#git

Researchers at Acronis have discovered a new campaign called Boto Cor-de-Rosa, where the Astaroth banking malware spreads like a worm through WhatsApp Web to steal contact lists and banking credentials.

## LFS Lock Force-Delete Authorization Bypass ### Summary An authorization bypass in the LFS lock deletion endpoint allows any authenticated user with repository write access to delete locks owned by other users by setting the `force` flag. The vulnerable code path processes force deletions before retrieving user context, bypassing ownership validation entirely. ### Severity - **CWE-863:** Incorrect Authorization - **CVSS 3.1:** 5.4 (Medium) — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L` ### Affected Code **File:** `pkg/web/git_lfs.go` **Function:** `serviceLfsLocksDelete` (lines 831–945) **Endpoint:** `POST /<repo>.git/info/lfs/locks/:lockID/unlock` The control flow processes `req.Force` at line 905 before retrieving user context at line 919: ```go // Line 905-916: Force delete executes immediately without authorization if req.Force { if err := datastore.DeleteLFSLock(ctx, dbx, repo.ID(), lockID); err != nil { // ... } renderJSON(w, http.StatusOK, l) ...

React Router (or Remix v2) is vulnerable to CSRF attacks on document POST requests to UI routes when using server-side route `action` handlers in [Framework Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#framework), or when using React Server Actions in the new unstable RSC modes. > [!NOTE] > This does not impact applications that use [Declarative Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#declarative) (`<BrowserRouter>`) or [Data Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#data) (`createBrowserRouter`/`<RouterProvider>`).

React Router (and Remix v1/v2) SPA open navigation redirects originating from loaders or actions in [Framework Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#framework), [Data Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#data), or the unstable RSC modes can result in unsafe URLs causing unintended javascript execution on the client. This is only an issue if developers are creating redirect paths from untrusted content or via an open redirect. > [!NOTE] > This does not impact applications that use [Declarative Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#declarative) (`<BrowserRouter>`).

A XSS vulnerability exists in in React Router's `<ScrollRestoration>` API in [Framework Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#framework) when using the `getKey`/`storageKey` props during Server-Side Rendering which could allow arbitrary JavaScript execution during SSR if untrusted content is used to generate the keys. > [!NOTE] > This does not impact applications if developers have [disabled server-side rendering](https://reactrouter.com/how-to/spa) in Framework Mode, or if they are using [Declarative Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#declarative) (`<BrowserRouter>`) or [Data Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#data) (`createBrowserRouter`/`<RouterProvider>`).

An attacker-supplied path can be crafted so that when a React Router application navigates to it via `navigate()`, `<Link>`, or `redirect()`, the app performs a navigation/redirect to an external URL. This is only an issue if developers pass untrusted content into navigation paths in their application code.

If applications use `createFileSessionStorage()` from `@react-router/node` (or `@remix-run/node`/`@remix-run/deno` in Remix v2) with an [**unsigned cookie**](https://reactrouter.com/explanation/sessions-and-cookies#signing-cookies), it is possible for an attacker to cause the session to try to read/write from a location outside the specified session file directory. The success of the attack would depend on the permissions of the web server process to access those files. Read files cannot be returned directly to the attacker. Session file reads would only succeed if the file matched the expected session file format. If the file matched the session file format, the data would be populated into the server side session but not directly returned to the attacker unless the application logic returned specific session information.

A XSS vulnerability exists in in React Router's `meta()`/`<Meta>` APIs in [Framework Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#framework) when generating `script:ld+json` tags which could allow arbitrary JavaScript execution during SSR if untrusted content is used to generate the tag. > [!NOTE] > This does not impact applications using [Declarative Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#declarative) (`<BrowserRouter>`) or [Data Mode](https://reactrouter.com/start/modes#data) (`createBrowserRouter`/`<RouterProvider>`).

### TL;DR This vulnerability affects all Kirby sites where user permissions are configured to prevent specific role(s) from performing write actions, specifically by disabling the `update` permission with the intent to prevent modifications to site content. If developers haven't configured any user permissions that deviate from the default of allowing all actions, their site is *not* affected. ---- ### Introduction Kirby allows to restrict the permissions of specific user roles. Users of that role can only perform permitted actions. Permissions for updating content have already existed and could be configured for each model type, but were not enforced by Kirby's API backend code during operations to the changes version. The changes version is the content version that contains unsaved changes of existing models (pages, users, files or the site). ### Impact The missing permission checks allowed attackers with Panel access to create or discard a changes version or update the cont...

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust Redis connections by repeatedly opening and closing browser tabs on any NiceGUI application using Redis-backed storage. Connections are never released, leading to service degradation when Redis hits its connection limit. **NiceGUI continues accepting new connections - errors are logged but the app stays up with broken storage functionality.** ### Details When a client disconnects, tab_id is cleared at https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/main/nicegui/client.py#L307 before delete() is called at https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/main/nicegui/client.py#L319. By then tab_id is None, so there's no way to find the RedisPersistentDict and call https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/main/nicegui/persistence/redis_persistent_dict.py#L92. Each tab creates a RedisPersistentDict with a Redis client connection and a pubsub subscription. These are never closed, accumulating until Redis maxclients is reached. ### PoC #### Test ...