The threat actor known as Arid Viper (aka APT-C-23, Desert Falcon, or TAG-63) has been attributed as behind an Android spyware campaign targeting Arabic-speaking users with a counterfeit dating app designed to harvest data from infected handsets.
"Arid Viper's Android malware has a number of features that enable the operators to surreptitiously collect sensitive information from victims' devices

The threat actor known as Arid Viper (aka APT-C-23, Desert Falcon, or TAG-63) has been attributed as behind an Android spyware campaign targeting Arabic-speaking users with a counterfeit dating app designed to harvest data from infected handsets.

"Arid Viper's Android malware has a number of features that enable the operators to surreptitiously collect sensitive information from victims' devices and deploy additional executables," Cisco Talos said in a Tuesday report.

Active since at least 2017, Arid Viper is a cyber espionage that's aligned with Hamas, an Islamist militant movement that governs the Gaza Strip. The cybersecurity firm said there is no evidence connecting the campaign to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war.

The activity is believed to have commenced no earlier than April 2022.

Interestingly, the mobile malware shares source code similarities with a non-malicious online dating application called Skipped, suggesting that the operators are either linked to the latter's developer or managed to copy its features in an attempt at deception.

The use of seemingly-benign chat applications to deliver malware is "in line with the 'honey trap' tactics used by Arid Viper in the past," which has resorted to leveraging fake profiles on social media platforms to trick potential targets into installing them.

Cisco Talos said it also identified an extended web of companies that create dating-themed applications that are similar or identical to Skipped and can be downloaded from the official app stores for Android and iOS.

*   VIVIO - Chat, flirt & Dating (Available on Apple App Store)
*   Meeted (previously Joostly) - Flirt, Chat & Dating (Available on Apple App Store)
*   SKIPPED - Chat, Match & Dating (50,000 downloads on Google Play Store)
*   Joostly - Dating App! Singles (10,000 downloads on Google Play)

The array of simulated dating applications has raised the possibility that "Arid Viper operators may seek to leverage these additional applications in future malicious campaigns," the company noted.

The malware, once installed, hides itself on a victim machine by turning off system or security notifications from the operating system and also disables notifications on Samsung mobile devices and on any Android phone with the APK package name containing the word "security" to fly under the radar.

It's also designed to request for intrusive permissions to record audio and video, read contacts, access call logs, intercept SMS messages, alter Wi-Fi settings, terminate background apps, take pictures, and create system alerts.

Among other noteworthy features of the implant includes the ability to retrieve system information, get an updated command-and-control (C2) domain from the current C2 server, as well as download additional malware, which is camouflaged as legitimate apps like Facebook Messenger, Instagram, and WhatsApp.

The development comes as Recorded Future revealed signs possibly connecting Arid Viper to Hamas through infrastructure overlaps related to an Android application named Al Qassam that's been disseminated in a Telegram Channel claiming affiliation to Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas.

"They depict not only a possible slip in operational security but also ownership of the infrastructure shared between groups," the company said. "One possible hypothesis to explain this observation is that TAG-63 shares infrastructure resources with the rest of the Hamas organization."

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Arid Viper Targeting Arabic Android Users with Spyware Disguised as Dating App

TOTOLINK LR1200GB V9.1.0u.6619_B20230130 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the password parameter in the function loginAuth.

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CVE-2023-46977: vuln-reports/TOTOLINK LR1200GB/1/README.md at master · shinypolaris/vuln-reports

TOTOLINK A3300R 17.0.0cu.557_B20221024 contains a command injection via the file_name parameter in the UploadFirmwareFile function.

CVE-2023-46976: vuln-reports/TOTOLINK A3300R/1/README.md at master · shinypolaris/vuln-reports

TOTOLINK X6000R V9.4.0cu.852_B20230719 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the enable parameter in the setLedCfg function.

CVE-2023-46979: vuln-reports/TOTOLINK X6000R/2/README.md at master · shinypolaris/vuln-reports

TOTOLINK X6000R V9.4.0cu.852_B20230719 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control.Attackers can reset login password & WIFI passwords without authentication.

