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Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-10379-03 - An update for pam is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Issues addressed include a bypass vulnerability.
Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-10289-03 - An update for the container-tools:rhel8 module is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Issues addressed include denial of service and traversal vulnerabilities.
Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-10282-03 - An update for the kernel-rt:4.18.0 module is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Issues addressed include a use-after-free vulnerability.
Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-10281-03 - An update for the kernel:4.18.0 module is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Issues addressed include a use-after-free vulnerability.
Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-10275-03 - An update for kernel-rt is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 Advanced Mission Critical Update Support, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 Telecommunications Update Service, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 Update Services for SAP Solutions.
### Summary sigstore-java has insufficient verification for a situation where a validly-signed but "mismatched" bundle is presented as proof of inclusion into a transparency log ### Impact This bug impacts clients using any variation of KeylessVerifier.verify() The verifier may accept a bundle with an unrelated log entry, cryptographically verifying everything but fails to ensure the log entry applies to the artifact in question, thereby "verifying" a bundle without any proof the signing event was logged. This allows the creation of a bundle without fulcio certificate and private key combined with an unrelated but time-correct log entry to fake logging of a signing event. A malicious actor using a compromised identity may want to do this to prevent discovery via rekor's log monitors. The signer's identity will still be available to the verifier. The signature on the bundle must still be on the correct artifact for the verifier to pass. sigstore-gradle-plugin and sigstore-maven-pl...
### Summary lobe-chat before 1.19.13 has an unauthorized ssrf vulnerability. An attacker can construct malicious requests to cause SSRF without logging in, attack intranet services, and leak sensitive information. ### Details * visit https://chat-preview.lobehub.com/ * click settings -> llm -> openai * fill the OpenAI API Key you like * fill the proxy address that you want to attack (e.g. a domain that resolved to a local ip addr like 127.0.0.1.xip.io) (the address will concat the path "/chat/completions" which can be bypassed with sharp like "http://172.23.0.1:8000/#") * then lobe will echo the ssrf result The jwt token header X-Lobe-Chat-Auth strored proxy address and OpenAI API Key, you can modify it to scan internal network in your target lobe-web.    XSS in generated `search_index.js` `deno_doc` outputed a JavaScript file for searching. However, the generated file used `innerHTML` on unsanitzed HTML input. https://github.com/denoland/deno_doc/blob/dc556c848831d7ae48f3eff2ababc6e75eb6b73e/src/html/templates/pages/search.js#L120-L144 2.) XSS via property, method and enum names `deno_doc` did not sanitize property names, method names and enum names. ### Impact The first XSS most likely didn't have an impact since `deno doc --html` is expected to be used locally with own packages.
### Summary "Unsanitized input from *the request URL* flows into `end`, where it is used to render an HTML page returned to the user. This may result in a Cross-Site Scripting attack (XSS)." ### Details Source of potentially tainted data is in `packages/kit/src/exports/vite/dev/index.js`, line 437. This potentially tainted data is passed through a number of steps (which I could detail if you'd like) all the way down to line 91 in `packages/kit/src/exports/vite/utils.js`, which performs an operation that Snyk believes an attacker shouldn't be allowed to manipulate. Another source of potentially tainted data (according to Snyk) comes from `packages/kit/src/exports/vite/utils.js`, line 30, col 30 (i.e., the `url` property of `req`). This potentially tainted data is passed through a number of steps (which I could detail if you'd like) all the way down line 91 in `packages/kit/src/exports/vite/utils.js`, which performs an operation that Snyk believes an attacker shouldn't be allowed to...
### Summary The static error.html template for errors contains placeholders that are replaced without escaping the content first. ### Details From https://kit.svelte.dev/docs/errors: > error.html is the page that is rendered when everything else fails. It can contain the following placeholders: %sveltekit.status% — the HTTP status %sveltekit.error.message% — the error message This leads to possible injection if an app explicitly creates an error with a message that contains user controlled content that ends up being something like this inside a server handle function: ```js error(500, '<script>alert("boom")</script>'); ``` Uncaught errors cannot be exploited like this, as they always render the message "Internal error". Escaping the message string in the function that creates the html output can be done to improve safety for applications that are using custom errors on the server. ### PoC None provided ### Impact Only applications where user provided input is used in the `Er...