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Attacks that target users in their web browsers have seen an unprecedented rise in recent years. In this article, we’ll explore what a “browser-based attack” is, and why they’re proving to be so effective. What is a browser-based attack? First, it’s important to establish what a browser-based attack is. In most scenarios, attackers don’t think of themselves as attacking your web browser.
Hackers leaked 600 GB of data linked to the Great Firewall of China, exposing documents, code, and operations.…
Geedge Networks, a company with ties to the founder of China’s mass censorship infrastructure, is selling its censorship and surveillance systems to at least four other countries in Asia and Africa.
### Impact The blog application in XWiki allowed remote code execution for any user who has edit right on any page. Normally, these are all logged-in users as they can edit their own user profile. To exploit, it is sufficient to add an object of type `Blog.BlogPostClass` to any page and to add some script macro with the exploit code to the "Content" field of that object. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in the blog application version 9.14 by executing the content of blog posts with the rights of the appropriate author. ### Workarounds We're not aware of any workarounds. ### Resources * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/BLOG-191 * https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/application-blog/commit/b98ab6f17da3029576f42d12b4442cd555c7e0b4
Pentesting remains one of the most effective ways to identify real-world security weaknesses before adversaries do. But as the threat landscape has evolved, the way we deliver pentest results hasn't kept pace. Most organizations still rely on traditional reporting methods—static PDFs, emailed documents, and spreadsheet-based tracking. The problem? These outdated workflows introduce delays,
### Impact It's possible to get access and read configuration files by using URLs such as `http://localhost:8080/bin/ssx/Main/WebHome?resource=../../WEB-INF/xwiki.cfg&minify=false`. This can apparently be reproduced on Tomcat instances. ### Patches This has been patched in 17.4.0-rc-1, 16.10.7. ### Workarounds There is no known workaround, other than upgrading XWiki. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/) * Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org) ### Attribution The vulnerability was reported by Gregor Neumann.
### Impact It's possible to get access and read configuration files by using URLs such as `http://localhost:8080/xwiki/webjars/wiki%3Axwiki/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2FWEB-INF%2Fxwiki.cfg`. The trick here is to encode the / which is decoded when parsing the URL segment, but not re-encoded when assembling the file path. ### Patches This has been patched in 17.4.0-rc-1, 16.10.7. ### Workarounds There is no known workaround, other than upgrading XWiki. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/) * Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org)
### Impact The PDF export uses a background job that runs on the server-side. Jobs like this have a status that is serialized in the permanent directory when the job is finished. The job status includes the job request. The PDF export job request is initialized, before the job starts, with some context information that is needed to replicate the HTTP request (used to trigger the export) in the background thread used to run the export job. This context information includes the cookies from the HTTP request that triggered the export. As a result, the user cookies (including the encrypted username and password) are stored in the permanent directory after the PDF export is finished. As the encryption key is stored in the same data directory (by default it is generated in ``data/configuration.properties``), this means that this job status contains the equivalent of the plain text password of the user who requested the PDF export. XWiki shouldn't store passwords in plain text, and it shoul...
### Impact The XML export of a page in XWiki that can be triggered by any user with view rights on a page by appending `?xpage=xml` to the URL includes password and email properties stored on a document that aren't named `password` or `email`. This allows any user to obtain the salted and hashed user account validation or password reset token. As those tokens are randomly generated strings, the immediate impact of this should be low. The user's password and email itself aren't exposed as those fields are named `password` and `email` and thus aren't affected. However, depending on how the wiki is used, there could be extensions or custom code that store passwords in plain text in such password properties that would be exposed by this vulnerability. ### Patches This vulnerability has been fixed by completely removing the output of password and email fields in this XML export in versions 17.2.0 RC1, 16.10.5 and 16.4.7. ### Workarounds If this XML export isn't needed, the file `templates...
### Impact Any user with edit right on a page of the wiki can create an XClass with a database list property that references a password property, for example the password hash that is stored for users. When adding an object of that XClass, the content of that password property is displayed. In practice, with a standard rights setup, this means that any user with an account on the wiki can access password hashes of all users, and possibly other password properties (with hashed or plain storage) that are on pages that the user can view. ### Patches This vulnerability has been pached in XWiki 16.4.7, 16.10.5, and 17.2.0 by disallowing the use of password properties in database list properties. Additionally, queries for email properties are disallowed, too, when email obfuscation is enabled. ### Workarounds We're not aware of any workarounds.