As ransomware attacks continue to evolve, beyond using security best practices organizations can build resiliency with extended detection and response solutions and fast response times to shut down attacks.

Ransomware is the most significant cybersecurity threat facing organizations today. But recently, leaders from the National Security Agency and the FBI both indicated that attacks declined during the first half of 2022. The combination of sanctions on Russia, where many cybercriminal gangs originate, and crashing cryptocurrency markets may have had an effect, making it difficult for ransomware gangs to extract funds and get their payouts.

But we aren't out of the woods yet. Despite a temporary dip, ransomware is not only thriving but also evolving. Today, ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) has evolved from a commoditized, automated model relying on prepackaged exploit kits, to a human-operated, highly targeted, and sophisticated business operation. That's reason for businesses of any size to be concerned.

**Becoming RaaS**

It is widely known that today's cybercriminals are well equipped, highly motivated, and very effective. They didn't get that way by accident, and they haven't remained so effective without continuously evolving their technologies and methodologies. The motivation of massive financial gain has been the only constant.

Early ransomware attacks were simple, technology-driven attacks. The attacks drove increased focus on backup and restore capabilities, which led adversaries to seek out online backups and encrypt those, too, during an attack. Attacker success led to larger ransoms, and the larger ransom demands made it less likely that the victim would pay, and more likely that law enforcement would get involved. Ransomware gangs responded with extortion. They transitioned to not only encrypting data, but exfiltration and threatening to make public the often-sensitive data of the victim's customers or partners, introducing a more complex risk of brand and reputational damage. Today, it isn't unusual for ransomware attackers to seek out a victim's cyber-insurance policy to help set the ransom demand and make the whole process (including payment) as efficient as possible.

We have also seen less disciplined (but equally damaging) ransomware attacks. For example, choosing to pay a ransom in turn also identifies a victim as a reliable fit for a future attack, increasing the likelihood it will be hit again, by the same or a different ransomware gang. Research estimates between 50% to 80% (PDF) of organizations that paid a ransom suffered a repeat attack.

As ransomware attacks have evolved, so have security technologies, especially in areas of threat identification and blocking. Anti-phishing, spam filters, antivirus, and malware-detection technologies have all been fine-tuned to address modern threats to minimize the threat of a compromise through email, malicious websites, or other popular attack vectors.

This proverbial "cat and mouse" game between adversaries and security providers that deliver better defenses and sophisticated approaches to stopping ransomware attacks has led to more collaboration within global cybercriminal rings. Much like safecrackers and alarm specialists used in traditional robberies, experts in malware development, network access, and exploitation are powering today's attacks and created conditions for the next evolution in ransomware.

**The RaaS Model Today**

RaaS has evolved to become a sophisticated, human-led operation with a complex, profit sharing business model. A RaaS operator who may have worked independently in the past now contracts with specialists to increase chances of a success.

A RaaS operator — who maintains specific ransomware tools, communicates with the victim, and secures payments — will now often work alongside a high-level hacker, who will perform the intrusion itself. Having an interactive attacker inside the target environment enables live decision-making during the attack. Working together, they identify specific weaknesses within the network, escalate privileges, and encrypt the most sensitive data to ensure payouts. In addition, they carry out reconnaissance to find and delete online backups and disable security tooling. The contracted hacker will often work alongside an access broker, who is responsible for providing access to the network through stolen credentials or persistence mechanisms that are already in place.

The attacks resulting from this collaboration of expertise have the feel and appearance of "old-fashioned," state-sponsored advanced persistent threat-style attacks, but are much more prevalent.

**How Organizations Can Defend Themselves**

The new, human operated RaaS model is much more sophisticated, targeted, and destructive than the RaaS models of the past, but there are still best practices organizations can follow to defend themselves.

Organizations must be disciplined about their security hygiene. IT is always changing, and any time a new endpoint is added, or a system is updated, it has the potential to introduce a new vulnerability or risk. Security teams must remain focused on security best practices: patching, using multifactor authentication, enforcing strong credentials, scanning the Dark Web for compromised credentials, training employees on how to spot phishing attempts, and more. These best practices help reduce the attack surface and minimize the risk that an access broker will be able to exploit a vulnerability to gain entry. Additionally, the stronger security hygiene an organization has, the less "noise" there will be for analysts to sort through in the security operations center (SOC), enabling them to focus on the real threat when one is identified.