CVE-2023-46978: vuln-reports/TOTOLINK X6000R/1/README.md at master · shinypolaris/vuln-reports

The top-level domain for the United States -- .US -- is home to thousands of newly-registered domains tied to a malicious link shortening service that facilitates malware and phishing scams, new research suggests. The findings come close on the heels of a report that identified .US domains as among the most prevalent in phishing attacks over the past year.

The top-level domain for the United States — **.US** — is home to thousands of newly-registered domains tied to a malicious link shortening service that facilitates malware and phishing scams, new research suggests. The findings come close on the heels of a report that identified .US domains as among the most prevalent in phishing attacks over the past year.

Researchers at **Infoblox** say they’ve been tracking what appears to be a three-year-old link shortening service that is catering to phishers and malware purveyors. Infoblox found the domains involved are typically three to seven characters long, and hosted on bulletproof hosting providers that charge a premium to ignore any abuse or legal complaints. The short domains don’t host any content themselves, but are used to obfuscate the real address of landing pages that try to phish users or install malware.

A graphic describing the operations of a malicious link shortening service that Infoblox has dubbed “Prolific Puma.”

Infoblox says it’s unclear how the phishing and malware landing pages tied to this service are being initially promoted, although they suspect it is mainly through scams targeting people on their phones via SMS. A new report says the company mapped the contours of this link shortening service thanks in part to pseudo-random patterns in the short domains, which all appear on the surface to be a meaningless jumble of letters and numbers.

“This came to our attention because we have systems that detect registrations that use domain name generation algorithms,” said **Renee Burton**, head of threat intelligence at Infoblox. “We have not found any legitimate content served through their shorteners.”

Infoblox determined that until May 2023, domains ending in .info accounted for the bulk of new registrations tied to the malicious link shortening service, which Infoblox has dubbed “**Prolific Puma**.” Since then, they found that whoever is responsible for running the service has used .US for approximately 55 percent of the total domains created, with several dozen new malicious .US domains registered daily.

.US is overseen by the **National Telecommunications and Information Administration** (NTIA), an executive branch agency of the **U.S. Department of Commerce**. But Uncle Sam has long outsourced the management of .US to various private companies, which have gradually allowed the United States’s top-level domain to devolve into a cesspool of phishing activity.

Or so concludes **The Interisle Consulting Group**, which gathers phishing data from multiple industry sources and publishes an annual report on the latest trends. As far back as 2018, Interisle found .US domains were the worst in the world for spam, botnet (attack infrastructure for DDOS etc.) and illicit or harmful content.

Interisle’s newest study examined six million phishing reports between May 1, 2022 and April 30, 2023, and identified approximately 30,000 .US phishing domains. Interisle found significant numbers of .US domains were registered to attack some of the United States’ most prominent companies, including Bank of America, Amazon, Apple, AT&T, Citi, Comcast, Microsoft, Meta, and Target. Others were used to impersonate or attack U.S. government agencies.

Under NTIA regulations, domain registrars processing .US domain registrations must take certain steps (PDF) to verify that those customers actually reside in the United States, or else own organizations based in the U.S. However, if one registers a .US domain through GoDaddy — the largest domain registrar and the current administrator of the .US contract — the way one “proves” their U.S. nexus is simply by choosing from one of three pre-selected affirmative responses.

In an age when most domain registrars are automatically redacting customer information from publicly accessible registration records to avoid running afoul of European privacy laws, .US has remained something of an outlier because its charter specifies that all registration records be made public. However, Infoblox said it found more than 2,000 malicious link shortener domains ending in .US registered since October 2023 through **NameSilo** that have somehow subverted the transparency requirements for the usTLD and converted to private registrations.

“Through our own experience with NameSilo, it is not possible to select private registration for domains in the usTLD through their interface,” Infoblox wrote. “And yet, it was done. Of the total domains with private records, over 99% were registered with NameSilo. At this time, we are not able to explain this behavior.”

NameSilo CEO **Kristaps Ronka** said the company actively responds to reports about abusive domains, but that it hasn’t seen any abuse reports related to Infoblox’s findings.

“We take down hundreds to thousands of domains, lots of them proactively to combat abuse,” Ronka said. “Our current abuse rate on abuseIQ for example is currently at 0%. AbuseIQ receives reports from countless sources and we are yet to see these ‘Puma’ abuse reports.”

