#web

The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) has issued a bulletin warning of a maximum-severity security flaw in SmarterTools SmarterMail email software that could be exploited to achieve remote code execution. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-52691, carries a CVSS score of 10.0. It relates to a case of arbitrary file upload that could enable code execution without requiring any

### Summary An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via `POST /api/setup/backup` and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., `database.php` with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise. ### Details The endpoint `/api/setup/backup` is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file. Relevant code paths: - Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint: - `phpmyfaq/.htaccess`: `RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]` - Controller implementation: - `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php` → `backup...

### Summary Picklescan uses the `numpy.f2py.crackfortran._eval_length` function (a NumPy F2PY helper) to execute arbitrary Python code during unpickling. ### Details Picklescan fails to detect a malicious pickle that uses the gadget `numpy.f2py.crackfortran._eval_length` in `__reduce__`, allowing arbitrary command execution when the pickle is loaded. A crafted object returns this function plus attacker‑controlled arguments; the scan reports the file as safe, but pickle.load() triggers execution. ### PoC ```python class PoC: def __reduce__(self): from numpy.f2py.crackfortran import _eval_length return _eval_length, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", None) ``` ### Impact - Arbitrary code execution on the victim machine once they load the “scanned as safe” pickle / model file. - Affects any workflow relying on Picklescan to vet untrusted pickle / PyTorch artifacts. - Enables supply‑chain poisoning of shared model files. ### Credits - [ac0d3r](https://github.c...

### Summary Picklescan uses the `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef` function (a NumPy F2PY helper) to execute arbitrary Python code during unpickling. ### Details Picklescan fails to detect a malicious pickle that uses the gadget `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef` in `__reduce__`, allowing arbitrary command execution when the pickle is loaded. A crafted object returns this function plus attacker‑controlled arguments; the scan reports the file as safe, but pickle.load() triggers execution. ### PoC ```python class PoC: def __reduce__(self): from numpy.f2py.crackfortran import getlincoef return getlincoef, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", None) ``` ### Impact - Arbitrary code execution on the victim machine once they load the “scanned as safe” pickle / model file. - Affects any workflow relying on Picklescan to vet untrusted pickle / PyTorch artifacts. - Enables supply‑chain poisoning of shared model files. ### Credits - [ac0d3r](https://github.com/ac0d3...

Warning for EmEditor users: A third-party breach tampered with the official download link between Dec 19–22, 2025. Learn how to identify the fake installer and protect your data from infostealer malware.

The threat actor known as Silver Fox has turned its focus to India, using income tax-themed lures in phishing campaigns to distribute a modular remote access trojan called ValleyRAT (aka Winos 4.0). "This sophisticated attack leverages a complex kill chain involving DLL hijacking and the modular Valley RAT to ensure persistence," CloudSEK researchers Prajwal Awasthi and Koushik Pal said in an

### Summary A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in an administrator’s browser by registering a user whose **display name** contains HTML entities (e.g., `<img ...>`). When an administrator views the admin user list, the payload is decoded server-side and rendered without escaping, resulting in script execution in the admin context. ### Details Root cause is the following chain: - **User-controlled input stored**: attacker-provided `display_name` (real name) is stored in DB (often as HTML entities, e.g., `<img ...>`). - **Decode on read**: `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User/UserData.php` decodes `display_name` using `html_entity_decode(...)` (“for backward compatibility”). - **Unsafe sink**: admin user list renders the decoded value unescaped using Twig `|raw`: - `phpmyfaq/assets/templates/admin/user/users.twig` (users table uses `{{ user.display_name|raw }}`) As a result, an entity-encoded payload becomes active ...

### Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) filter bypass vulnerability exists in the webhook URL validation of the Secret Requests feature. The application attempts to block internal/private IP addresses but can be bypassed using DNS rebinding (e.g., `localtest.me` which resolves to `127.0.0.1`) or open redirect services (e.g., `httpbin.org/redirect-to`). This allows an authenticated user to make the server initiate HTTP requests to internal network resources. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the `isPublicUrl` function located in `/api/lib/utils.ts`. The function validates webhook URLs against a blocklist of private IP patterns: ```typescript export const isPublicUrl = (url: string): boolean => { const parsed = new URL(url); const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase(); const blockedPatterns = [ /^localhost$/, /^127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/, /^192\.168\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/, // ... other patterns ]; return...

KrebsOnSecurity.com celebrates its 16th anniversary today! A huge "thank you" to all of our readers -- newcomers, long-timers and drive-by critics alike. Your engagement this past year here has been tremendous and truly a salve on a handful of dark days. Happily, comeuppance was a strong theme running through our coverage in 2025, with a primary focus on entities that enabled complex and globally-dispersed cybercrime services.

### Summary Picklescan has got open() and shutil in its default dangerous blocklist to prevent arbitrary file overwrites. However the module distutils isnt blocked and can be used for the same purpose ie to write arbitrary files. ### Details This is another vulnerability which impacts the downstream user. By constructing a pickle that user distutils.file_util.write_file, an attacker can overwrite critical system files (like .ssh/authorized_keys, web server configurations, or source code) to achieve DoS or escalate to RCE. ### PoC ```python import pickle import distutils.file_util class FileWriteBypass: def __reduce__(self): target_file = "pwned_config.env" content = ["print('I have overwritten your config')"] return (distutils.file_util.write_file, (target_file, content)) payload = pickle.dumps(FileWriteBypass()) with open("bypass_filewrite.pkl", "wb") as f: f.write(payload) print("bypass_filewrite.pkl") ``` <img width="853" heig...