Beyond security best practices, organizations must also ensure they have advanced threat detection and response capabilities. Because access brokers spend time performing reconnaissance in the organization's infrastructure, security analysts have an opportunity to spot them and stop the attack in its early stages — but only if they have the right tools. Organizations should look to extended detection and response solutions that can detect and cross-correlate telemetry from security events across their endpoints, networks, servers, email and cloud systems, and applications. They also need the ability to respond wherever the attack is identified to shut it down quickly. Large enterprises may have these capabilities built into their SOC, whereas midsize organizations may want to consider the managed detection and response model for 24/7 threat monitoring and response.

Despite the recent decline in ransomware attacks, security professionals shouldn't expect the threat to go extinct anytime soon. RaaS will continue to evolve, with the latest adaptations replaced by new approaches in response to cybersecurity innovations. But with a focus on security best practices paired with key threat prevention, detection, and response technologies, organizations will become more resilient against attacks.

Ransomware: The Latest Chapter

Ubuntu Security Notice 5618-1 - It was discovered the Ghostscript incorrectly handled memory when processing certain inputs. By tricking a user into opening a specially crafted PDF file, an attacker could cause the program to crash.

    ==========================================================================Ubuntu Security Notice USN-5618-1September 20, 2022ghostscript vulnerability==========================================================================A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives:- Ubuntu 16.04 ESMSummary:Ghostscript could be made to crash if it opened a specially crafted.Software Description:- ghostscript: PostScript and PDF interpreterDetails:It was discovered the Ghostscript incorrectly handled memory whenprocessing certain inputs. By tricking a user into opening a speciallycrafted PDF file, an attacker could cause the program to crash.Update instructions:The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the followingpackage versions:Ubuntu 16.04 ESM:   ghostscript                      9.26~dfsg+0-0ubuntu0.16.04.14+esm4   ghostscript-x                   9.26~dfsg+0-0ubuntu0.16.04.14+esm4   libgs9                              9.26~dfsg+0-0ubuntu0.16.04.14+esm4In general, a standard system update will make all the necessary changes.References:   https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-5618-1   CVE-2020-27792

Ubuntu Security Notice USN-5618-1

XPDF 4.04 is vulnerable to Null Pointer Dereference in FoFiType1C.cc:2393.

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cyth

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**null pointer dereference caused by no-check malloc pointer**

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Post by **cyth** » Sat Aug 20, 2022 10:03 am

Hello.  
I find a npd bug in xpdf 4.04 in FoFiType1C.cc:2393, it may caused by WebFont.cc:198 ( a no-check pointer).  
It can be triggered by a crafted file in attachment by using pdftohtml.

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derekn

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**Re: null pointer dereference caused by no-check malloc pointer**

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Post by **derekn** » Tue Aug 23, 2022 6:49 pm

I'll have that fixed in the next release.

Thanks for the bug report.

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cyth

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**Re: null pointer dereference caused by no-check malloc pointer**

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Post by **cyth** » Thu Aug 25, 2022 2:53 am

Thanks for your confirmation.

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CVE-2022-38928: null pointer dereference caused by no-check malloc pointer

A stacked combination of hardware and software protects the next version of Windows against the latest generation of firmware threats.

Microsoft on Tuesday released a hefty PDF detailing Windows 11's new security-focused features, with a heavy emphasis on supporting zero trust.

For a couple of years now, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon have been working with the US federal government on improving cybersecurity through zero trust, among other techniques. It's no coincidence that these are the big three cloud service providers, of course; they are best positioned to institute controls to prevent catastrophic cyberattacks.

But Microsoft is also moving security way down the stack to where cloud rivals can't follow: firmware.

**Hardware Security Under Attack**

While network-level security is mandatory, it is not sufficient to protect against attackers who target firmware and other low-level elements of a computer.

Flaws in firmware for CPUs, printers, and other hardware can open a door to a corporate network. Malware like TrickBot, MoonBounce, and LoJax that worms its way into the silicon is difficult to dislodge.

"These new threats call for computing hardware that is secure down to the very core, including hardware chips and processors which store sensitive business information," Microsoft stated in the new report. "With hardware-based protection, we can enable strong mitigation against entire classes of vulnerabilities that are difficult to thwart with software alone." 

Besides the extra strength of the protection, Microsoft touts less slowdown using hardware-based protection versus running it in software.

The foundation of the built-in hardware security is a partnership between hardware root-of-trust and silicon-assisted security.

**Hardware Root-of-Trust**

Hardware root-of-trust is, by definition, "a starting point that is implicitly trusted." In the case of a PC, it's the part that checks BIOS code to ensure it's legitimate before it boots up. And anyone who's had to remove malware from a machine with infected BIOS knows how vital that is.