Experts who track domains associated with malware and phishing say even phony information supplied at registration is useful in identifying potentially malicious or phishous domains before they can be used for abuse.

For example, when it was registered through NameSilo in July 2023, the domain **1ox\[.\]us** — like thousands of others — listed its registrant as “**Leila Puma**” at a street address in Poland, and the email address **blackpumaoct33@ukr.net**. But according to **DomainTools.com**, on Oct. 1, 2023 those records were redacted and hidden by NameSilo.

Infoblox notes that the username portion of the email address appears to be a reference to the song October 33 by the Black Pumas, an Austin, Texas based psychedelic soul band. The Black Pumas aren’t exactly a household name, but they did recently have a popular Youtube video that featured a cover of the Kinks song “Strangers,” which included an emotional visual narrative about Ukrainians seeking refuge from the Russian invasion, titled “Ukraine Strangers.” Also, Leila Puma’s email address is at a Ukrainian email provider.

DomainTools shows that hundreds of other malicious domains tied to Prolific Puma previously were registered through **NameCheap** to a “Josef Bakhovsky” at a different street address in Poland. According to ancestry.com, the anglicized version of this surname — Bakovski — is the traditional name for someone from Bakowce, which is now known as Bakivtsi and is in Ukraine.

This possible Polish and/or Ukrainian connection may or may not tell us something about the “who” behind this link shortening service, but those details are useful for identifying and grouping these malicious short domains. However, even this meager visibility into .US registration data is now under threat.

The NTIA recently published a proposal that would allow registrars to redact all registrant data from WHOIS registration records for .US domains. A broad array of industry groups have filed comments opposing the proposed changes, saying they threaten to remove the last vestiges of accountability for a top-level domain that is already overrun with cybercrime activity.

Infoblox’s Burton says Prolific Puma is remarkable because they’ve been able to facilitate malicious activities for years while going largely unnoticed by the security industry.

“This exposes how persistent the criminal economy can be at a supply chain level,” Burton said. “We’re always looking at the end malware or phishing page, but what we’re finding here is that there’s this middle layer of DNS threat actors persisting for years without notice.”

Infoblox’s full report on Prolific Puma is here.

.US Harbors Prolific Malicious Link Shortening Service

An issue in Univention UCS v.5.0 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code and gain privileges via the check_univention_joinstatus function.

**Table of Contents**

1.  Introduction
2.  The Basics
3.  Exploitation via LDAP
4.  Exploitation via SSH/Kerberos
5.  Exploitation via Hash Cracking
6.  The Fix
7.  Lessons Learned
8.  Disclosure Timeline
9.  Update history

**Introduction**

Recently, DriveByte was assigned to perform a penetration test for a customer. The goal was to find as many vulnerabilities as possible, as well as to determine, if an attacker would be able to compromise the customer’s infrastructure. The unusual part about it? The customer’s IT had no Microsoft Active Directory nor Entra ID but something similar. It was based on a product called Univention UCS, which is according to their website, a solution for "easy and centralized administration of domains". This was especially interesting for us, as we did not know this solution before and are of course always genuinely interested in digging into new technologies. The following blogpost shows a very classic and simple flaw, that had a huge impact on the customer's environment.

Since the initial publication of this blogpost, some changes have been made. This includes especially some additional information that we received from univention. For better tracking we added a section "Update History". Special thanks again to Univention for the awesome information and collaboration!

**TLDR:**

By spying on the process creation of a UCS connected server with extensive permissions, it was possible to gather a large amount of LDAP data. This data includes different credentials and other authentication information. The vendor responded extremely professional and fixed the issues very quickly. He did not only fix the script where we found the issue, but also checked their code base for similar problems and fixed them as well.

**Do the basics. They might reward you with some quick wins!**

The vulnerability analysis was performed with access to the customer’s network and a user with very limited permissions (domain joined, but nothing else). While enumerating the network, we found that it is possible to access several servers with our basic user via SSH (remember, the network is mainly based on Linux machines, with only a very small number of Windows and Mac machines). This was possible due to faulty configured permissions and is not a default setting or problem of Univention UCS, but a configuration error. We know this kind of misconfigurations from Windows Active Directory environments, where we often see permissions for "authenticated users" for SMB, RDP and so on.

