#git

### Impact The vulnerability depends on user interaction by opening a malicious notebook with Markdown cells, or Markdown file using JupyterLab preview feature. A malicious user can access any data accessible from JupyterLite and perform arbitrary actions in JupyterLite environment. ### Patches JupyterLite 0.4.1 was patched. ### Workarounds There is no workaround for the underlying DOM Clobbering susceptibility. However, select plugins can be disabled on deployments which cannot update in a timely fashion to minimise the risk. These are: - `@jupyterlab/mathjax-extension:plugin` - users will loose ability to preview mathematical equations - `@jupyterlab/markdownviewer-extension:plugin` - users will loose ability to open Markdown previews - `@jupyterlab/mathjax2-extension:plugin` (if installed with optional `jupyterlab-mathjax2` package) - an older version of the mathjax plugin for JupyterLab 4.x To disable these extensions populate the `disabledExtensions` key in `jupyter-config...

### Impact XSLT transforms performed by various components are vulnerable to XML external entity injections. A processed XML file with a malicious DTD tag ( `<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY example SYSTEM "/etc/passwd"> ]>` could produce XML containing data from the host system. This impacts use cases where org.hl7.fhir.core is being used to within a host where external clients can submit XML. ### Patches This issue has been patched in release 6.3.23 ### Workarounds None. ### References [MITRE CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html) [OWASP XML External Entity Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html#transformerfactory)

This report concerns the Groth16 prover when used with commitments (as in `frontend.Committer`). To simplify exposition of the issue, I will focus on the case of a single commitment, to only private witnesses. But the issue should be present whenever commitments are used that include private witnesses. > The commitment to private witnesses `w_i` is computed as ``` c = sum_i w_i * b_i ``` where `b_i` would be `ProvingKey.CommitmentKeys[0].Basis[i]` in the code. While this is a binding commitment, it is not hiding. In practice, an adversary will know the points `b_i`, as they are part of the proving key, and can verify correctness of a guess for the values of `w_i` by computing `c'` as the right hand side of the above formula, and checking whether `c'` is equal to `c`. I attach a proof of concept that demonstrates this. This breaks the perfect zero-knowledge property of Groth16, so the Groth16 scheme using commitments to private witnesses as implemented by gnark fails to be a zk-SNARK...

Vendors of mercenary spyware tools used by nation-states to track citizens and enemies have gotten savvy about evading efforts to limit their use.

C-MOR Video Surveillance versions 5.2401 and 6.00PL01 suffer from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

Travel version 1.0 suffers from a remote shell upload vulnerability.

SPIP version 4.2.12 suffers from a code execution vulnerability.

A recently disclosed security flaw in OSGeo GeoServer GeoTools has been exploited as part of multiple campaigns to deliver cryptocurrency miners, botnet malware such as Condi and JenX, and a known backdoor called SideWalk. The security vulnerability is a critical remote code execution bug (CVE-2024-36401, CVSS score: 9.8) that could allow malicious actors to take over susceptible instances. In

Threat actors have long leveraged typosquatting as a means to trick unsuspecting users into visiting malicious websites or downloading booby-trapped software and packages. These attacks typically involve registering domains or packages with names slightly altered from their legitimate counterparts (e.g., goog1e.com vs. google.com). Adversaries targeting open-source repositories across

The funds from Germany's Sovereign Tech Fund will be used to integrate zero-trust capabilities, tools for software bill of materials, and other security features.