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## Summary A nil pointer dereference vulnerability in the Omni Resource Service allows unauthenticated users to cause a server panic and denial of service by sending empty create/update resource requests through the API endpoints. ## Details The vulnerability exists in the `isSensitiveSpec` function which calls `grpcomni.CreateResource` without checking if the resource's metadata field is nil. When a resource is created with an empty `Metadata` field, the `CreateResource` function attempts to access `resource.Metadata.Version` causing a segmentation fault. ### Vulnerable Code The `isSensitiveSpec` function in `/src/internal/backend/server.go`: ```go func isSensitiveSpec(resource *resapi.Resource) bool { res, err := grpcomni.CreateResource(resource) // No nil check on resource.Metadata if err != nil { return false } // ... rest of function } ``` The `CreateResource` function expects `resource.Metadata` to be non-nil: ```go func CreateResource(resource *r...

ShinyHunters and its affiliate hackers have leaked data from 6 firms, including Qantas and Vietnam Airlines, after claiming to breach 39 companies via a Salesforce vulnerability.

# Escape of VM Context gives access to process level functionality ## Summary Happy DOM v19 and lower contains a security vulnerability that puts the owner system at the risk of RCE (Remote Code Execution) attacks. A Node.js VM Context is not an isolated environment, and if the user runs untrusted JavaScript code within the Happy DOM VM Context, it may escape the VM and get access to process level functionality. What the attacker can get control over depends on if the process is using ESM or CommonJS. With CommonJS the attacker can get hold of the `require()` function to import modules. Happy DOM has JavaScript evaluation enabled by default. This may not be obvious to the consumer of Happy DOM and can potentially put the user at risk if untrusted code is executed within the environment. ## Reproduce ### CommonJS (Possible to get hold of require) ```javascript const { Window } = require('happy-dom'); const window = new Window({ console }); window.document.write(` <script> ...

### Summary When running Astro in on-demand rendering mode using a adapter such as the node adapter it is possible to maliciously send an `X-Forwarded-Host` header that is reflected when using the recommended `Astro.url` property as there is no validation that the value is safe. ### Details Astro reflects the value in `X-Forwarded-Host` in output when using `Astro.url` without any validation. It is common for web servers such as nginx to route requests via the `Host` header, and forward on other request headers. As such as malicious request can be sent with both a `Host` header and an `X-Forwarded-Host` header where the values do not match and the `X-Forwarded-Host` header is malicious. Astro will then return the malicious value. This could result in any usages of the `Astro.url` value in code being manipulated by a request. For example if a user follows guidance and uses `Astro.url` for a canonical link the canonical link can be manipulated to another site. It is not impossible to...

### Summary The ReadFileTool in Flowise does not restrict file path access, allowing authenticated attackers to exploit this vulnerability to read arbitrary files from the file system, potentially leading to remote command execution. ### Details Flowise supports providing ReadFileTool for large models to read files in the server's file system. The implementation of this tool is located at packages/components/nodes/tools/ReadFile/ReadFile.ts. ``` /** * Class for reading files from the disk. Extends the StructuredTool * class. */ export class ReadFileTool extends StructuredTool { static lc_name() { return 'ReadFileTool' } schema = z.object({ file_path: z.string().describe('name of file') }) as any name = 'read_file' description = 'Read file from disk' store: BaseFileStore constructor({ store }: ReadFileParams) { super(...arguments) this.store = store } async _call({ file_path }: z.infer<typeof this.sche...

### Summary The sanitization method `ldap.filter.escape_filter_chars` can be tricked to skip escaping of special characters when a crafted `list` or `dict` is supplied as the `assertion_value` parameter, and the non-default `escape_mode=1` is configured. ### Details The method `ldap.filter.escape_filter_chars` supports 3 different escaping modes. `escape_mode=0` (default) and `escape_mode=2` happen to raise exceptions when a `list` or `dict` object is supplied as the `assertion_value` parameter. However, `escape_mode=1` happily computes without performing adequate logic to ensure a fully escaped return value. ### PoC ``` >>> import ldap.filter ``` **Exploitable** ``` >>> ldap.filter.escape_filter_chars(["abc@*()/xyz"], escape_mode=1) 'abc@*()/xyz' >>> ldap.filter.escape_filter_chars({"abc@*()/xyz": 1}, escape_mode=1) 'abc@*()/xyz' ``` **Not exploitable** ``` >>> ldap.filter.escape_filter_chars("abc@*()/xyz", escape_mode=1) 'abc@\\2a\\28\\29\\2fxyz' >>> ldap.filter.escape_filter_chars...

**Summary** Authlib’s JOSE implementation accepts unbounded JWS/JWT header and signature segments. A remote attacker can craft a token whose base64url‑encoded header or signature spans hundreds of megabytes. During verification, Authlib decodes and parses the full input before it is rejected, driving CPU and memory consumption to hostile levels and enabling denial of service. **Impact** - Attack vector: unauthenticated network attacker submits a malicious JWS/JWT. - Effect: base64 decode + JSON/crypto processing of huge buffers pegs CPU and allocates large amounts of RAM; a single request can exhaust service capacity. - Observed behaviour: on a test host, the legacy code verified a 500 MB header, consuming ~4 GB RSS and ~9 s CPU before failing. - Severity: High. CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (7.5). Affected Versions Authlib ≤ 1.6.3 (and earlier) when verifying JWS/JWT tokens. Later snapshots with 256 KB header/signature limits are not affected. **Proof of concep...

Fortinet warns of Stealit, a MaaS infostealer, now targeting Windows systems and evading detection by using Node.js’s SEA feature while hiding in fake game and VPN installers.

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of an active malware campaign called Stealit that has leveraged Node.js' Single Executable Application (SEA) feature as a way to distribute its payloads. According to Fortinet FortiGuard Labs, select iterations have also employed the open-source Electron framework to deliver the malware. It's assessed that the malware is being propagated through

Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new set of 175 malicious packages on the npm registry that have been used to facilitate credential harvesting attacks as part of an unusual campaign. The packages have been collectively downloaded 26,000 times, acting as an infrastructure for a widespread phishing campaign codenamed Beamglea targeting more than 135 industrial, technology, and energy