Of course, this was a very easy entry point and we started to dig into the machines to see if there is anything juicy to be found. Before trying to escalate privileges, we first checked for secrets and so on. Also, for chances of a quick win, we usually start monitoring process creations, to check for privilege escalation opportunities and other valuable information (hell yeah, full HackTheBox/OSCP style!!!). By searching through the system, we discovered the files /etc/ldap.secret and /etc/machine.secret. This sounded like relevant information. Sadly, we couldn’t read the files, as they were set to read/write-only by root. Also, we didn't know what they are used for, but suspected them to be part of the Univention software. A quick search through the extensive Univention documentation proved this assumption right. After publishing this blogpost, Univention contacted us again and hinted us to this discussion about a solution for the machine.secret and ldap.secretfiles. As they identified this files as a possible attack surface, they are planning to find another solution for this. So a solution is in the making.

We played around a little with some of the Univention scripts etc., but at first did not find anything that seemed promising. So, the next step was to check for privilege escalation. Next to other approaches, we went back to the process creation monitoring, and there it was:

The script check_univention_joinstatus requested the LDAP database as the system account, presenting the password in cleartext. We suspected that this might be the password from the /etc/machine.secret file which was later confirmed. So, the logical next step for us was to recreate this exact command from our attacker machine. We were quite surprised to see, that this machine had permissions to basically perform DCSync. It's not Windows AD of course. The machine had the permission to retrieve ALL directory objects _with all their attributes_. This includes users, with their krb5key, sambaNTPassword (NTHash), SHA512 or bcrypt hashes (SHA512 is the default) as well as their password history. The following screenshot shows the output we recreated in a lab environment:

However, this is only possible if the domain joined system has the permissions that match DCSync. In our test environment we joined an arbitrary machine to the domain and checked what information we get back from the "Domain Controller". So, in comparison to the information above, you can see in the screenshot below what information a usual domain joined system gets:

**Exploitation attempt 1: LDAP**

To exploit this issue, we can rely on n00py's awesome "Alternative ways to Pass the Hash (PtH)" blogpost. However, a bit more research on that topic showed, that it is not as simple as we first thought. Our first guess was, that we can just use the LDAP3 Python module to connect to LDAP with the NTLM hash. Unfortunately, that seems to be impossible with Univention, as it is not supporting NTLM authentication for LDAP:

While our first impression was, that we are doing something wrong, this GitHub entry stated that the "authMethodNotSupported" message is from the server. It seems that Univention does not have NTLM authentication activated on the server by default (atm, we don't know if it is supported at all).

For comparison, the SIMPLE authentication via LDAP is working fine:

But the 'server.info' output is puzzling us a bit because it says that NTLM is a valid SASL mechanism, so maybe there is a workaround by using NTLM for SASL. Before going too deep into that path and losing a lot of time, we decided to try something else. Maybe this motivates somebody who has more knowledge in this area to dig into it. Or maybe we will come back to this later...

Here we also got some additional information from Univention. NTLM is indeed not supported. The fact that it is still shown as supported sasl mechanism is due to the OpenLDAP defaulf configuration. Univention is tracking this issue here.

**Exploitation attempt 2: SSH via Kerberos**

As an alternative way, \\@n00py suggests in his blogpost to use the NThash to sign a Kerberos ticket and then connect via SSH. Well, that seems easy. So we took the administrator's hash and threw it in Impacket's ticketer.py. All information for this including the domain-sid etc. was included in the full domain dump.

    ticketer.py -nthash 3B0E04870F352EDC0EF120F16431FA42 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2228799870-4051273110-1256914315 -spn host/ucs-7427.drivebytetest.intranet -domain drivebytetest.intranet Administrator

Sadly, the authentication failed with the following message:

As this is no traditional AD, we were thinking that they could use another approach to sign their Kerberos tickets. What was bugging us from the start was the krb5Key fields we've seen in the second screenshot. And again, the Univention documentation comes to our rescue. It states that "The krb5Key attribute stores the Kerberos password". Nice. But how?

