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The llama_index library version 0.12.33 sets the NLTK data directory to a subdirectory of the codebase by default, which is world-writable in multi-user environments. This configuration allows local users to overwrite, delete, or corrupt NLTK data files, leading to potential denial of service, data tampering, or privilege escalation. The vulnerability arises from the use of a shared cache directory instead of a user-specific one, making it susceptible to local data tampering and denial of service.

When tlsInsecure=False appears in a connection string, certificate validation is disabled. This vulnerability affects MongoDB Rust Driver versions prior to v3.2.5.

### Impact A logic flaw exists in the message command handler of CommandKit that affects how the `commandName` property is exposed to both middleware functions and command execution contexts when handling command aliases. When a message command is invoked using an alias, the `ctx.commandName` value reflects the alias rather than the canonical command name. This occurs in both middleware functions and within the command’s own run function. Developers who rely on `ctx.commandName` for logic that assumes it represents the canonical command identifier may introduce unintended behavior. In security-sensitive cases, such as middleware used for permission checks, rate limiting, or audit logging, this behavior could allow unauthorized command execution or inaccurate access control decisions. Slash commands and context menu commands are not affected. ### Patches Fixed in v1.2.0-rc.12. `ctx.commandName` now consistently returns the actual command name, regardless of the alias used to invoke it...

### Summary When using **filter** authorization, two edge cases could cause the policy compiler/authorizer to generate a permissive filter: 1. **Bypass policies whose condition can never pass at runtime** were compiled as `OR(AND(condition, compiled_policies), NOT(condition))`. If the condition could never be true at runtime, the `NOT(condition)` branch evaluated truthy and the overall expression became permissive. 2. **Runtime policy scenarios that reduce to “no checks are applicable”** (an empty SAT scenario) were treated as an empty clause and dropped instead of being treated as **`false`**, which could again produce an overly broad (permissive) filter. These bugs could allow reads to return records that should have been excluded by policy. ### Impact Projects that rely on **filter-based authorization** and define: * `bypass ... do ... end` blocks whose condition(s) are only resolvable at runtime and can never pass in a given request context, **or** * runtime checks tha...

Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in attribute table in QGIS QWC2 < 2025.08.14 allows an authorized attacker to plant arbitrary JavaScript code in the page.

### Summary Parsing certain malformed CEL expressions can cause the parser to panic, terminating the process. When the crate is used to evaluate untrusted expressions (e.g., user-supplied input over an API), an attacker can send crafted input to trigger a denial of service (DoS). ### Remediation Upgrade to 0.11.4 ```toml [dependencies] cel = "0.11.4" ``` ### PoC ```rust use cel::{Context, Program}; fn main() { let program = Program::compile("x(1,").unwrap(); let context = Context::default(); let value = program.execute(&context).unwrap(); assert_eq!(value, true.into()); } ``` ``` $ RUST_BACKTRACE=1 cargo run --bin example-simple Compiling num-traits v0.2.19 Compiling aho-corasick v1.1.3 Compiling regex-syntax v0.8.5 Compiling arbitrary v1.4.1 Compiling serde v1.0.219 Compiling thiserror v1.0.69 Compiling regex-automata v0.4.9 Compiling chrono v0.4.41 Compiling regex v1.11.1 Compiling cel v0.10.0 (/home/john/git/cel-rust/cel) warning:...

# Escape of VM Context gives access to process level functionality ## Summary Happy DOM v19 and lower contains a security vulnerability that puts the owner system at the risk of RCE (Remote Code Execution) attacks. A Node.js VM Context is not an isolated environment, and if the user runs untrusted JavaScript code within the Happy DOM VM Context, it may escape the VM and get access to process level functionality. What the attacker can get control over depends on if the process is using ESM or CommonJS. With CommonJS the attacker can get hold of the `require()` function to import modules. Happy DOM has JavaScript evaluation enabled by default. This may not be obvious to the consumer of Happy DOM and can potentially put the user at risk if untrusted code is executed within the environment. ## Reproduce ### CommonJS (Possible to get hold of require) ```javascript const { Window } = require('happy-dom'); const window = new Window({ console }); window.document.write(` <script> ...

### Impact A vulnerable node can be made to consume very large amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node. In order to carry out the attack, the attacker establishes a peer connections to the victim, and sends a malicious `GetBlockHeadersRequest` message with a `count` of `0`, using the `Parallax` protocol. In `descendants := chain.GetHeadersFrom(num+count-1, count-1)`, the value of `count-1` is passed to the function `GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64)` as parameter `count`. Due to integer overflow, `UINT64_MAX` value is then passed as the `count` argument to function `GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64)`. This allows an attacker to bypass `maxHeadersServe` and request all headers from the latest block back to the genesis block. ### Patches The fix has been included in the Parallax client version `0.1.4` and onwards. The vulnerability was patched in: https://github.com/microstack-tech/parallax/commit/f759e9090aaf00a43c616d7cbd133...

### Summary When running Astro in on-demand rendering mode using a adapter such as the node adapter it is possible to maliciously send an `X-Forwarded-Host` header that is reflected when using the recommended `Astro.url` property as there is no validation that the value is safe. ### Details Astro reflects the value in `X-Forwarded-Host` in output when using `Astro.url` without any validation. It is common for web servers such as nginx to route requests via the `Host` header, and forward on other request headers. As such as malicious request can be sent with both a `Host` header and an `X-Forwarded-Host` header where the values do not match and the `X-Forwarded-Host` header is malicious. Astro will then return the malicious value. This could result in any usages of the `Astro.url` value in code being manipulated by a request. For example if a user follows guidance and uses `Astro.url` for a canonical link the canonical link can be manipulated to another site. It is not impossible to...

### Summary The ReadFileTool in Flowise does not restrict file path access, allowing authenticated attackers to exploit this vulnerability to read arbitrary files from the file system, potentially leading to remote command execution. ### Details Flowise supports providing ReadFileTool for large models to read files in the server's file system. The implementation of this tool is located at packages/components/nodes/tools/ReadFile/ReadFile.ts. ``` /** * Class for reading files from the disk. Extends the StructuredTool * class. */ export class ReadFileTool extends StructuredTool { static lc_name() { return 'ReadFileTool' } schema = z.object({ file_path: z.string().describe('name of file') }) as any name = 'read_file' description = 'Read file from disk' store: BaseFileStore constructor({ store }: ReadFileParams) { super(...arguments) this.store = store } async _call({ file_path }: z.infer<typeof this.sche...