The new security measures include storing sensitive data such as cryptographic keys and user credentials isolated from the operating system within a separate secure area. Microsoft requires a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 chip to be installed on both new and upgraded Windows 11 machines. The company had required TPM 2.0 capabilities on all new Windows 10 machines, but the latest version of Windows won't even run if the PC doesn't have a TPM 2.0 security chip.

"With hardware-based isolation security that begins at the chip, Windows 11 stores sensitive data behind additional barriers separated from the operating system," Microsoft wrote in its new report. "As a result, information including encryption keys and user credentials are protected from unauthorized access and tampering."

To provide TPM 2.0 protection directly on the motherboard, Windows 11 machines include the Microsoft Pluton security processor on the system-on-chip. While Pluton is not brand new – it was previewed back in November 2020 – integrating TPM 2.0 capabilities in this way eliminates one attack vector: the bus interface between the CPU and the TPM chip.

Not all Windows 11 machines will have a Pluton chip, but they will all have a TPM 2.0 chip.

**Silicon-Assisted Security**

The silicon-assisted security measures in Windows 11 start with a secure kernel carved out using virtualization-based security (VBS). 

"The isolated VBS environment protects processes, such as security solutions and credential managers, from other processes running in memory," Microsoft wrote. "Even if malware gains access to the main OS kernel, the hypervisor and virtualization hardware help prevent the malware from executing unauthorized code or accessing platform secrets in the VBS environment."

Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HCVI) uses VBS to check the validity of code within the secure VBS environment instead of in the main Windows kernel. Kernel mode code integrity (KMCI), as that's called, fends off attempts to modify drivers and the like. KMCI verifies that all kernel code is properly signed and has not been altered before it allows it to run. HVCI is supported in all versions of Windows 11 and enabled by default in most editions.

A further measure of protection against such attacks as memory corruption and zero-day exploits is offered by hardware-enforced stack protection. 

"Based on Controlflow Enforcement Technology (CET) from Intel and AMD Shadow Stacks, hardware-enforced stack protection is designed to protect against exploit techniques that try to hijack return addresses on the stack," Microsoft explained. The OS does this by creating a "shadow stack," set apart from other stacks, for return addresses.

To protect against physical incursions where an intruder surreptitiously installs malware from a device, Microsoft's line of Secured-core PCs will only run executables signed by "known and approved authorities," keeping external peripherals from accessing memory without authorization.

Even more firmware protection comes from Windows 11's universal implementation of the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot standard. The TPM stores a boot audit log, the Static Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM), to check whether any attempts to subvert the boot were made.

UEFI is not unique to Windows machines, of course, but Windows 11 adds Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM) that checks the UEFI boot process for suspicious activity before allowing it to continue. Non-PC devices such as the Surface tablet use Firmware Attack Surface Reduction in place of DRTM.

Silicon-assisted security is part of the Pro, Pro Workstation, Enterprise, Pro Education, and Education versions of Windows 11. The Home editions will have some of these protections but not the full slate. See Microsoft's website for comparisons.

Microsoft Brings Zero Trust to Hardware in Windows 11

Protection mechanism failure in firmware for some Intel(R) SSD DC Products may allow a privileged user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access.

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CVE-2021-33081

A call for federal agency "review and assessment" of cyber-safety plans at water treatment plants should better protect customers and move the industry forward.

Sparked by high-risk cyberattacks and subsequent mainstream press coverage, the federal government is moving toward new requirements for critical infrastructure cybersecurity.

A July Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memo (PDF) called for agencies across the federal government to establish specific cybersecurity "performance standards" for their respective industries — and, even more significantly, to budget for federal agency "review and assessment" of cyber-hardening plans prepared by organizations required to meet those new standards.

**Needed: Federal Review and Assessment of Plans**

This level of direct supervision extends the approach that today is applied only to the most critical national infrastructure — notably the electrical grid (regulated by the Department of Energy, the Federal Energy Reliability Commission, and the North Amerian Reliability Corp.) and oil and gas pipelines (Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration) — across the full range of US industries that people rely on, including retail, pharmaceuticals, chemical, transportation and distribution, food and beverage, and many others.

One industry that's likely to feel this regulatory activity strongly, and see substantial changes as a result, is the water sector. Heavily vulnerable to cyberattacks, water utilities are in urgent need of refreshed — and enforced — security standards. In fact, the Biden administration recently hinted that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is set to issue a new rule that would include cybersecurity in sanitation reviews of the nation's water facilities — further supporting higher standards when it comes to cybersecurity.

