#docker

### Impact Some cache backends allow configuring their credentials by setting secrets directly as attribute values in `cache-to/cache-from` configuration. If this was done by the user, these secure values could be captured together with OpenTelemetry trace as part of the arguments and flags for the traced CLI command. Passing tokens to Github cache backend via environment variables or using registry authentication is not affected. If you passed a token value like this and use a custom OpenTelemetry collector for computing traces you should make sure that your traces are kept secure. OpenTelemetry traces are also saved in BuildKit daemon's history records. ### Patches Issue has been fixed in Buildx v0.21.3 or newer. ### Workarounds Avoid passing cache backend credentials with CLI arguments. Make sure access to traces and BuildKit history records is kept secure.

### Summary A mock API configuration for static file serving following the same approach presented in the [documentation page](https://mockoon.com/tutorials/create-endpoint-serving-static-file/), where the server filename is generated via templating features from user input is vulnerable to Path Traversal and LFI, allowing an attacker to get any file in the mock server filesystem. The issue may be particularly relevant in cloud hosted server instances ### Details In `sendFileWithCallback`([code](https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/1ed31c4059d7f757f6cb2a43e10dc81b0d9c55a9/packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts#L1400)) and `sendFile`([code](https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/1ed31c4059d7f757f6cb2a43e10dc81b0d9c55a9/packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts#L1551)) the `filePath` variable is parsed using `TemplateParser` ```js let filePath = TemplateParser({ shouldOmitDataHelper: false, // replace backslashes with forward slashes, but not if f...

Cisco Talos has discovered an active exploitation of CVE-2024-4577 by an attacker in order to gain access to the victim's machines and carry out post-exploitation activities.

### Summary A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability in OpenDJ has been discovered that causes the server to become unresponsive to all LDAP requests without crashing or restarting. This issue occurs when an alias loop exists in the LDAP database. If an `ldapsearch` request is executed with alias dereferencing set to "always" on this alias entry, the server stops responding to all future requests. I have confirmed this issue using the latest OpenDJ version (9.2), both with the official OpenDJ Docker image and a local OpenDJ server running on my Windows 10 machine. ### Details An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability using a single crafted `ldapsearch` request. Fortunately, the server can be restarted without data corruption. While this attack requires the existence of an alias loop, I am uncertain whether such loops can be easily created in specific environments or if the method can be adapted to execute other DoS attacks more easily. ### PoC (Steps to Reproduce) 1. ...

TopSec data leak: 7000+ documents expose potential Chinese government surveillance and censorship practices. Learn about the key findings…

Overview OpenFGA v1.8.4 or previous (Helm chart < openfga-0.2.22, docker < v.1.8.5) are vulnerable to authorization bypass when certain Check and ListObject calls are executed. Am I Affected? If you are using OpenFGA v1.8.4 or previous, specifically under the following conditions, you are affected by this authorization bypass vulnerability: - Calling Check API or ListObjects with a model that has a relation [directly assignable](https://openfga.dev/docs/concepts#what-is-a-directly-related-user-type) to both [public access](https://openfga.dev/docs/concepts#what-is-type-bound-public-access) AND [userset](https://openfga.dev/docs/concepts#what-is-a-user) with the [same type](https://openfga.dev/docs/concepts#what-is-a-type), and - A type bound public access tuple is assigned to an object, and - userset tuple is not assigned to the same object, and - Check request's user field is a userset that has the same type as the type bound public access tuple's user type Fix Upgrade to v1.8.5. ...

Researchers earned a $50,500 Bug Bounty after uncovering a critical supply chain flaw in a newly acquired firm,…

### Summary The application is vulnerable to parameter injection in database connection strings, which allows an attacker to read local files on the machine the application is running on. ### Details The application uses string concatenation to build database connection URIs which are then passed to corresponding libraries responsible for setting up the database connections. This string concatenation is done unsafely and without escaping or encoding the user input. This allows an user, in many cases, to inject arbitrary parameters into the URI string. These parameters can be potentially dangerous depending on the libraries used. One of these dangerous parameters is `allowAllFiles` in the library `github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql`. Should this be set to `true`, the library enables running the `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` query on any file on the host machine (in this case, the machine that WhoDB is running on). Source: https://github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql/blob/7403860363ca112af503b4612...

### Summary While the application only displays Sqlite3 databases present in the directory `/db`, there is no path traversal prevention in place. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to open any Sqlite3 database present on the host machine that the application is running on. ### Details WhoDB allows users to connect to Sqlite3 databases. By default, the databases must be present in `/db/` (or alternatively `./tmp/` if development mode is enabled). Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L14-L20 If no databases are present in the default directory, the UI indicates that the user is unable to open any databases:  The database file is an user-controlled value. This value is used in `.Join()` with the default directory, in order to get the full path of the database file to open. Source: https://github.co...

By integrating security into CI/CD, applying automated policies, and supporting developers with the right processes and tools, infosec teams can increase efficiency and build secure software.