#git

**Summary** There is a critical vulnerability on xmlseclibs [CVE-2025-66475](https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/security/advisories/GHSA-c4cc-x928-vjw9), a dependency of php-saml Update to the following versions of php-saml which forces the use of patched versions of xmlseclibs: - [2.21.1](https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/php-saml/releases/tag/2.21.1) - [3.8.1](https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/php-saml/releases/tag/3.8.1) - [4.3.1](https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/php-saml/releases/tag/4.3.1) **Impact** Signature Wrapping Vulnerabilities allows an attacker to impersonate a user.

### Summary A flaw in the handling of recovery codes for **app-based multi-factor authentication** allows the same recovery code to be reused indefinitely. This issue does **not** affect email-based MFA. It also only applies when recovery codes are enabled. ### Impact If an attacker gains access to both the user's password and their recovery codes, they can repeatedly complete MFA without the user's app-based second factor. This weakens the expected security of MFA by turning recovery codes into a static, long-term bypass method.

### Summary Siyuan is vulnerable to RCE. The issue stems from a "Zip Slip" vulnerability during zip file extraction, combined with the ability to overwrite system executables and subsequently trigger their execution. ### Steps to reproduce 1. Authenticate 2. Create zip slip payload with path traversal entry `../../../../opt/siyuan/startup.sh`. startup.sh contains malicious code like: ```bash #!/bin/sh echo 'you have been pwned' > /siyuan/workspace/data/pwned.txt echo "pandoc 3.1.0" ``` 3. Upload zip to workspace via `/api/file/putFile` 4. Extract zip via `/api/archive/unzip`, overwrites the existing executable `startup.sh` while maintaining the +x permission 5. Trigger execution by calling `/api/setting/setExport` with `pandocBin=/opt/siyuan/startup.sh`. This calls `IsValidPandocBin()` which executes `startup.sh --version` that outputs "pandoc 3.1.0" and executes any arbitrary malicious code

### Summary Function [**importZipMd**](https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/blob/dae6158860cc704e353454565c96e874278c6f47/kernel/api/import.go#L190) is vulnerable to **ZipSlip** which allows an authenticated user to overwrite files on the system. ### Details An authenticated user with access to the import functionality in notes is able to overwrite any file on the system, the vulnerable function is [**importZipMd**](https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/blob/dae6158860cc704e353454565c96e874278c6f47/kernel/api/import.go#L190), this can escalate to full code execution under some circumstances, for example using the official **docker image** it is possible to overwrite **entrypoint.sh** and after a container restart it will execute the changed code causing remote code execution. ### PoC Code used to generate the ZipSlip: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import sys, base64, zipfile, io, time def prepare_zipslip(filename): orgfile1 = open('Test.md','rb').read() payload = open(...

### Summary The patch deployed against CVE-2025-62156 is ineffective against malicious archives containing symbolic links. ### Details The untar code that handles symbolic links in archives is unsafe. Concretely, the computation of the link's target and the subsequent check are flawed: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/5291e0b01f94ba864f96f795bb500f2cfc5ad799/workflow/executor/executor.go#L1034-L1037 ### PoC 1. Create a malicious archive containing two files: a symbolik link with path "./work/foo" and target "/etc", and a normal text file with path "./work/foo/hostname". 2. Deploy a workflow like the one in https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-p84v-gxvw-73pf with the malicious archive mounted at /work/tmp. 3. Submit the workflow and wait for its execution. 4. Connect to the corresponding pod and observe that the file "/etc/hostname" was altered by the untar operation performed on the malicious archive. The attacker can hence alter arbitr...

Arbitrary code execution from cookie config. If dynamic cookies are enabled (ie there exists a schema for cookies), the cookie config is injected into the compiled route without first being sanitised. Availability of this exploit is generally low, as it requires write access to either the Elysia app's source code (in which case the vulnerability is meaningless) or write access to the cookie config (perhaps where it is assumed to be provisioned by the environment). However when combined with GHSA-hxj9-33pp-j2cc, this vulnerability allows for a full RCE chain. ### Impact - aot enabled (default) - cookie schema passed to route - Cookie config controllable eg. via env Example of vulnerable code ```js new Elysia({ cookie: { secrets: `' + console.log('pwned from secrets') + '` }, }) .get("/", () => "hello world", { cookie: t.Cookie({ foo: t.Any(), }), }) ``` POC: https://github.com/sportshead/elysia-poc ### Patches Patched by 1.4.17 (https://github.com/elysiajs/elysia/pul...

Prototype pollution vulnerability in `mergeDeep` after merging results of two standard schema validations with the same key. Due to the ordering of merging, there must be an `any` type that is set as a `standalone` guard, to allow for the `__proto__` prop to be merged. When combined with GHSA-8vch-m3f4-q8jf this allows for a full RCE by an attacker. ### Impact Routes with more than 2 standalone schema validation, eg. zod Example vulnerable code: ```typescript import { Elysia } from "elysia" import * as z from "zod" const app = new Elysia() .guard({ schema: "standalone", body: z.object({ data: z.any() }) }) .post("/", ({ body }) => ({ body, win: {}.foo }), { body: z.object({ data: z.object({ messageId: z.string("pollute-me"), }) }) }) ``` ### Patches Patched by 1.4.17 (https://github.com/elysiajs/elysia/pull/1564) Reference commit: - https://github.com/elysiajs/elysia/pull/1564/commits/26935bf76ebc43b4a43d48b173fc853de43bb51e - https://github.com/elysiaj...

Four distinct threat activity clusters have been observed leveraging a malware loader known as CastleLoader, strengthening the previous assessment that the tool is offered to other threat actors under a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model. The threat actor behind CastleLoader has been assigned the name GrayBravo by Recorded Future's Insikt Group, which was previously tracking it as TAG-150.

Google AI systems (Gemini Enterprise) had a critical 'GeminiJack' security flaw allowing attackers to steal Gmail, Docs, and Calendar data with no clicks.

## Summary An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in Taguette that allows attackers to craft malicious URLs that redirect users to arbitrary external websites after authentication. This can be exploited for phishing attacks where victims believe they are interacting with a trusted Taguette instance but are redirected to a malicious site designed to steal credentials or deliver malware. **Severity:** Medium to High --- ## Details The application accepts a user-controlled `next` parameter and uses it directly in HTTP redirects without any validation. The vulnerable code is located in two places: ### Location 1: Login Handler (`taguette/web/views.py`, lines 140-144) ```python def _go_to_next(self): next_ = self.get_argument('next', '') if not next_: next_ = self.reverse_url('index') return self.redirect(next_) # ← No validation of next_ parameter ``` This method is called after successful login (line 132) and when an already-logged-in user visits the login pa...