ghsa

When an application passed an attacker controlled float poing number into the `toFixed()` function, it might lead to high CPU consumption and a potential Denial of Service. Small numbers go through this call stack: `NativeNumber.numTo > DToA.JS_dtostr > DToA.JS_dtoa > DToA.pow5mult` where `pow5mult` attempts to raise `5` to a ridiculous power. Example code: `(4.47118444E-314).toFixed(2)`

## Summary Workspace Agent manifests containing sensitive values were logged in plaintext unsanitized ## Details By default Workspace Agent logs are redirected to [stderr](https://linux.die.net/man/3/stderr) https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/a8862be546f347c59201e2219d917e28121c0edb/cli/agent.go#L432-L439 [Workspace Agent Manifests](https://coder.com/docs/reference/agent-api/schemas#agentsdkmanifest) containing sensitive environment variables were logged insecurely https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/7beb95fd56d2f790502e236b64906f8eefb969bd/agent/agent.go#L1090 An attacker with limited local access to the Coder Workspace (VM, K8s Pod etc.) or a third-party system ([SIEM](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/security_information_and_event_management_tool), logging stack) could access those logs This behavior opened room for unauthorized access and privilege escalation ## Impact Impact varies depending on the environment variables set in a given workspace ## Patches [Fix](https://g...

## Summary A security fix is now available for Step CA that resolves a vulnerability affecting deployments configured with the SSHPOP provisioner. All operators running these provisioners should upgrade to the latest release (`v0.29.0`) immediately. The issue was discovered and responsibly disclosed by a research team during a security review. There is no evidence of active exploitation. To limit exploitation risk during a coordinated disclosure window, we are withholding detailed technical information for now. A full write-up will be published in several weeks. --- ## Embargo List If your organization runs Step CA in production and would like advance, embargoed notification of future security updates, visit https://u.step.sm/disclosure to request inclusion on our embargo list. --- ## Acknowledgements This issue was identified and reported by Gabriel Departout and Andy Russon, from [AMOSSYS](http://amossys.fr/). This audit was sponsored by [ANSSI](https://cyber.gouv.fr/) (Fren...

Due to errors in parsing shell commands related to $IFS and short CLI flags, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code read-only validation and trigger arbitrary code execution. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to [RyotaK](hxxps://ryotak.net) from [GMO Flatt Security Inc.](hxxps://flatt.tech/en/) for reporting this issue!

We believe that we have discovered a potential security vulnerability in ImageMagick’s Magick++ layer that manifests when `Options::fontFamily` is invoked with an empty string. **Vulnerability Details** - Clearing a font family calls `RelinquishMagickMemory` on `_drawInfo->font`, freeing the font string but leaving `_drawInfo->font` pointing to freed memory while `_drawInfo->family` is set to that (now-invalid) pointer. Any later cleanup or reuse of `_drawInfo->font` re-frees or dereferences dangling memory. - `DestroyDrawInfo` and other setters (`Options::font`, `Image::font`) assume `_drawInfo->font` remains valid, so destruction or subsequent updates trigger crashes or heap corruption. ```cpp if (family_.length() == 0) { _drawInfo->family=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(_drawInfo->font); DestroyString(RemoveImageOption(imageInfo(),"family")); } ``` - **CWE-416 (Use After Free):** `_drawInfo->font` is left dangling yet still reachable through the Options object. - **CW...

### Impact When ran in sse or streaming mode (--transport), the Docker MCP Gateway is vulnerable to a DNS rebinding attack. Vulnerability allows for Browser-Based exploitation of any MCP servers that are executing within the Docker MCP Gateway. Any tools or other features exposed by MCP servers can be manipulated by an attacker who is able to get a victim to visit a malicious website, or if a victim is served a malicious advertisement. The MCP Gateway is not prone to this attack when started in its default stdio mode, which does not listen on any network ports. ### Patches Patch available in version v0.28.0 ### Workarounds Do not start the MCP gateway in sse or streaming mode (use default stdio)

### Impact Javascript code can be injected by malicious editors for a stored XSS attack if the standard Content Security Policy is disabled. ### Workaround If the standard CSP rules are active (default in production mode), an exploit isn't possible. ### Credits Lwin Min Oo <lwinminoo2244@gmail.com>

A fix was made in BlazeMeter Jenkins Plugin version 4.27 to allow users only with certain permissions to see the list of available resources like credential IDs, bzm workspaces and bzm project Ids. Prior to this fix, anyone could see this list as a dropdown on the Jenkins UI.

FeehiCMS version 2.1.1 has a Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted File Upload in Ad Management. FeehiCMS version 2.1.1 allows authenticated remote attackers to upload files that the server later executes (or stores in an executable location) without sufficient validation, sanitization, or execution restrictions. An authenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted PHP file and cause the application or web server to execute it, resulting in remote code execution (RCE).

SQL injection vulnerability in long2ice assyncmy thru 0.2.10 allows attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via crafted dict keys.