#git

A list of topics we covered in the week of July 21 to July 27 of 2025

### Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-25mx-8f3v-8wh7. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ### Original Description The sequoia-openpgp crate before 1.16.0 for Rust allows out-of-bounds array access and a panic.

A sandbox escape vulnerability was identified in huggingface/smolagents version 1.14.0, allowing attackers to bypass the restricted execution environment and achieve remote code execution (RCE). The vulnerability stems from the local_python_executor.py module, which inadequately restricts Python code execution despite employing static and dynamic checks. Attackers can exploit whitelisted modules and functions to execute arbitrary code, compromising the host system. This flaw undermines the core security boundary intended to isolate untrusted code, posing risks such as unauthorized code execution, data leakage, and potential integration-level compromise. The issue is resolved in version 1.17.0.

Cybersecurity researchers at CloudSEK’s STRIKE team used facial recognition and GPS data to expose a massive, over $2…

### Description Opencast prior to versions 17.6 would incorrectly send the hashed global system account credentials (ie: `org.opencastproject.security.digest.user` and `org.opencastproject.security.digest.pass`) when attempting to fetch mediapackage elements included in a mediapackage XML file. A [previous CVE](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/security/advisories/GHSA-hcxx-mp6g-6gr9) prevented many cases where the credentials were inappropriately sent, but not all. The remainder are addressed with this patch. ### Impact Anyone with ingest permissions could cause Opencast to send its hashed global system account credentials to a url of their choosing. ### Patches This issue is fixed in Opencast 17.6 If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open an issue in our [issue tracker](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/issues) - Email us at security@opencast.org

### Summary The HAX CMS API endpoints do not perform authorization checks when interacting with a resource. Both the JS and PHP versions of the CMS do not verify that a user has permission to interact with a resource before performing a given operation. ### Details The API endpoints within the HAX CMS application check if a user is authenticated, but don't check for authorization before performing an operation. #### Affected Resources - [Operations.php: 760](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L760) `createNode()` - [Operations.php: 868](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L868) `saveNode()` - [Operations.php: 1171](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L1171) `deleteNode()` - [Operations.php: 1789](https://github.com/haxth...

#### **Overview** A critical vulnerability has been identified in the `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Action workflow which allows arbitrary command execution in downstream workflows. This issue arises due to inconsistent input sanitization and unescaped output, enabling malicious actors to exploit specially crafted branch names or tags. While internal sanitization mechanisms have been implemented, the action outputs remain vulnerable, exposing consuming workflows to significant security risks. #### **Technical Details** The vulnerability stems from the unsafe use of the `eval printf "%s"` pattern within the action's codebase. Although initial sanitization using `printf "%q"` properly escapes untrusted input, subsequent unescaping via `eval printf "%s"` reintroduces command injection risks. This unsafe pattern is demonstrated in the following code snippet: ```bash echo "base_ref_branch=$(eval printf "%s" "$BASE_REF")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "head_ref_branch=$(eval printf "%s" "$...

## Summary An inconsistency in `MethodNode` can be exploited to access unexpected object fields through dot notation. This can be used to achieve **arbitrary code execution at load time**. While this issue may seem similar to https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/security/advisories/GHSA-m7f4-hrc6-fwg3, it is actually more severe, as it relies on fewer assumptions about trusted types. ## Details The `MethodNode` allows access to attributes of existing objects via dot notation. However, there are several critical shortcomings: * Although the `__class__` and `__module__` fields are checked via `get_untrusted_types` and during the `load` phase (as a concatenated string), **they are not actually used by `MethodNode`**. Instead, the `func` and `obj` entries in the `schema.json` are used to determine behavior. This means that even an apparently harmless `__module__.__class__` pair can lead to access of arbitrary attributes or methods of loaded objects, without any additional checks. * **...

## Summary An inconsistency in `OperatorFuncNode` can be exploited to hide the execution of untrusted `operator.xxx` methods. This can then be used in a code reuse attack to invoke seemingly safe functions and escalate to arbitrary code execution with minimal and misleading trusted types. **Note:** This report focuses on `operator.call` as it appears to be the most interesting target, but the same technique applies to other `operator` methods. Moreover, please do not focus too much on the specific example used to hide the `operator.call` invocation—it was a zero-effort choice meant solely to demonstrate the issue. The key point is the **inconsistency** that allows a user to approve a type as trusted, while in reality enabling the execution of `operator.xxx`. ## Details The `OperatorFuncNode` allows calling methods belonging to the `operator` module and included in a trusted list of methods. However, what is returned by `get_untrusted_types` and checked during the `load` call is no...

Medusa Ransomware breached NASCAR, demanded $4 million, leaked sensitive data including maps and staff info, exposing major security failures. The incident was exclusively reported by Hackread.com.