#git

In 2025, receiving a .vbs “invoice” is like finding a floppy disk in your mailbox. It's retro, suspicious, and definitely not something you should run.

Behind every click, there’s a risk waiting to be tested. A simple ad, email, or link can now hide something dangerous. Hackers are getting smarter, using new tools to sneak past filters and turn trusted systems against us. But security teams are fighting back. They’re building faster defenses, better ways to spot attacks, and stronger systems to keep people safe. It’s a constant race — every

Cybersecurity researchers are calling attention to a large-scale spam campaign that has flooded the npm registry with thousands of fake packages since early 2024 as part of a likely financially motivated effort. "The packages were systematically published over an extended period, flooding the npm registry with junk packages that survived in the ecosystem for almost two years," Endor Labs

Singapore, Singapore, 13th November 2025, CyberNewsWire

Singapore, Singapore, 13th November 2025, CyberNewsWire

### Impact In affected versions, a specially crafted Brotli-compressed envelope can cause Bugsink to spend excessive CPU time in decompression, leading to denial of service. This can be done if the DSN is known, which it is in many common setups (JavaScript, Mobile Apps). ### Patches Patched in Bugsink 2.0.6 ### References The vulnerability in this security advisory is similar to, but distinct from, another brotli-related problem in Bugsink: https://github.com/bugsink/bugsink/security/advisories/GHSA-fc2v-vcwj-269v

The software supply chain has evolved dramatically in recent years. Today's applications integrate countless components—from open source libraries and container images to AI models and training datasets. Each element represents a potential security risk that organizations must understand, verify, and continuously monitor. As supply chain attacks increase in frequency and sophistication, enterprises need comprehensive solutions that provide both artifact integrity and deep visibility into their software dependencies.Red Hat's latest releases of Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer 1.3 and Red Hat

### Description The `Request` class improperly interprets some `PATH_INFO` in a way that leads to representing some URLs with a path that doesn't start with a `/`. This can allow bypassing some access control rules that are built with this `/`-prefix assumption. ### Resolution The `Request` class now ensures that URL paths always start with a `/`. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/9962b91b12bb791322fa73836b350836b6db7cac) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Andrew Atkinson for discovering the issue, Chris Smith for reporting it and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

### Summary A vulnerability was identified in the `evervault-go` SDK’s attestation verification logic that may allow incomplete documents to pass validation. This may cause the client to trust an enclave operator that does not meet expected integrity guarantees. The exploitability of this issue is limited in Evervault-hosted environments as an attacker would require the pre-requisite ability to serve requests from specific evervault domain names, following from our ACME challenge based TLS certificate acquisition pipeline. The vulnerability primarily affects applications which only check PCR8. Though the efficacy is also reduced for applications that check all PCR values, the impact is largely remediated by checking PCR 0, 1 and 2. ### Patches The identified issue has been addressed in version [1.3.2](https://github.com/evervault/evervault-go/pull/48) by validating attestation documents before storing in the cache, and replacing the naive equality checks with a new SatisfiedBy c...

### Impact All deployments of OAuth2 Proxy in front of applications that normalize underscores to dashes in HTTP headers (e.g., WSGI-based frameworks such as Django, Flask, FastAPI, and PHP applications). Authenticated users can inject underscore variants of X-Forwarded-* headers that bypass the proxy’s filtering logic, potentially escalating privileges in the upstream app. OAuth2 Proxy authentication/authorization itself is not compromised. ### Patches This change mitigates a request header smuggling vulnerability where an attacker could bypass header stripping by using different capitalization or replacing dashes with underscores. The problem has been patched with v7.13.0. By default all specified headers will now be normalized, meaning that both capitalization and the use of underscores (_) versus dashes (-) will be ignored when matching headers to be stripped. For example, both `X-Forwarded-For` and `X_Forwarded-for` will now be treated as equivalent and stripped away. However...