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Plus: The world’s “largest illicit online marketplace” gets hit by regulators, police seize the Garantex crypto exchange, and scammers trick targets by making up ransomware attacks.

**Nature of issue:** Crash (Denial of Service) **Source of issue:** Dependent package (ring) **Affected versions of qcp:** 0.1.0-0.3.2 **Recommendation:** Upgrade to qcp 0.3.3 or later ### Who is affected All versions of qcp from 0.1.0 to 0.3.2 are affected, but **only if built with runtime overflow checks.** * Released qcp binaries do not enable runtime overflow checks by default. **If you use an official released qcp binary download, you are not affected.** * If you built qcp yourself in debug mode, you are affected unless your debug configuration explicitly disables overflow checks. * If you built qcp yourself in release mode, you are only affected if you explicitly requested runtime overflow checks at build time by setting the appropriate `RUSTFLAGS`, or in your Cargo.toml profile. ### What to do if you are affected **We recommend you upgrade to qcp 0.3.3 or later.** Users upgrading from versions prior to 0.3.0 should note that an incompatible protocol change was introduced in...

Outpost24’s KrakenLabs reveals EncryptHub’s multi-stage malware campaign, exposing their infrastructure and tactics through critical OPSEC failures. Learn how…

# **Horcrux Incident Disclosure: Possible Double-Sign** ## **Summary** On March 6, 2025, a Horcrux user (01node) experienced a double-signing incident on the Osmosis network, resulting in a 5% slash penalty (approximately 75,000 OSMO or $20,000 USD). After thorough investigation, we have identified a race condition in Horcrux's signature state handling as the root cause. This vulnerability was introduced in July 2023 as part of PR [\#169](https://github.com/strangelove-ventures/horcrux/pull/169) and affects all Horcrux versions from v3.1.0 through v3.3.1. A fix has been developed and is being deployed immediately. ## **Probability** The bug has an extremely low probability of occurrence, affecting one validator out of hundreds that have been using the affected software versions to validate over the past few years. In the added tests, the probability on typical hardware is in the range of 1 in 1 billion per signed vote due to the root cause needing two independent events to occur wi...

Cryptocurrency offers financial freedom, but it also comes with privacy challenges. Unlike traditional banking, where transactions remain relatively…

`ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask()` may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received. On 64-bit targets operations using `ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM}` may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk. Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but `RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks"` or `overflow-checks = true` in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.

# Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2025-24043 | WinDbg Remote Code Execution Vulnerability ## <a name="executive-summary"></a>Executive summary Microsoft is releasing this security advisory to provide information about a vulnerability in [WinDbg](https://aka.ms/windbg/download). This advisory also provides guidance on what developers can do to update their applications to remove this vulnerability. Improper verification of cryptographic signature in SOS allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network resulting in Remote Code Execution. ## Announcement Announcement for this issue can be found at https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/346 ## <a name="mitigation-factors"></a>Mitigation factors Microsoft has not identified any mitigating factors for this vulnerability. ## <a name="affected-packages"></a>Affected Packages The vulnerability affects any Microsoft .NET Core project if it uses any of affected packages versions listed below ### <a name="">WinDbg</a>...

### Impact The homepage of the application is public which enables a guest to download the package which might contain sensitive information. ### Patches 1.11.7 ### Workarounds The access to the page can be manually restricted to a specific set of users or groups.

### Impact A user that doesn't have programming rights can execute arbitrary code when creating a page using the Migration Page template. A possible attack vector is the following: * Create a page and add the following content: ``` confluencepro.job.question.advanced.input={{/html}} {{async async="true" cached="false" context="doc.reference"}}{{groovy}}println("hello from groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} ``` * Use the object editor to add an object of type `XWiki.TranslationDocumentClass` with scope `USER`. * Access an unexisting page using the `MigrationTemplate` ``` http://localhost:8080/xwiki/bin/edit/Page123?template=ConfluenceMigratorPro.Code.MigrationTemplate ``` It is expected that `{{/html}} {{async async="true" cached="false" context="doc.reference"}}{{groovy}}println("hello from groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}` will be present on the page, however, `hello from groovy` will be printed. ### Patches The issue will be fixed as part of v1.2. The fix was added with commit [35cef22](...

**Vulnerability type:** Prototype Pollution **Vulnerability Location(s):** ```js # v9.1 node_modules/@intlify/message-resolver/index.js # v9.2 or later node_modules/@intlify/vue-i18n-core/index.js ``` **Description:** The latest version of `@intlify/message-resolver (9.1)` and `@intlify/vue-i18n-core (9.2 or later)`, (previous versions might also affected), is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) `handleFlatJson`. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) a the minimum consequence. Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context. **PoC:** ...