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Organizations looking to better understand the lineage of their software artifacts have begun to adopt signing as a way to improve their security posture. By applying digital signatures to software artifacts, trust can be established to verify that assets have not been substituted or tampered with through the software development and delivery process.Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer, a key component of Red Hat’s Trusted Software Supply Chain portfolio, provides a suite of tools that supports signing and verifying assets from first commit to deployment. Since Trusted Artifact Signer was first

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ESET has identified PromptLock, the first AI-powered ransomware, using OpenAI models to generate scripts that target Windows, Linux…

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Discovery & Research team recently disclosed ten vulnerabilities in BioSig Libbiosig, nine in Tenda AC6 Router, eight in SAIL, two in PDF-XChange Editor, and one in a Foxit PDF Reader. The vulnerabilities mentioned in this blog post have been patched by their respective vendors, all in

## Summary A 32-bit integer overflow in the BMP encoder’s scanline-stride computation collapses `bytes_per_line` (stride) to a tiny value while the per-row writer still emits `3 × width` bytes for 24-bpp images. The row base pointer advances using the (overflowed) stride, so the first row immediately writes past its slot and into adjacent heap memory with attacker-controlled bytes. This is a classic, powerful primitive for heap corruption in common auto-convert pipelines. - **Impact:** Attacker-controlled heap out-of-bounds (OOB) write during conversion **to BMP**. - **Surface:** Typical upload → normalize/thumbnail → `magick ... out.bmp` workers. - **32-bit:** **Vulnerable** (reproduced with ASan). - **64-bit:** Safe from this specific integer overflow (IOF) by arithmetic, but still add product/size guards. - **Proposed severity:** **Critical 9.8** (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). --- ## Scope & Affected Builds - **Project:** ImageMagick (B...

## Summary A format string bug vulnerability exists in `InterpretImageFilename` function where user input is directly passed to `FormatLocaleString` without proper sanitization. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary memory regions, enabling a wide range of attacks from heap overflow to remote code execution. <br> ## Details ### root cause ``` MagickExport size_t InterpretImageFilename(const ImageInfo *image_info, Image *image,const char *format,int value,char *filename, ExceptionInfo *exception) { ... while ((cursor=strchr(cursor,'%')) != (const char *) NULL) { const char *q = cursor; ssize_t offset = (ssize_t) (cursor-format); cursor++; /* move past '%' */ if (*cursor == '%') { /* Escaped %%. */ cursor++; continue; } /* Skip padding digits like %03d. */ if (isdigit((int) ((unsigned char) *cursor)) != 0) (void) strtol(cursor,(char **) &cursor,10); switch (*cursor) ...

## Summary Passing a geometry string containing only a colon (":") to montage -geometry leads GetGeometry() to set width/height to 0. Later, ThumbnailImage() divides by these zero dimensions, triggering a crash (SIGFPE/abort), resulting in a denial of service. ## Details **Root Cause** 1. `montage -geometry ":" ...` reaches `MagickCore/geometry.c:GetGeometry().` 2. `StringToDouble/InterpretLocaleValue` parses `":"` as `0.0;` then: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/0ba1b587be17543b664f7ad538e9e51e0da59d17/MagickCore/geometry.c#L355 `WidthValue` (and/or `HeightValue)` is set with a zero dimension. 3. In MagickCore/resize.c:ThumbnailImage(), the code computes: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/0ba1b587be17543b664f7ad538e9e51e0da59d17/MagickCore/resize.c#L4625-L4629 causing a division by zero and immediate crash. The issue is trivially triggerable without external input files (e.g., using `xc:white`). ### Reproduction Environment ``` Version: ImageMagick 7.1...

The application constructs a shell command using unsanitized user input passed to the system() function, calling an external binary for authentication. Due to improper input handling and reliance on the binary's return value for access control, an attacker can inject special characters, such as a double quote (") to manipulate command parsing and induce execution failure. Since the application interprets any non-zero exit code from the binary as successful authentication, this flaw allows remote users to bypass authentication entirely without providing valid credentials.

## Summary In ImageMagick's `magick stream` command, specifying multiple consecutive `%d` format specifiers in a filename template causes a memory leak. ## Details - **Vulnerability Type:** Memory leak - **Affected Version:** ImageMagick 7.1.1-47 (as of commit 82572afc, June 2025) ## Reproduction ### Tested Environment - **Operating System:** Ubuntu 22.04 LTS - **Architecture:** x86_64 - **Compiler:** gcc with AddressSanitizer (gcc version: 11.4.0) ### Reproduction Steps ```bash # Clone source git clone --depth 1 --branch 7.1.1-47 https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick.git ImageMagick-7.1.1 cd ImageMagick-7.1.1 # Build with ASan CFLAGS="-g -O0 -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer" CXXFLAGS="$CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" ./configure --enable-maintainer-mode --enable-shared && make -j$(nproc) && make install # Trigger crash ./utilities/magick stream %d%d a a ``` ### Output ``` $ magick stream %d%d a a stream: no decode delegate for this image format `' @ erro...

# Heap Buffer Overflow in InterpretImageFilename ## Summary A heap buffer overflow was identified in the `InterpretImageFilename` function of ImageMagick. The issue stems from an off-by-one error that causes out-of-bounds memory access when processing format strings containing consecutive percent signs (`%%`). ## Environment - **OS**: Arch Linux (Linux gmkhost 6.14.2-arch1-1 # 1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu, 10 Apr 2025 18:43:59 +0000 x86_64 GNU/Linux (GNU libc) 2.41) - **Architecture**: x86_64 - **Compiler**: gcc (GCC) 15.1.1 20250425 ## Reproduction ### Build Instructions ```bash # Clone the repository git clone https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick.git cd ImageMagick git reset --hard 8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12 # Build with AddressSanitizer export CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -g -O1" export CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -g -O1" export LDFLAGS="-fsanitizer=address" ./configure make # Set library path and trigger the crash export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$(pwd)/MagickWand/.lib...