#xss

**What actions do customers need to take to protect themselves from this vulnerability?** The vulnerability has been mitigated by the latest change to the Azure Migrate Appliance. See here for information on how to ensure your Azure Migrate Appliance can get the latest Azure Migrate Agent and ConfigManager updates.

### Impact A Nautobot user with admin privileges can modify the `BANNER_TOP`, `BANNER_BOTTOM`, and `BANNER_LOGIN` configuration settings via the `/admin/constance/config/` endpoint. Normally these settings are used to provide custom banner text at the top and bottom of all Nautobot web pages (or specifically on the login page in the case of `BANNER_LOGIN`) but it was reported that an admin user can make use of these settings to inject arbitrary HTML, potentially exposing Nautobot users to security issues such as cross-site scripting (stored XSS). ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ Patches will be released as part of Nautobot 1.6.22 and 2.2.4. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ As [described in the Nautobot documentation](https://docs.nautobot.com/projects/core/en/stable/user-guide/administration/configuration/optional-settings/#administratively-configurable-settings), t...

### Summary A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability exists within the Formula virtual cell comments functionality. ### Details The nc-gui/components/virtual-cell/Formula.vue displays a v-html tag with the value of "urls" whose contents are processed by the function replaceUrlsWithLink(). This function recognizes the pattern URI::(XXX) and creates a hyperlink tag <a> with href=XXX. However, it leaves all the other contents outside of the pattern URI::(XXX) unchanged, which makes the evil users can create a malicious table with a formula field whose payload is <img src=1 onerror="malicious javascripts"URI::(XXX). The evil users then can share this table with others by enabling public viewing and the victims who open the shared link can be attacked. ### PoC Step 1: Attacker login the nocodb and creates a table with two fields, "T" and "F". The type of field "T" is "SingleLineText", and the type of the "F" is "Fomula" with the formula content {T} Step 2: The attacker sets the content...

Panel.SmokeLoader malware suffers from cross site request forgery, and cross site scripting vulnerabilities.

Panel.SmokeLoader malware suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

Esteghlal F.C.'s site suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

### Summary --- Attacker can upload a html file with malicious content. If user tries to open that file in browser malicious scripts can be executed leading Stored XSS(Cross-Site Script) attack. ### PoC --- NocoDB was configured using the Release Binary `Noco-macos-arm64`, and nocodb version 0.202.9 (currently the latest version) was used. binary hash infos: md5(164b727f287af56168bc16fba622d0b4) / sha256(43e8e97f4c5f5330613abe071a359f84e4514b7186f92954b678087c37b7832e) <img width="665" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/86613161/287472673-aeb60a02-2080-429f-8583-9f130ab62779.png"> ### 1. Run the binary to start the server and access the arbitrary table dashboard. <img width="830" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/86613161/287472852-98b2286e-ad66-45bf-b503-63780619d775.png"> Here, used the default `Features` table. ### 2. Click `+` in the table `field header` to add an `attachment` field. <img width="1173" alt="image" src="https://us...

Improper escaping of a custom field's name allows an attacker to inject HTML and, if CSP settings permit, achieve execution of arbitrary JavaScript when: - resolving or closing issues (bug_change_status_page.php) belonging to a project linking said custom field - viewing issues (view_all_bug_page.php) when the custom field is displayed as a column - printing issues (print_all_bug_page.php) when the custom field is displayed as a column ### Impact Cross-site scripting (XSS). ### Patches https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/447a521aae0f82f791b8116a14a20e276df739be ### Workarounds Ensure Custom Field Names do not contain HTML tags. ### References - https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=34432 - This is related to CVE-2020-25830 (same root cause, different affected pages)

Last week, the United States joined the U.K. and Australia in sanctioning and charging a Russian man named Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev as the leader of the infamous LockBit ransomware group. LockBit's leader "LockBitSupp" claims the feds named the wrong guy, saying the charges don't explain how they connected him to Khoroshev. This post examines the activities of Khoroshev's many alter egos on the cybercrime forums, and tracks the career of a gifted malware author who has written and sold malicious code for the past 14 years.

### Impact There is a possibility to save XSS code in province field in the Checkout and Address Book and then execute it on these pages. The problem occurs when you open the address step page in the checkout or edit the address in the address book. This only affects the base UI Shop provided by Sylius. ### Patches The issue is fixed in versions: 1.12.16, 1.13.1 and above. ### Workarounds 1. Create new file `assets/shop/sylius-province-field.js`: ```js // assets/shop/sylius-province-field.js function sanitizeInput(input) { const div = document.createElement('div'); div.textContent = input; return div.innerHTML; // Converts text content to plain HTML, stripping any scripts } const getProvinceInputValue = function getProvinceInputValue(valueSelector) { return valueSelector == undefined ? '' : `value="${sanitizeInput(valueSelector)}"`; }; $.fn.extend({ provinceField() { const countrySelect = $('select[name$="[countryCode]"]'); countrySelect.on('change', (event) ...