#redis

LokiLocker looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

BlackBasta looks for and loads a DLL named wow64log.dll in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). Our BlackBasta exploit DLL must export the InterlockedExchange function or it fails with error. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Ransom.AvosLocker ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Ransom.LockBit malware suffers from a dll hijacking vulnerability.

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) leading to Arbitrary File Upload vulnerability in Rara One Click Demo Import plugin <= 1.2.9 on WordPress allows attackers to trick logged-in admin users into uploading dangerous files into /wp-content/uploads/ directory.

By Waqas In total, 308,000 unsecured databases were found exposing sensitive assets worldwide of which around 90,000 databases have already… This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: US and China Exposed Most Databases Among 308,000 Discovered in 2021

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Prior to versions 6.2.7 and 7.0.0, an attacker attempting to load a specially crafted Lua script can cause NULL pointer dereference which will result with a crash of the redis-server process. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 7.0.0 and 6.2.7. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable, if Lua scripting is not being used, is to block access to `SCRIPT LOAD` and `EVAL` commands using ACL rules.

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Prior to versions 6.2.7 and 7.0.0, an attacker attempting to load a specially crafted Lua script can cause NULL pointer dereference which will result with a crash of the redis-server process. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 7.0.0, 6.2.X and 6.0.X. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable, if Lua scripting is not being used, is to block access to `SCRIPT LOAD` and `EVAL` commands using ACL rules.

This Metasploit module exploits CVE-2022-0543, a Lua-based Redis sandbox escape. The vulnerability was introduced by Debian and Ubuntu Redis packages that insufficiently sanitized the Lua environment. The maintainers failed to disable the package interface, allowing attackers to load arbitrary libraries. On a typical redis deployment (not docker), this module achieves execution as the redis user. Debian/Ubuntu packages run Redis using systemd with the "MemoryDenyWriteExecute" permission, which limits some of what an attacker can do. For example, staged meterpreter will fail when attempting to use mprotect. As such, stageless meterpreter is the preferred payload. Redis can be configured with authentication or not. This module will work with either configuration (provided you provide the correct authentication details). This vulnerability could theoretically be exploited across a few architectures: i386, arm, ppc, etc. However, the module only supports x86_64, which is likely to be the m...

Backdoor.Win32.Agent.aegg malware suffers from a hardcoded credential vulnerability.