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CVE-2023-49355: GitHub - jqlang/jq at 88f01a741c8d63c4d1b5bc3ef61520c6eb93edaa

decToString in decNumber/decNumber.c in jq 88f01a7 has a one-byte out-of-bounds write via the " []-1.2e-1111111111" input.

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#js#git#docker
CVE-2023-50465: Releases · monicahq/monica

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Monica (aka MonicaHQ) 4.0.0 via an SVG document uploaded by an authenticated user.

CVE-2023-48311: Any image allowed by default

dockerspawner is a tool to spawn JupyterHub single user servers in Docker containers. Users of JupyterHub deployments running DockerSpawner starting with 0.11.0 without specifying `DockerSpawner.allowed_images` configuration allow users to launch _any_ pullable docker image, instead of restricting to only the single configured image, as intended. This issue has been addressed in commit `3ba4b665b` which has been included in dockerspawner release version 13. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should explicitly set `DockerSpawner.allowed_images` to a non-empty list containing only the default image will result in the intended default behavior.

GHSA-hfgr-h3vc-p6c2: DockerSpawner allows any image by default

### Impact Users of JupyterHub deployments running DockerSpawner starting with 0.11.0 without specifying `DockerSpawner.allowed_images` configuration allow users to launch _any_ pullable image, instead of restricting to only the single configured image, as intended. ### Patches Upgrade to DockerSpawner 13. ### Workarounds Explicitly setting `DockerSpawner.allowed_images` to a non-empty list containing only the default image will result in the intended default behavior: ```python c.DockerSpawner.image = "your-image" c.DockerSpawner.allowed_images = ["your-image"] ```

Docker cgroups Container Escape

This Metasploit exploit module takes advantage of a Docker image which has either the privileged flag, or SYS_ADMIN Linux capability. If the host kernel is vulnerable, its possible to escape the Docker image and achieve root on the host operating system. A vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel's cgroup_release_agent_write in the kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c function. This flaw, under certain circumstances, allows the use of the cgroups v1 release_agent feature to escalate privileges and bypass the namespace isolation unexpectedly.

CVE-2023-41913: Releases · strongswan/strongswan

strongSwan before 5.9.12 has a buffer overflow and possible unauthenticated remote code execution via a DH public value that exceeds the internal buffer in charon-tkm's DH proxy. The earliest affected version is 5.3.0. An attack can occur via a crafted IKE_SA_INIT message.

GHSA-6fwg-jrfw-ff7p: Traefik docker container using 100% CPU

### Summary The traefik docker container uses 100% CPU when it serves as its own backend, which is an automatically generated route resulting from the Docker integration in the default configuration. ### Details While attempting to set up Traefik to handle traffic for Docker containers, I observed in the webUI a rule with the following information: `Host(traefik-service) | webwebsecure | traefik-service@docker | traefik-service` I assumed that this is something internal; however, I wondered why it would have a host rule on the web entrypoint configured. So I have send a request with that hostname with `curl -v --resolve "traefik-service:80:xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx" http://traefik-service`. That made my whole server unresponsive. I assume the name comes from a docker container with that name, traefik itself: ``` localhost ~ # docker ps CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS ...

GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm: Traefik incorrectly processes fragment in the URL, leads to Authorization Bypass

### Summary When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query. When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions. ### Details For example, we have this Nginx configuration: ``` location /admin { deny all; return 403; } ``` This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin This won’t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment. However, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become /%23/../admin And allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy. Here is a diagram to summarize the attack: ![i...

CVE-2023-47633: Uses 100% CPU after request to with host `traefik-service`

Traefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. The traefik docker container uses 100% CPU when it serves as its own backend, which is an automatically generated route resulting from the Docker integration in the default configuration. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.10.6 and 3.0.0-beta5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

CVE-2023-47106: Incorrect processing of fragment in the URL leads to Authorization Bypass

Traefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates RFC 7230 because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query. When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions. This vulnerability has been addressed in versions 2.10.6 and 3.0.0-beta5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.