Schools in the US are installing vape-detection tech in bathrooms to thwart student nicotine and cannabis use. A new investigation reveals the impact of using spying to solve a problem.

Vaping Is ‘Everywhere’ in Schools—Sparking a Bathroom Surveillance Boom

Singapore, Singapore, 19th November 2025, CyberNewsWire

**Singapore, Singapore, November 19th, 2025, CyberNewsWire**

The collaboration advances enterprise grade application security into decentralized ecosystems, uniting Checkmarx’s AppSec expertise with Web3 specialization by CredShields.

CredShields, a leading Web3 security firm, has partnered with Checkmarx, the global leader in agentic AI-powered application security testing, to work with AI-driven smart contract audits, vulnerability research, and blockchain security tooling from CredShields to work alongside the Checkmarx application security platform.

As the application security market accelerates toward an expected US $55 billion by 2029, decentralized architectures introduce new attack surfaces that traditional AppSec programs are not designed to address. Nearly half of the largest DeFi breaches trace back to smart contract flaws, and in 2025 to date, losses from cryptocurrency service hacks already surpass US $2.1 billion and are projected to climb further. Research further indicates that up to 89% of smart contracts contain vulnerabilities, highlighting the need for Web3-native security standards alongside legacy security frameworks.

Through this agreement, Checkmarx is adding CredShields as a Web3 security partner to provide customers with dedicated support for decentralized environments. The collaboration combines Checkmarx’s enterprise AppSec leadership with deep expertise in smart contract auditing, vulnerability assessment, and blockchain security research from CredShields, enabling organizations to extend their existing DevSecOps programs into Web3 with minimal friction.

> “This partnership represents a natural evolution in the AppSec landscape,” said **Shashank**, Co-founder of CredShields. “Together with Checkmarx, we’re delivering a seamless layer of security that protects enterprise systems, decentralized applications, and smart contracts with the same rigor and intelligence.”

**The partnership will focus on:**

*   Comprehensive security coverage for decentralized applications, smart contracts, and wallets
*   AI-assisted vulnerability detection and manual audits powered by CredShields’ proprietary systems
*   Joint contributions to global security frameworks, including OWASP Smart Contract Security Standards and Smart Contract Top 10
*   Enterprise enablement to integrate Web3 security into existing DevSecOps pipelines

> “As enterprises extend their digital footprint into Web3, new attack surfaces emerge,” said **Scott Sieper**, Director of Product Management at Checkmarx. “Partnering with CredShields enables us to bring our deep AppSec expertise to blockchain environments and help organizations innovate with confidence while maintaining the same rigorous security standards they expect from Checkmarx.”

Checkmarx and CredShields aim to redefine enterprise application security for the decentralized era, ensuring that innovation and security evolve in parallel as organizations adopt blockchain at scale.

For more information about securing code at the speed of AI and the Checkmarx One platform, users can visit the website.

**About CredShields**

CredShields is a Web3 security firm specializing in manual smart contract audits, AI-powered vulnerability detection, and security automation across blockchain ecosystems. A contributor to the OWASP Smart Contract Top 10, CredShields protects leading protocols and enterprises through full-spectrum decentralized security solutions.

Users can watch the demo: https://lnk.credshields.com/checkmarx-demo

**Contact**

**CredShields**  
**marketing@credshields.com**

CredShields Joins Forces with Checkmarx to Bring Smart Contract Security to Enterprise AppSec Programs

Fortinet has warned of a new security flaw in FortiWeb that it said has been exploited in the wild.
The medium-severity vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-58034, carries a CVSS score of 6.7 out of a maximum of 10.0.
"An Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability [CWE-78] in FortiWeb may allow an authenticated attacker to execute

Vulnerability / Network Security

Fortinet has warned of a new security flaw in FortiWeb that it said has been exploited in the wild.

The medium-severity vulnerability, tracked as **CVE-2025-58034**, carries a CVSS score of 6.7 out of a maximum of 10.0.

