, email, first and last name, hashed password, ip addresses, etc]), access files of servers managed by the panel, etc. ## Patches This vulnerability was patched by https://github.com/pterodactyl/panel/commit/24c82b0e335fb5d7a844226b08abf9f176e592f0 and was released under the [`v1.11.11`](https://github.com/pterodactyl/panel/releases/tag/v1.11.11) tag without any other code modifications compared to `v1.11.10`. For those who need to patch their installations in-place or apply it on top of other code modi...

### Description There is a path traversal vulnerability in any DotVVM application started in Debug mode, if at least one resource with the `FileResourceLocation` has been added. The vulnerability allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem accessible by the web application (i.e. appsettings.json or other files containing secrets). ### Patches The bug is patched in versions **4.2.10**, **4.3.8** and **5.0.0-preview03-final** (and newer). Apart from updating DotVVM, it is also recommend invalidating any secrets which could have been leaked by an application deployed in Debug mode (such as database passwords). ### Workarounds If you cannot update to a patched version, avoid running a publicly accessible DotVVM application in Debug mode (Development environment in Asp.Net Core). It is recommend adding the following statement to the DotvvmStartup class: ``` config.Debug = false; // TODO: workaround for GHSA-6q65-j4jw-9cg8, remove after updating DotVVM ```

urllib3 [supports](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.4.0/reference/contrib/emscripten.html) being used in a Pyodide runtime utilizing the [JavaScript Fetch API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Fetch_API) or falling back on [XMLHttpRequest](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/XMLHttpRequest). This means you can use Python libraries to make HTTP requests from your browser or Node.js. Additionally, urllib3 provides [a mechanism](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.4.0/user-guide.html#retrying-requests) to control redirects. However, the `retries` and `redirect` parameters are ignored with Pyodide; the runtime itself determines redirect behavior. ## Affected usages Any code which relies on urllib3 to control the number of redirects for an HTTP request in a Pyodide runtime. ## Impact Redirects are often used to exploit SSRF vulnerabilities. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects may remain vul...

A denial of service (DoS) vulnerability has been identified in the JavaScript library microlight version 0.0.7. This library, used for syntax highlighting, does not limit the size of textual content it processes in HTML elements with the microlight class. When excessively large content (e.g., 100 million characters) is processed, the reset function in microlight.js consumes excessive memory and CPU resources, causing browser crashes or unresponsiveness. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by tricking a user into visiting a malicious web page containing a microlight element with large content, resulting in a denial of service.

A null pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in microlight.js (version 0.0.7), a lightweight syntax highlighting library. When processing elements with non-standard CSS color values, the library fails to validate the result of a regular expression match before accessing its properties, leading to an uncaught TypeError and potential application crash.

Mezzanine CMS, in versions prior to 6.1.1, contains a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the admin interface. The vulnerability exists in the "displayable_links_js" function, which fails to properly sanitize blog post titles before including them in JSON responses served via "/admin/displayable_links.js". An authenticated admin user can create a blog post with a malicious JavaScript payload in the title field, then trick another admin user into clicking a direct link to the "/admin/displayable_links.js" endpoint, causing the malicious script to execute in their browser.

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package. The vulnerability stems from an unimplemented feature in the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next, which allowed unauthenticated users to proxy arbitrary remote content via the `/_next/image` endpoint. This issue allowed attackers to load remote resources from arbitrary hosts under the victim site’s domain for any site deployed using the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next. For example: `https://victim-site.com/_next/image?url=https://attacker.com`. In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site’s domain (`victim-site.com`), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services. ### Impact - SSRF via unrestricted remote URL loading - Arbitrary remote content loading - Potential internal service exposure or phishing risks through domain abuse ### Mitigation The following mitigations have been put in...

European law enforcement agencies have dismantled Archetyp Market, a long-running dark web platform used primarily for drug sales,…

Cybersecurity researchers are calling attention to a "large-scale campaign" that has been observed compromising legitimate websites with malicious JavaScript injections. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, these malicious injects are obfuscated using JSFuck, which refers to an "esoteric and educational programming style" that uses only a limited set of characters to write and execute code.

### Summary Various date messages returned by `Language::userDate` are inserted into raw HTML, allowing anybody who can edit those messages to insert arbitrary HTML into the DOM. ### Details The result of `$this->lang->userDate( $timestamp, $this->user )` returns unescaped values, but is inserted as raw HTML by Citizen: https://github.com/StarCitizenTools/mediawiki-skins-Citizen/blob/072e4365e9084e4b153eac62d3666566c06f5a49/includes/Components/CitizenComponentUserInfo.php#L55-L60 ### PoC 1. Go to any page using citizen with the uselang parameter set to x-xss and while being logged in Depending on the registration date of the account you're logged in with, various messages can be shown. In my case, it's `november`:  ### Impact This impacts wikis where a group has the `editinterface` but not the `editsitejs` user right.