After googling for a while, we came across this post in the Univention help forum. It contains some very interesting information. First, the krb5Key seems to consist of a keytype, a keyblock, in one case even an NThash and a salt string. Well, now of course we wanted to get our fingers on this s4search-decode script that was mentioned in this help request. We did not find it. It wasn’t on the domain controller and we didn't find it in the Univention Git repo (but maybe we just went over it???, there are tons of mentions, but we didn't find the actual script <- The awesome people from univention pointed us to this. So yeah. We were indeed just not finding it somehow). At that point a friend with whom we discussed the topic pointed us to the following page https://docs.software-univention.de/ucs-python-api/\_modules/univention/s4connector/s4/password.html. This file can also be found in the Univention Git. He pointed this out to us because of the following function:

    ...
    def extract_NThash_from_krb5key(ucs_krb5key):
    
        NThash = None
    
        for k in ucs_krb5key:
            (keyblock, salt, kvno) = heimdal.asn1_decode_key(k)
    
            enctype = keyblock.keytype()
            enctype_id = enctype.toint()
            if enctype_id == 23:
                krb5_arcfour_hmac_md5 = keyblock.keyvalue()
                NThash = binascii.b2a_hex(krb5_arcfour_hmac_md5)
                break
    
        return NThash
    
    ...

Nice. This seemed promising with only one downside; The dependency on heimdal which looked like a Univention-specific library version. We quickly recognized that this lib is installed on the Univention DC. But we didn't want to rely on that for executing the script. After a bit of searching we found a download portal which offered a Debian package and the source code etc. The package requires python below 3.8 and some other dependencies, but nothing too special. So we spun up a docker container to go on with the testing (The Dockerfile and final script can be found on our GitHub). We extracted the function, added only the important imports, and fired it up in iPython... and failed:

It seems that the krb5Key usually is not base64 encoded when passed to the function. But after modifying this, we were still running into an error. We started to break down the steps and came out with the following working script, which does basically the same steps as the actual function.

    #!/usr/bin/python3
    # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
    
    import binascii
    import heimdal
    import base64
    import argparse
    
    krb5_keytype__des_cbc_crc = 1
    krb5_keytype__des_cbc_md4 = 2
    krb5_keytype__des_cbc_md5 = 3
    krb5_keytype__des3_cbc_sha1 = 16
    krb5_keytype__aes128_cts_hmac_sha1_96 = 17
    krb5_keytype__aes256_cts_hmac_sha1_96 = 18
    krb5_keytype__arcfour_hmac_md5 = 23
    
    def extract_NThash_from_krb5key(ucs_krb5key):
    
        NThash = None
    
        keyblock,salt,kvno = heimdal.asn1_decode_key(base64.b64decode(ucs_krb5key))
    
        if keyblock.keytype().toint() == krb5_keytype__arcfour_hmac_md5:
            NThash = binascii.hexlify(keyblock.keyvalue()).decode('utf-8')
        else:
            print(f'Keytype is: ', keyblock.keytype().toint())
    
        return NThash
    
    
    def main():
        parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
                prog='ProgramName',
                        description='Simple tool to extract ntlm hash out of the arcfour_hmac_md5 krb5key used by univention ucs')
        parser.add_argument('-d', help="put your base64 encoded krb5key value here", required=True)
        args = parser.parse_args()
        nt_hash = extract_NThash_from_krb5key(args.d)
        print("NThash: ",nt_hash)
    
    
    if __name__ == '__main__':
        main()

And this worked like a charm. It allows us to extract the NThash out of the krb5Key. Now we could take the krb5Key of the krbtgt account for example to forge a ticket as Administrator, which is the default "Domain Admin" in Univention UCS.

And that's it. We can now be everybody we want to be :blush:.

Maybe we can also use the other keyblock values to sign the TGTs somehow. But we didn't look into that so far.

**Exploitation attempt 3: Hash Cracking**

As we are in possession of the NThashes, we are also able to try password cracking quite efficiently. We confirmed that the sambaNTPassword represents the actual password. Using hashcat, some proper wordlists as well as some good rules, can open some more pathways.

Using those methods we were able to go from "any user in the directory" to "Administrator", the "Domain Admin" equivalent because of some very basic misconfigurations, a trivial but impactful bug and a recoverable password.

**The Fix**

The mitigation time and responses from Univention have been extraordinary. It was a pleasure to work with them, as the communication was fast, professional as well as solution-oriented! Special thanks for this awesome experience and awareness for security! Univention rated the bug with 7.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N)

CVE-2023-38994 was reserved by MITRE for this issue, but not released yet.

