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### Summary Attackers with commit access to the default branch of a repo using Renovate could manipulate helmv3 registryAliases to execute arbitrary commands. ### Details Since [#26848](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/pull/26848), `registryAliases` has become mergeable. This means that the helmv3 manager started honoring its value and uses a `helm repo add <key> <parameters>` command for each defined alias. See source code: https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/blob/23f3df6216375cb5bcfe027b0faee304f877f891/lib/modules/manager/helmv3/artifacts.ts#L80 The key was not quoted, leading to the ability to use variable references (`$FOO`) in it and have them printed by Renovate on the pull request, or even running any shell commands. ### PoC Inside a repository where Renovate runs, add a Helm chart with an outdated dependency, for example: test-chart/Chart.yaml: ``` apiVersion: v2 name: redis version: 1.0.0 dependencies: - name: redis version: 18.13.10 repository: oc...

### Summary When using serveStatic with deno, it is possible to directory traverse where main.ts is located. My environment is configured as per this tutorial https://hono.dev/getting-started/deno ### PoC ```bash $ tree . ├── deno.json ├── deno.lock ├── main.ts ├── README.md └── static └── a.txt ``` source ```jsx import { Hono } from 'https://deno.land/x/hono@v4.2.6/mod.ts' import { serveStatic } from 'https://deno.land/x/hono@v4.2.6/middleware.ts' const app = new Hono() app.use('/static/*', serveStatic({ root: './' })) Deno.serve(app.fetch) ``` request ```bash curl localhost:8000/static/%2e%2e/main.ts ``` response is content of main.ts ### Impact Unexpected files are retrieved.

Versions of the package mysql2 before 3.9.7 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due to improper sanitization of the timezone parameter in the readCodeFor function by calling a native MySQL Server date/time function.

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may be able to launch containers that bypass the mountable secrets policy enforced by the ServiceAccount admission plugin when using containers, init containers, and ephemeral containers with the envFrom field populated. The policy ensures pods running with a service account may only reference secrets specified in the service account’s secrets field. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if the ServiceAccount admission plugin and the kubernetes.io/enforce-mountable-secrets annotation are used together with containers, init containers, and ephemeral containers with the envFrom field populated.

### Summary Using a version of `sqlparse` that has a security vulnerability and no way to update in current version of dbt core. Snyk recommends using `sqlparse==0.5` but this causes a conflict with dbt. Snyk states the issues is a recursion error: `SNYK-PYTHON-SQLPARSE-6615674`. ### Details Dependency conflict error message: ```sh The conflict is caused by: The user requested sqlparse==0.5 dbt-core 1.7.10 depends on sqlparse<0.5 and >=0.2.3 ``` Resolution was to pin `sqlparse >=0.5.0, <0.6.0` in `dbt-core`, patched in 1.6.13 and 1.7.13. ### PoC From Snyk: ```python import sqlparse sqlparse.parse('[' * 10000 + ']' * 10000) ``` ### Impact Snyk classifies it as high 7.5/10. ### Patches The bug has been fixed in [dbt-core v1.6.13](https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/releases/tag/v1.6.13) and [dbt-core v1.7.13](https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/releases/tag/v1.7.13). ### Mitigations Bump `dbt-core` 1.6 and 1.7 dependencies to 1.6.13 and 1.7.13 respectively

Sylius 1.12.13 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via the "Province" field in Address Book.

The git hook feature in Gitea 1.1.0 through 1.12.5 allows for authenticated remote code execution.

### Impact A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where containers were incorrectly started with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities, creating an atypical Linux environment and enabling programs with inheritable file capabilities to elevate those capabilities to the permitted set during `execve(2)`. Normally, when executable programs have specified permitted file capabilities, otherwise unprivileged users and processes can execute those programs and gain the specified file capabilities up to the bounding set. Due to this bug, containers which included executable programs with inheritable file capabilities allowed otherwise unprivileged users and processes to additionally gain these inheritable file capabilities up to the container's bounding set. Containers which use Linux users and groups to perform privilege separation inside the container are most directly impacted. This bug did not affect the container security sandbox as the inheritable set never contained more ...

### Observations The Hoppscotch desktop app takes multiple precautions to be secure against arbitrary JavaScript and system command execution. It does not render user-controlled HTML or Markdown, uses Tauri instead of Electron, and sandboxes pre-request scripts with a simple yet secure implementation using web workers. Unfortunately, web workers are not available in a pure Node.js application like Hoppscotch CLI. That is why the [@hoppscotch/js-sandbox](https://github.com/hoppscotch/hoppscotch/tree/main/packages/hoppscotch-js-sandbox) package also provides a Javascript sandbox that uses the Node.js `vm` module. However, the `vm` module is not safe for sandboxing untrusted Javascript code, as stated [in the documentation](https://nodejs.org/api/vm.html#vm-executing-javascript). This is because [code inside the vm context can break out](https://thegoodhacker.com/posts/the-unsecure-node-vm-module/) if it can get a hold of any reference to an object created outside of the vm. In the cas...

### Summary Get a valid API token, make sure you can access api functions, then replace string on my PoC code, Test on offical OVA image, it's a old version 23.9.1, but this vulerable is also exists on latest version 24.2.0 ### Details in file `api_functions.php`, line 307 for function list_devices ```php $order = $request->get('order'); $type = $request->get('type'); $query = $request->get('query'); $param = []; if (empty($order)) { $order = 'hostname'; } if (stristr($order, ' desc') === false && stristr($order, ' asc') === false) { $order = 'd.`' . $order . '` ASC'; } /* ... */ $devices = []; $dev_query = "SELECT $select FROM `devices` AS d $join WHERE $sql GROUP BY d.`hostname` ORDER BY $order"; foreach (dbFetchRows($dev_query, $param) as $device) { ``` The "order" parameter is obtained from $request. After performing a string check, the value is directly incorporated into an SQL statement and concatenated, resulting in...