#linux

### Summary The OpenEXR file format defines many information about the final image inside of the file header, such as the size of data/display window. The application trusts the value of `dataWindow` size provided in the header of the input file, and performs computations based on this value. This may result in unintended behaviors, such as excessively large number of iterations and/or huge memory allocations. ### Details A concrete example of this issue is present in the function `readScanline()` in `ImfCheckFile.cpp` at line 235, that performs a for-loop using the `dataWindow min.y` and `max.y` coordinates that can be arbitrarily large. ```cpp in.setFrameBuffer (i); int step = 1; // // try reading scanlines. Continue reading scanlines // even if an exception is encountered // for (int y = dw.min.y; y <= dw.max.y; y += step) // <-- THIS LOOP IS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE OF DW.MAX { try { in.readPixels (y); } catch (...) { threw = true; // ...

### Summary When reading a deep scanline image with a large sample count in `reduceMemory` mode, it is possible to crash a target application with a NULL pointer dereference in a write operation. ### Details In the `ScanLineProcess::run_fill` function, implemented in `src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfDeepScanLineInputFile.cpp`, the following code is used to write the `fillValue` in the sample buffer: ```cpp switch (fills.type) { case OPENEXR_IMF_INTERNAL_NAMESPACE::UINT: { unsigned int fillVal = (unsigned int) (fills.fillValue); unsigned int* fillptr = static_cast<unsigned int*> (dest); for ( int32_t s = 0; s < samps; ++s ) fillptr[s] = fillVal; // <--- POTENTIAL CRASH HERE break; } ``` However, when `reduceMemory` mode is enabled in the `readDeepScanLine` function in `src/lib/Open...

### Summary The OpenEXRCore code is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow during a read operation due to bad pointer math when decompressing DWAA-packed scan-line EXR files with a maliciously forged chunk. ### Details In the `LossyDctDecoder_execute` function (from `src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_dwa_decoder.h`, when SSE2 is enabled), the following code is used to copy data from the chunks: ```cpp // no-op conversion to linear for (int y = 8 * blocky; y < 8 * blocky + maxY; ++y) { __m128i* restrict dst = (__m128i *) chanData[comp]->_rows[y]; __m128i const * restrict src = (__m128i const *)&rowBlock[comp][(y & 0x7) * 8]; for (int blockx = 0; blockx < numFullBlocksX; ++blockx) { _mm_storeu_si128 (dst, _mm_loadu_si128 (src)); // src += 8 * 8; // <--- si128 pointer incremented as a uint16_t dst += 8; } } ``` The issue arises because the `src` pointer, which is a `si128` pointer, is incremented by `8*8`, as if it were a `uint16_t` pointer...

### Summary The OpenEXRCore code is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow during a write operation when decompressing ZIPS-packed deep scan-line EXR files with a maliciously forged chunk header. ### Details When parsing `STORAGE_DEEP_SCANLINE` chunks from an EXR file, the following code (from `src/lib/OpenEXRCore/chunk.c`) is used to extract the chunk information: ```cpp if (part->storage_mode == EXR_STORAGE_DEEP_SCANLINE) // SNIP... cinfo->sample_count_data_offset = dataoff; cinfo->sample_count_table_size = (uint64_t) ddata[0]; cinfo->data_offset = dataoff + (uint64_t) ddata[0]; cinfo->packed_size = (uint64_t) ddata[1]; cinfo->unpacked_size = (uint64_t) ddata[2]; // SNIP... ``` By storing this information, the code that will later decompress and reconstruct the chunk bytes, will know how much space the uncompressed data will occupy. This size is carried along in the chain of decoding/decompression...

The EVE X1 server suffers from an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability. This can be exploited to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands through the 'passwd' HTTP POST parameter in /ajax/php/login.php script.

The controller suffers from an unauthenticated file disclosure vulnerability. Using the 'db_log' POST parameter, attackers can disclose arbitrary files on the affected device and disclose sensitive and system information.

July Linux Patch Wednesday. This time, there are 470 vulnerabilities, slightly fewer than in June. Of these, 291 are in the Linux Kernel. One vulnerability shows signs of being exploited in the wild (CISA KEV): 🔻 SFB – Chromium (CVE-2025-6554) There are also 36 (❗️) vulnerabilities for which public exploits are available or suspected to […]

Threat actors have been observed exploiting a now-patched critical SAP NetWeaver flaw to deliver the Auto-Color backdoor in an attack targeting a U.S.-based chemicals company in April 2025. "Over the course of three days, a threat actor gained access to the customer's network, attempted to download several suspicious files and communicated with malicious infrastructure linked to Auto-Color

OpenShift confidential containers (CoCo) is now generally available for Microsoft Azure. You can extend the security capabilities of Red Hat OpenShift by using OpenShift confidential containers, which allows you to deploy and manage confidential workloads with enhanced data protection and integrity. This release marks a significant milestone, providing a robust solution for enterprises seeking to protect sensitive applications and data on Azure. It addresses critical security concerns by isolating workloads within a hardware-protected trusted execution environment, helping ensure that data re

The emerging cybercriminal gang, which initially targeted Microsoft Windows systems, is looking to go cross-platform using sophisticated, multithread encryption.