#php

### Problem Local platform users who can write to TYPO3’s mail‑file spool directory can craft a file that the system will automatically deserialize without any class restrictions. This flaw allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary PHP code in the public scope of the web server. The vulnerability is triggered when TYPO3 is configured with `$GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['MAIL']['transport_spool_type'] = 'file';` and a scheduler task or cron job runs the command `mailer:spool:send`. The spool‑send operation performs the insecure deserialization that is at the core of this issue. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 10.4.55 ELTS, 11.5.49 ELTS, 12.4.41 LTS, 13.4.23 LTS, 14.0.2 that fix the problem described. ### Credits Thanks to Vitaly Simonovich for reporting this issue, and to TYPO3 security team members Elias Häußler and Oliver Hader for fixing it. ### References * [TYPO3-CORE-SA-2026-004](https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2026-004)

A new wave of GoBruteforcer attacks has targeted databases of cryptocurrency and blockchain projects to co-opt them into a botnet that's capable of brute-forcing user passwords for services such as FTP, MySQL, PostgreSQL, and phpMyAdmin on Linux servers. "The current wave of campaigns is driven by two factors: the mass reuse of AI-generated server deployment examples that propagate common

Cybersecurity researchers have shed light on two service providers that supply online criminal networks with the necessary tools and infrastructure to fuel the pig butchering-as-a-service (PBaaS) economy. At least since 2016, Chinese-speaking criminal groups have erected industrial-scale scam centers across Southeast Asia, creating special economic zones that are devoted to fraudulent investment

### Affected Version(s) - CoreShop 4.1.2 Demo (tested) [Demo | CoreShop](https://docs.coreshop.com/CoreShop/Getting_Started/Demo/index.html) - Earlier versions may also be affected if the same code path exists ### Summary A blind SQL injection vulnerability exists in the application that allows an authenticated administrator-level user to extract database contents using boolean-based or time-based techniques. The database account used by the application is read-only and non-DBA, limiting impact to confidential data disclosure only. No data modification or service disruption is possible. ### Details The vulnerability occurs due to unsanitized user input being concatenated into a SQL query without proper parameterization. An attacker with administrative access can manipulate the affected parameter to influence the backend SQL query logic. Although no direct query output is returned, boolean and time-based inference techniques allow an attacker to extract data from the database. #...

### Summary Authenticated users with backup permissions can read arbitrary files within the webroot via path traversal in the Backup addon's file export functionality. <img width="664" height="899" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fd1ca69e-b275-4daf-9a62-621cde6525f5" /> <img width="2358" height="445" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fad81152-9e1b-413e-9823-09540a23e2fb" /> ### Details The Backup addon does not validate the `EXPDIR` POST parameter against the UI-generated allowlist of permitted directories. An attacker can supply relative paths containing `../` sequences (or even absolute paths inside the document root) to include any readable file in the generated `.tar.gz` archive. Vulnerable code: - `redaxo/src/addons/backup/pages/export.php` (lines 72-76) – directly uses `$_POST['EXPDIR']` - `redaxo/src/addons/backup/lib/backup.php` (lines ~413 & ~427) – concatenates unsanitized user input with base path This allows disclo...

Note that attackers must have administrator access to the Craft Control Panel for this to work. Users should update to the patched versions (5.8.21 and 4.16.17) to mitigate the issue. Resources: https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/6e608a1a5bfb36943f94f584b7548ca542a86fef https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/27f55886098b56c00ddc53b69239c9c9192252c7 https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/ec43c497edde0b2bf2e39a119cded2e55f9fe593 https://github.com/craftcms/cms/blob/5.x/CHANGELOG.md#5821---2025-12-04 ### Summary This was reported as a vulnerability in Yii framework on August 7th (https://github.com/yiisoft/yii2/security/advisories/GHSA-gcmh-9pjj-7fp4). The Yii framework team denies responsibility for this (placing the onus on application developers) and hence has not (and seemingly will not) provide a fix at the framework level. Hence, I am reporting this to Craft as I found it to affect the latest (`5.6.0`) version of Craft CMS. Leveraging a legitimate but maliciously crafte...

Unauthenticated users can trigger database backup operations via specific admin actions, potentially leading to resource exhaustion or information disclosure. Users should update to the patched versions (5.8.21 and 4.16.17) to mitigate the issue. Craft 3 users should update to the latest Craft 4 and 5 releases, which include the fixes. Resources: https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/f83d4e0c6b906743206b4747db4abf8164b8da39 https://github.com/craftcms/cms/blob/5.x/CHANGELOG.md#5821---2025-12-04 ## Affected Endpoints - `POST /admin/actions/app/migrate` (unauthenticated) - `POST /admin/actions/updater/backup` ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause Certain admin actions are explicitly configured with anonymous access: ```php // AppController.php protected array|bool|int $allowAnonymous = [ 'migrate' => self::ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_LIVE | self::ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_OFFLINE, // ... ]; // BaseUpdaterController.php protected array|bool|int $allowAnonymous = self::ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_L...

The Craft CMS GraphQL `save_<VolumeName>_Asset` mutation is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability arises because the `_file` input, specifically its `url` parameter, allows the server to fetch content from arbitrary remote locations without proper validation. Attackers can exploit this by providing internal IP addresses or cloud metadata endpoints as the `url`, forcing the server to make requests to these restricted services. The fetched content is then saved as an asset, which can subsequently be accessed and exfiltrated, leading to potential data exposure and infrastructure compromise. This exploitation requires specific GraphQL permissions for asset management within the targeted volume. Users should update to the patched 5.8.21 and 4.16.17 releases to mitigate the issue. References: https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/013db636fdb38f3ce5657fd196b6d952f98ebc52 https://github.com/craftcms/cms/blob/5.x/CHANGELOG.md#5821---2025-12-04 --- ### Requi...

### Summary An Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerability in the customer order reorder function allows any authenticated customer to add items from another customer's order to their own shopping cart by manipulating the order ID parameter. This exposes sensitive purchase information and enables potential fraud. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the reorder method within OrderController.php. Unlike other order-related functions like view, cancel, printInvoice that properly validate customer ownership, the reorder function retrieves orders using only the order ID without verifying that the order belongs to the authenticated customer. Code location: `packages/Webkul/Shop/src/Http/Controllers/Customer/Account/OrderController.php` Exposed Route: `packages/Webkul/Shop/src/Routes/customer-routes.php` ```php Route::get('reorder/{id}', 'reorder')->name('shop.customers.account.orders.reorder'); ``` ### PoC I. Create victim account and place an order. II. Login as attacker. III...

### Vulnerable Code **File:** `packages/Ibkul/Installer/src/Routes/Ib.php` ``` <?php use Illuminate\\Session\\Middleware\\StartSession; use Illuminate\\Support\\Facades\\Route; use Ibkul\\Installer\\Http\\Controllers\\InstallerController; Route::middleware(\['Ib', 'installer\_locale'\])-\>group(function () { Route::controller(InstallerController::class)-\>group(function () { Route::get('install', 'index')-\>name('installer.index'); Route::middleware(StartSession::class)-\>prefix('install/api')-\>group(function () { Route::post('env-file-setup', 'envFileSetup')-\>name('installer.env\_file\_setup'); Route::post('run-migration', 'runMigration')-\>name('installer.run\_migration')-\>withoutMiddleware('Ib'); Route::post('run-seeder', 'runSeeder')-\>name('installer.run\_seeder')-\>withoutMiddleware('Ib'); Route::get('download-sample', 'downloadSample')-\>name('installer.download\_sample')-\>withoutMiddlew...