The stakes are high: A typical municipal water processing system filters 16 million gallons of water each day, and one successful hacker could taint the community's entire water supply. This is not a hypothetical fear — a hacking group recently managed to infiltrate a water treatment system in Oldsmar, Fla. By tinkering with the amount of lye in the water, they put an entire town at risk. And recently, the Clop ransomware gang targeted the South Staffordshire water utility in the UK. While these attacks are not always successful, the gravity of the risks has been made abundantly clear.

Despite previous attempts to improve security standards for the water sector, it remains vulnerable. Even America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA), which stated that water utilities must develop emergency response plans that address cybersecurity threats as part of a broader effort to improve overall infrastructure and quality, did not significantly change the cybersecurity posture for the industry. The sector encompasses 50,000 separate utilities in the United States, most of which are small and managed by municipalities; this fragmentation, coupled with general unwillingness from operators to abandon existing practices, allowed the impetus for change to peter out.

But precedent tells us that, when done right, federal regulations can make a difference. We're already seeing progress in another vulnerable critical infrastructure sector: oil and gas. Following the high-profile Colonial Pipeline hack in 2021, the Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security Administration (TSA) quickly released two Security Directives, with an update in 2022, doubling down on its efforts to ensure better protection for energy infrastructure nationwide. These directives emphasized credential management and access control, two things that would have helped block the ransomware attack in the first place.

Despite initial pushback from pipeline owners and operators, these first-of-their-kind TSA requirements are already leading the entire sector toward a more-protected environment. Operators are now leaning into security measures centered around proactivity and attack prevention.

**Call for Attack Prevention Leads to More Protection**

The key difference here is that the TSA directives require implementation plans for cyber _protection_, not just for incident detection and response. Once operators were required to _protect_ themselves, not just respond to events after the fact — and once the federal government was reviewing their cyber-protection plans — the oil and gas sector began to move in earnest.

And now, with the OMB's guidance to agencies, the same direct supervision of cyber protection will come to other sectors, too, including water. In other words, the movement within oil and gas is a hint at what's to come for other critical infrastructure.

The 2021 Oldsmar hack showed the world just how easy — and how devastating — an attack on a water plant can be. Regardless of historical industry norms, a clear need for better cybersecurity has emerged, and it appears that the government is prepared to move ahead more aggressively than ever. Its broad push toward better security for critical infrastructure is poised to be the catalyst that many sectors, such as water, have desperately needed.

Plant owners and operators can no longer ignore the risks; heavier regulation is a "when," not an "if." Now is the time for them to pursue better, more modern cybersecurity.

Water Sector Will Benefit From Call for Cyber Hardening of Critical Infrastructure

A potential unathenticated file deletion vulnerabilty on Trend Micro Mobile Security for Enterprise 9.8 SP5 could allow an attacker with access to the Management Server to delete files.

This issue was resolved in 9.8 SP5 Critical Patch 2.

CVE-2022-40980

Genesys PureConnect as of their build on 08-October-2020 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    Product: Genesys PureConnect - Interaction Web Tools Chat ServiceDescription: Interaction Web Tools Chat Service allows XSS within the Printable Chat History via the participant -> name JSON POST parameter.Vulnerability Type: XSSVendor of Product: Genesys PureConnectAffected Product Code Base: Interaction Web Tools - Chat Service - Appears to be all versions up to current releaseAffected Component: "Print" feature of the Interaction Web Tools Chat: https://help.genesys.com/pureconnect/mergedprojects/wh_tr/desktop/pdfs/web_tools_dg.pdfAttack Vectors:  *   To exploit the Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability, visit https://<vulnerable-domain>/I3Root/chatOrCallback.html<https://%3cvulnerable-domain%3e/I3Root/chatOrCallback.html>  *   Then select the 'I don't have an account" option, and enter the name "><script>alert(1)</script>  *   Then press 'Start Chat'  *   Then enter anything in the chat box like 'asdfg' and press send  *   Now select the 'Printable Chat History' in the top right corner  *   XSS will trigger. You can google dork for vulnerable versions with inurl:"/I3Root/chatOrCallback.html"I'm assuming if an admin tries to print the chat conversation, it will trigger for them as well. Unable to confirm though.Discoverer: Jake Murphy - Echelon Risk + Cyber - https://echeloncyber.com/> [References]> http://genesys.com> http://interaction.com

Genesys PureConnect Cross Site Scripting

A local unprivileged attacker may escalate to administrator privileges in Honeywell SoftMaster version 4.51, due to insecure permission assignment.

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