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### Impact Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key. ### Patches No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation. ### Workarounds The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the `rsa` crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine. ### References This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks. - https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071.html - https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/ - https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19

The [Marvin Attack] is a timing sidechannel vulnerability which allows performing RSA decryption and signing operations as an attacker with the ability to observe only the time of the decryption operation performed withthe private key. A recent survey of RSA implementations found that the Rust `rsa` crate is one of many implementations vulnerable to this attack. No fixed version is available at this time. [Marvin Attack]: https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/

An issue in GitKraken GitLens before v.14.0.0 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file to the Visual Studio Codes workspace trust component.

Insecure Permissions vulnerability in JumpServer GPLv3 v.3.8.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via bypassing the command filtering function.

This function returned a reference into an OpenSSL datastructure, but there was no way to ensure OpenSSL would not mutate the datastructure behind one's back. Use of this function should be replaced with `X509StoreRef::all_certificates`.

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By Deeba Ahmed In a press release, Ukraine’s intelligence agency referred to the hacking as a “successful complex special operation in cyberspace.”  This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Ukraine Hacks Russia’s Aviation Agency, Claims “Aviation Cannibalism”

raptor-web is a CMS for game server communities that can be used to host information and keep track of players. In version 0.4.4 of raptor-web, it is possible to craft a malicious URL that will result in a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability. A user controlled URL parameter is loaded into an internal template that has autoescape disabled. This is a cross-site scripting vulnerability that affects all deployments of `raptor-web` on version `0.4.4`. Any victim who clicks on a malicious crafted link will be affected. This issue has been patched 0.4.4.1.

### Overview An attacker with access to the SQL Lab and the ab_user and ab_user_role tables can elevate his privileges to become administrator. ### Details On a more general level, diverse tables who are supposed to be only readable can be modified using the WITH … AS and RETURNING keywords. Modification of the table key_value can also be done, which could lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. "V7 - Insecure deserialization leading to remote code execution" report vulnerability). ### Proof of Concept Some tables are supposed to accept only SELECT requests from the SQL tab. - Attempt to create a new user injected_admin into the ab_user table: [PoC_1](https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/blob/main/CVE-2023-40610/PoC_1.png) But this protection can be bypassed by using the WITH … AS () syntax with RETURNING value after the INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE query. INSERT query accepted by the database due to the use of WITH … AS ( … RETURNING ) syntax: WITH a AS ( INSERT INTO ab_use...

Validation of an XML Signature requires verification that the hash value of the related XML-document (after any optional transformations and/or normalizations) matches a specific DigestValue-value, but also that the cryptografic signature on the SignedInfo-tree (the one that contains the DigestValue) verifies and matches a trusted public key. Within the simpleSAMLphp/xml-security library (https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security), the hash is being validated using SignedElementTrait::validateReference, and the signature is being verified in SignedElementTrait::verifyInternal https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security/blob/master/src/XML/SignedElementTrait.php:  What stands out is that the signature is being calculated over the canonical version of the SignedInfo-tree. The validateReference method, however, uses the original non-canonicalized version of SignedInf...