Tag
#mac
The Defense Department operates slot machines on US military bases overseas, raising millions of dollars to fund recreation for troops—and creating risks for soldiers prone to gambling addiction.
Security firm Point Wild has exposed a new malware campaign using malicious LNK files to install the REMCOS backdoor. This report details how attackers disguise files to gain full system control.
## Summary A critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability was discovered in the `@nestjs/devtools-integration` package. When enabled, the package exposes a local development HTTP server with an API endpoint that uses an unsafe JavaScript sandbox (`safe-eval`-like implementation). Due to improper sandboxing and missing cross-origin protections, any malicious website visited by a developer can execute arbitrary code on their local machine. A full blog post about how this vulnerability was uncovered can be found on [Socket's blog](https://socket.dev/blog/nestjs-rce-vuln). ## Details The `@nestjs/devtools-integration` package adds HTTP endpoints to a locally running NestJS development server. One of these endpoints, `/inspector/graph/interact`, accepts JSON input containing a `code` field and executes the provided code in a Node.js `vm.runInNewContext` sandbox. Key issues: 1. **Unsafe Sandbox:** The sandbox implementation closely resembles the abandoned `safe-eval` library. The No...
An Ohio man lost $27,000 after an Apple ID scam text hit his phone. The strangest part? It happened at his doorstep.
### Summary Nested imports of MaterialX files can lead to a crash via stack memory exhaustion, due to the lack of a limit on the "import chain" depth. ### Details The MaterialX [specification](https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/MaterialX/blob/main/documents/Specification/MaterialX.Specification.md#mtlx-file-format-definition) supports importing other files by using `XInclude` tags. When parsing file imports, recursion is used to process nested files in the form of a tree with the root node being the first MaterialX files parsed. However, there is no limit imposed to the depth of files that can be parsed by the library, therefore, by building a sufficiently deep chain of MaterialX files one referencing the next, it is possible to crash the process using the MaterialX library via stack exhaustion. ### PoC This test is going to employ Windows UNC paths, in order to make the Proof Of Concept more realistic. In fact, by using windows network shares, an attacker would be able t...
### Summary The OpenEXR file format defines many information about the final image inside of the file header, such as the size of data/display window. The application trusts the value of `dataWindow` size provided in the header of the input file, and performs computations based on this value. This may result in unintended behaviors, such as excessively large number of iterations and/or huge memory allocations. ### Details A concrete example of this issue is present in the function `readScanline()` in `ImfCheckFile.cpp` at line 235, that performs a for-loop using the `dataWindow min.y` and `max.y` coordinates that can be arbitrarily large. ```cpp in.setFrameBuffer (i); int step = 1; // // try reading scanlines. Continue reading scanlines // even if an exception is encountered // for (int y = dw.min.y; y <= dw.max.y; y += step) // <-- THIS LOOP IS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE OF DW.MAX { try { in.readPixels (y); } catch (...) { threw = true; // ...
### Summary When reading a deep scanline image with a large sample count in `reduceMemory` mode, it is possible to crash a target application with a NULL pointer dereference in a write operation. ### Details In the `ScanLineProcess::run_fill` function, implemented in `src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfDeepScanLineInputFile.cpp`, the following code is used to write the `fillValue` in the sample buffer: ```cpp switch (fills.type) { case OPENEXR_IMF_INTERNAL_NAMESPACE::UINT: { unsigned int fillVal = (unsigned int) (fills.fillValue); unsigned int* fillptr = static_cast<unsigned int*> (dest); for ( int32_t s = 0; s < samps; ++s ) fillptr[s] = fillVal; // <--- POTENTIAL CRASH HERE break; } ``` However, when `reduceMemory` mode is enabled in the `readDeepScanLine` function in `src/lib/Open...
### Summary The OpenEXRCore code is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow during a read operation due to bad pointer math when decompressing DWAA-packed scan-line EXR files with a maliciously forged chunk. ### Details In the `LossyDctDecoder_execute` function (from `src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_dwa_decoder.h`, when SSE2 is enabled), the following code is used to copy data from the chunks: ```cpp // no-op conversion to linear for (int y = 8 * blocky; y < 8 * blocky + maxY; ++y) { __m128i* restrict dst = (__m128i *) chanData[comp]->_rows[y]; __m128i const * restrict src = (__m128i const *)&rowBlock[comp][(y & 0x7) * 8]; for (int blockx = 0; blockx < numFullBlocksX; ++blockx) { _mm_storeu_si128 (dst, _mm_loadu_si128 (src)); // src += 8 * 8; // <--- si128 pointer incremented as a uint16_t dst += 8; } } ``` The issue arises because the `src` pointer, which is a `si128` pointer, is incremented by `8*8`, as if it were a `uint16_t` pointer...
### Summary The OpenEXRCore code is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow during a write operation when decompressing ZIPS-packed deep scan-line EXR files with a maliciously forged chunk header. ### Details When parsing `STORAGE_DEEP_SCANLINE` chunks from an EXR file, the following code (from `src/lib/OpenEXRCore/chunk.c`) is used to extract the chunk information: ```cpp if (part->storage_mode == EXR_STORAGE_DEEP_SCANLINE) // SNIP... cinfo->sample_count_data_offset = dataoff; cinfo->sample_count_table_size = (uint64_t) ddata[0]; cinfo->data_offset = dataoff + (uint64_t) ddata[0]; cinfo->packed_size = (uint64_t) ddata[1]; cinfo->unpacked_size = (uint64_t) ddata[2]; // SNIP... ``` By storing this information, the code that will later decompress and reconstruct the chunk bytes, will know how much space the uncompressed data will occupy. This size is carried along in the chain of decoding/decompression...
This week Bill connects the hype of literary awards to cybersecurity conference season. We highlight key insights from the Q2 2025 IR Trends report, including phishing trends, new ransomware strains, and top targeted sectors. Finally, check out all the places Talos will be at Black Hat.