#js

### Summary The JS implementation for copying button labels to the sticky header in the Citizen skin unescapes HTML characters, allowing for stored XSS through system messages. ### Details In the `copyButtonAttributes` function in `stickyHeader.js`, when copying the button labels, the `innerHTML` of the new element is set to the `textContent` of the old element: https://github.com/StarCitizenTools/mediawiki-skins-Citizen/blob/f4cbcecf5aca0ae69966b23d4983f9cb5033f319/resources/skins.citizen.scripts/stickyHeader.js#L29-L41 This unescapes any escaped HTML characters and causes the contents of the system messages to be interpreted as HTML. ### PoC 1. Edit any of the affected messages (`citizen-share`, `citizen-view-history`, `citizen-view-edit`, `nstab-talk`) to the following payload: `<img src="" onerror="alert('Sticky Header Button XSS')">`. 2. Visit any mainpage article in the wiki using the Citizen skin. <img width="495" height="228" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachme...

### Description In the FlightServer class of the pyquokka framework, the do_action() method directly uses pickle.loads() to deserialize action bodies received from Flight clients without any sanitization or validation, which results in a remote code execution vulnerability. The vulnerable code is located in pyquokka/flight.py at line 283, where arbitrary data from Flight clients is directly passed to pickle.loads(). Even more concerning, when FlightServer is configured to listen on 0.0.0.0 (as shown in the provided server example at line 339), this allows attackers across the entire network to perform arbitrary remote code execution by sending malicious pickled payloads through the set_configs action. In addition, the functions cache_garbage_collect, do_put, and do_get also contain vulnerability points where pickle.loads is used to deserialize untrusted remote data. Please review and fix these issues accordingly. This report uses the set_configs action as an example. ### Proof of ...

### Vulnerability Description --- Vulnerability Overview - When the client sends an arbitrary URL array and impl: ["naive"] to the tRPC endpoint tools.search.crawlPages, the server issues outbound HTTP requests directly to those URLs. There is no defensive logic that restricts or validates requests to internal networks (127.0.0.1, localhost, private ranges) or metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). - Flow: client input (urls, impls) → service invocation in the tRPC router → the service passes the URLs to Crawler.crawl → the Crawler prioritizes the user-specified impls (naive) → the naive implementation performs a server-side fetch(url) as-is (SSRF) → the server collects responses from internal resources. - In the dev environment, authentication can be bypassed using the lobe-auth-dev-backend-api: 1 header (production requires a valid token). In the PoC, this was used to successfully retrieve the internal API at localhost:8889 from the server side. Vulnerable Code https://github...

### Summary JSON objects after decoding might use more memory than their serialized version. It is possible to tune a JSON to maximize the factor between serialized memory usage and deserialized memory usage (similar to a zip bomb). While reproducing the issue, we could reach a factor of about 35. This can be used to circumvent the [`max_request_size` (https://openbao.org/docs/configuration/listener/tcp/) configuration parameter, which is meant to protect against Denial of Service attacks, and also makes Denial of Service attacks easier in general, as the attacker needs much less resources. ### Details The request body is parsed into a `map[string]interface{}` https://github.com/openbao/openbao/blob/788536bd3e10818a7b4fb00aac6affc23388e5a9/http/logical.go#L50 very early in the request handling chain (before authentication), which means an attacker can send a specifically crafted JSON object and cause an OOM crash. Additionally, for simpler requests with large numbers of strings, the...

The North Korean threat actor linked to the Contagious Interview campaign has been observed merging some of the functionality of two of its malware programs, indicating that the hacking group is actively refining its toolset. That's according to new findings from Cisco Talos, which said recent campaigns undertaken by the hacking group have seen the functions of BeaverTail and OtterCookie coming

It might surprise some that a security company would choose WordPress as the backbone of its digital content operations. Here's what we considered when choosing it.

### Impact The vulnerability is a **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular's Server-Side Rendering package (`@angular/ssr`). The function `createRequestUrl` uses the native `URL` constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., `originalUrl` or `url`) begins with a **double forward slash (`//`) or backslash (`\\`)**, the `URL` constructor treats it as a **schema-relative URL**. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname. This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page's virtual location (accessible via `DOCUMENT` or `PlatformLocation` tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent **relative HTTP requests** made during the SSR process (e.g., using `HttpClient.get('a...

## Executive Summary **Product:** LibreNMS **Vendor:** LibreNMS **Vulnerability Type:** Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) **CVSS Score:** 4.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L) **Affected Version:** 25.8.0 (latest at time of discovery) **POC File:** [Download POC](https://trendmicro-my.sharepoint.com/:u:/p/kholoud_altookhy/EQYQOiGddUtOtz6739YUFU4B5FkNob_TvKBYEA8P6lSRQw?e=lDOR5W) **Ticket:** ZDI-CAN-28105: LibreNMS Alert Rules Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability ## Vulnerability Details ### Description Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative has identified a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in LibreNMS. The vulnerability exists in the Alert Rules functionality where the alert rule name is not properly sanitized, allowing injection of HTML code. ### Technical Details **Version Tested:** 25.8.0 **Installer File:** 25.8.0.tar.gz **Download Link:** https://github.com/librenms/librenms/archive/refs/tags/25.8.0.tar.gz **Platform:** N/A ### Attack Vector When browsing to **Alerts ...

## Summary Strapi's password hashing implementation using bcryptjs lacks maximum password length validation. Since bcryptjs truncates passwords exceeding 72 bytes, this creates potential vulnerabilities such as authentication bypass and performance degradation. ## POC Create an admin user with a password exceeding 72 characters like 85, Log in using only the first 72 characters of the password. Authentication is successful, confirming the issue. Proposed Solution Based on discussions: Add a maximum password length validation (72 characters) during password creation and updates for both Admin and U&P users. Truncate passwords exceeding 72 bytes on the server before passing them to bcryptjs during login. Optionally, issue a warning to users with passwords longer than 72 bytes during login, informing them of truncation. ## Impact This issue affects all Strapi installations using bcryptjs for password hashing. Until resolved, it can lead to: Authentication Bypass: Users may unknowing...

Input passed to the GET parameter 'error' is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site.