#git

### Impact A peer can obtain a valid TLS certificate for arbitrary IP addresses, effectively rendering the mTLS authentication useless. The issue is that the Manager’s Certificate gRPC service does not validate if the requested IP addresses “belong to” the peer requesting the certificate—that is, if the peer connects from the same IP address as the one provided in the certificate request. ```golang if addr, ok := p.Addr.(*net.TCPAddr); ok { ip = addr.IP.String() } else { ip, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(p.Addr.String()) if err != nil { return nil, err } } // Parse csr. [skipped] // Check csr signature. // TODO check csr common name and so on. if err = csr.CheckSignature(); err != nil { return nil, err } [skipped] // TODO only valid for peer ip // BTW we need support both of ipv4 and ipv6. ips := csr.IPAddresses if len(ips) == 0 { // Add default connected ip. ips = []net.IP{net.ParseIP(ip)} } ``` ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0...

### Impact A peer exposes the gRPC API and HTTP API for consumption by other peers. These APIs allow peers to send requests that force the recipient peer to create files in arbitrary file system locations, and to read arbitrary files. This allows peers to steal other peers’ secret data and to gain remote code execution (RCE) capabilities on the peer’s machine. ```golang file, err := os.OpenFile(t.DataFilePath, os.O_RDWR, defaultFileMode) if err != nil { return 0, err } defer file.Close() if _, err = file.Seek(req.Range.Start, io.SeekStart); err != nil { return 0, err } n, err := io.Copy(file, io.LimitReader(req.Reader, req.Range.Length)) ``` ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/main/docs/security/dragonfly-comprehensive-report-2023.pdf). If ...

### Impact We found two instances in the DragonFly codebase where the first return value of a function is dereferenced even when the function returns an error (figures 9.1 and 9.2). This can result in a nil dereference, and cause code to panic. The codebase may contain additional instances of the bug. ```golang request, err := source.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, parentReq.Url, parentReq.UrlMeta.Header) if err != nil { log.Errorf("generate url [%v] request error: %v", request.URL, err) span.RecordError(err) return err } ``` Eve is a malicious actor operating a peer machine. She sends a dfdaemonv1.DownRequest request to her peer Alice. Alice’s machine receives the request, resolves a nil variable in the server.Download method, and panics. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://g...

### Impact The access control mechanism for the Proxy feature uses simple string comparisons and is therefore vulnerable to timing attacks. An attacker may try to guess the password one character at a time by sending all possible characters to a vulnerable mechanism and measuring the comparison instruction’s execution times. The vulnerability is shown in figure 8.1, where both the username and password are compared with a short-circuiting equality operation. ```golang if user != proxy.basicAuth.Username || pass != proxy.basicAuth.Password { ``` It is currently undetermined what an attacker may be able to do with access to the proxy password. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/main/docs/security/dragonfly-comprehensive-report-2023.pdf). If you have any ...

### Summary jinjava’s current sandbox restrictions prevent direct access to dangerous methods such as `getClass()`, and block instantiation of Class objects. However, these protections can be bypassed. By using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). ### Details jinjava templates expose a built-in variable `____int3rpr3t3r____`, which provides direct access to the jinjavaInterpreter instance. This variable was previously abused (see [Add interpreter to blacklist](https:/...

### Impact DragonFly2 uses the os.MkdirAll function to create certain directory paths with specific access permissions. This function does not perform any permission checks when a given directory path already exists. This allows a local attacker to create a directory to be used later by DragonFly2 with broad permissions before DragonFly2 does so, potentially allowing the attacker to tamper with the files. Eve has unprivileged access to the machine where Alice uses DragonFly2. Eve watches the commands executed by Alice and introduces new directories/paths with 0777 permissions before DragonFly2 does so. Eve can then delete and forge files in that directory to change the results of further commands executed by Alice. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/mai...

### Impact The processPieceFromSource method (figure 4.1) is part of a task processing mechanism. The method writes pieces of data to storage, updating a Task structure along the way. The method does not update the structure’s usedTraffic field, because an uninitialized variable n is used as a guard to the AddTraffic method call, instead of the result.Size variable. ```golang var n int64 result.Size, err = pt.GetStorage().WritePiece([skipped]) result.FinishTime = time.Now().UnixNano() if n > 0 { pt.AddTraffic(uint64(n)) } ``` A task is processed by a peer. The usedTraffic metadata is not updated during the processing. Rate limiting is incorrectly applied, leading to a denial-of-service condition for the peer. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/ma...

### Impact The Manager disables TLS certificate verification in two HTTP clients (figures 3.1 and 3.2). The clients are not configurable, so users have no way to re-enable the verification. ```golang func getAuthToken(ctx context.Context, header http.Header) (string, error) { [skipped] client := &http.Client{ Timeout: defaultHTTPRequesttimeout, Transport: &http.Transport{ TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, }, } [skipped] } ``` A Manager processes dozens of preheat jobs. An adversary performs a network-level Man-in-the-Middle attack, providing invalid data to the Manager. The Manager preheats with the wrong data, which later causes a denial of service and file integrity problems. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report]...

### Impact There are multiple server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in the DragonFly2 system. The vulnerabilities enable users to force DragonFly2’s components to make requests to internal services, which otherwise are not accessible to the users. One SSRF attack vector is exposed by the Manager’s API. The API allows users to create jobs. When creating a Preheat type of a job, users provide a URL that the Manager connects to (see figures 2.1–2.3). The URL is weakly validated, and so users can trick the Manager into sending HTTP requests to services that are in the Manager’s local network. ```golang func (p *preheat) CreatePreheat(ctx context.Context, schedulers []models.Scheduler, json types.PreheatArgs) (*internaljob.GroupJobState, error) { [skipped] url := json.URL [skipped] // Generate download files var files []internaljob.PreheatRequest switch PreheatType(json.Type) { case PreheatImageType: // Parse image manifest url s...

### Impact The /api/v1/jobs and /preheats endpoints in Manager web UI are accessible without authentication. Any user with network access to the Manager can create, delete, and modify jobs, and create preheat jobs. An unauthenticated adversary with network access to a Manager web UI uses /api/v1/jobs endpoint to create hundreds of useless jobs. The Manager is in a denial-of-service state, and stops accepting requests from valid administrators. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/main/docs/security/dragonfly-comprehensive-report-2023.pdf). If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [dragonfly-maintainers@googlegroups.com](mailto:dragonfly-maintainers@googlegroups.com).