"An Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability \[CWE-78\] in FortiWeb may allow an authenticated attacker to execute unauthorized code on the underlying system via crafted HTTP requests or CLI commands," the company said in a Tuesday advisory.

In other words, successful attacks require an attacker to first authenticate themselves through some other means and chain it with CVE-2025-58034 to execute arbitrary operating system commands.

It has been addressed in the following versions -

*   FortiWeb 8.0.0 through 8.0.1 (Upgrade to 8.0.2 or above)
*   FortiWeb 7.6.0 through 7.6.5 (Upgrade to 7.6.6 or above)
*   FortiWeb 7.4.0 through 7.4.10 (Upgrade to 7.4.11 or above)
*   FortiWeb 7.2.0 through 7.2.11 (Upgrade to 7.2.12 or above)
*   FortiWeb 7.0.0 through 7.0.11 (Upgrade to 7.0.12 or above)

The company credited Trend Micro researcher Jason McFadyen for reporting the flaw under its responsible disclosure policy.

Interestingly, the development comes days after Fortinet confirmed that it silently patched another critical FortiWeb vulnerability (CVE-2025-64446, CVSS score: 9.1) in version 8.0.2.

"We activated our PSIRT response and remediation efforts as soon as we learned of this matter, and those efforts remain ongoing," a Fortinet spokesperson told The Hacker News. "Fortinet diligently balances our commitment to the security of our customers and our culture of responsible transparency."

It's currently not clear why Fortinet opted to patch the flaws without releasing an advisory. But the move has left defenders at a disadvantage, effectively preventing them from mounting an adequate response.

"When popular technology vendors fail to communicate new security issues, they are issuing an invitation to attackers while choosing to keep that same information from defenders," VulnCheck noted last week.

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Fortinet Warns of New FortiWeb CVE-2025-58034 Vulnerability Exploited in the Wild

A mongoc_bulk_operation_t may read invalid memory if large options are passed.

**Exploitability Metrics**

Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.

Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.

Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.

Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.

User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.

**Vulnerable System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

**Subsequent System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

GHSA-mwcc-7vpp-xmv9: MongoDB driver extension affected by mongoc_bulk_operation_t's read of invalid memory

Unsafe Deserialization vulnerability in Modular Max Serve before 25.6, specifically when the "--experimental-enable-kvcache-agent" feature is used allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code.

GHSA-7xcv-9j6c-2fmc: Modular Max Serve has Unsafe Deserialization vulnerability

Host Header Injection vulnerability in Backdrop CMS 1.32.1 allows attackers to manipulate the Host header in password reset requests, leading to redirects to malicious domains and potential session hijacking via cookie injection.

GHSA-ffpg-gm3h-4p5p: Backdrop CMS Host Header Injection vulnerability

Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal core allows Object Injection. This issue affects Drupal core: from 8.0.0 before 10.4.9, from 10.5.0 before 10.5.6, from 11.0.0 before 11.1.9, from 11.2.0 before 11.2.8.

GHSA-m6vv-vcj8-w8m7: Drupal core allows Object Injection

Use of Web Browser Cache Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in Drupal Drupal core allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Drupal core: from 8.0.0 before 10.4.9, from 10.5.0 before 10.5.6, from 11.0.0 before 11.1.9, from 11.2.0 before 11.2.8.

GHSA-mhpg-hpj5-73r2: Drupal core allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels

User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information vulnerability in Drupal Drupal core allows Content Spoofing. This issue affects Drupal core: from 8.0.0 before 10.4.9, from 10.5.0 before 10.5.6, from 11.0.0 before 11.1.9, from 11.2.0 before 11.2.8.

GHSA-h89p-5896-f4q8: Drupal core allows Content Spoofing

Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in Drupal Drupal core allows Forceful Browsing. This issue affects Drupal core: from 8.0.0 before 10.4.9, from 10.5.0 before 10.5.6, from 11.0.0 before 11.1.9, from 11.2.0 before 11.2.8.

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#web