Fixed version: Univention UCS 5.0-4 Fix number: 1.0.2-4

**Lessons Learned**

*   Do not grant "everyone" or "authenticated users" permissions to any machine if possible (and we guess that’s possible in almost every scenario)
*   Upgrade your software
*   Set strong and unique passwords
*   For developers and admins: Avoid sensitive information in process creations (Univention added this to their developers security guidelines. Great Job!)

**Disclosure Timeline**

2023/07/17 - Bug Reported

2023/07/17 - Bug confirmed by Univention and opened in their Bugtracker

2023/07/17 - GitHub push to fix the Bug

2023/07/19 - Fix release in 1.0.2-4 Release Note

2023/07/19 - Fix release of similar issues in another script Release Note

**Update History**

*   2023/10/19 - Added advisory for developers and admins in Lesson Learned
*   2023/10/30 - Mentioning Updates in the introduction
*   2023/10/30 - Added information about the misconfiguration of the ssh permissions
*   2023/10/30 - Added the outlook on a solution for the machine.secret and ldap.secret files
*   2023/10/30 - Changed wording from "synced" to "requested"
*   2023/10/30 - Added additional information and bugtracker about NTLM
*   2023/10/30 - Added the link to the s4search-decode script
*   2023/10/30 - Updated "Lessons Learned" with the fact that univention updated their developers security guidelines
*   2023/10/30 - Added link to the bugtracker in the timeline

CVE-2023-38994: Simple yet effective. The story of some simple bugs that led to the complete compromise of a network

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a new set of malicious packages published to the NuGet package manager using a lesser-known method for malware deployment.
Software supply chain security firm ReversingLabs described the campaign as coordinated and ongoing since August 1, 2023, while linking it to a host of rogue NuGet packages that were observed delivering a remote access trojan called

Software Security / Malware

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a new set of malicious packages published to the NuGet package manager using a lesser-known method for malware deployment.

Software supply chain security firm ReversingLabs described the campaign as coordinated and ongoing since August 1, 2023, while linking it to a host of rogue NuGet packages that were observed delivering a remote access trojan called **SeroXen RAT**.

"The threat actors behind it are tenacious in their desire to plant malware into the NuGet repository, and to continuously publish new malicious packages," Karlo Zanki, reverse engineer at ReversingLabs, said in a report shared with The Hacker News.

The names of some of the packages are below -

*   Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.Build.Config
*   KucoinExchange.Net
*   Kraken.Exchange
*   DiscordsRpc
*   SolanaWallet
*   Monero
*   Modern.Winform.UI
*   MinecraftPocket.Server
*   IAmRoot
*   ZendeskApi.Client.V2
*   Betalgo.Open.AI
*   Forge.Open.AI
*   Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig
*   CData.NetSuite.Net.Framework
*   CData.Salesforce.Net.Framework
*   CData.Snowflake.API

These packages, which span several versions, imitate popular packages and exploit NuGet's MSBuild integrations feature in order to implant malicious code on their victims, a feature called inline tasks to achieve code execution.

"This is the first known example of malware published to the NuGet repository exploiting this inline tasks feature to execute malware," Zanki said.

The now-removed packages exhibit similar characteristics in that the threat actors behind the operation attempted to conceal the malicious code by making use of spaces and tabs to move it out of view of the default screen width.

As previously disclosed by Phylum, the packages also have artificially inflated downloaded counts to make them appear more legitimate. The ultimate goal of the decoy packages is to act as a conduit for retrieving a second-stage .NET payload hosted on a throwaway GitHub repository.

"The threat actor behind this campaign is being careful and paying attention to details, and is determined to keep this malicious campaign alive and active," Zanki said.

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Malicious NuGet Packages Caught Distributing SeroXen RAT Malware

Since April 2022, Cisco Talos has been tracking a malicious campaign operated by the espionage-motivated Arid Viper advanced persistent threat (APT) group targeting Arabic-speaking Android users.

Arid Viper disguising mobile spyware as updates for non-malicious Android applications

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository pimcore/pimcore prior to 11.1.0.

**Pimcore Cross-site Scripting vulnerability**

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Oct 31, 2023 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Nov 1, 2023

Tag

#git